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READER’S GUIDE TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN
AND PENNSYLVANIA CODE
Pennsylvania Bulletin
The Pennsylvania Bulletin is the official gazette of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is published
every week and includes a table of contents. A
cumulative subject matter index is published quar-
terly.
The Pennsylvania Bulletin serves several pur-
poses. First, it is the temporary supplement to the
Pennsylvania Code, which is the official codification
of agency rules and regulations and other statuto-
rily authorized documents. Changes in the codified
text, whether by adoption, amendment, repeal or
emergency action must be published in the Pennsyl-
vania Bulletin. Further, agencies proposing changes
to the codified text do so in the Pennsylvania
Bulletin.
Second, the Pennsylvania Bulletin also publishes:
Governor’s Executive Orders; State Contract No-
tices; Summaries of Enacted Statutes; Statewide
and Local Court Rules; Attorney General Opinions;
Motor Carrier Applications before the Public Utility
Commission; Applications and Actions before the
Department of Environmental Protection; Orders of
the Independent Regulatory Review Commission;
and other documents authorized by law.
The text of certain documents published in the
Pennsylvania Bulletin is the only valid and enforce-
able text. Courts are required to take judicial notice
of the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
There are no restrictions on the republication of
official documents appearing in the Pennsylvania
Bulletin.
Adoption, Amendment or Repeal of
Regulations
Generally an agency wishing to adopt, amend or
repeal regulations must first publish in the Pennsyl-
vania Bulletin a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
There are limited instances where the agency may
omit the proposal step; they still must publish the
adopted version.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contains the
full text of the change, the agency contact person, a
fiscal note required by law and background for the
action.
The agency then allows sufficient time for public
comment before taking final action. An adopted
proposal must be published in the Pennsylvania
Bulletin before it can take effect. If the agency
wishes to adopt changes to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to enlarge the scope, they must re-
propose.
Citation to the Pennsylvania Bulletin
Cite material in the Pennsylvania Bulletin by
volume number and page number. Example: Volume
1, Pennsylvania Bulletin, page 801 (short form: 1
Pa.B. 801).
Pennsylvania Code
The Pennsylvania Code is the official codification
of rules and regulations issued by Commonwealth
agencies and other statutorily authorized docu-
ments. The Pennsylvania Bulletin is the temporary
supplement to the Pennsylvania Code, printing
changes as soon as they occur. These changes are
then permanently codified by the Pennsylvania
Code Reporter, a monthly, loose-leaf supplement.
The Pennsylvania Code is cited by title number
and section number. Example: Title 10 Pennsylva-
nia Code, § 1.1 (short form: 10 Pa.Code § 1.1).
Under the Pennsylvania Code codification system,
each regulation is assigned a unique number by
title and section. Titles roughly parallel the organi-
zation of Commonwealth government. Title 1 Penn-
sylvania Code lists every agency and its correspond-
ing Code title location.
How to Find Documents
Search for your area of interest in the Pennsylva-
nia Code.
The Pennsylvania Code contains, as Finding Aids,
subject indexes for the complete Code and for each
individual title, a list of Statutes Used As Authority
for Adopting Rules and a list of annotated cases.
Source Notes give you the history of the documents.
To see if there have been recent changes, not yet
codified, check the List of Pennsylvania Code Chap-
ters Affected in the most recent issue of the Penn-
sylvania Bulletin.
The Pennsylvania Bulletin also publishes a quar-
terly List of Pennsylvania Code Sections Affected
which lists the regulations in numerical order,
followed by the citation to the Pennsylvania Bulle-
tin in which the change occurred.
SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION: (717) 766-0211
GENERAL INFORMATION AND FINDING AIDS: (717) 783-1530
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Printing Format
Material proposed to be added to an existing rule or regulation is printed in bold face and material proposed to be
deleted from such a rule or regulation is enclosed in brackets [ ] and printed in bold face. Asterisks indicate ellipsis
of Pennsylvania Code text retained without change. Proposed new or additional regulations are printed in ordinary style
face.
Fiscal Notes
Section 612 of The Administrative Code of 1929 (71 P. S. § 232) requires that the Office of Budget prepare a fiscal
note for regulatory actions and administrative procedures of the administrative departments, boards, commissions or
authorities receiving money from the State Treasury stating whether the proposed action or procedure causes a loss
of revenue or an increase in the cost of programs for the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions; that the fiscal note
be published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin at the same time as the proposed change is advertised; and that the fiscal
note shall provide the following information: (1) the designation of the fund out of which the appropriation providing for
expenditures under the action or procedure shall be made; (2) the probable cost for the fiscal year the program is
implemented; (3) projected cost estimate of the program for each of the five succeeding fiscal years; (4) fiscal history of
the program for which expenditures are to be made; (5) probable loss of revenue for the fiscal year of its
implementation; (6) projected loss of revenue from the program for each of the five succeeding fiscal years; (7) line item,
if any, of the General Appropriation Act or other appropriation act out of which expenditures or losses of Commonwealth
funds shall occur as a result of the action or procedures; (8) recommendation, if any, of the Secretary
of the Budget and the reasons therefor.
The required information is published in the foregoing order immediately following the proposed change to which it
relates; the omission of an item indicates that the agency text of the fiscal note states that there is no information
available with respect thereto. In items (3) and (6) information is set forth for the first through fifth fiscal years; in that
order, following the year the program is implemented, which is stated. In item (4) information is set forth for the
current and two immediately preceding years, in that order. In item (8) the recommendation, if any, made by the
Secretary of Budget is published with the fiscal note. See 4 Pa. Code § 7.231 et seq. Where ‘‘no fiscal impact’’ is
published, the statement means no additional cost or revenue loss to the Commonwealth or its local political subdivision
is intended.
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List of Pa. Code Chapters Affected
The following numerical guide is a list of the chapters of each title of the Pennsylvania Code affected by documents
published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin during 1997.
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61 Pa. Code (Revenue)
Proposed Rulemaking
31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 933
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67 Pa. Code (Transportation)
Adopted Rules
476 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1352
201 Pa. Code
Adopted Rules
7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 794
204 Pa. Code (Judicial System General Provisions)
Adopted Rules
71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .795, 796
73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
89 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
211 (with correction) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
303 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1252
Proposed Rulemaking
303 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
207 Pa. Code (Judicial Conduct)
Adopted Rules
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1010
210 Pa. Code (Appellate Procedure)
Adopted Rules
65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715
67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282
225 Pa. Code (Rules of Evidence)
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1282
231 Pa. Code (Rules of Civil Procedure)
Adopted Rules
200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
1900 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 715
1910 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
Proposed Rulemaking
200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
1000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
4000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
249 Pa. Code (Philadelphia Rules)
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 926
252 (Allegheny County Rules)
Unclassified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 581
255 Pa. Code (Local Court Rules)
Unclassified . . . . . . . 8, 12, 16, 17, 188, 294, 412, 583, 584,
723, 727, 798, 1011, 1152
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THE GOVERNOR
GOVERNOR’S OFFICE
Proclamation of Disaster Emergency
March 5, 1997
Whereas, investigations made at my direction have disclosed that a
massive tire fire has occurred at the EZ Recycling facility in the City of
Washington, on or about February 27, 1997, which has resulted in the
release of large quantities of toxic pollutants into the atmosphere and onto
the ground and has caused the evacuation of persons residing in the City of
Washington and the closure of a nearby school; and
Whereas, the tire fire has the potential for causing additional damage and
the loss of essential services to affected areas of Washington County as a
result of possible water supply pollution and other long-term environmental
impacts; and
Whereas, the tire fire and resulting pollution has by investigation been
found to seriously affect the safety, health, and welfare of a substantial
number of citizens of the Commonwealth, and has been of such magnitude
or severity as to render essential the Commonwealth’s supplementation of
county and local efforts and resources;
Now, Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7301(c) of the
Emergency Management Services Code (35 Pa.C.S.A. Section 7101 et seq.), I
do hereby proclaim the existence of a disaster emergency in the affected
areas of Washington County.
Further, I do hereby transfer unused appropriated funds to the Pennsyl-
vania Emergency Management Agency as deemed appropriate to meet the
exigencies of the emergency. The aforementioned funds shall be utilized for
disaster-related expenses incurred by various state agencies and depart-
ments as I shall direct. These funds shall be credited to a special account
established by the Office of Budget; and
Further, I direct that the Secretaries of Environmental Protection and
Health be prepared to conduct a damage assessment of the affected areas to
determine the magnitude and severity of individual and public damage
resulting from the tire fire and falling within the functional responsibilities
of these departments. The overall state damage assessment will be coordi-
nated by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency to which
individual departmental damage assessment data will be provided for
possible further submission to federal or other appropriate authorities; and
Further, I direct that the emergency response and recovery aspects of the
Commonwealth and all applicable county, municipal, and other plans be
activated and that all state, county, and municipal actions taken to
implement those plans be coordinated through the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency; and
Still Further, I do hereby urge the governing bodies and executive officers
of all stricken subdivisions of the Commonwealth immediately to act as
necessary to meet the current exigencies as legally authorized under this
Proclamation, namely, by the employment of temporary workers, by the
rental of equipment, and by entering into such contracts and agreements as
may be required to meet the emergency, all without regard to those time-
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consuming procedures and formalities normally prescribed by law, manda-
tory constitutional requirements excepted.
Given under my hand and the Seal of
the Governor, at the city of Harris-
burg, this fifth day of March in the
year of our Lord, one thousand nine
hundred and ninety-seven and of
the Commonwealth, the two hun-
dred and twenty-first.
Governor
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-399. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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THE COURTS
Title 204—JUDICIAL
SYSTEM GENERAL
PROVISIONS
PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING
[204 PA. CODE CH. 303]
Adoption of Sentencing Guidelines
The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing is hereby
submitting revised sentencing guidelines, (204 Pa. Code
§ 303.1—§ 303.18) for consideration by the General As-
sembly. The Commission adopted the revised sentencing
guidelines on June 6, 1996, published them for comment
at 26 Pa.B. 3404 (July 20, 1996), and held public hearings
on August 29, 1996, September 4, 1996 and September 6,
1996. The Commission modified the proposed guidelines
on December 5, 1996, published them for comment at 27
Pa.B. 289 (January 18, 1997), and held a public hearing
on February 21, 1997. Immediately following the public
hearing, the Commission adopted the revised sentencing
guidelines found in Annex A.
As specified by statute, the General Assembly has
ninety days from the date of this publication [March 15,
1997] to review the revisions to the sentencing guidelines
(42 Pa.C.S. § 2155). Unless rejected by concurrent resolu-
tion during that period, these revised guidelines will
become effective on Friday, June 13, 1997 and will apply
to all offenses committed on or after that date.
SENATOR DAVID HECKLER
Chair
Commentary on Annex A
Reasons for Changes to the Guidelines
After an extensive multi-year review of the guidelines,
a revised set of sentencing guidelines became effective on
August 12, 1994. The Commission is proposing changes to
these sentencing guidelines for the following reasons.
First, there were concerns brought to the attention of the
Commission that the revised recommendations for violent
offenders, particularly for repeat violent offenders, were
not harsh enough. The Commission evaluated this issue
and agreed that some violent offenders warranted more
severe sentences than the current guidelines recommend.
The second reason for changing the guidelines is to
address the new legislation passed since the revised
guidelines took effect. In January, 1995, Governor Tom
Ridge convened a Special Session on Crime [Special
Session No. 1] that, along with the regular legislative
session [1995-1996 Session], resulted in the passage of a
number of new laws. One of the most notable was the
adoption of the ‘3 strikes’ legislation that revised the
mandatory sentences for violent offenders. The Commis-
sion is proposing changes that provide some consistency
between the ‘3 strikes’ legislation and the guidelines. The
third reason for some of the proposed changes is to
address areas of inconsistency in the guidelines. The
proposed changes provide better consistency in how of-
fenses are viewed with respect to Offense Gravity Score
ranking (OGS) and Prior Record Score (PRS) calculations.
Revisions to Sentence Recommendations
1. More severe sentences for violent offenders. The cur-
rent guidelines focus on providing harsher penalties for
violent offenders while recommending community based
alternatives for certain non-violent offenders. However,
concerns have been raised that the sentences for certain
violent offenders, particularly repeat violent offenders,
are not harsh enough. The Commission re-evaluated the
recommendations for violent offenders and decided that
the concerns were justified and thus, is proposing more
severe sentence recommendations for violent offenders.
Some of the violent offenses have been re-ranked in order
to address this issue. The Commission is also proposing
harsher sentence recommendations in response to legisla-
tive changes that increased the statutory limit for Murder
3 and inchoate murder (attempts, solicitations and con-
spiracies) and that re-drafted the sexual assault statute.
2. ‘3 strikes’ offenses. In 1995 the legislature passed,
and the Governor signed, a ‘3 strikes’ statute that
provides harsher mandatory penalties for certain violent
offenders. To provide some consistency between the ‘3
strikes’ legislation and the guideline recommendations,
the Commission decided to include the offenses desig-
nated as ‘‘crimes of violence’’ in the ‘3 strikes’ legislation
in the upper tier of the guidelines that recommend state
incarceration in all cases. The major change involves
assigning a higher Offense Gravity Score ranking to the
offense of Burglary (structure adapted for overnight
accommodation/person present) so that it is ranked in the
upper tier of the guidelines with the most serious of-
fenses.
3. More severe sentences for Repeat Felony 1/Felony 2
(RFEL) offenders. The current guidelines include a Prior
Record Score category for Repeat Felony 1/Felony 2
(RFEL) offenders. This category was created to isolate the
more serious felony offenders. The Commission is propos-
ing an increase in sentence recommendations for such
offenders.
4. Revision of RS-RIP cells. The current guideline
recommendation for four cells of the matrix is RS-RIP
(i.e.—sentence recommendations limited to restorative
sanctions and restrictive intermediate punishments),
which recommends up to 30 days in a restrictive interme-
diate punishment program but does not recommend incar-
ceration. The Commission proposes that these recommen-
dations be changed to RS-1, thus expanding the cells to
include 30 days of incarceration. This is consistent with
Commission policy that has established a rough equiva-
lency between restrictive intermediate punishment and
incarceration in areas of the matrix that allow for
incarceration. That is, the maximum length of time in an
RIP program is the same as the maximum length of
confinement. Allowing 30 days of incarceration also pro-
vides more flexibility for counties that do not have
Intermediate Punishment sentencing authority or re-
sources to support RIP programs.
5. Expand sentencing levels. Current guidelines provide
four sentencing levels which target certain types of
offenders and describe sentencing options available for
each level. The proposed guidelines increase to five the
number of sentencing levels. Previous Level 4 is proposed
as Level 5, and the newly proposed Level 4 generally
includes those offenders who by statute are permitted to
serve a state sentence in a county facility.
6. Limit Level 1 recommendations. Current guidelines
provide a standard sentence recommendation of RS for
offenders with an OGS of 1 or 2 and PRS of 0 or 1. The
proposed guidelines would continue to provide RS as a
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standard recommendation for offenders who have an
OGS=1 or 2 and PRS=0, but would expand the recommen-
dations for offenders with a PRS=1 to include an incar-
ceration option.
7. Permit Level 4 RIP exchange. Currently, the guide-
lines allow for an exchange of RIP for certain offenders
who would otherwise receive a county jail sentence (i.e.
maximum sentence under two years and minimum sen-
tence under one year). The proposed change would allow
an RIP exchange for certain state offenders who are
eligible to serve their sentence in a county jail (i.e.
maximum sentence under five years and minimum sen-
tence under 2.5 years). This proposed change is indicated
by the dark grey areas of the grid and referenced as Level
4.
8. Deadly Weapon Enhancement (DWE). Statute re-
quires the guidelines to provide for enhanced sentences if
the offender possessed a deadly weapon during the com-
mission of the offense. Currently the amount of time is
based upon the seriousness of the offense. The Commis-
sion is proposing that the DWE also make a distinction
between offenders who use vs. possess the weapon during
the commission of the offense.
Revisions to the Offense Gravity Score
1. Redefine OGS categories. The Commission is propos-
ing an increase in the number of Offense Gravity Score
categories from thirteen to fourteen. Included in this
increase are two additional categories in the upper tier of
the guidelines where recommendations are limited to
state incarceration and one less Offense Gravity Score
category in the area of the guidelines where recommenda-
tions are generally limited to county incarceration.
2. New/Amended Offenses. Legislation passed since the
last adoption of sentencing guidelines [May 1994] and the
end of the 1996 Session [December 1996] created new
offenses or amended previously existing offenses. Addi-
tionally, due to the changes in the Offense Gravity Score
categories, a number of offenses previously assigned OGS
scores have been changed. The proposed OGS and PRS
assignment for offenses considered by the Commission are
included as part of the text of the proposed guidelines.
3. Omnibus Offense Gravity Score Policy. The Commis-
sion has a policy that provides for an Omnibus Offense
Gravity Score to be applied to new offenses or offenses
that have a change in the statutory grading. The omnibus
score, which is based upon the statutory grade of the
offense, remains in place until the Commission has the
opportunity to rank the offense. Recently, however, the
General Assembly increased the statutory grading of
some offenses (e.g. attempted murder was changed from a
felony 2 to a felony 1) that ended up resulting in a lower
recommendation based upon the omnibus score. The
Commission is proposing a change to the omnibus policy
to assure that when the statutory grading for an offense
is raised, that the omnibus score for the offense does not
result in a lower score, and thus lower recommendation,
than what currently exists.
Revisions to the Prior Record Score
1. Assignment of points. The Commission is proposing
changes in how offenses are counted for the purposes of
the Prior Record Score (PRS). These changes provide
better consistency between how these offenses are
counted in the Prior Record Score and how they are
ranked for the Offense Gravity Score. Under the proposal,
4 points are assigned to all completed ‘‘three strikes’’
offenses. Some of these violent offenses, in particular
Arson (F1) and Robbery (F1) are subcategorized for Prior
Record Score purposes. Three points are assigned to all
inchoates of 4 point offenses, certain drug felonies involv-
ing 50 grams or more, and all F1 offenses not otherwise
designated. Two points are assigned to the remaining
drug felonies and all F2 offenses not otherwise desig-
nated. One point is assigned to all F3 offenses, and an
expanded list of designated Misdemeanor 1 offenses. The
M1 offenses, chosen due to the serious nature of the
offenses, fall into three categories: M1 offenses involving
weapons, M1 offenses involving death or danger to chil-
dren, and M1 Driving Under the Influence. All other
misdemeanors, including M2 or M3 weapons misdemean-
ors, are designated as ‘‘Other Misdemeanors’’ and scored
collectively based upon the total number of misdemeanors
involved.
2. Prior juvenile offenses. The Commission is proposing
two changes concerning the use of prior juvenile adjudica-
tions. First, in accordance with the recent legislative
change that allows prior juvenile adjudications to be
considered in the sentencing for misdemeanor offenses
(Act 13 of 1995), the Commission is proposing a change to
the juvenile adjudication criteria that would also allow
prior juvenile offenses to count when the currently sen-
tenced offense is either a felony or misdemeanor. Cur-
rently, they can only count when the current offense is a
felony. Second, the Commission is proposing a change to
the juvenile lapsing provision that includes the completed
‘3-strikes’ offenses (i.e.—4 point PRS offenses) in the list
of juvenile offenses that would never lapse for the
purposes of Prior Record Score calculation.
3. Former Pennsylvania offenses. The Commission is
proposing several changes in Prior Record Score miscella-
neous provisions. The first proposal is to reinsert in the
text a phrase contained in the 1991 guidelines but
inadvertently omitted from the 1994 guidelines: ‘‘When a
prior conviction is for a crime which has a summary
grade, and the grade of the conviction is unknown, the
prior conviction shall not be counted in the Prior Record
Score.’’
4. Excluded offenses. The Commission also proposes a
change to the policy regarding excluded offenses. The
current policy holds that if a previous conviction increases
the maximum sentence applicable to the current offense,
the previous conviction is excluded from calculation of the
Prior Record Score. The proposal changes the text by
replacing maximum sentence applicable to the current
offense with grade of a subsequent offense, a phrase
similar to that used in the original text of the guidelines.
The original text was revised in 1986, primarily to
accommodate drug convictions. However, the text was
revised again in 1988, at which time the drug convictions
were excluded from the policy. This proposal simplifies
the policy by returning to the original term. The proposal
would also extend the policy so that any previous convic-
tion that increases the grade of an offense, either a
current or previous offense, would be excluded from
calculation of the Prior Record Score. This proposal
removes the ‘double counting’ of a conviction, which was
the premise of this policy.
Definition of Transaction
The current guidelines utilize the concept of transaction
to determine how the prior record is applied to multiple
offenses and how current multiple offenses are counted in
future Prior Record Scores. The definition of transaction
is important as it influences current and future sentence
recommendations. The current definition of transaction
has resulted in confusion in the field and has been
interpreted in different ways among the counties. Thus,
the Commission proposes deleting the current definition
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of transaction and adopting a policy which considers each
conviction separately and takes into account the sentence
previously imposed in determining the Prior Record
Score. Under the proposal, all prior convictions are
counted in the Prior Record Score, except those which did
not increase a term of probation, intermediate punish-
ment, partial or total confinement. In determining the
sentence recommendation, the Prior Record Score is
attached to each conviction offense.
Guideline recommendations for Driving Under the Influ-
ence (DUI) and Homicide by Vehicle while DUI
Currently, the only two offenses that do not have an
Offense Gravity Score (OGS) assigned to them are Driv-
ing Under the Influence (75 Pa.C.S. § 3731) and Homi-
cide by Vehicle while DUI (75 Pa.C.S. § 3735). The
guideline recommendation for these two offenses has
always been application of the mandatory statute govern-
ing them. The proposed change would assign an OGS = 2
to Driving Under the Influence when it is a M2 (1st or
2nd conviction) and an OGS = 3 when it is a M1 (3rd or
subsequent conviction). An OGS = 8 would be assigned to
Homicide by Vehicle while DUI. As always, any manda-
tory statute governing these offenses would supersede the
guideline recommendations.
The Commission also is proposing the elimination of
the subcategorization of DUI according to whether there
is serious bodily injury or not, in light of the new offense
of Aggravated Assault by Vehicle while DUI. The pro-
posed OGS scores for Homicide by Vehicle and Involun-
tary Manslaughter when there is also a conviction for
DUI were raised to be consistent with the recommenda-
tion for Aggravated Assault.
It should be noted that with incorporation of DUI into
the sentencing guidelines, the Prior Record Score, based
on previous DUI and non-DUI offenses, will be used to
determine a sentence recommendation for a current con-
viction for DUI.
Multiple offenses overlapping different guidelines
Current guideline policy states that the guidelines
apply to offenses that occur on or after the effective date
of the guidelines. When there are amendments to the
guidelines, offenses that occur before the effective date of
the amendments are subject to the prior guidelines, while
offenses that occur after the effective date of the amend-
ments are subject to the new guidelines. When there are
multiple offenses and the dates of the offenses are
unknown, there has been no guideline policy. Thus, the
Commission is proposing a policy that would indicate that
the most recent guidelines apply if the specific dates are
undetermined.
Technical changes
The Commission proposes three technical changes to
the guidelines: 1) a clarification that the guidelines do
apply to persons who plead guilty or nolo contendere, not
just to persons found guilty through trial; 2) that the
Guideline Sentence Form be submitted to the Commission
within 30 days, rather than 20 days, of sentencing; and 3)
clarification that the original guidelines were effective
July 22, 1982 and were invalidated due to a procedural
technicality, but that new guidelines did become effective
again April 25, 1988.
Annex A
TITLE 204. JUDICIAL SYSTEM GENERAL
PROVISIONS
PART VIII. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
CHAPTER 303. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 303.1. Sentencing guidelines standards.
(a) The court shall consider the sentencing guidelines
in determining the appropriate sentence for offenders
convicted of, or pleading guilty or nolo contendere to,
felonies and misdemeanors.
(b) The sentencing guidelines do not apply to sentences
imposed as a result of the following: accelerated rehabili-
tative disposition; disposition in lieu of trial; direct or
indirect contempt of court; violations of protection from
abuse orders; revocation of probation, intermediate pun-
ishment or parole.
(c) The sentencing guidelines shall apply to all offenses
committed on or after the effective date of the guidelines.
Amendments to the guidelines shall apply to all offenses
committed on or after the date the amendment becomes
part of the guidelines.
(1) When there are current multiple convictions for
offenses that overlap two sets of guidelines, the former
guidelines shall apply to offenses that occur prior to the
effective date of the amendment and the later guidelines
shall apply to offenses that occur on or after the effective
date of the amendment. If the specific dates of the
offenses cannot be determined, then the later guidelines
shall apply to all offenses.
(2) The initial sentencing guidelines went into effect on
July 22, 1982 and applied to all crimes committed on or
after that date. Amendments to the guidelines went into
effect in June 1983, January 1986 and June 1986. On
October 7, 1987 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invali-
dated the guidelines due to a procedural error that
occurred in 1981 when the legislature rejected the first
set of guidelines. New guidelines were drafted and be-
came effective on April, 25, 1988. Amendments to the
guidelines went into effect August 9, 1991 and December
20, 1991. A revised set of guidelines became effective
August 12, 1994. The current set of guidelines become
effective June 13, 1997.
(d) In every case in which the court imposes a sentence
for a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall make as a
part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time
of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the
sentence imposed. In every case where the court imposes
a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines, the court
shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the
reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines.
These reasons shall be recorded on the Guideline Sen-
tence Form, a copy of which is forwarded to the Commis-
sion on Sentencing.
(e) A Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing Guide-
line Sentence Form shall be completed at the court’s
direction and shall be made a part of the record no later
than 30 days after the date of each sentencing and a copy
shall be forwarded to the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing.
§ 303.2. Procedure for determining the guideline
sentence.
(a) The procedure for determining the guideline sen-
tence shall be as follows:
(1) Determine the Offense Gravity Score as described
in §§ 303.3 and 303.15.
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(2) Determine the Prior Record Score as described in
§§ 303.4—303.8.
(3) Determine the guideline sentence recommendation
as described in §§ 303.9—303.14, including Deadly
Weapon Enhancement and Youth/School Enhancement
(§ 303.10), and aggravating or mitigating circumstances
(§ 303.13).
§ 303.3. Offense gravity score—general.
(a) An Offense Gravity Score is given for each offense.
The Offense Gravity Scores are located in § 303.15.
(b) Subcategorized offenses. Certain offenses are
subcategorized and scored by the Commission according
to the particular circumstances of the offense. The court
determines which Offense Gravity Score, located in
§ 303.15, applies. These offenses are designated by an
asterisk [*].
(c) Inchoate offenses. Inchoate offenses are scored as
follows:
(1) Convictions for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy
to commit a Felony 1 offense receive an Offense Gravity
Score of one point less than the offense attempted,
solicited, or which was the object of the conspiracy.
(2) Convictions for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy
to commit any offense which is not a Felony 1 offense,
receive the Offense Gravity Score of the offense at-
tempted, solicited, or which was the object of the con-
spiracy.
(3) Convictions for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy
to commit any offense under The Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (35 P. S. §§ 780-101—780-
144) receive the Offense Gravity Score of the offense
attempted, solicited, or which was the object of the
conspiracy.
(4) Exception for inchoate murder convictions. Convic-
tions for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit
murder receive the Offense Gravity Score of 14 if there is
serious bodily injury and 13 if there is no serious bodily
injury.
(d) Ethnic Intimidation. Convictions for Ethnic Intimi-
dation (18 Pa. C.S. § 2710) receive an Offense Gravity
Score that is one point higher than the offense which was
the object of the Ethnic Intimidation. When the object
offense is Murder of the Third Degree, a conviction for
Ethnic Intimidation receives the highest Offense Gravity
Score.
(e) Violations of The Controlled Substance, Drug, De-
vice and Cosmetic Act (35 P. S. §§ 780-101—780-144). If
any mixture or compound contains any detectable amount
of a controlled substance, the entire amount of the
mixture or compound shall be deemed to be composed of
the controlled substance. If a mixture or compound
contains a detectable amount of more than one controlled
substance, the mixture or compound shall be deemed to
be composed entirely of the controlled substance which
has the highest Offense Gravity Score.
(1) Exception for prescription pills. The exception to
subsection (e) above is for violations of 35 P. S. § 780-113
(a)(12) (relating to fraudulent prescriptions) when pre-
scription pills of Schedule II are involved. For such
violations it is the number of pills rather than the
amount of the controlled substance which is considered in
determining the Offense Gravity Score. (See § 303.15.)
(f) Omnibus Offense Gravity Scores. The Omnibus Of-
fense Gravity Score is applied when the offense is not
otherwise listed in § 303.15, or when the grade of an
offense listed in § 303.15 has changed, unless application
of this section would result in a lower Offense Gravity
Score for an increased grading of the offense. The Omni-
bus Offense Gravity Scores are provided below and in the
listing at § 303.15:
Felony 1 8
Felony 2 7
Felony 3 5
Felonies not subclassified
by the General Assembly
5
Misdemeanor 1 3
Misdemeanor 2 2
Misdemeanor 3 1
Misdemeanors not subclassified
by the General Assembly
1
§ 303.4. Prior Record Score—categories.
(a) Prior Record Score categories. Determination of the
correct Prior Record Score category under this section is
based on the type and number of prior convictions
(§ 303.5) and prior juvenile adjudications (§ 303.6).
There are eight Prior Record Score categories: Repeat
Violent Offender [REVOC], Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2
Offender [RFEL], and point-based categories of 0, 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5.
(1) Repeat Violent Offender Category [REVOC]. Offend-
ers who have two or more previous convictions or adjudi-
cations for four point offenses (§ 303.7(a)(1) and
§ 303.15) and whose current conviction carries an Offense
Gravity Score of 9 or higher shall be classified in the
Repeat Violent Offender Category.
(2) Repeat Felony 1/Felony 2 Offender Category
[RFEL]. Offenders who have previous convictions or
adjudications for Felony 1 and/or Felony 2 offenses which
total 6 or more in the prior record, and who do not fall
within the Repeat Violent Offender Category, shall be
classified in the repeat Felony 1/Felony 2 Offender Cat-
egory.
(3) Point-based Categories (0-5). Offenders who do not
fall into the REVOC or RFEL categories shall be classi-
fied in a Point-based Category. The Prior Record Score
shall be the sum of the points accrued based on previous
convictions or adjudications, up to a maximum of five
points.
§ 303.5. Prior Record Score—prior convictions.
(a) All prior convictions shall be counted in the Prior
Record Score, except certain prior convictions from sen-
tences described in (b).
(b) When a sentence for a prior conviction was imposed
totally concurrent to another sentence, or was served
totally concurrent to another sentence, only the conviction
with the greatest number of points under § 303.7 shall be
counted.
(c) Totally concurrent. A conviction is considered totally
concurrent if the sentence imposed did not increase the
term of probation, intermediate punishment, partial or
total confinement of any sentence.
§ 303.6. Prior Record Score—prior juvenile adjudi-
cations.
(a) Juvenile adjudication criteria. Prior juvenile adjudi-
cations are counted in the Prior Record Score when the
following criteria are met:
(1) The juvenile offense occurred on or after the offend-
er’s 14th birthday, and
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(2) There was an express finding by the juvenile court
that the adjudication was for a felony or one of the
Misdemeanor 1 offenses listed in § 303.7(a)(4).
(b) Only the most serious juvenile adjudication of each
prior disposition is counted in the Prior Record Score. No
other prior juvenile adjudication shall be counted in the
Prior Record Score.
(c) Lapsing of juvenile adjudications. Prior juvenile
adjudications for four point offenses listed in § 303.7(a)(1)
shall always be included in the Prior Record Score,
provided the criteria in subsection (a) above are met:
(1) All other juvenile adjudications not identified above
in subsection (a) lapse and shall not be counted in the
Prior Record Score if the offender was 28 years of age or
older at the time the current offense was committed.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prevent the court from
considering lapsed prior adjudications at the time of
sentencing.
§ 303.7. Prior Record Score—guideline points scor-
ing.
(a) Scoring of prior convictions and adjudications is
provided below and in the listing of offenses at § 303.15:
(1) Four Point Offenses. Four points are added for each
prior conviction or adjudication for the following offenses:
Murder, and attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit
Murder
Voluntary Manslaughter
Drug Delivery Resulting in Death
Aggravated Assault (causing serious bodily injury)
Kidnapping
Rape
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse
Arson (resulting in bodily injury or a person inside at
start)
Burglary (adapted structure, person present)
Robbery (inflicts serious bodily injury)
Robbery of Motor Vehicle (inflicts serious bodily injury)
Ethnic Intimidation to any Felony 1 offense
(2) Three Point Offenses. Three points are added for
each prior conviction or adjudication for the following
offenses:
All other Felony 1 offenses not listed in § 303.7 (a)(1).
All inchoates to offenses listed in § 303.7 (a)(1).
Sexual Assault
Aggravated Indecent Assault
Violation of 35 P. S.§§ 780-113(a)(12)(14) or (30) involving
50 grams or more, including inchoates involving
50 grams or more.
(3) Two Point Offenses. Two points are added for each
prior conviction or adjudication for the following offenses:
All other Felony 2 offenses not listed in § 303.7 (a)(1)
or (a)(2).
All felony drug violations not listed in § 303.7 (a)(2),
including inchoates.
(4) One Point Offenses. One point is added for each
prior conviction or adjudication for the following offenses:
All other felony offenses not listed in § 303.7 (a)(1),
(a)(2) or (a)(3).
Any of the following Misdemeanor 1 offenses that
involve weapons:
Possessing Instruments of Crime
Prohibited Offensive Weapons
Possession of Weapon on School Property
Possession of Firearm or Other Dangerous Weapon in
Court Facility
Violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act
Any of the following Misdemeanor 1 offenses that
involve death or danger to children:
Involuntary Manslaughter
Simple Assault (against child by adult)
Luring a Child into a Vehicle
Indecent Assault (involving minors)
Indecent Exposure (person less than age 16 present)
Endangering Welfare of Children
Dealing in Infant Children
Corruption of Minors (of a sexual nature)
Homicide by Vehicle
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled
Substance when the grade is a Misdemeanor 1.
(5) Other Misdemeanor Offenses. All other misde-
meanor offenses are designated by an ‘‘m’’ in the offense
listing at § 303.15, and are scored as follows:
(i) One point is added if the offender was previously
convicted of two or three misdemeanors.
(ii) Two points are added if the offender was previously
convicted of four to six misdemeanors.
(iii) Three points are added if the offender was previ-
ously convicted of seven or more misdemeanors.
§ 303.8. Prior Record Score—miscellaneous.
(a) Prior convictions and adjudications of delinquency.
A prior conviction means ‘‘previously convicted’’ as defined
in 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154(a)(2). A prior adjudication of delin-
quency means ‘‘previously adjudicated delinquent’’ as
defined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154(a)(2). In order for an offense
to be considered in the Prior Record Score, both the
commission of and conviction for the previous offense
must occur before the commission of the current offense.
(b) Inchoate offenses. Unless otherwise provided in
§ 303.7 or § 303.15, a prior conviction or adjudication of
delinquency for criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or
criminal conspiracy is scored under § 303.7 based upon
the grade of the inchoate offense.
(c) Ethnic Intimidation. Unless otherwise provided in
§ 303.7 or § 303.15, a prior conviction or adjudication of
delinquency for Ethnic Intimidation is scored under
§ 303.7 based upon the grade of the Ethnic Intimidation.
(d) Former Pennsylvania offenses.
(1) A prior conviction or adjudication of delinquency
under former Pennsylvania law is scored as a conviction
for the current equivalent Pennsylvania offense.
(2) When there is no current equivalent Pennsylvania
offense, prior convictions or adjudications of delinquency
are scored under § 303.7 based on the grade of the
offense. When a prior conviction or adjudication of delin-
quency was for a felony, but the grade of the felony is
unknown, it shall be treated as a Felony 3. When a prior
conviction was for a misdemeanor, but the grade of the
misdemeanor is unknown, it shall be treated as a Misde-
meanor 3. When it cannot be determined if the prior
conviction was a felony or a misdemeanor, it shall be
treated as a Misdemeanor 3. When a prior conviction is
for a crime which has a summary grade, and the grade of
the conviction is unknown, the prior conviction shall not
be counted in the Prior Record Score.
(e) A prior conviction or adjudication of delinquency for
an offense which was misgraded is scored as a conviction
for the current equivalent Pennsylvania offense.
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(f) Out-of-state, federal or foreign offenses.
(1) An out-of-state, federal or foreign conviction or
adjudication of delinquency is scored as a conviction for
the current equivalent Pennsylvania offense.
(2) When there is no current equivalent Pennsylvania
offense, determine the current equivalent Pennsylvania
grade of the offense based on the maximum sentence
permitted, and then apply § 303.8(d)(2).
(g) Excluded offenses. The following types of offenses
shall not be scored in the Prior Record Score:
(1) Summary offenses, violations of local ordinances,
and dispositions under Pa.R.Crim.P. Rules 175-186 (relat-
ing to accelerated rehabilitative disposition), 35 P. S.
§ 780-117 (relating to probation without verdict) or 35
P. S. § 780-118 (relating to disposition in lieu of trial or
criminal punishment), shall not be used in computing the
Prior Record Score.
(2) Any prior conviction which contributed to an in-
crease in the grade of a subsequent conviction shall not
be used in computing the Prior Record Score.
§ 303.9. Guideline sentence recommendation: gen-
eral.
(a) Basic sentence recommendations. Guideline sen-
tence recommendations are based on the Offense Gravity
Score and Prior Record Score. In most cases, the sentence
recommendations are found in the Basic Sentencing
Matrix (§ 303.16). The Basic Sentencing Matrix specifies
a range of sentences (i.e.—standard range) that shall be
considered by the court for each combination of Offense
Gravity Score [OGS] and Prior Record Score [PRS].
(b) Deadly Weapon Enhancement sentence recommen-
dations. If the court determines that an offender pos-
sessed a deadly weapon pursuant to § 303.10(a)(1), the
court shall instead consider the DWE/Possessed Matrix
(§ 303.17). If the court determines that an offender used
a deadly weapon pursuant to § 303.10(a)(2), the court
shall instead consider the DWE/Used Matrix (§ 303.18).
Both enhanced matrices specify a range of sentences
(i.e.—standard range) that shall be considered by the
court for each combination of Offense Gravity Score
[OGS] and Prior Record Score [PRS].
(c) Youth/School Enhancement sentence recommenda-
tions. If the court determines that an offender violated
the drug act pursuant to § 303.10(b), 12 months shall be
added to the lower limit of the standard range of the
applicable sentencing matrix and 36 months shall be
added to the upper limit of the standard range of the
applicable sentencing matrix. The range of sentences
(i.e.— standard range) shall be considered by the court
for each combination of Offense Gravity Score [OGS] and
Prior Record Score [PRS].
(d) Aggravated and mitigated sentence recommenda-
tions. To determine the aggravated and mitigated sen-
tence recommendations, apply § 303.13.
(e) Numeric sentence recommendations. All numbers in
sentence recommendations suggest months of minimum
confinement pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9755(b) (partial
confinement) and § 9756(b) (total confinement).
(f) Alphabetic sentence recommendations. RS in the
sentence recommendation, an abbreviation for Restorative
Sanctions, suggests use of the least restrictive, non-
confinement sentencing alternatives described in 42
Pa.C.S. § 9753 (determination of guilt without further
penalty), § 9754 (order of probation) and § 9758 (fine),
and include § 9763 (intermediate punishment) when lim-
ited to restorative sanction programs (see § 303.12(a)(5)).
42 Pa.C.S.§ 9721(c) (mandatory restitution) is also in-
cluded in RS. No specific recommendations are provided
for periods of supervision or amounts of fines for these
non-confinement sentencing alternatives. RIP in the sen-
tence recommendation, an abbreviation for Restrictive
Intermediate Punishments, suggests use of Restrictive
Intermediate Punishments pursuant to § 303.12(a)(4).
(g) When the guideline sentence recommendation ex-
ceeds that permitted by 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103 and § 1104
(relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony and
misdemeanor) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9755(b) and § 9756(b)
(relating to sentence of partial and total confinement) or
other applicable statute setting the maximum term of
confinement, then the statutory limit is the longest
guideline sentence recommendation. For the purposes of
the guidelines, the statutory limit is the longest legal
minimum sentence, which is one-half the maximum al-
lowed by law.
(h) Mandatory sentences. The court has no authority to
impose a sentence less than that required by a mandatory
minimum provision established in statute. When the
guideline range is lower than that required by a manda-
tory sentencing statute, the mandatory minimum require-
ment supersedes the sentence recommendation. When the
sentence recommendation is higher than that required by
a mandatory sentencing statute, the court shall consider
the guideline sentence recommendation.
(i) Driving Under the Influence. The court shall con-
sider the sentence recommendations pursuant to this
section (§ 303.9) for an offender convicted under 75
Pa.C.S. § 3731 (Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or
Controlled Substance). The court may use a qualified
Restrictive Intermediate Punishment pursuant to
§ 303.12(a)(6) to satisfy the mandatory minimum require-
ment.
§ 303.10. Guideline sentence recommendations: en-
hancements.
(a) Deadly Weapon Enhancement.
(1) When the court determines that the offender pos-
sessed a deadly weapon during the commission of the
current conviction offense, the court shall consider the
DWE/Possessed Matrix (§ 303.17). An offender has pos-
sessed a deadly weapon if any of the following were on
the offender’s person or within his immediate physical
control:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9712)
whether loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in 18
Pa.C.S.§ 913), or
(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality de-
signed as a weapon or capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury where the court determines that the
defendant intended to use the weapon to threaten or
injure another individual.
(2) When the court determines that the offender used a
deadly weapon during the commission of the current
conviction offense, the court shall consider the DWE/Used
Matrix (§ 303.18). An offender has used a deadly weapon
if any of the following were employed by the offender in a
way that threatened or injured another individual or in
the furtherance of the crime:
(i) Any firearm, (as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9712)
whether loaded or unloaded, or
(ii) Any dangerous weapon (as defined in 18
Pa.C.S.§ 913), or
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(iii) Any device, implement, or instrumentality capable
of producing death or serious bodily injury.
(3) There shall be no Deadly Weapon Enhancement for
the following offenses:
Possessing Instruments of Crime
Prohibited Offensive Weapons
Possession of Weapon on School Property
Possession of Firearm or Other Dangerous Weapon in
Court Facility
Simple Assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(2))
Aggravated Assault (18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4))
Violations of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act
Any other offense for which possession of a deadly
weapon is an element of the statutory definition.
(4) The Deadly Weapon Enhancement shall apply to
each conviction offense for which a deadly weapon is
possessed or used.
(b) Youth/School Enhancement
(1) When the court determines that the offender either
distributed a controlled substance to a person or persons
under the age of 18 in violation of 35 P. S. § 780-114, or
manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to de-
liver a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a public or
private elementary or secondary school, the court shall
consider the range of sentences described in § 303.9(c).
(2) The Youth/School Enhancement only applies to vio-
lations of 35 P. S. § 780-113(a)(14) and (a)(30).
(3) The Youth/School Enhancement shall apply to each
violation which meets the criteria above.
§ 303.11. Guideline sentence recommendation: sen-
tencing levels.
(a) Purpose of sentence. In writing the sentencing
guidelines, the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
strives to provide a benchmark for the judges of Pennsyl-
vania. The sentencing guidelines provide sanctions pro-
portionate to the severity of the crime and the severity of
the offender’s prior conviction record. This establishes a
sentencing system with a primary focus on retribution,
but one in which the recommendations allow for the
fulfillment of other sentencing purposes including reha-
bilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation. To facilitate
consideration of sentencing options consistent with the
intent of the sentencing guidelines, the Commission has
established five sentencing levels. Each level targets
certain types of offenders, and describes ranges of sen-
tencing options available to the court.
(b) Sentencing levels. The sentencing level is based on
the standard range of the sentencing recommendation.
Refer to § 303.9 to determine which sentence recommen-
dation (i.e.—Basic, Deadly Weapon Enhancement or
Youth/School Enhancement) applies. The descriptions of
the five sentencing levels are as follows:
(1) Level 1—Level 1 provides sentence recommenda-
tions for the least serious offenders with no more than
one prior misdemeanor conviction, such that the standard
range is limited to Restorative Sanctions [RS]. The
primary purpose of this level is to provide the minimal
control necessary to fulfill court-ordered obligations. The
following sentencing option is available:
Restorative Sanctions (see § 303.9(f))
(2) Level 2—Level 2 provides sentence recommenda-
tions for generally non-violent offenders and those with
numerous less serious prior convictions, such that the
standard range requires a county sentence but permits
both incarceration and non-confinement. The standard
range is defined as having an upper limit of less than 12
months and a lower limit of Restorative Sanctions [RS].
The primary purposes of this level are control over the
offender and restitution to victims. Treatment is recom-
mended for drug dependent offenders. The following
sentencing options are available:
Total confinement in a county facility under a county
sentence (see 61 P. S. § 331.17).
Partial confinement in a county facility
Restrictive Intermediate Punishments (see § 303.12(a)
for eligibility criteria)
Restorative Sanctions (see § 303.9(f))
(3) Level 3—Level 3 provides sentence recommenda-
tions for serious offenders and those with numerous prior
convictions, such that the standard range requires incar-
ceration or a Restrictive Intermediate Punishment [RIP],
but in all case permits a county sentence. The standard
range is defined as having a lower limit of incarceration
of less than 12 months. The primary purposes of this
level are retribution and control over the offender. If
eligible, treatment is recommended for drug dependent
offenders in lieu of incarceration. The following sentenc-
ing options are available:
Total confinement in a state facility.
Total confinement in a state facility, with participation
in the State Motivational Boot Camp (see § 303.12(b)
for eligibility criteria)
Total confinement in a county facility under a state or
county sentence (see 61 P. S. § 331.17).
Partial confinement in a county facility.
Restrictive Intermediate Punishment (see § 303.12(a)
for eligibility criteria)
(4) Level 4—Level 4 provides sentence recommenda-
tions for very serious offenders and those with numerous
prior convictions, such that the standard range requires
state incarceration but permits it to be served in a county
facility. The standard range is defined as having a lower
limit of incarceration of greater than 12 months but less
than 30 months, but limited to offenses with an Offense
Gravity Score of less than 9. The primary purposes of the
sentencing options at this level are punishment and
incapacitation. However, it is recognized that certain
offenders at this level are permitted to serve a sentence of
total confinement in a county facility, and some non-
violent offenders may benefit from drug and alcohol
treatment. The following sentencing options are available:
Total confinement in a state facility.
Total confinement in a state facility, with participation
in the State Motivational Boot Camp (see § 303.12(b)
for eligibility criteria)
Total confinement in a county facility as a state
offender. (see 61 P. S. § 331.17).
Restrictive Intermediate Punishment (see § 303.12.(a)
for eligibility criteria)
(5) Level 5—Level 5 provides sentence recommenda-
tions for the most violent offenders and those with major
drug convictions, such that the conviction has an Offense
Gravity Score of 9 or greater or the standard range
requires state incarceration in a state facility. The stan-
dard range in such a case is defined as having a lower
limit of 30 months or greater. The primary purposes of
the sentencing options at this level are punishment
commensurate with the seriousness of the criminal be-
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havior and incapacitation to protect the public. The
following sentencing options are available:
Total confinement in a state facility.
Total confinement in a state facility, with participation
in the State Motivational Boot Camp (see § 303.12(b)
for eligibility criteria)
§ 303.12. Guideline sentence recommendations: sen-
tencing programs.
(a) County intermediate punishment program.
(1) Eligibility.
(i) The following regulations and statutes govern opera-
tion of and eligibility for county intermediate punishment
programs:
37 Pa. Code § 451.1 et seq.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9729, § 9763, and § 9773.
61 P. S. § 1101—§ 1114.
204 Pa.Code Chapter 303.
(ii) Sentence recommendations which include an option
of Restrictive Intermediate Punishments for certain of-
fenders are designated as shaded cells in the guideline
matrices.
(2) The county intermediate punishment plan provides
a mechanism to advise the court of the extent and
availability of services and programs authorized in the
county. This plan includes information on the appropriate
classification and use of county programs based on
program-specific requirements.
(3) Intermediate punishments classifications. In order
to incorporate intermediate punishment programs into
the sentencing levels, the Commission has classified
intermediate punishment programs as Restrictive Inter-
mediate Punishments (RIP) and restorative sanction pro-
grams. Additionally, specific intermediate punishment
programs have been identified in legislation (42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9763(c)) and regulation (37 Pa. Code § 451.52) as
authorized sentences for conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3731(e) (relating to Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol or Controlled Substance); the Commission has
classified these programs as qualified Restrictive Interme-
diate Punishments.
(4) Restrictive Intermediate Punishments (RIP). Re-
strictive Intermediate Punishments are defined as pro-
grams that provide for strict supervision of the offender.
Restrictive Intermediate Punishments may be imposed
only if the court has been granted sentencing authority by
the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency
(pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9729). The county intermediate
punishment board is required to develop assessment and
evaluation procedures to assure the appropriate targeting
of offenders. All programs must meet the minimum
standards provided in the Pennsylvania Commission on
Crime and Delinquency regulations [37 Pa.Code Chapter
451] for intermediate punishments.
(i) Restrictive Intermediate Punishments (RIP) either:
(A) house the offender full or part time; or
(B) significantly restrict the offender’s movement and
monitor the offender’s compliance with the program(s); or
(C) involve a combination of programs that meet the
standards set forth above.
(ii) An offender under consideration for Restrictive
Intermediate Punishments at Level 4 or Level 3 shall
have a diagnostic assessment of dependency on alcohol or
other drugs conducted by one of the following: the
Pennsylvania Department of Health’s Office of Drug and
Alcohol Programs (ODAP) or a designee; the county
authority on drugs and alcohol or a designee; or clinical
personnel of a facility licensed by the Office of Drug and
Alcohol Programs.
(iii) An offender assessed to be dependent shall be
evaluated for purposes of a treatment recommendation by
one of the above listed assessors. The evaluation shall
take into account the level of motivation of the offender. If
sentenced to a Restrictive Intermediate Punishment, the
sentence shall be consistent with the level of care and
length of stay prescribed in the treatment recommenda-
tion, regardless of the standard range sentencing recom-
mendation.
(iv) An offender assessed as not in need of drug or
alcohol treatment may be placed in any approved Restric-
tive Intermediate Punishment program. Each day of
participation in a Restrictive Intermediate Punishment
program or combination of programs shall be considered
the equivalent of one day of total confinement.
(v) The court may impose a qualified Restrictive Inter-
mediate Punishment in lieu of incarceration for any
conviction under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (relating to Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance).
(5) Restorative sanction programs. Restorative sanction
programs are the least restrictive, non-confinement inter-
mediate punishments. Restorative sanction programs are
generally used in conjunction with Restrictive Intermedi-
ate Punishments as the level of supervision is reduced,
but may also be used as separate sanctions under any of
the non-confinement sentencing alternatives provided in
the statute (see § 303.9(f)).
(i) Restorative sanction programs:
(A) are the least restrictive in terms of constraint of
offender’s liberties;
(B) do not involve the housing of the offender (either
full or part time); and
(C) focus on restoring the victim to pre-offense status.
(6) Qualified Restrictive Intermediate Punishments. In
accordance with 37 Pa. Code § 451.52 (relating to sen-
tencing restrictions for driving under the influence convic-
tions), qualified Restrictive Intermediate Punishment pro-
grams may be used to satisfy the mandatory minimum
sentencing requirements of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731.
(i) Qualified Restrictive Intermediate Punishment pro-
grams include:
(A) residential inpatient drug and alcohol programs or
residential rehabilitative center programs; or
(B) house arrest and electronic monitoring combined
with drug and alcohol treatment.
(b) State Motivational Boot Camp.
(1) Eligibility.
(i) The following statute governs operation of and
eligibility for the State Motivational Boot Camp:
61 P. S. § 1121—§ 1129
(ii) Sentence recommendations which include boot
camp eligible offenders are designated by the letters BC
in the cells of the Basic Sentencing Matrix (§ 303.16).
(2) The court shall indicate on the offender’s commit-
ment order and the Guideline Sentence Form if the
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offender is authorized as eligible for the boot camp
program. The Department of Corrections makes the final
determination as to whether the offender will be accepted
into the boot camp program.
§ 303.13. Guideline sentence recommendations: ag-
gravated and mitigated circumstances.
(a) When the court determines that an aggravating
circumstance(s) is present, it may impose an aggravated
sentence as follows:
(1) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
and 14, the court may impose a sentence that is up to 12
months longer than the upper limit of the standard
range.
(2) For the Offense Gravity Score of 8, the court may
impose a sentence that is up to 9 months longer than the
upper limit of the standard range.
(3) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 6 and 7, the court
may impose a sentence that is up to 6 months longer
than the upper limit of the standard range.
(4) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
the court may impose a sentence that is up to 3 months
longer than the upper limit of the standard range.
(5) When the standard range is Restorative Sanctions
(RS), the aggravated sentence recommendation is RIP-3.
(b) When the court determines that a mitigating cir-
cumstance(s) is present, it may impose a mitigated
sentence as follows:
(1) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
and 14, the court may impose a sentence that is up to 12
months shorter than the lower limit of the standard
range.
(2) For the Offense Gravity Score of 8, the court may
impose a sentence that is up to 9 months shorter than the
lower limit of the standard range.
(3) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 6 and 7, the court
may impose a sentence that is up to 6 months shorter
than the lower limit of the standard range.
(4) For the Offense Gravity Scores of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5,
the court may impose a sentence that is up to 3 months
shorter than the lower limit of the standard range.
(5) When the bottom of the standard range is less than
or equal to 3 months of incarceration, the lower limit of
the mitigated sentence recommendation is Restorative
Sanctions (RS).
(6) In no case where a Deadly Weapon Enhancement is
applied may the mitigated sentence recommendation be
lower than 3 months.
(c) When the court imposes an aggravated or mitigated
sentence, it shall state the reasons on the record and on
the Guideline Sentence Form, a copy of which is for-
warded to the Commission on Sentencing.
§ 303.14. Guideline sentence recommendations—
fines and restitution.
(a) Fines and restitution.
(1) Fines and restitution, as provided by law, may be
added to any guideline sentence.
(2) A fine, within the limits established by law, shall be
considered by the court when the offender is convicted of
35 P. S. § 780-113(a)(12), (14) or (30), and the drug
involved is 2.5 or more grams of any of the following: a
controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in
Schedule I or II and which is a narcotic; phencyclidine,
methamphetamine, or cocaine, including the isomers,
salts, compounds, salts of isomers, or derivatives of
phencyclidine, methamphetamine, or cocaine; or is one
thousand pounds or more of marijuana. Such fine shall be
of an amount that is at least sufficient to exhaust the
assets utilized in, and the proceeds obtained by the
offender from, the illegal possession, manufacture, or
distribution of controlled substances. Such fine shall not
include assets concerning which the attorney for the
Commonwealth has filed a forfeiture petition or concern-
ing which he has given notice to the court of his intent to
file a forfeiture petition.
(3) Fines and restitution may be utilized as part of an
intermediate punishment sentence or as a non-
confinement sentencing alternative (see Restorative Sanc-
tion § 303.9(f)).
§ 303.15. Offense Listing
CRIMES CODE OFFENSES
18 Pa.C.S. § OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
901 Criminal Attempt [INCHOATE] 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
See § 303.3(c) See § 303.8(b)
902 Criminal Solicitation [INCHOATE] 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
See § 303.3(c) See § 303.8(b)
903 Criminal Conspiracy [INCHOATE] 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
See § 303.3(c) See § 303.8(b)
907 (a) Possessing Instruments of Crime (criminal
instruments)
M1 3 1
907 (b) Possessing Instruments of Crime (weapon) M1 4 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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18 Pa.C.S. § OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
907 (c) Possessing Instruments of Crime (unlawful body
armor)
F3 5 1
908 Prohibited Offensive Weapons M1 4 1
909 Manufacture, Distribution or Possession of Mas-
ter Key for Motor Vehicles
M1 3 m
910 Manufacture, Distribution or Possession of De-
vices for Theft of Telecommunications
F3 5 1
910 Manufacture, Distribution or Possession of De-
vices for Theft of Telecommunications
M1 3 m
911 Corrupt Organizations F1 8 3
912 Weapon on School Property M1 4 m
913 (a)(1) Possession of Firearm or Other Dangerous
Weapon in Court Facility
M3 1 m
913 (a)(2) Possession of Firearm or Other Dangerous
Weapon in Court Facility (intend for crime)
M1 3 m
2102 Desecration of Flag M3 1 m
2103 Insults to Flag M2 2 m
2502 (a) Murder, First Degree Murder of the
First Degree
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(a)
4
2502 (a)
INCHOATE
Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [SBI] to First
Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
14 4
2502 (a) IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [No SBI] to
First Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
13 4
2502 (b) Murder, Second Degree Murder of the
Second Degree
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(b)
4
2502 (b) IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [SBI] to Second
Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
14 4
2502 (b) IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [No SBI] to
Second Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
13 4
2502 (c) Murder, Third Degree F1 14 4
2502 (c) IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [SBI] to Third
Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
14 4
2502 (c) IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy [No SBI] to
Third Degree Murder
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(c)
13 4
2503 Manslaughter, Voluntary F1 11 4
2503 INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Voluntary
Manslaughter
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
10 3
2504* Manslaughter, Involuntary (when there is also a
conviction for DUI arising from the same INCI-
DENT)
M1 8 1
2504* Manslaughter, Involuntary (when there is not a
conviction for DUI arising from the same INCI-
DENT)
M1 6 1
2504 Manslaughter, Involuntary (victim under 12
years)
F2 8 2
2505 (b) Suicide, Aids or Solicits F2 6 2
2505 (b) Suicide, Aids or Solicits M2 2 m
2506 Drug Delivery Resulting in Death F1 13 4
2506
INCHOATE
Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Drug Delivery
Resulting in Death
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
12 3
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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2701 Simple Assault M2 3 m
2701 (b)(1) Simple Assault (mutual consent) M3 1 m
2701 (b)(2) Simple Assault (against child by adult) M1 4 1
2702 (a)(1)* Aggravated Assault (causes serious bodily injury) F1 11 4
2702 (a)(1)*
INCHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Aggravated
Assault (causes SBI)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
10 3
2702 (a)(1)* Aggravated Assault (attempts to cause serious
bodily injury)
F1 10 3
2702 (a)(2)* Aggravated Assault (causes serious bodily injury
police, etc.)
F1 11 4
2702 (a)(2)*
INCHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Aggravated
Assault (causes SBI to police, etc.)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
10 3
2702 (a)(2)* Aggravated Assault (attempts to cause serious
bodily injury, police, etc.)
F1 10 3
2702 (a)(3) Aggravated Assault (causes or attempts to cause
bodily injury, police, etc.)
F2 6 2
2702 (a)(4) Aggravated Assault (causes or attempts to cause
bodily injury with a deadly weapon)
F2 8 2
2702 (a)(5) Aggravated Assault (teacher) F2 6 2
2702 (a)(6) Aggravated Assault (fear SBI) F2 6 2
2703 Assault by Prisoner F2 6 2
2705 Recklessly Endangering Another Person M2 3 m
2706 Terroristic Threats M1 3 m
2707 (a) Propulsion of Missiles into an Occupied Vehicle M1 3 m
2707 (b) Propulsion of Missiles onto a Roadway M2 2 m
2708 Use of Tear Gas in Labor Dispute M1 3 m
2709 (b) Stalking, Subsequent Offense F3 5 1
2709 (b) Stalking M1 3 m
2710 Ethnic Intimidation 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 2710(b)
See § 303.3(d) See § 303.8(c)
2712 Assault on Sports Official M1 3 m
2713 (a)(1)(2) Neglect of Care-dependent Person (SBI) F1 10 3
2713 (a)(1)(2) Neglect of Care-dependent Person (BI) M1 4 m
2901 Kidnapping F1 10 4
2901 INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Kidnapping 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
9 3
2902 Unlawful Restraint M1 3 m
2903 False Imprisonment M2 2 m
2904 (c) Interference with the Custody of Children F3 4 1
2904 (c)(1) Interference with the Custody of Children F2 6 2
2904 (c)(2) Interference with the Custody of Children M2 2 m
2905 Interference w/Custody of Committed Persons M2 4 m
2906 Criminal Coercion M1 3 m
2906 Criminal Coercion M2 2 m
2907 Disposition of Ransom F3 5 1
2909 Concealment of Whereabouts of a Child F3 4 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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2910 Luring a Child into a Motor Vehicle M1 5 1
3121 Rape F1 12 4
3121 INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Rape 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
11 3
3122.1 Statutory Sexual Assault F2 7 2
3123 Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse F1 12 4
3123 INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Involuntary
Deviate Sexual Intercourse
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
11 3
3124.1 Sexual Assault F2 11 3
3125 Aggravated Indecent Assault F2 10 3
3126 (a)(1)-(6),
(8)
Indecent Assault M2 4 m
3126 (a)(7) Indecent Assault (involving minors) M1 5 1
3127 Indecent Exposure (person present is 16 years of
age or older)
M2 3 m
3127 Indecent Exposure (person present is less than
16 years of age)
M1 4 1
3301(a)* Arson Endangering Persons (where a person is
inside the structure when the fire is started or
when bodily injury results, either directly or in-
directly, at the scene of the fire)
F1 10 4
3301 (a)* IN-
CHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Arson En-
dangering Persons (person inside or bodily injury
results)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
9 3
3301(a)* Arson Endangering Persons (where no person is
inside the structure when the fire is started and
no bodily injury results either directly or indi-
rectly, at the scene of the fire)
F1 9 3
3301 (c) Arson, Endangering Property F2 6 2
3301 (d) Arson, Reckless Burning F3 5 1
3301 (e) Arson, Failure to Report M1 3 m
3301 (f) Arson, Possess Explosive Material F3 5 1
3301 (g) Arson, Disclosure of True Owner M3 1 m
3302 (a) Catastrophe, Causing F1 10 3
3302 (a) Catastrophe, Recklessly Causing F2 6 2
3302 (b) Catastrophe, Risking F3 4 1
3303 Failure to Prevent Catastrophe M2 2 m
3304 Criminal Mischief (over $5,000) F3 5 1
3304 Criminal Mischief (over $1,000) M2 2 m
3304 Criminal Mischief (over $500) M3 1 m
3304 Criminal Mischief (over $150 under (a)(4)) M3 1 m
3305 Tampering w/Fire Hydrants M3 1 m
3307 Institutional Vandalism (over $5,000) F3 5 1
3307 Institutional Vandalism M2 2 m
3309 Agricultural Vandalism (over $5,000) F3 5 1
3309 Agricultural Vandalism (over $1,000) M1 3 m
3309 Agricultural Vandalism (over $500) M2 2 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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3309 Agricultural Vandalism ($500 or less) M3 1 m
3502* Burglary (of a structure adapted for overnight
accommodation in which at the time of the of-
fense any person is present)
F1 9 4
3502* INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Burglary
(structure adapted for overnight accommodation,
person present)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
8 3
3502* Burglary (of a structure adapted for overnight
accommodation in which at the time of the of-
fense no person is present)
F1 7 3
3502* Burglary (of a structure not adapted for over-
night accommodation in which at the time of the
offense any person is present)
F1 6 3
3502 Burglary (of a structure not adapted for over-
night accommodation in which at the time of the
offense no person is present)
F2 5 2
3503 (a)(1)(ii) Trespass, Criminal F2 4 2
3503 (a)(1)(i) Trespass, Criminal F3 3 1
3503 (b) Trespass, Defiant M3 1 m
3701 (a)(1)(i) Robbery (inflicts serious bodily injury) F1 12 4
3701 (a)(1)(i)
INCHOATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Robbery
(SBI)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
11 3
3701 (a)(1)(ii) Robbery (threatens another with or intentionally
puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily in-
jury)
F1 10 3
3701 (a)(1)(iii) Robbery (commits or threatens immediately to
commit any F1 or F2)
F1 9 3
3701 (a)(1) (iv) Robbery (threatens or inflicts bodily injury or
intentionally puts him in fear of immediate
bodily injury)
F2 7 2
3701 (a)(1)(v) Robbery (physically takes or removes property
by force, however slight)
F3 5 1
3702* Robbery of Motor Vehicle (inflicts serious bodily
injury)
F1 12 4
3702* INCHO-
ATE
- Attempt/Solicitation/Conspiracy to Robbery of a
Motor Vehicle (SBI)
18 Pa.C.S.
§ 905
11 3
3702* Robbery of a Motor Vehicle (does not inflict seri-
ous bodily injury)
F1 9 3
3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking, During Disaster F2 7 2
3921* Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition (over
$100,000)
F3 8 1
3921* Theft By Unlawful Taking or Disposition (over
$50,000 to $100,000)
F3 7 1
3921* Theft By Unlawful Taking or Disposition (over
$25,000 to $50,000)
F3 6 1
3921* Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition (over
$2,000 to $25,000, or if the property is a firearm,
automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or
other motor- propelled vehicle)
F3 5 1
3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition ($2,000
or less, from person or by threat or in breach of
fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition ($200 to
$2,000)
M1 3 m
3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition ($50 to
less than $200)
M2 2 m
3921 Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition (less
than $50)
M3 1 m
3922* Theft by Deception (over $100,000) F3 8 1
3922* Theft By Deception (over $50,000 to $100,000) F3 7 1
3922* Theft By Deception (over $25,000 to $50,000) F3 6 1
3922* Theft by Deception (over $2,000 to $25,000, or if
the property is a firearm, automobile, airplane,
motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled
vehicle)
F3 5 1
3922 Theft by Deception ($2,000 or less, from person
or by threat or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3922 Theft by Deception ($200 to $2,000) M1 3 m
3922 Theft by Deception ($50 to less than $200) M2 2 m
3922 Theft by Deception (less than $50) M3 1 m
3923* Theft by Extortion (over $100,000) F3 8 1
3923* Theft by Extortion (over $50,000 to $100,000) F3 7 1
3923* Theft by Extortion (over $25,000 to $50,000) F3 6 1
3923* Theft by Extortion (over $2,000 to $25,000, or if
the property is a firearm, automobile, airplane,
motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled
vehicle)
F3 5 1
3923 Theft by Extortion ($2,000 or less, from person
or by threat or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 4 m
3923 Theft by Extortion ($200 to $2,000) M1 4 m
3923 Theft by Extortion ($50 to less than $200) M2 2 m
3923 Theft by Extortion (less than $50) M3 1 m
3924* Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by
Mistake (over $100,000)
F3 8 1
3924* Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by
Mistake (over $50,000 to $100,000)
F3 7 1
3924* Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by
Mistake (over $25,000 to $50,000)
F3 6 1
3924* Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by
Mistake (over $2,000 to $25,000, or if the prop-
erty is a firearm, automobile, airplane, motor-
cycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled ve-
hicle)
F3 5 1
3924 Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid or Delivered by
Mistake ($2,000 or less, from person or by threat
or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3924 Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid or Delivered by
Mistake ($200 to $2,000)
M1 3 m
3924 Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid or Delivered by
Mistake ($50 to less than $200)
M2 2 m
3924 Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid or Delivered by
Mistake (less than $50)
M3 1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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3925 Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, During Dis-
aster
F2 7 2
3925* Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (over
$100,000)
F3 8 1
3925* Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (over $50,000
to $100,000)
F3 7 1
3925* Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (over $25,000
to $50,000)
F3 6 1
3925* Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (over $2,000
to $25,000, or if the property is a firearm, auto-
mobile, airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or other
motor-propelled vehicle, or if the receiver is in
the business of buying or selling stolen property)
F3 5 1
3925 Theft by Receiving Stolen Property ($2,000 or
less, from person or by threat or in breach of fi-
duciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3925 Theft by Receiving Stolen Property ($200 to
$2,000)
M1 3 m
3925 Theft by Receiving Stolen Property ($50 to less
than $200)
M2 2 m
3925 Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (less than
$50)
M3 1 m
3926* Theft of Services (over $100,000) F3 8 1
3926* Theft of Services (over $50,000 to $100,000) F3 7 1
3926* Theft of Services (over $25,000 to $50,000) F3 6 1
3926* Theft of Services (over $2,000 to $25,000, or if
the property is a firearm, automobile, airplane,
motorcycle, motor-boat, or other motor-propelled
vehicle)
F3 5 1
3926 Theft of Services ($2,000 or less, from person or
by threat or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3926 Theft of Services ($200 to $2,000) M1 3 m
3926 Theft of Services ($50 to less than $200) M2 2 m
3926 Theft of Services (less than $50) M3 1 m
3926 (e) Theft of Services (sale transfer of device for di-
version of services)
M3 1 m
3927* Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received (over $100,000)
F3 8 1
3927* Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received (over $50,000 to $100,000)
F3 7 1
3927* Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received (over $25,000 to $50,000)
F3 6 1
3927* Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received (over $2,000 to $25,000, or if the
property is a firearm, automobile, airplane, mo-
torcycle, motorboat, or other motor- propelled
vehicle)
F3 5 1
3927 Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received ($2,000 or less, from person or
by threat or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3927 Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received ($200 to $2,000)
M1 3 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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3927 Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received ($50 to less than $200)
M2 2 m
3927 Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
Funds Received (less than $50)
M3 1 m
3928 Unauthorized Use of Auto (during disaster) F2 7 2
3928 Unauthorized Use of Auto M2 2 m
3929 Theft, Retail (during disaster) F2 7 2
3929 Theft, Retail (>$2,000, firearm, motor veh.) F3 5 1
3929 Theft, Retail (third or subsequent conviction) F3 3 1
3929 Theft, Retail (first or second offense, $150 or
more)
M1 2 m
3929 Theft, Retail (second offense, less than $150) M2 2 m
3929.1 Library Theft (3rd; subsequent offense) F3 5 1
3929.1 Library Theft (1st; 2nd over $150) M1 3 m
3929.1 Library Theft (2nd less than $150) M2 2 m
3930 Theft of Trade Secrets by Force, Violence, or
Burglary
F2 7 2
3930 Theft of Trade Secrets F3 5 1
3931 Theft of Unpublished Dramas and Musical Com-
positions (over $2,000 or if the property is a fire-
arm, automobile, airplane, motorcycle, motor-
boat, or other motor-propelled vehicle)
F3 5 1
3931 Theft of Unpublished Dramas and Musical Com-
positions ($2,000 or less, from person or by
threat or in breach of fiduciary obligation)
M1 3 m
3931 Theft of Unpublished Dramas and Musical Com-
positions ($200 to $2,000)
M1 3 m
3931 Theft of Unpublished Dramas and Musical Com-
positions ($50 to less than $200)
M2 2 m
3931 Theft of Unpublished Dramas and Musical Com-
positions (less than $50)
M3 1 m
3932* Theft of Leased Property (over $100,000) F3 8 1
3932* Theft of Leased Property (over $50,000 to
$100,000)
F3 7 1
3932* Theft of Leased Property (over $25,000 to
$50,000)
F3 6 1
3932* Theft of Leased Property (over $2,000 to
$25,000, or if property is a firearm, automobile,
airplane, motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-
propelled vehicle)
F3 5 1
3932 Theft of Leased Property ($2,000 or less from
person or by threat or in breach of fiduciary obli-
gation)
M1 3 m
3932 Theft of Leased Property ($200 to $2,000) M1 3 m
3932 Theft of Leased Property ($50 to less than $200) M2 2 m
3932 Theft of Leased Property (less than $50) M3 1 m
3933 (a)(1) Unlawful Use of Computer F3 5 1
3933 (a)(2)(3) Unlawful Use of Computer M1 3 m
4101 Forgery (money, stocks, etc.) F2 4 2
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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4101 Forgery (will, deed, etc.) F3 3 1
4101 Forgery (other) M1 3 m
4102 Simulating Antiques M1 3 m
4103 Fraudulent Destruction of Recordable Instru-
ments
F3 5 1
4104 (a) Tampering with Records or Identification M1 3 m
4105 (c)(1)(ii) Bad Checks ($200 <$500) M3 1 m
4105 (c)(1)(iii) Bad Checks ($500 <$1000) M2 2 m
4105 (c)(1)(iv) Bad Checks ($1,000 <$75,0000) M1 3 m
4105 (c)(1)(v) Bad Checks ($75,000 or more) F3 5 1
4105 (c)(2) Bad Checks (3rd or subseq./<$75,000) M1 3 m
4105 (c)(2) Bad Checks (3rd or subseq./ $75,000 or more) F3 5 1
4106 Credit Cards (more than $500) F3 3 1
4106 Credit Cards ($50 or more but less than $500) M2 2 m
4107 (a.1)(1)(i) Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
(< $2,000)
F3 5 1
4107 (a.1)(1)(ii) Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
($200 - $2,000)
M1 3 m
4107
(a.1)(1)(iii)
Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
( $200)
M2 2 m
4107
(a.1)(1)(iv)
Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
(amt. not ascertained)
M2 2 m
4107 (a.1)(3)(i) Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
(< $2,000; victim 60 yrs.+)
F2 7 2
4107 (a.1)(3)(ii) Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
($200 - $2,000; victim 60 yrs. +)
F3 5 1
4107
(a.1)(3)(iii)
Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices (
$200; victim 60 yrs. +)
M1 3 m
4107
(a.1)(3)(iv)
Deceptive or Fraudulent Business Practices
(amt. not ascertained; victim 60 yrs.+)
M1 3 m
4107.1 Deception Relating to Kosher Foods M3 1 m
4107.2 Deception Relating to Certification of Minority
Business Enterprise or Women’s Business Enter-
prise
F3 4 1
4108 Commercial Bribery and Breach of Duty M2 2 m
4109 Rigging Public Contest M1 3 m
4110 Defrauding Secured Creditors M2 2 m
4111 Fraud in Insolvency M2 2 m
4112 Receiving Deposits; Failed Institution M2 2 m
4113 Misapplication of Entrusted Property (over $50) M2 2 m
4113 Misapplication of Entrusted Property ($50 or
less)
M3 1 m
4114 Securing Execution of Documents by Deception M2 2 m
4115 Falsely Impersonating Persons Privately Em-
ployed
M2 2 m
4116 (g)(1) Copying; Recording Devices (100 or more motion
picture devices or 1,000 or more sound recording
devices)
F3 5 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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4116 (g)(1) Copying; Recording Devices (second or subse-
quent conviction at time of sentencing)
F2 7 2
4116 (g)(2) Copying; Recording Devices (any other violation) M1 3 m
4116 (g)(2) Copying; Recording Devices (any other violation;
second or subsequent conviction at time of sen-
tencing)
F3 5 1
4116.1 Unlawful Operation of Recording Device in Mo-
tion Picture Theater (first violation)
M1 3 m
4116.1 Unlawful Operation of Recording Device in Mo-
tion Picture Theater (second or subsequent con-
viction at time of sentencing)
F3 4 1
4117 (a) Insurance Fraud F3 4 1
4117 (b) Insurance Fraud M1 3 m
4118 Washing Titles [vehicles] F3 4 1
4119 (c)(1) Trademark Counterfeiting M1 3 m
4119 (c)(2) Trademark Counterfeiting F3 5 1
4119 (c)(3) Trademark Counterfeiting F2 7 2
4301 Bigamy M2 3 m
4302 Incest F2 7 2
4303 Concealing Death of Child M1 3 m
4304 Endangering Welfare of Children M1 5 1
4304 Endangering Welfare of Children (course of con-
duct)
F3 6 1
4305 Dealing in Infant Children M1 4 1
4701 Bribery, Official and Political Matters F3 5 1
4702 Threats, Official and Political Matters F3 5 1
4702 Threats, Official and Political Matters M2 2 m
4703 Retaliation for Past Official Action M2 2 m
4902 Perjury F3 5 1
4903 (a) False Swearing M2 2 m
4903 (b) False Swearing M3 1 m
4904 (a) Unsworn Falsification to Authorities M2 2 m
4904 (b) Unsworn Falsification to Authorities M3 1 m
4905 False Alarms M1 3 m
4906 (a) False Reports to Law Enforcement Officials M2 2 m
4906 (b) False Reports to Law Enforcement Officials M3 1 m
4909 Witness Taking Bribe F3 5 1
4910 Tampering with Physical Evidence M2 2 m
4911 Tampering w/Public Records or Information F3 4 1
4911 Tampering w/Public Records or Information M2 2 m
4912 Impersonating a Public Servant M2 2 m
4913 Impersonating Notary Public M1 3 m
4952 Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims F3 7 1
4952 Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims M2 5 m
4953 Retaliation Against Witness or Victim F3 8 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
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4953 Retaliation Against Witness or Victim M2 5 m
5101 Obstructing Justice M2 3 m
5102 Obstruction of Justice by Picketing M2 2 m
5103 Unlawfully Listening to Jury Deliberations M3 1 m
5104 Resisting Arrest M2 2 m
5105 Apprehension, Hindering (if conduct liable to be
charged is F1 or F2)
F3 4 1
5105 Apprehension, Hindering M2 2 m
5107 Aiding Consummation of Crime (of F1/F2) F3 5 1
5107 Aiding Consummation of Crime M2 2 m
5108 Compounding M2 2 m
5109 Barratry M3 1 m
5110 Contempt of General Assembly M3 1 m
5111 Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities F1 8 3
5121
(d)(1)(i)(ii)(iii)*
Escape (from a halfway house, pre-release cen-
ter, treatment center, work-release center, work-
release, or by failing to return from an autho-
rized leave or furlough)
F3 5 1
5121
(d)(1)(i)(ii)(iii)*
Escape (all other escapes from this subsection) F3 6 1
5121 (d)(2) Escape M2 3 m
5122 (a)(1) Weapons, Providing to Inmate M1 8 m
5122 (a)(2) Weapons, Possession by Inmate M1 4 m
5122 (a)(3) Weapons or Implements for Escape (tools) M2 3 m
5123 (a) Contraband (provide controlled substance to con-
fined person)
F2 7 2
5123 (a.2) Contraband (possession of controlled substance
by confined person)
M1 3 m
5123 (b) Contraband (money) M3 1 m
5123 (c) Contraband (other) M1 3 m
5124 Default in Required Appearance F3 4 1
5124 Default in Required Appearance M2 2 m
5125 Absconding Witness M3 1 m
5126 Avoiding Apprehension F3 5 1
5126 Avoiding Apprehension M2 2 m
5301 Official Oppression M2 2 m
5302 Speculating on Official Action M2 2 m
5501 Riot F3 4 1
5502 Failure to Disperse M2 2 m
5503 Disorderly Conduct M3 1 m
5504 Harassment by Communication M3 1 m
5506 Loitering and Prowling M3 1 m
5507 Obstructing Highways M3 1 m
5508 Disrupting Meetings M3 1 m
5509 Desecration of Venerated Objects M2 2 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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SCORE
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5510 Abuse of Corpse M2 3 m
5511 (a)(2) Cruelty to Animals F3 5 1
5511 (a)(2.1)(i) Cruelty to Animals M2 3 m
5511 (a)(2.1)(ii) Cruelty to Animals F3 5 1
5511 (a)(1) Cruelty to Animals M2 3 m
5511 (h.1) Cruelty to Animals F3 5 1
5512 Lotteries M1 3 m
5513 Gambling Devices M1 3 m
5514 Pool Selling and Bookmaking M1 3 m
5515 Prohibiting Paramilitary Training M1 3 m
5703 Interception, Disclosure or Use of Wire, Elec-
tronic or Oral Communications
F3 5 1
5705 Possession, Sale, Distribution, Manufacture or
Advertisement of Interception Devices
F3 5 1
5719 Unlawful Use of Intercepted Communications M2 2 m
5771 Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices M3 1 m
5901 Open Lewdness M3 1 m
5902 (a) Prostitution M3 1 m
5902 (a)(b)(d)(e)
when (a.1),(c)(v)
or (e.1) applies
Prostitution and Related Offenses (HIV or Aids
related)
F3 5 1
5902 (b)(d)
when
(c)(1)(i)(ii)(iv)
applies
Prostitution and Related Offenses F3 5 1
5902 (b) when
(c)(1)(iii) applies
Prostitution Involving Minors F3 8 1
5902 (b) Prostitution M2 3 m
5902 (e) Patronizing Prostitutes M3 1 m
5903 Obscene Materials (subsequent offense) F3 5 1
5903 Obscene Materials M1 3 m
5904 Public Exhibition of Insane or Deformed Person M2 2 m
6105* Persons Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, Con-
trol, Sell or Transfer Firearms (loaded)
M1 5 1
6105* Persons Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, Con-
trol, Sell or Transfer Firearms (unloaded)
M1 4 1
6106* Firearms, Not to be Carried Without a License
(loaded or ammunition in possession or control
of defendant)
F3 5 1
6106* Firearms, Not to be Carried Without a License
(unloaded and ammunition not in possession or
control of defendant)
F3 4 1
6107 Prohibited Conduct during Emergency M1 3 1
6108* Carrying Firearms on Public Streets or Public
Property in Philadelphia (loaded or ammunition
in possession or control of defendant)
M1 5 1
6108* Carrying Firearms on Public Streets or Public
Property in Philadelphia (unloaded and ammu-
nition not in possession or control of defendant)
M1 4 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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6110.1 (a) Possession of Firearm by Minor M1 3 1
6110.1 (c) Possession of Firearms by Minor (responsibility
of adult)
F3 7 1
6111 (g)(1) Sale or Transfer of Firearms M2 2 m
6111
(g)(2)(3)(4)
Sale or Transfer of Firearms (to ineligibles; un-
lawful request for criminal history; false state-
ments)
F3 5 1
6111 (h) Sale or Transfer of Firearms (subsequent) F2 7 2
6112 Retail Dealer Required to be Licensed M1 3 1
6113 Licensing of Dealers M1 3 1
6115 Loans, Lending, Giving Firearms Prohibited M1 3 1
6116 False Evidence of Identity M1 3 1
6117 Altering Marks of Identification F2 7 2
6121 Certain Bullets Prohibited F3 5 1
6122 Proof of License M1 3 1
6161 Carrying Explosives M2 3 m
6162 Shipping Explosives M3 3 m
6301 (a)(1)* Corruption of Minors (when of a sexual nature) M1 5 m
6301 (a)(1)* Corruption of Minors M1 4 1
6301 (a)(2) Corruption of Minors (second violation of truancy
in year)
M3 1 m
6302 Sale or Lease of Weapons M1 4 m
6303 Sale of Starter Pistols M1 4 m
6304 Sale of Air Rifles M3 1 m
6306 Furnish Cigarettes to Minors (3rd and subse-
quent offenses)
M3 1 m
6307 Misrepresentation of Age to Secure Alcohol (sub-
sequent offense)
M3 1 m
6309 Representing that Minor is of Age M3 1 m
6310 Inducement of Minors to Buy Liquor M3 1 m
6310.1 Selling Liquor to Minors M3 1 m
6310.2 Manufacture or Sale of False ID M2 2 m
6310.3 Carrying False ID (subsequent offense) M3 1 m
6311 Tattooing (a minor) M3 1 m
6312 (b) Sexual Abuse of Children (taking photos) F2 7 2
6312 (c) Sexual Abuse of Children (selling photos) F3 6 1
6312 (d) Possession of Child Pornography F3 5 1
6501 (a)(3) Scattering Rubbish (2nd; subsequent offense) M1 3 m
6501 (a)(3) Scattering Rubbish (1st. offense) M2 2 m
6501 (a)(1)(2) Scattering Rubbish (2nd; subsequent offense) M3 1 m
6504 Public Nuisances M2 2 m
6703 Military Decorations M3 1 m
6707 False Registration of Domestic Animals M3 1 m
6709 Use of Union Labels M3 1 m
6901 Extension of Water Line M3 1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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6910 Unauthorized Sale of Tickets M3 1 m
7102 Drugs to Race Horses M1 3 m
7103 Horse Racing M3 1 m
7104 Fortune Telling M3 1 m
7107 Unlawful Actions by Athlete Agents M1 3 m
7302 (a) Sale of Solidified Alcohol M2 2 m
7302 (b) Labeling of Solidified Alcohol M1 3 m
7303 Sale or Illegal Use of Solvents M3 1 m
7306 Incendiary Devices M1 3 m
7307 Out of State Convict Made Goods M2 2 m
7308 Unlawful Advertising of Insurance Business M2 2 m
7309 Unlawful Coercion in Contracting Insurance M1 3 m
7310 Furnishing Free Insurance M3 1 m
7311 Unlawful Collection Agency Practices M3 1 m
7312 Debt Pooling M3 1 m
7313 Buying Food Stamps($1,000 or more) F3 5 1
7313 Buying Food Stamps( $1,000) M1 3 m
7314 Fraudulent Traffic in Food Orders ($1,000 or
more)
F3 5 1
7314 Fraudulent Traffic in Food Orders ( $1,000) M1 3 m
7316 Keeping Bucket-Shop M3 1 m
7317 Accessories, Bucket-Shop M3 1 m
7318 Maintaining Bucket-Shop Premises M3 1 m
7319 Bucket-Shop Contracts M3 1 m
7321 Lie Detector Tests M2 2 m
7322 Demanding Property to Secure Employment M3 1 m
7323 Discrimination on Account of Uniform M2 2 m
7324 Unlawful Sale of Dissertations, Thesis, Term Pa-
pers
M3 1 m
7326 Disclosure of Confidential Tax Information M3 1 m
7328 Operation of Certain Establishments M3 1 m
7503 Interest of Certain Architects in Public Works
Contracts
M3 1 m
7504 Appointment of Special Police M3 1 m
7507 Breach of Privacy M2 2 m
Offenses not otherwise listed [OMNIBUS] F1 8 3
F2 7 2
F3 5 1
FELONY NOT
CLASSIFIED
5 1
M1 3 m
M2 2 m
M3 1 m
MISD. NOT
CLASSIFIED
1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
INCHOATE = Inchoates to 4 point PRS offenses. See 303.3(c) and 303.8(b) for all other inchoates.
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DRUG ACT OFFENSES
35 P. S. § 780-
113(a) DESCRIPTION
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
(1) Manufacture/Sale/Delivery of Adulterated Drug M 4 m
(2) Adulteration of Controlled Substance M 4 m
(3) False Advertisement M 4 m
(4) Removal of Detained Substance M 5 m
(5) Adulteration of Sellable Controlled Substance M 4 m
(6) Forging ID Under Act M 5 m
(7) Defraud Trademark M 5 m
(8) Selling Defrauded Trademark M 5 m
(9) Having Equipment to Defraud M 5 m
(10) Illegal Sale of Nonproprietary Drug M 4 m
(11) Illegal Pharmacy Operations M 5 m
(12)* Acquisition of Controlled Substance by Fraud:
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine ( 1,000g)
F 13 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (100g to 1000g)
F 11 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (50g to  100
g)
F 10 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (10g to 50g)
F 8 2
Heroin (1g to 10 g) F 7 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g to 10g)
F 7 2
Heroin (1g) F 6 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g)
F 6 2
Marijuana (50 lbs. or greater or 51 or more live
plants)
F 8 2
Marijuana (10 lbs. to 50 lbs. or 21 to 51 live
plants)
F 7 2
Marijuana (1 lb. to 10 lbs. or 10 to 21 live
plants)
F 5 2
Marijuana (1 lb. or 10 live plants) F 3 2
Prescription Pills of Schedule II ( 100 pills) F 10 2
Prescription Pills of Schedule II (51-100 pills) F 9 2
Prescription Pills of Schedule II (21-50 pills) F 8 2
Prescription Pills of Schedule II (1-20 pills) F 6 2
Schedule I and II Drugs not listed F 5 2
Schedule III and IV Drugs F 5 2
Schedule V Drugs M 3 m
(13) Dispense of Drugs to Drug Dependent Person M 4 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
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§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
(14)* Delivery by Practitioner:
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine ( 1,000g)
F 13 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (100g to 1000g)
F 11 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (50g  100g)
F 10 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (10g to 50g)
F 8 2
Heroin (1g to 10 g) F 7 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g to 10g)
F 7 2
Heroin ( 1g) F 6 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g)
F 6 2
Marijuana (50 lbs. or greater or 51 or more live
plants)
F 8 2
Marijuana (10 lbs. to 50 lbs. or 21 to 51 live
plants)
F 7 2
Marijuana (1 lb. to 10 lbs. or 10 to 21 live
plants)
F 5 2
Marijuana (1 lb. or 10 live plants) F 3 2
Schedule I and II Drugs not listed F 5 2
Schedule III and IV Drugs F 5 2
Schedule V Drugs M 3 m
(15) Illegal Retail Sale M 4 m
(16) Simple Possession M 3 m
(17) Dispensing of Drugs Without Label M 4 m
(18) Illegal Sale Container M 4 m
(19) Intentional Unauthorized Purchase M 5 m
(20) Divulging Trade Secret M 4 m
(21) Failure to Keep Records M 2 m
(22) Refusal of Inspection M 2 m
(23) Unauthorized Removal of Seals M 5 m
(24) Failure to Obtain License M 2 m
(25) Manufacture by Unauthorized Party M 5 m
(26) Distribution by Registrant of Controlled Sub-
stance
M 5 m
(27) Use of Fictitious Registration Number M 5 m
(28) False Application Material M 5 m
(29) Production of Counterfeit Trademarks M 5 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
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§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
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RECORD
POINTS
(30)* Possession With Intent to Deliver (PWID):
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine ( 1,000g)
F 13 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (100g to 1000g)
F 11 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (50g to 100g)
F 10 3
Heroin, Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II,
Cocaine, PCP, Methamphetamine (10g to 50g)
F 8 2
Heroin (1g to 10 g) F 7 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g to 10g)
F 7 2
Heroin (1g) F 6 2
Other Narcotics of Schedule I and II, Cocaine,
PCP, Methamphetamine (2.5g)
F 6 2
Marijuana (50 lbs. or greater or 51 or more live
plants)
F 8 2
Marijuana (10 lbs. to 50 lbs. or 21 to 51 live
plants)
F 7 2
Marijuana (1 lb. to 10 lbs. or 10 to 21 live
plants)
F 5 2
Marijuana (1 lb. or 10 live plants) F 3 2
Schedule I and II Drugs not listed F 5 2
Schedule III and IV Drugs F 5 2
Schedule V Drugs M 3 m
(31) Small Amount of Marijuana M 1 m
(32) Possession of Paraphernalia M 1 m
(33) PWID Paraphernalia (no minor) M 3 m
(33) PWID Paraphernalia (minor w/Conditions) M2 4 m
(34) Ad for Drug Paraphernalia M 1 m
(35) Illegal Sale of Non controlled Substance F 6 2
(36) Designer Drugs F 5 2
(37) Possession of Steroids M 4 m
Offenses not otherwise listed [OMNIBUS] F1 8 3
F2 7 2
F3 5 1
FELONY NOT
CLASSIFIED
5 1
M1 3 m
M2 2 m
M3 1 m
MISD. NOT
CLASSIFIED
1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
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ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENSES
35 P. S. § OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
6018.101-
6018.1002
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
Knowingly Transports, etc. Hazardous Waste
Without Permit
F1 9 1
Transports, etc. Hazardous Without Permit F2 7 2
Violation of Act; DER Order, etc. M3 1 m
691.1-691.1001 CLEAN STREAMS LAW
Violation of Act; DER Order M3 1 m
4001-4015 AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
Knowingly Releases Hazardous Air Pollutant F1 9 1
Violation of Act ; DER Order M2 2 m
Negligently Releases Hazardous Air Pollution M3 1 m
721.1-721.17 SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
Knowingly Introduces Contaminant Into Public
Water
M1 3 m
Violation of Act; DER Order M3 1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
JUDICIAL CODE
42 Pa.C.S. § OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
9793 (e) Failure to Register [sexually violent offenses] F3 6 1
9795 (d) Failure to Register [sexually violent predator] F3 6 1
9796 (e) Failure to Register [residence of sexually violent
predator]
F3 6 1
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
VEHICLE LAW OFFENSES
75 Pa.C.S.§ OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
3712 Abandonment/Stripping of Vehicles M3 1 m
3731 Driving Under the Influence (1st conviction in 7
years) [MANDATORY MINIMUM=48 HOURS]
M2 2 m
3731 Driving Under the Influence (2nd conviction in 7
years) [MANDATORY MINIMUM=30 DAYS]
M2 2 m
3731 Driving Under the Influence (3rd conviction in 7
years) [MANDATORY MINIMUM=90 DAYS]
M1 3 1
3731 Driving Under the Influence (4th/subseq.
conviction in 7 years) [MANDATORY
MINIMUM=1 YEAR]
M1 3 1
3732* Homicide by Vehicle (when there is also a
conviction for DUI arising from the same
INCIDENT)
M1 8 1
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
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75 Pa.C.S.§ OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
3732* Homicide by Vehicle (when there is not a convic-
tion for DUI arising from the same INCIDENT)
M1 6 1
3733 Fleeing or Aluding Police M2 2 m
3735 Homicide by Vehicle while DUI [MANDATORY
MINIMUM=3 YEARS]
F2 8 2
3735.1 Aggravated Assault by Vehicle while DUI F2 7 2
3742 (b)(1) Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
(failure to stop)
M1 3 m
3742 (b)(2) Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury (re-
sulting in SBI) [MANDATORY MINIMUM= 90
DAYS]
F3 5 1
3742 (b)(3) Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury (re-
sulting in death) [MANDATORY MINIMUM=1
YEAR]
F3 6 1
3742.1 (b)(1) Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury (li-
cense suspended)
M2 2 m
3742.1 (b)(1) Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury (no
license issued)
M3 1 m
3742.1 (b)(2) * Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
(SBI, license suspended)
F3 4 1
3742.1 (b)(2) * Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
(death, no license issued)
F3 5 1
3742.1 (b)(2) * Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
(SBI, license suspended)
M1 3 m
3742.1 (b)(2) * Accident Involving Death or Personal Injury
(death, no license issued)
M1 4 m
3743 Accident Involving Damage to Attended Vehicle M3 1 m
7102 Falsify Vehicle Identification M1 3 m
7102 Falsify Vehicle Identification M3 1 m
7103 Deal in Vehicles with Removed Identification F3 5 1
7103 Deal in Vehicles with Removed Identification M3 1 m
7111 Deal in Stolen Plates M1 3 m
7112 False Report of Theft or Vehicle Conversion M3 1 m
7121 False Application for Title/Registration M1 3 m
7122 Altered or Forged Title or Plates M1 3 m
7132 Prohibited Activities Related to Odometers (1st
or subsequent offense, subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7133 Permissible Activities Related to Odometers (1st
or subsequent offense, subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7134 Odometer Disclosure Requirement (1st or subse-
quent offense, subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7135 Odometer Mileage Statement (1st or subsequent
offense, subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7136 Conspiracy to Violate (1st or subsequent offense,
subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7137 Violation of Unfair Trade Practices (1st or subse-
quent offense, subchapter D)
F3 4 1
7752(b) Unauthorized Disposition of Forms M3 1 m
8306(b) Willful Violations M3 1 m
8306(c) Subsequent Willful Violations M2 2 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
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75 Pa.C.S.§ OFFENSE TITLE
STATUTORY
CLASS
§ 303.3
OFFENSE
GRAVITY
SCORE
§ 303.7 PRIOR
RECORD
POINTS
Offenses not otherwise listed [OMNIBUS]: F1 8 3
F2 7 2
F3 5 1
FELONY NOT
CLASSIFIED
5 1
M1 3 m
M2 2 m
M3 1 m
MISD. NOT
CLASSIFIED
1 m
* = Subcategorized Offenses. See 303.3(b).
m = Other Misdemeanor Offenses. See 303.7(a)(5).
§ 303.16. Basic Sentencing Matrix.
Prior Record Score
Level OGS ExampleOffenses 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
LEVEL
5
State
Incar
14
Murder 3
Inchoate Murder/
SBI
72-240 84-240 96-240 120-240 168-240 192-240 204-240 240 +/- 12
13
Inchoate
Murder/no SBI
Drug Del. Result
in Death
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (1,000 gms)
60-78 66-84 72-90 78-96 84-102 96-114 108-126 240 +/- 12
12
Rape
IDSI
Robbery (SBI)
Robbery/car (SBI)
48-66 54-72 60-78 66-84 72-90 84-102 96-114 120 +/- 12
11
Agg Asslt (SBI)
Voluntary
Manslaughter
Sexual Assault
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (100-1,000
gms)
36-54
BC 42-60 48-66 54-72 60-78 72-90 84-102 120 +/- 12
10
Kidnapping
Arson (person
inside)
Agg Asslt
(att. SBI)
Robbery
(threat. SBI)
Agg. Indecent.
Assualt
Causing Catastro-
phe (F1)
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (50-100
gms)
22-36
BC
30-42
BC 36-48 42-54 48-60 60-72 72-84 120 +/- 12
9
Robbery/car
(no SBI)
Robbery (F1/F2)
Burglary (home/
person)
Arson (no person)
12-24
BC
18-30
BC
24-36
BC
30-42
BC
36-48
BC 48-60 60-72 120 +/- 12
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Level OGS ExampleOffenses 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
LEVEL
4
State
Incar/
RIP
trade
8
[F1]
Agg. Asslt. (BI
w/DW)
Agg. Asslt. (att.
BI w/DW)
Invol. Mansl.
(when DUI)
Hom. by Vehicle
(when DUI)
Theft ($100,000)
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (10-50 gms)
9-16
BC
12-18
BC
15-21
BC
18-24
BC
21-27
BC
27-33
BC 40-52 NA +/- 9
LEVEL
3
State/
Cnty
Incar
RIP
trade
7
[F2]
Robbery (inflicts/
threatens BI)
Burglary (home/
no person)
Statutory Sexual
Assault
Theft ($50,000-
$100,000)
Arson (no person)
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (2.5-10 gms)
6-14
BC
9-16
BC
12-18
BC
15-21
BC
18-24
BC
24-30
BC
35-45
BC NA +/- 6
6
Invol. Mansl.
(when no
DUI)
Hom. by Vehicle
(when no DUI)
Burglary (not
home/person)
Theft ($25,000-
$50,000)
Arson (property)
PWID Cocaine,
etc. (2.5 gms)
3-12
BC
6-14
BC
9-16
BC
12-18
BC
15-21
BC
21-27
BC
27-40
BC NA +/- 6
LEVEL
2
Cnty
Incar
RIP
RS
5
[F3]
Burglary (not
home/no person)
Corruption of
Minors
Robbery (prop by
force)
Firearms (loaded)
Theft ($2000-
$25,000)
PWID (1-<10 lb of
marij)
RS-9 1-12BC
3-14
BC
6-16
BC
9-16
BC
12-18
BC
24-36
BC NA +/- 3
4
Indecent Assault
Forgery (will,
deed)
Firearms
(unloaded)
Crim. Trespass
(breaks in)
RS-3 RS-9 RS-12 3-14BC
6-16
BC
9-16
BC
21-30
BC NA +/- 3
3
[M1]
Simple Assault
Terr. Threats
Theft ($200-
$2000)
Retail Theft (3rd)
DUI (M1)
Drug Poss.
RS-1 RS-6 RS-9 RS-12 3-14BC
6-16
BC
12-18
BC NA +/- 3
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Level OGS ExampleOffenses 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
LEVEL
1
RS
2
[M2]
Theft ($50-$200)
Retail Theft
(1st, 2nd)
DUI (M2)
Bad Checks
RS RS-2 RS-3 RS-4 RS-6 1-9 6-12 NA +/- 3
1
[M3]
Most Misd. 3’s;
Theft ($50)
Drug Paraph.
Poss. Small
Amount Marij.
RS RS-1 RS-2 RS-3 RS-4 RS-6 3-6 NA +/- 3
1. Shaded areas of the matrix indicate restrictive intermediate punishments may be imposed as a substitute for
incarceration.
2. When restrictive intermediate punishments are appropriate, the duration of the restrictive intermediate punishment
program shall not exceed the guideline ranges.
3. When the range is RS through a number of months (e.g. RS-6), RIP may be appropriate.
Key:
CNTY =county
INCAR =incarceration
PWID =possession with intent to deliver
REVOC =repeat violent offender category
RFEL =repeat felony 1/felony 2 offender category
RIP =restrictive intermediate punishments
RS =restorative sanctions
<;> =less than;greater than
BC =boot camp
Italics=Three Strikes Offense
§ 303.17. DWE/Possessed Matrix
Prior Record Score
Level OGS Deadly Weapon 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
Level 5
14 Possessed 81-240 93-240 105-240 129-240 177-240 201-240 213-240 240 +/-12
13 Possessed 69-87 75-93 81-99 87-105 93-111 105-123 117-135 240 +/-12
12 Possessed 57-75 63-81 69-87 75-93 81-99 93-111 105-123 120 +/-12
11 Possessed 45-63 51-69 57-75 63-81 69-87 81-99 93-111 120 +/-12
10 Possessed 31-45 39-51 45-57 51-63 57-69 69-81 81-93 120 +/-12
9 Possessed 21-33 27-39 33-45 39-51 45-57 57-69 69-81 120 +/-12
Level 4
8 Possessed 15-22 18-24 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-39 46-58 NA +/-9
7 Possessed 12-20 15-22 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-36 41-51 NA +/-6
6 Possessed 9-18 12-20 16-22 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-46 NA +/-6
Level 3
5 Possessed 6-15 7-18 9-20 12-22 15-22 18-24 30-42 NA +/-3
4 Possessed 3-6 3-12 3-15 6-17 9-19 12-19 24-33 NA +/-3
3 Possessed 3-4 3-9 3-12 3-15 6-17 9-19 15-21 NA +/-3
2 Possessed 3-3 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-9 4-12 9-15 NA +/-3
1 Possessed 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7 3-9 6-9 NA +/-3
§ 303.18. DWE/Used Matrix
Prior Record Score
Level OGS Deadly Weapon 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
Level 5
14 Used 90-240 102-240 114-240 138-240 186-240 210-240 222-240 240 +/-12
13 Used 78-96 84-102 90-108 96-114 102-120 114-132 126-144 240 +/-12
12 Used 66-84 72-90 78-96 84-102 90-108 102-120 114-132 120 +/-12
11 Used 54-72 60-78 66-84 72-90 78-96 90-108 102-120 120 +/-12
10 Used 40-54 48-60 54-66 60-72 66-78 78-90 90-102 120 +/-12
9 Used 30-42 36-48 42-54 48-60 54-66 66-78 78-90 120 +/-12
Level 4
8 Used 21-28 24-30 27-33 30-36 33-39 39-45 52-64 NA +/-9
7 Used 18-26 21-28 24-30 27-33 30-36 36-42 47-57 NA +/-6
6 Used 15-24 18-26 21-28 24-30 27-33 33-39 39-52 NA +/-6
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Level OGS Deadly Weapon 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL REVOC AGG/MIT
Level 3 5 Used 12-21 13-24 15-26 18-28 21-28 24-30 36-48 NA +/-3
4 Used 6-9 6-15 6-18 9-20 12-22 15-22 27-36 NA +/-3
3 Used 6-7 6-12 6-15 6-18 9-20 12-22 18-24 NA +/-3
2 Used 6-6 6-8 6-9 6-10 6-12 7-15 12-18 NA +/-3
1 Used 6-6 6-7 6-8 6-9 6-10 6-12 9-12 NA +/-3
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-400. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Title 210—APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
PART II. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE
[210 PA. CODE CH. 67]
Repealing of § 67.52: Reporting of Opinions; Pub-
lications
Please be advised that the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania has repealed Section 411 of its Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 67.52, as obsolete. That sec-
tion provided:
Annex A
TITLE 210. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
PART II. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 67. INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES OF THE COMMONWEALTH
COURT
DECISIONS
§ 67.52. Reporting of Opinions; Publications.
Official bound volume opinions of the Commonwealth
Court are published periodically by Murrelle Printing
Company as the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Re-
ports, with the approval of and by agreement between the
Commonwealth Court and the publisher. Advance reports
of the opinions of the Commonwealth Court are not
officially published under the authority of the court but
are published with the consent of the Commonwealth
Court by the West Publishing Company, Atlantic Reporter.
In June of 1995, the court ceased publication of the
Commonwealth Court Reports.
G. RONALD DARLINGTON,
Executive Administrator
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-401. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Title 225—RULES OF
EVIDENCE
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE
Proposed Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
In 1995 the Supreme Court authorized its Ad Hoc
Committee on Evidence to draft Rules of Evidence to be
considered for adoption by the Court. The Committee has
drafted these Rules, and the Court has now authorized
the publication of the Rules for comments and sugges-
tions by interested persons.
Written comments should be submitted no later than
June 1, 1997 and directed to:
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Ad Hoc Committee on Evidence
c/o A.O.C.P., Office of Judicial Services
1515 Market Street, Suite 1428
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Comments
The comments accompanying the Proposed Rules were
drafted for discussion purposes only. It is intended that
the comments will be substantially revised after the
period for comment and suggestion has been concluded.
NANCY M. SOBOLEVITCH,
Court Administrator of Pennsylvania
Annex A
TITLE 225. RULES OF EVIDENCE
Art.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
II. JUDICIAL NOTICE
III. PRESUMPTIONS
IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
V. PRIVILEGES
VI. WITNESSES
VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
VIII. HEARSAY
IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDING, AND PHOTO-
GRAPHS
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Rule
101. Scope and Citation of the Rules.
102. Purpose and Construction.
103. Rulings on Evidence.
104. Preliminary Questions.
105. Limited Admissibility.
106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements.
Rule 101. Scope and Citation of the Rules.
(a) Scope. These rules of evidence shall govern proceed-
ings in all courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s
unified judicial system, except as otherwise provided by
law.
(b) Citation. These rules of evidence are adopted by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania under the authority of
Article V § 10(c) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania,
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adopted April 23, 1968. They shall be known as the
Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and shall be cited as
‘‘Pa.R.E.’’
Comment
A principal goal of these rules is to construct a
comprehensive code of evidence governing court proceed-
ings in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. However,
these rules cannot be all-inclusive. Some of our law of
evidence is governed by the Constitutions of the United
States and of Pennsylvania. Some is within the authority
of the legislative branch. Some evidentiary rules are
contained in the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure
and the rules governing proceedings before courts of
limited jurisdiction. Traditionally, our courts have not
applied the law of evidence in its full rigor in proceedings
such as preliminary hearings, bail hearings, grand jury
proceedings, sentencing hearings, parole and probation
hearings, extradition or rendition hearings, and others.
Traditional rules of evidence have also been relaxed to
some extent in custody matters, see e.g., Pa.R.C.P.
1915.11(b) (court interrogation of a child, and other
domestic relations matters), Pa.R.C.P. 1930.3 (telephone
testimony). These rules are not intended to supersede
these other provisions of law unless they do so expressly
or by necessary implication.
These rules are applicable only to courts. They are
applicable in all divisions of the Courts of Common Pleas
including the Civil Division, Criminal Division, Trial
Division, Orphans’ Court Division and Family Division.
They are not applicable to other tribunals, such as
administrative agencies and arbitration panels, except as
provided by law or unless the tribunal chooses to apply
them.
Rule 102. Purpose and Construction.
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the
law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 102.
Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence.
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predi-
cated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection, motion to strike or motion in
limine appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from
the context; or
(2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known
to the court by offer or by motion in limine or was
apparent from the context within which the evidence was
offered.
(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of
the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the
objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the
making of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by
any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
Comment
Paragraph 103(a) differs from F.R.E. 103(a) in that the
Federal Rule says ‘‘Error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a sub-
stantial right of the party is affected, and.’’ (emphasis
added). The italicized words have been deleted because
they are inconsistent with Pennsylvania law in both
criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases the accused is
entitled to relief for an erroneous ruling unless the court
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is
harmless. See Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383
A.2d 155 (1978). In civil cases, Pa.R.C.P. 126 permits the
court to disregard an erroneous ruling ‘‘which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.’’ The deletion
of the underlined words is intended to retain the present
Pennsylvania law in both criminal and civil cases.
Paragraphs 103(a)(1) and (a)(2) are consistent with
Pennsylvania law. See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust
Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974); Commonwealth v.
Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974). Paragraphs
103(a)(1) and (a)(2) are similar to F.R.E. 103(a)(1)—(a)(2).
The term ‘‘motion in limine’’ has been added in paragraph
(a)(2), and the last three words have been changed.
Motions in limine permit the trial court to make rulings
on evidence prior to trial or at trial but before the
evidence is offered. Such motions can expedite the trial
and assist in producing just determinations. Care must be
taken, however, to assure that the record is preserved
should there be post trial motions or appeals. The change
in language is intended to make it clear that the require-
ment that offers of proof be made is applicable to
testimonial and other types of evidence.
Paragraphs 103(b) and (c) are identical to F.R.E. 103(b)
and (c) and are consistent with Pennsylvania practice.
F.R.E. 103(d) permits a court to grant relief for ‘‘plain
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not
brought to the attention of the court.’’ This paragraph has
been deleted because it is inconsistent with paragraphs
(a)(1) and (a)(2) and with Pennsylvania law as established
in Dilliplaine and Clair. In capital cases, the Supreme
Court has relaxed traditional waiver concepts and has
considered alleged errors on their merits. See Common-
wealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982).
Rule 104. Preliminary Questions.
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to
the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determina-
tion it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. When the relevancy
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of
fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of
the fulfillment of the condition.
(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of
evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the
defendant’s rights shall in all cases be conducted outside
the presence of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary
matters shall be so conducted when the interests of
justice require, or when an accused is a witness and so
requests.
(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to
cross-examination as to other issues in the case.
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(e) Weight and Credibility. Even though the court has
decided that evidence is admissible, this does not pre-
clude a party from offering evidence relevant to the
weight or credibility of that evidence.
Comment
Paragraph 104(a) is identical to F.R.E. 104(a). The first
sentence is consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Com-
monwealth v. Chester, 526 Pa. 578, 587 A.2d 1367, cert.
denied, Laird v. Pennsylvania, 502 U. S. 849 and Chester
v. Pennsylvania, 502 U. S. 959 (1991).
The second sentence of paragraph 104(a) is based on
the premise that, by and large, the law of evidence is a
‘‘child of the jury system’’ and that the rules of evidence
should not be applied when the judge is the fact finder.
The theory is that the judge should be empowered to hear
any relevant evidence in order to resolve questions of
admissibility. Under the Federal Rule the court may
consider even the allegedly inadmissible evidence in
deciding whether to admit the evidence. See Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U. S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d
144 (1987). There is no express authority in Pennsylvania
on whether the court is bound by the rules of evidence in
making its determinations on preliminary questions. In
view of this, the approach of the Federal Rule has been
adopted.
The Federal Rules have not specifically resolved the
question of whether the allegedly inadmissible evidence
may be sufficient in and of itself to establish its own
admissibility. See Bourjaily v. United States, supra. This
question cannot be resolved in the abstract. Certainly,
there are some instances in which the disputed evidence
will be sufficiently reliable to establish its own admissibil-
ity. For example, Pa.R.E. 902 provides that some evidence
is self-authenticating. But, in some cases, additional
evidence will be required. Sufficiency of the evidence is a
question that must be resolved by the trial court on a
case-by-case basis.
Paragraph 104(b) is identical to F.R.E. 104(b) and
appears to be consistent with Pennsylvania law. See
Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 806
(1977).
The first sentence of paragraph 104(c) differs from the
first sentence of F.R.E. 104(c) in that the federal rule says
‘‘Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all
cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury.’’ The
first sentence of Pa.R.E. 104(c) has been changed to be
consistent with Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(f), which requires hear-
ings outside the presence of the jury in all cases in which
it is alleged that the evidence was obtained in violation of
the defendant’s rights.
The second sentence of paragraph 104(c) is identical to
the second sentence of F.R.E. 104(c) and indicates that
hearings on other preliminary matters, both criminal and
civil, shall be conducted outside the jury’s presence when
required by the interests of justice. Certainly, the court
should conduct the hearing outside the presence of the
jury when the court believes that it will be necessary to
do so in order to prevent prejudicial information being
heard by the jury. The right of an accused to have his
testimony on a preliminary matter taken outside the
presence of the jury does not appear to have been
discussed in Pennsylvania law.
Paragraph 104(d) is identical to F.R.E. 104(d). In
general, when a party offers himself as a witness, the
party may be questioned on all relevant matters in the
case. See Agate v. Dunleavy, 398 Pa. 26, 156 A.2d 530
(1959). Under Pa.R.E. 104(d), when the accused in a
criminal case testifies only with regard to a preliminary
matter, he or she may not be cross-examined as to other
matters. Although there is no Pennsylvania authority on
this point, it appears that this rule is consistent with
Pennsylvania practice. This approach is consistent with
paragraph 104(c) in that it is designed to preserve the
defendant’s right not to testify generally in the case.
Paragraph 104(e) differs from F.R.E. 104(e) in order to
clarify the meaning of this paragraph. See 21 Wright and
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5058. This
paragraph is consistent with Pennsylvania law.
Rule 105. Limited Admissibility.
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or
for another purpose is admitted, the court upon request
shall, or on its own initiative may, restrict the evidence to
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
Comment
This rule differs from F.R.E. 105, in that the language
‘‘or on its own initiative may’’ has been added. This rule
as amended is consistent with Pennsylvania law. It
should be noted that there are other approaches that may
be utilized when evidence is admissible as to one party or
for one purpose, but not admissible as to another party or
for another purpose. The evidence may be redacted. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 474 Pa. 410, 378 A.2d 859
(1977). A severance may be an appropriate remedy. See
Commonwealth v. Young, 263 Pa. Super. 333, 397 A.2d
1234 (1979). Where the danger of unfair prejudice out-
weighs probative value, the evidence may be excluded.
See Pa.R.E. 403 and McShain v. Indemnity Insurance Co.
of North America, 338 Pa. 113, 12 A.2d 59 (1940).
Rule 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or
Recorded Statements.
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to
be considered contemporaneously with it.
Comment
This section is identical to F.R.E. 106. It is consistent
with Pennsylvania law. See Pedretti v. Pittsburgh Rail-
ways Co., 417 Pa. 581, 209 A.2d 289 (1965). A similar
principle is expressed in Pa.R.C.P. 4020(a)(4) which pro-
vides ‘‘If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by
a party, any other party may require him to introduce all
of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any
party may introduce any other parts.’’
The purpose of Pa.R.E. 106 is to give the adverse party
an opportunity to correct a misleading impression that
may be created by the use of portions of a writing or
recorded statement that are taken out of context. This
rule gives the adverse party the right to correct the
misleading impression at the time that the evidence is
introduced. The trial court has discretion to decide
whether other parts, or other writings or recorded state-
ments, ought in fairness to be considered contemporane-
ously with the original portion.
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE
Rule
201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts.
Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts.
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts.
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(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determina-
tion by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reason-
ably be questioned.
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take judicial no-
tice, whether requested or not.
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice
if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be taken
at any stage of the proceeding.
(g) Instructing Jury. The court shall instruct the jury
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive,
any fact judicially noticed.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 201, except for para-
graph (g).
Paragraph (a) limits the application of this rule to
adjudicative facts. This rule is not applicable to judicial
notice of law. Adjudicative facts are facts about the
events, persons and places relevant to the matter before
the court. See McCormick, Evidence § 328 (4th ed. 1992).
In determining the law applicable to a matter, the
judge is sometimes said to take judicial notice of law. See
Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure,
§ 5102. In Pennsylvania, judicial notice of law has been
regulated by decisional law and statute. See, In re Annual
Controller’s Reports for Years 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935 and
1936, 333 Pa. 489, 5 A.2d 201 (1939) (judicial notice of
public laws); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6107 (judicial notice of
municipal ordinances); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327 (judicial no-
tice of laws of any jurisdiction outside the Common-
wealth); 45 Pa.C.S.A. § 506 (judicial notice of the con-
tents of the Pennsylvania Code and the Pennsylvania
Bulletin). These rules are not intended to change existing
provisions of law.
Paragraph (b) is consistent with Pennsylvania law. See,
Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952); In re
Siemens’ Estate, 346 Pa. 610, 31 A.2d 280 (1943), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 758, 64 S. Ct. 66, 88 L.Ed. 452 (1943).
Paragraph (c) is consistent with Pennsylvania practice.
Paragraph (d) is new to Pennsylvania. Heretofore, the
taking of judicial notice has been discretionary, not
mandatory. The approach of the Federal Rule has been
adopted because it has not been problematic in the
jurisdictions that have adopted this paragraph.
Paragraph (e) provides that parties will have an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the propriety of the court’s taking
judicial notice. No formal procedure has been provided.
Pennsylvania practice appears to have operated satisfac-
torily without a formal procedure.
Paragraph (f). Pennsylvania law has not been com-
pletely consistent with regard to whether a court may
take judicial notice at the pleading stage of proceedings.
See Clouser v. Shamokin Packing Co., 240 Pa. Super. 268,
361 A.2d 836 (1976) (trial court generally should not take
judicial notice at the pleading stage); Bykowski v. Chesed
Co., 425 Pa. Super. 595, 625 A.2d 1256 (1993) (trial court
may take judicial notice in ruling on motion for judgment
on the pleadings). Similarly, older authority has held that
judicial notice may not be taken at the appellate stage.
See Wilson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 421 Pa. 419, 219
A.2d 666 (1966). More recently, the Supreme Court has
taken judicial notice at the appellate stage. See Common-
wealth v. Tau Kappa Epsilon, 530 Pa. 416, 609 A.2d 791
(1992). This paragraph will resolve these apparent incon-
sistencies.
Paragraph (g) differs from F.R.E. 201(g). Under the
Federal Rule the court is required to instruct the jury to
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed in a civil
case. In a criminal case the judicially noticed fact is not
treated as conclusive.
Under Pennsylvania law the judicially noticed fact has
not been treated as conclusive in either civil or criminal
cases, and the opposing party may submit evidence to the
jury to disprove the noticed fact. See Appeal of Albert, 372
Pa. 13, 92 A.2d 663 (1952); Commonwealth v. Brown, 428
Pa. Super. 587, 631 A.2d 1014 (1993). This paragraph
follows the established Pennsylvania law.
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS
Rule
301. General Rule.
Rule 301. General Rule.
Presumptions as they now exist or may be modified by
law shall be unaffected by the adoption of these rules.
Comment
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not modify the
existing law with regard to presumptions. These rules
take a similar approach.
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
Rule
401. Definition of ‘‘Relevant Evidence.’’
402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence
Inadmissible
403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice
404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Excep-
tions; Other Crimes
405. Methods of Proving Character
406. Habit; Routine Practice
407. Subsequent Remedial Measures
408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise
409. Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses
410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions and Related State-
ments
411. Liability Insurance
412. [Vacant]
Rule 401. Definition of ‘‘Relevant Evidence.’’
‘‘Relevant evidence’’ means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 401 is identical to F.R.E. 401. The rule codifies
existing Pennsylvania law, as represented by the Su-
preme Court’s definition of relevance in Commonwealth v.
Scott, 480 Pa. 50, 389 A.2d 79, 82 (1978): ‘‘Evidence which
tends to establish some fact material to the case, or which
tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, is
relevant.’’ See also, Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa.
274, 336 A.2d 282, 284 (1975), describing the relevance
inquiry under Pennsylvania law. Whether evidence has a
tendency to make a given fact more or less probable is to
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be determined by the court in the light of reason,
experience, scientific principles and the other testimony
offered in the case.
A finding of relevance may be conditional, or dependent
on facts not yet of record. Under Pa.R.E. 104(b) such
evidence may be admitted subject to the introduction of
further evidence demonstrating that all conditions neces-
sary to a finding of relevance have been met.
The word, ‘‘fact,’’ as used in Pa.R.E. 401 should be
construed liberally to conform to existing Pennsylvania
law. In conformity with existing law, the rule applies to
proof of a negative, or ‘‘negative evidence.’’ See, e.g., Klein
v. Woolworth, 309 Pa. 320, 163 A. 532 (1932), holding that
the absence of entries in a payroll record was relevant
and admissible to prove that a person was not an
employee, and Stack v. Wapner, 244 Pa. Super.. 278, 368
A.2d 292 (1976), holding that the absence of entries in a
hospital record was relevant and admissible to prove that
the defendant-physician was not present during a critical
time period. These same principles appear in statutory
law. Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104(b) the absence of entries in
an official record is relevant and admissible to prove the
nonexistence of a fact, provided the fact is of the type that
would have been recorded pursuant to an official duty.
See also, Comment under subsection (7) of Pa.R.E. 803,
regarding the absence of entries in records of regularly
conducted activity.
Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible;
Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by law. Evidence that is not relevant is not
admissible.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 402 is substantively the same as F.R.E. 402.
The only variance is in the language of the exceptions
clause in the first sentence. The exceptions clause of the
federal rule specifically enumerates the various sources of
federal rulemaking power. Pa.R.E. 402 substitutes the
phrase, ‘‘by law,’’ to encompass analogous sources of
rulemaking power within the Commonwealth.
The rule states a fundamental concept of the law of
evidence. Relevant evidence is admissible; evidence that
is not relevant is not admissible. This concept is modified
by the exceptions clause of the rule, which states another
fundamental principle of evidentiary law. Evidence other-
wise relevant may be excluded by operation of constitu-
tional law, by statute, by rules of evidence created by
decisional law, by these rules, or by other rules promul-
gated by the Supreme Court.
As noted in the Comment to Pa.R.E. 101, a principal
goal of these rules is to construct a comprehensive code of
evidence governing court proceedings in the Common-
wealth. Pa.R.E. 402 explicitly recognizes, however, that
these rules cannot be all inclusive. The law of evidence is
also shaped by constitutional principle, legislative enact-
ment, procedural rulemaking and decisional law. These
rules of evidence are not intended to supersede other
provisions of law, unless they do so expressly, or by
necessary implication.
Examples of decisionally created rules of exclusion that
are not abrogated by the adoption of these rules include:
the corpus delecti rule, Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa.
334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974); the collateral source rule,
Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 410 Pa. 31, 188 A.2d 259
(1963); the parol evidence rule, Gianni v. R. Russell and
Co., Inc., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924); and the rule
excluding certain evidence to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy, John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 571 A.2d
1380 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 850.
Option I
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on
Grounds of Prejudice.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 403 differs from F.R.E. 403. The federal rule
provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is ‘‘substantially outweighed’’ by the
danger of unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 403 eliminates the
word, ‘‘substantially,’’ in order to conform the text of the
rule more closely to decisional law.
‘‘Unfair prejudice’’ means a tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention
away from their duty of weighing the evidence impar-
tially.
Pa.R.E. 403 provides a single standard for civil and
criminal cases. The rule may differ in application, how-
ever, because evidentiary questions in criminal cases may
have a constitutional dimension not found in civil cases.
In criminal cases, procedural rules cannot be applied to
the detriment of the defendant’s due process right to a
fair trial. See, generally, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U. S. 284 (1973); Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1,
617 A.2d 696 (1992). The absence of analogous constitu-
tional constraints in civil cases may result in more liberal
application of the rule in civil cases.
Civil cases. Pennsylvania decisional law prior to adop-
tion of this rule did not reflect a uniform standard for
balancing probative value against prejudice in civil cases.
Although a number of intermediate appellate cases have
used the language of the federal rule in discussing the
admissibility of contested evidence, see, e.g., Daset Min-
ing Co. v. Industrial Fuels Corp., 326 Pa.Super. 14, 473
A.2d 584, 588 (1984), Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa.Super.
33, 617 A.2d 380, 383 (1992), an equal number of cases
have been decided without reference to a standard for
balancing probative value against prejudice. See, e.g.,
Morrison v. Com., Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 538 Pa. 122, 646
A.2d 565, 572 (1994); Egelkamp v. Egelkamp, 362
Pa.Super. 269, 524 A.2d 501, 504 (1987); Christy v. Darr,
78 Pa.Cmwlth. 354, 467 A.2d 1362, 1364 (1983). Codifica-
tion of a uniform standard by adoption of this rule is not
intended to change substantive law regarding the admis-
sibility of evidence in civil cases.
Criminal cases. Pa.R.E. 403 is consistent with existing
law in criminal cases. See, Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498
Pa. 486, 447 A.2d 250, 254 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Cohen, 529 Pa. 552, 605 A.2d 1212, 1218 (1992); Com-
monwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846, 854
(1989); Commonwealth v. Ulatowski, 472 Pa. 53, 371 A.2d
186, 191, n. 11 (1977).
In criminal cases, there are exceptions to the applica-
tion of this general standard. The degree of prejudice
associated with certain types of evidence has been found
high enough to shift the balance away from admissibility
and towards exclusion, and the evidence is not admitted
unless the proponent can demonstrate that its probative
value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. See,
Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 425 A.2d 715, 729
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(1981) (even where a legitimate evidentiary purpose is
demonstrated, evidence of other crimes is not admissible
unless its probative value is shown to outweigh its
potential for prejudice); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa.
363, 508 A.2d 1167, 1182 (1986)(inflammatory photo-
graphs are admissible only upon a showing that the
photos are of such evidentiary value that their need
clearly outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice);
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468,
481 (1977) (same). Pa.R.E. 403 does not overrule deci-
sional law favoring the exclusion of certain types of
evidence which the courts have found to be highly
prejudicial in criminal cases. Under Pa.R.E. 403 courts
may continue to recognize that the prejudice inherent in
certain types of evidence is strong enough to shift the
balance towards exclusion.
With regard to evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
of the defendant in a criminal case, Pa.R.E. 404(b)(iii)
codifies the standard set by Commonwealth v. Morris,
supra. Rule 404(b)(iii) provides that such evidence, when
offered for a legitimate evidentiary purpose, is admissible
only upon a showing that the probative value outweighs
the potential for prejudice.
Rule 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible To
Prove Conduct; Exceptions; 0ther Crimes.
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a per-
son’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except as follows:
(1) Character of Accused. In a criminal case, evidence
of a pertinent trait of character of the accused is admis-
sible when offered by the accused, or by the prosecution
to rebut the same.
(2) Character of Alleged Victim.
(i) In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim is admissible when offered
by the accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.
(ii) In a homicide case, where the accused has offered
evidence that the deceased was the first aggressor, evi-
dence of a character trait of the deceased for peacefulness
is admissible when offered by the prosecution to rebut the
same.
(iii) In a civil action for assault and battery, evidence of
a character trait of violence of the plaintiff may be
admitted when offered by the defendant to rebut evidence
that the defendant was the first aggressor.
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of a pertinent trait
of character of a witness is admissible as provided in
rules 607 (who may impeach), 608 (character and conduct
of witness) and 609 (evidence of conviction of crime).
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith.
(2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be
admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity
or absence of mistake or accident.
(3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts proffered
under subsection (ii) of this rule may be admitted only
upon a showing that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its potential for prejudice.
(4) In criminal cases, the prosecution shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the
court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of any
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 404 differs from F.R.E. 404. The differences are
discussed in the subsection Comments that follow.
Subsection (a). Pa.R.E. 404(a) is substantively the
same as F.R.E. 404(a). The rules differ only as to
structure. Although the exception provided at Rule
(a)(2)(iii) does not appear in the federal rule, it is
consistent with both federal and Pennsylvania decisional
law. See, Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, 601 F.2d 516
(10th Cir. 1979); Bell v. Philadelphia, 341 Pa. Super.. 534,
491 A.2d 1386 (1985).
This rule does not control the use of character evidence
in civil actions where character is an element of a claim
or defense. For example, in actions for negligent entrust-
ment, evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of the
character of the person to whom he entrusted some duty
is both relevant and admissible. It is not excluded by this
rule, because it is not offered to prove action in confor-
mity therewith. Pa.R.E. 405 (b)(i) provides that in a civil
action where character is an element of a claim or
defense, character may be proved either by reputation
evidence or by specific instances of conduct.
Subsection (a)(2) is a restatement of Pennsylvania law.
In cases of homicide and assault, an accused who claims
self-defense is permitted to introduce evidence of the
alleged victim’s violent or aggressive character for the
following purposes: (i) to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the accused’s apprehension of immediate danger; or (ii)
to show that the alleged victim was, in fact, the aggres-
sor. For the first purpose, there must be a showing that
the accused had knowledge of the alleged victim’s violent
character. For the second purpose, the accused’s knowl-
edge of the alleged victim’s character for violence is not
required. Commonwealth v. Dillon, 528 Pa. 417, 598 A.2d
963, 965 (1991). Under Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa.
297, 284 A.2d 748 (1971), evidence of the alleged victim’s
criminal record for violence is admissible for both pur-
poses. See, also, Pa.R.E. 405, providing that the alleged
victim’s character for violence may be proven either by
reputation evidence or by specific instances of conduct.
After the accused has offered evidence regarding the
alleged victim’s violent character, the prosecution is per-
mitted to rebut such evidence by offering proof of the
peaceful character of the alleged victim. Under Pa.R.E.
405, the peaceful character of the alleged victim may be
proven by reputation evidence.
Subsection (b). This subsection reflects the courts’
long-standing concern regarding the prejudicial impact of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs and acts in the trial of a
criminal accused. In Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa.
601, 391 A.2d 1048 (1978) the Court characterized evi-
dence of other crimes as, ‘‘probably only equalled by a
confession in its prejudicial impact upon a jury.’’ Id. at
606, 391 A.2d at 1050. ‘‘The presumed effect of such
evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to
believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip
him of the presumption of innocence.’’ Id. In Common-
wealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981),
the Court held that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts offered for a legitimate evidentiary purpose is admis-
sible, ‘‘if the probative worth . . . outweighs the tendency
to prejudice the jury’’. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(iii) adopts the
standard used in Morris.
The Supreme Court has cautioned lower courts against
liberal interpretation of the ‘‘other purposes’’ clause to
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permit the introduction of other crimes evidence under
subsection (b)(ii). Commonwealth v. Spruill, 391 A.2d at
1050. Cases in which the Supreme Court has approved
admission of evidence under the ‘‘other purposes’’ clause
include: where the other crimes were part of a chain or
sequence of events which formed the history of the case
and were part of its natural development, Commonwealth
v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988), and where the
defendant used other crimes to threaten or intimidate the
alleged victim. Commonwealth v. Claypool, 508 Pa. 198,
495 A.2d 176 (1985).
Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character.
(a) Reputation Evidence. In all cases in which evidence
of character or a trait of character of a person is
admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation. A witness whose testimony is to be admitted
under this Rule may not be called at trial under this Rule
unless the party seeking to call the witness makes known
to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet the evidence, the proponent’s
intention in calling the witness, the particulars of the
witness’ expected testimony, and the name and address of
the witness. The particulars of the witness’ expected
testimony should include the identity of any person the
witness spoke to in the community in order to reach a
conclusion about the person’s reputation for the relevant
trait of character, the nature of the information provided
by such person(s) in the community, and what relation-
ship, if any, the person in the community has with the
person who is the subject of the testimony. On cross-
examination of the reputation witness, inquiry is allow-
able into specific instances of conduct probative of the
character trait in question, except that in criminal cases
inquiry into arrests of the accused not resulting in
conviction is not permissible.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of
conduct are not admissible to prove character or a trait of
character, except as follows:
(i) In civil cases, specific instances of a person’s conduct
may be admitted to prove character or a trait of charac-
ter, where character or a trait of character is an element
of a claim or defense.
(ii) In criminal cases, the accused may prove the
alleged victim’s character or a trait of character by
specific instances of conduct.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 405 differs from F.R.E. 405. One of the princi-
pal points of divergence is that Pennsylvania law does not
permit proof of character by opinion evidence. Such
evidence is admissible to prove character under the
federal rules. In criminal cases, Pennsylvania law also
imposes additional restrictions on the use of specific acts
evidence to prove character. These restrictions are dis-
cussed in the subsection Comments that follow.
Reputation evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule
under Pa.R.E. 803(21).
Subsection (a). Pa.R.E. 405(a) differs from F.R.E. 405 in
providing that reputation witnesses offered on behalf of a
defendant in a criminal case may not be cross-examined
regarding arrests of the defendant not resulting in convic-
tion. There is no similar restriction under the federal
rule. The restriction set forth in Pa.R.E. 405(a) derives
from Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 188, 436 A.2d 607,
611—612 (1981), holding that arrests not resulting in
conviction may not be used to impeach testimony that the
accused was a person of good character. Pa.R.E. 405(a)
also differs from F.R.E. 405 in that it provides a notice
requirement. This requirement is intended to eliminate
unfair surprise.
See, also, Comment to Pa.R.E. 608(b), infra, regarding
the use of specific instances of conduct, either on cross-
examination or as extrinsic evidence, to attack or support
the credibility of a witness.
Subsection (b). Pa.R.E. 405(b) is substantively the same
as F.R.E. 405(b). The difference between the two rules is
essentially structural. The federal rule does not distin-
guish between civil and criminal cases in permitting the
use of specific instances of conduct to prove character.
Pa.R.E. 405(b) does distinguish civil and criminal cases.
Subsection (b)(i). With regard to civil cases, Pa.R.E.
405(b)(i) is identical to the federal rule in permitting
proof of character by specific instances of conduct only
where character is an essential element of the claim or
defense. Historically, the use of specific acts to prove
character was prohibited under Pennsylvania law. Frazier
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 38 Pa. 104 (1861), Rosenstiel v.
Pittsburg Rys. Co., 230 Pa. 273, 79 A. 556 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 280 Pa. 368, 124 A. 486 (1924).
The rationale for exclusion was that such evidence would
confuse the case with collateral issues, prolong the trial,
and mislead and distract the jury. Rosensteil, 79 A. at
559. Without overruling these earlier cases, the Court in
Matusak v. Kulczewski, 295 Pa. 208, 145 A. 94 (1928) held
that specific acts of conduct were admissible to prove
character in a suit for alienation of affection. Specific acts
of conduct have more recently been admitted to prove
character in actions alleging negligent employment,
Dempsey v. Walso Bureau, Inc., 431 Pa. 562, 246 A.2d 418
(1968), and in custody cases on the issue of parental
fitness. Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Grimes, 281 Pa.
Super. 484, 422 A.2d 572 (1980). Pa.R.E. 405 is intended
to reflect the approach of these cases by permitting
specific instances of conduct to prove character in a civil
action only where character is an element of a claim or
defense.
Subsection (b)(ii). Under F.R.E. 405(b) criminal cases
are subject to the general rule that specific instances of
conduct are admissible to prove character, where charac-
ter is an element of the claim or defense. Pa.R.E.
405(b)(ii) is facially more restrictive than the federal rule
by permitting specific acts evidence to prove character in
criminal cases in only one instance: when offered by the
defendant to prove the character of the alleged victim.
This rule is consistent with Pennsylvania law. See, Com-
monwealth v. Dillon, 528 Pa. 417, 598 A.2d 963 (1991);
Commonwealth v. Amos, 445 Pa. 297, 284 A.2d 748
(1971). See also, Comment to Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2), supra,
regarding the admissibility of character evidence on be-
half of a defendant in a criminal case to prove the alleged
victim’s character for violence in support of a claim of
self-defense. Although different in form, Pa.R.E. 405(b)(ii)
does not differ significantly from the federal rule in
substance, since there are few, if any, identifiable in-
stances in criminal cases where character will be an
essential element of the claim or defense.
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice.
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not
and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant
to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on
a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice.
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Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 406 and restates Penn-
sylvania law. See Baldridge v. Matthews, 378 Pa. 566, 106
A.2d 809 (1954)(uniform practice of hotel permitted to
establish conduct in conformity with practice). The con-
cepts of ‘‘habit’’ and ‘‘routine practice’’ denote conduct that
occurs with fixed regularity in repeated specific situa-
tions. Like the federal rule, Pa.R.E. 406 does not set forth
the ways in which habit or routine practice may be
proven, but leaves this for case-by-case determination.
Evidence of specific past instances of conduct, as well as
opinion based on adequate factual foundation, are poten-
tial methods of proof. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivers,
537 Pa. 394, 644 A.2d 710 (1994) (allowing testimony
based on familiarity with another’s conduct); Baldridge,
106 A.2d at 811 (testimony of uniform practice apparently
permitted without examples of specific instances). The
court may determine whether evidence of specific in-
stances of conduct should be treated as a preliminary
question. The questions whether testimony on habit or
routine practice is supported by adequate foundation, or
should be conditionally received subject to further founda-
tion, are matters for the court’s discretion.
Evidence of habit must be distinguished from evidence
of character. Character applies to a generalized propen-
sity to act in a certain way without reference to specific
conduct, and frequently contains a normative, or value-
laden, component (e.g., a character for truthfulness).
Habit connotes one’s conduct in a precise factual context,
and frequently involves mundane matters (e.g., recording
the purpose for checks drawn). The Advisory Committee’s
Note to F.R.E. 406 sets forth a description of this
distinction: ‘‘Character is a generalized description of
one’s disposition in respect to a general trait, such as
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. . . . A habit, on the
other hand, is the person’s regular practice of meeting a
particular kind of situation with a specific type of con-
duct, such as the habit of going down a particular
stairway two stairs at a time, or of giving the hand-signal
for a left turn, or of alighting from railway cars while
they are moving.’’ F.R.E. 406 adv. comm. notes ¶ 2
(quoting McCormick on Evidence § 162 p. 340).
Option I
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures.
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove that the party who took the measures
was negligent or engaged in culpable conduct in connec-
tion with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when of-
fered for impeachment or to prove other controverted
matters, such as ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures.
Comment
This rule is similar to F.R.E. 407. The rule restates the
traditional Pennsylvania doctrine that evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures is not admissible to prove fault
or negligence. Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274, 51
A. 979 (1902).
Pa.R.E. 407 is silent on the issue whether it excludes
subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove a
defect in strict liability. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
has issued partially conflicting decisions on whether
subsequent remedial measures are admissible to prove
defect in strict liability cases. Compare Matsko v. Harley
Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 452, 473 A.2d
155 (1984)(proof of recall admitted to prove defect)(2 1
split opinion), with Connelly v. Roper Corp., 404 Pa.
Super. 67, 590 A.2d 11 (1991)(post-sale design changes
not admissible to prove design defect)(2 1 split opinion);
Dunkle v. West Penn Power Co., 400 Pa. Super. 334, 583
A.2d 814 (1990)(post-sale safety standard not admissible
to prove defective design or inadequate warning where no
recall required); and Gottfried v. American Can Co., 339
Pa. Super. 403, 489 A.2d 222 (1985)(post-sale design
changes not admissible to prove design defect). Pa.R.E.
allows the Pennsylvania courts to continue to develop the
law in this area, leaving the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia free to decide this matter in the context of a case or
controversy.
The majority of federal circuits to address this issue
have decided that F.R.E. 407 does not permit subsequent
remedial measures to be used to prove defect in strict
liability cases. See Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d
1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); Chase v. G.M. Corp., 856 F.2d
17, 22 (4th Cir. 1988); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d
634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,
733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Alexander v. Conveyors
& Dumpers, Inc., 731 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1984);
Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695
F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v. American Steamship
Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066—67 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v.
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U. S. 960 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628
F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1080
(1981); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d
Cir. 1979). See also Dine v. Western Exterminating Co.,
1988 U. S. Dist. Lexis 4745 (D.D.C. March 9, 1988). Two
federal circuits, the Eighth and the Tenth, have held that
Rule 407 does not exclude evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures in strict liability actions. See Huffman v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1483 (10th Cir.
1990); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008,
1013 (8th Cir. 1989); Roth v. Black & Decker, U. S., Inc.,
737 F.2d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 1984); Herndon v. Seven Bar
Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U. S. 958 (1984). See also McFarland v.
Bruno Mach. Co., 626 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio 1994) (the
Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio Rule 407, a duplicate
of the federal rule, should not apply in a strict products
liability case). The Eighth Circuit apparently is reconsid-
ering its position. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,
506 (8th Cir. 1993) (‘‘[T]his case illustrates the dangers
inherent in our present approach and further . . . it may
indeed be wise to revisit the issue en banc in a proper
case.’’); see also DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697
F.2d 222, 227—29 (8th Cir. 1983) (allowing 407 to exclude
evidence in a strict products liability setting).
Pa.R.E. 407 makes clear in the first sentence that the
rule of exclusion operates only in favor of a party who
took the subsequent remedial measures. The federal
version of Rule 407 is silent as to whether there is any
restriction on the actor who must have taken the subse-
quent remedial measure for the rule to preclude admissi-
bility of such evidence. The majority of federal courts
have held that the rule does not apply when one other
than the allegedly liable party takes the action because
the reason for the rule (to encourage remedial measures)
is not implicated. See, e.g., TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson
Electric Co., 33 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).
The rule does not, however, address whether measures
taken by another party are admissible against a party
that did not take the measures. To be admissible, such
evidence must satisfy the standards of Pa.R.E. 401, 402
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and 403. E.g., Leaphart v. Whiting Corp., 387 Pa. Super.
253, 564 A.2d 165 (1989)(repairs to product made by
plaintiff’s employer not admissible in strict liability action
against product seller/installer and component part
manufacturers), allocatur denied, 525 Pa. 619, 620, 577
A.2d 890, 891 (1990); Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-
Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984); O’Dell v.
Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir. 1990) (excluding
evidence under Rule 403 as prejudicial and irrelevant).
The last sentence of Pa.R.E. has been altered from the
federal rule to make clear that, when subsequent reme-
dial measures are offered to prove issues such as owner-
ship, control or feasibility of precautionary measures,
those issues must be controverted. Pennsylvania recog-
nizes the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures
to prove controverted issues other than negligence or
culpable conduct, such as the feasibility of precautions,
and the rule incorporates this recognition. See, e.g.,
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 282 A.2d 206 (1971);
Haas v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Transp.,
113 Pa. Cmwlth. 218, 536 A.2d 865 (1988) (evidence of
subsequent erection of warning sign not permitted to
show feasibility of same where issue not controverted).
Option II
Rule 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures.
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if
taken previously, would have made the event less likely
to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove that the party who took the measures
was negligent or engaged in culpable conduct in connec-
tion with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when of-
fered to prove other controverted matters, such as owner-
ship, control, feasibility of precautionary measures, or a
defect in strict liability cases, or when offered for im-
peachment purposes.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 407 is similar to its federal counterpart, but
differs substantially in its formulation.
Pa.R.E. 407 is a limited exception to the general
evidential precept set forth in Pa.R.E. 402 that all
relevant evidence is admissible. Evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, when not relevant, may be excluded
under Pa.R.E. 402.
Pa.R.E. 407 applies both to civil and criminal cases,
though its most common application, by far, is in civil
cases for personal injuries, or other damages, resulting
from an accident.
Pa.R.E. 407 is the result of a public policy decision that
must choose between two evils. On balance, it is thought
that the chances that finders of fact, usually juries, will
reach wrong decisions in cases because they have been
deprived of relevant evidence of subsequent remedial
measures, are outweighed by the chances that parties
being charged with fault for causing accidents, or other
undesirable events, will not take timely remedial mea-
sures to prevent recurrences for fear that their actions
will be used against them in litigation arising out of the
initial event.
Pa.R.E. 407, unlike its federal counterpart, makes it
clear that it may be used to exclude evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures only by the party who took
them. For example, a defendant manufacturer of a ma-
chine involved in an accident to a plaintiff worker cannot
use Pa.R.E. 407 to exclude relevant evidence that the
worker’s employer put a guard on the machine after the
accident. (If the evidence is not relevant, the manufact-
urer can use Rule 402 to exclude it.) The federal rule is
ambiguous, but after many years of litigation various
circuits seem to have reached a consensus that it should
be interpreted to preclude use by anyone other than a
party who has taken the subsequent remedial measures.
See TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co., 33 F.3d
397 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).
Pa.R.E. 407 also differs from its federal counterpart in
making clear that evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures may be admitted to prove a defect in a strict
products liability case. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 is
ambiguous on this point. More than 20 years after its
enactment, federal court decisions still conflict with re-
spect to its meaning.
Pennsylvania has long held that evidence of subsequent
remedial measures may not be introduced to prove ante-
cedent negligence. See Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa.
274, 51 A. 979 (1902). However, Pennsylvania has been
resolutely meticulous in holding that concepts of negli-
gence and fault have no place in a suit for damages based
on strict products liability. See Azzarello v. Black Bros.
Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Lewis v.
Coffing Hoist Div., 515 Pa. 334, 528 A.2d 590 (1987);
Walton v. Avco Corp., 530 Pa. 568, 610 A.2d 454 (1992).
Therefore, when Pa.R.E. 407 says that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove
‘‘negligence or culpable conduct,’’ it does not encompass
claims based on strict liability, i.e., liability without fault.
Pa.R.E. 407 is thus consistent with current Pennsylvania
law as enunciated in Matsko v. Harley Davidson Motor
Co., Inc., 325 Pa. Super. 452, 473 A.2d 155 (1984).
Pa.R.E. 407 also avoids another pitfall in the federal
formulation. In listing examples of purposes for which
evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be admit-
ted, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 is worded ambiguously.
It is not clear whether the words, ‘‘if controverted,’’ are
intended to apply only to the immediately preceding
example (feasibility of precautionary measures), or to all
preceding examples. At any rate, Pa.R.E. 407 makes it
clear that evidence of subsequent remedial measures may
be admitted only to prove ‘‘controverted matters.’’
Rule 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to
furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to
accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or at-
tempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to
either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. This
rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or prov-
ing an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
Comment
This rule, which is substantially similar to F.R.E. 408,
excludes the use of evidence of compromises in civil cases
to prove either liability for a claim or validity of an
amount in controversy. Contrary to its federal counter-
part, Pa.R.E. 408 does not bar the use of all statements
and conduct occurring during settlement negotiations. In
this respect, the rule continues existing Pennsylvania law
that distinct admissions of fact made during settlement
discussions are admissible. Rochester Machine Corp. v.
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Mulach Steel Corp., 498 Pa. 545, 449 A.2d 1366
(1982)(plurality); Heyman v. Hanauer, 302 Pa. 56, 152 A.
910 (1930); Hammel v. Christian, 416 Pa. Super. 78, 610
A.2d 979 (1992), allocatur denied, 533 Pa. 652, 624 A.2d
111 (1993).
Like the federal rule, Pa.R.E. 408 permits evidence
relating to compromises and offers to compromise to be
admitted for purposes other than proving liability, such as
showing bias or prejudice. See Heyman v. Hanauer, 302
Pa. 56, 152 A. 910 (1930) (if proposal was offer to settle, it
could have been used to impeach witness).
In allowing compromises to be used for ‘‘other pur-
poses,’’ Pa.R.E. reconciles partially conflicting authority in
Pennsylvania on the admissibility of completed compro-
mises. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
§ 6141. Effect of certain settlements
(a) Personal injuries.—Settlement with or any pay-
ment made to an injured person or to others on behalf of
such injured person with the permission of such injured
person or to anyone entitled to recover damages on
account of injury or death of such person shall not
constitute an admission of liability by the person making
the payment or on whose behalf the payment was made,
unless the parties to such settlement or payment agree to
the contrary.
(b) Damages to property.—Settlement with or any
payment made to a person or on his behalf to others for
damages to or destruction of property shall not constitute
an admission of liability by the person making the
payment or on whose behalf the payment was made,
unless the parties to such settlement or payment agree to
the contrary.
(c) Admissibility in evidence.—Except in an action
in which final settlement and release has been pleaded as
a complete defense, any settlement or payment referred
to in subsections (a) and (b) shall not be admissible in
evidence on the trial of any matter.
Based on section 6141(c), a panel of the Superior Court
in Wilkerson v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 360 Pa. Super. 523,
521 A.2d 25 (1987), allocatur denied, 518 Pa. 61, 540 A.2d
268 (1980), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 827 (1988), held that a
completed settlement could not be introduced to show
bias, prejudice or interest. Recent cases from the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania indicate, however, that reasons
such as public policy and the right to a fair cross-
examination require that evidence of a settlement be
admitted for purposes other than showing liability for a
claim or the amount of a claim. See Hatfield v. Continen-
tal Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 610 A.2d 446 (1992)(per-
mitting evidence of agreement akin to ‘‘Mary Carter’’
agreement to be used to show bias); Hammel v. Christian,
416 Pa. Super. 78, 610 A.2d 979 (1992), allocatur denied,
533 Pa. 652, 624 A.2d 111 (1993). Moreover, 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 6141(a) (c) can be interpreted to exclude
evidence only when offered as a party’s admission of
liability.
Consistent with Pennsylvania law, Pa.R.E. 408 follows
the federal rule that does not exclude evidence of offers to
compromise or completed compromises when used to
prove an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution. This is consistent with Pennsylvania law. See
Commonwealth v. Pettinato, 360 Pa. Super. 242, 520 A.2d
437 (1987). The rule would not permit, however, the use
of evidence relating to good faith compromises or offers to
compromise when made for the purpose of reaching an
agreement such as those sanctioned by Pa.R.Crim.P. 314
(relating to dismissal of criminal charges not committed
by force or violence upon payment of restitution) or
Pa.R.Crim.P. 145 (relating to dismissal upon satisfaction
or agreement). The court may need to conduct, out of the
hearing of the jury, a preliminary inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding compromises in criminal mat-
ters to determine whether to permit such evidence.
Rule 409. Payment of Medical and Similar Ex-
penses.
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay
medical, hospital or similar expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 409 and is consistent
with Pennsylvania law. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6141(c)(payment of
expenses not admissible); see also Burns v. Joseph
Flaherty Co., 278 Pa. 579, 123 A. 496 (1924)(guarantee of
medical expenses cannot be used as basis for liability). As
with F.R.E. 409 (and as with Pa.R.E. 408), collateral
factual admissions made in the course of offering to pay
for medical expenses are not excluded by this rule.
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea Discussions
and Related Statements.
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this
rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or
criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant
who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceed-
ings under Rules 59, 177, 179 or 319 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, or any
comparable rule or provision of law of another state
regarding the pleas identified in subsections (1) and (2) of
this rule; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discus-
sions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority
which does not result in a plea of guilty or which results
in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
(b) Exception. A statement made in the course of a
plea, proceedings or discussions identified in subsection
(a) of this rule is admissible (1) in any proceeding
wherein another statement made in the course of the
same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and
the statement ought in fairness to be considered contem-
poraneously with it, or (2) in a criminal proceeding for
perjury, false swearing or unsworn falsification to authori-
ties.
Comment
This rule is functionally equivalent to F.R.E. 410.
References to Rules 59, 177, 179 and 319 of the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Criminal Procedure and the comparable
rules or other provisions of other states have been added.
Unlike the federal rule, subsection (b) of the Pennsylva-
nia rule is set forth separately to indicate that it creates
an exception applicable to all of subsection (a). Subsection
(b) also refers to the Pennsylvania analogues to false
statement under federal law. Subsection (b) of the Penn-
sylvania rule also does not expressly include the federal
requirement that statements need be made by the defen-
dant under oath, on the record and in the presence of
counsel because, for example, prosecutions for unsworn
falsifications to authorities do not require a statement
under oath. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4904. The rule permits
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case law to decide whether any further limitations on the
rule should be imposed. As modified, the rule reflects
present Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Jones,
375 Pa. Super. 194, 544 A.2d 54 (1988); Commonwealth ex
rel. Warner v. Warner, 156 Pa. Super. 465, 40 A.2d 886
(1945).
The conviction that results from a plea of nolo
contendere, as distinct from the plea itself, may be used
to impeach in a later proceeding (subject to Pa.R.E. 609),
and to establish an element of a charge in a later
administrative proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Snyder,
408 Pa. 253, 182 A.2d 495 (1962)(conviction based on nolo
contendere plea could be used to impeach witness in later
criminal proceeding), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 957 (1963);
Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Wel-
fare, 512 Pa. 181, 516 A.2d 333 (1986)(conviction based on
nolo contendere plea permitted to establish element of
charge in administrative proceeding).
In addition, Pennsylvania has a statute that governs
the admissibility of pleas in summary proceedings involv-
ing motor vehicle matters. The statute, which appears at
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6142, provides as follows:
§ 6142. Pleas in vehicle matters
(a) General Rule.—A plea of guilty or nolo contendere,
or a payment of the fine and costs prescribed after any
such plea, in any summary proceeding made by any
person charged with a violation of Title 75 (relating to
vehicles) shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil
matter arising out of the same violation or under the
same facts or circumstances.
(b) Exception.—The provisions of subsection (a) shall
not be applicable to administrative or judicial proceedings
involving the suspension of a motor vehicle or tractor
operating privilege, learner’s permit, or right to apply for
a motor vehicle or tractor operating privilege, or the
suspension of a certificate of appointment as an official
inspection station, or the suspension of a motor vehicle,
tractor, or trailer designation.
Rule 411. Liability Insurance.
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against
liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the
person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This
rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insur-
ance against liability when offered for another purpose,
such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or
prejudice of a witness.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 411 and is a restatement
of Pennsylvania law that evidence of insurance can be
admitted notwithstanding some prejudicial effect if the
evidence of insurance is itself relevant to prove an issue
in the case. E.g., Beechwoods Flying Serv. v. Al Hamilton
Contracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618, 476 A.2d 350 (1984); Price
v. Yellow Cab Co. of Philadelphia, 443 Pa. 56, 278 A.2d
161 (1971) (plurality) (collecting cases); Fleischman v.
Reading, 388 Pa. 183, 130 A.2d 429 (1957); Copozi v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 371 Pa. 503, 92 A.2d 177 (1952);
McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apartments, 278 Pa. Super.
229, 420 A.2d 514 (1980); Jury v. New York Central R.
Co., 167 Pa. Super. 244, 74 A.2d 531 (1950). The rule lists
examples of issues on which evidence of insurance could
be relevant. As with all evidence, evidence not excluded
by this rule must satisfy the standard of Pa.R.E. 403.
Rule 412 [See Comment]
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted a Rule of Evidence
comparable to F.R.E. 412, ‘‘Rape Cases; Relevance of
Victim’s Past Behavior.’’ In Pennsylvania this subject is
governed by 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104 (the ‘‘Rape Shield Law’’)
and by decisional law which has redefined, on constitu-
tional grounds, the statute’s application.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3104 provides as follows:
§ 3104. Evidence of victim’s sexual conduct
(a) General rule.—Evidence of specific instances of
the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, opinion evidence
of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation
evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall
not be admissible in prosecutions under this chapter
except evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct
with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is
at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursu-
ant to the rules of evidence.
(b) Evidentiary proceedings.—A defendant who pro-
poses to offer evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual
conduct pursuant to subsection (a) shall file a written
motion and offer of proof at the time of trial. If, at the
time of trial, the court determines that the motion and
offer of proof are sufficient on their faces, the court shall
order an in camera hearing and shall make findings on
the record as to the relevance and admissibility of the
proposed evidence pursuant to the standards set forth in
subsection (a).
The statute permits evidence of past sexual conduct to
be introduced in only one instance: past sexual conduct
with the defendant is admissible where relevant to the
issue of consent. In response to a number of constitu-
tional challenges, Pennsylvania courts have defined fur-
ther exceptions to the statute’s rule of exclusion, holding
that evidence of prior sexual conduct is not barred in the
following circumstances: (1) where the evidence is consti-
tutionally required to permit a jury to make a fair
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, Com-
monwealth v. Spiewak, 533 Pa. 1, 617 A.2d 696, 701—702
(1992); (2) where the evidence is relevant to explain the
presence of semen, injury or other objective signs of
intercourse, Commonwealth v. Marjorana, 503 Pa. 602,
470 A.2d 80, 81 (1983); and (3) where the evidence may
demonstrate the complainant’s bias, interest, prejudice, or
motive. See, Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa. Super. 538,
605 A.2d 1248 (1992); Commonwealth v. Wall, 413 Pa.
Super. 599, 606 A.2d 449, appeal denied, 532 Pa. 645, 614
A.2d 1142 (1992); Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 372 Pa.
Super. 566, 539 A.2d 1341, appeal denied, 520 Pa. 573,
549 A.2d 134 (1988); see also, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S.
308 (1974). The exceptions recognized in these cases are
consistent with F.R.E. 412.
There is no correspondent legislative authority in Penn-
sylvania for excluding evidence of past sexual conduct in
civil actions. If evidence of sexual character or conduct in
a civil action is otherwise relevant and admissible under
these rules, it is not excludable under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104.
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES
Rule
501. General Rule.
Rule 501. General Rule.
Privileges as they now exist or may be modified by law
shall be unaffected by the adoption of these rules.
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Comment
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not modify the
existing law with regard to privileges. These rules take a
similar approach.
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES
Rule
601. Competency.
602. Lack of Personal Knowledge.
603. Oath or Affirmation.
604. Interpreters.
605. Competency of Judge as Witness.
606. Competency of Juror as Witness.
607. Impeachment of Witness.
608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.
609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.
610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions.
611. Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation.
612. Writing or Other Item Used to Refresh Memory.
613. Prior Statements of Witnesses.
614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court.
615. Sequestration of Witnesses.
Rule 601. Competency.
(a) General Rule. Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided by statute or in
these Rules.
(b) Disqualification for Specific Defects. A person is
incompetent to testify if because of a mental condition or
immaturity, the Court finds that he or she:
(1) is, or was, at any relevant time, incapable of
perceiving accurately;
(2) is unable to express himself or herself so as to be
understood either directly or through an interpreter;
(3) has an impaired memory; or
(4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to tell the
truth.
Comment
Section (a) of this Rule differs from F.R.E. 601, which
abolishes all existing grounds of incompetency not specifi-
cally provided for in later rules dealing with witnesses,
except in civil actions where state law supplies the rule of
decision. Section (b) has no counterpart in the Federal
Rules. Pa. R.E. 601 tracks current Pennsylvania statutory
and decisional law, except to the extent that spousal
incompetency to testify as to non-access may still persist.
Section (a).—Pennsylvania has several statutes relating
to the competency of witnesses. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5911, all persons are fully competent as witnesses in
any criminal proceeding except as ‘‘otherwise provided in
this subchapter.’’ Similarly, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5921 states
that in civil cases, a liability for costs, a right to
compensation and any interest in the question on trial or
any other interest or policy of law shall not make any
person incompetent, with the same exception. What has
been ‘‘otherwise provided’’ places a number of limits on
these general rules.
Originally, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5912 made those convicted of
perjury or subornation of perjury in a Pennsylvania court
incompetent to testify in criminal cases, except in a
proceeding to punish or prevent injury or violence to the
convicted person’s person or property. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5922, the same disqualification applies in civil cases.
Later, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5912 was amended by the Act of
April 22, 1993, P. L. 2, No. 2, so that those convicted of
perjury or subornation of perjury are now fully competent
to testify in criminal cases; the disqualification in civil
cases persists.
The marital relationship has been the source of various
statutes affecting competency. Initially, a husband and
wife were not competent to testify against each other
(with certain exceptions having to do generally with their
conduct toward one another or their children) either in
criminal proceedings, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5913, or civil mat-
ters, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5924. However, in both criminal and
civil cases, in which a spouse is a party, when that spouse
makes an attack upon the other’s character or conduct,
the latter becomes a competent witness in rebuttal. 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5915, 5925 and 5926. Moreover, in an action
by either a husband or wife against the other to recover
or protect the separate property of either, both are fully
competent witnesses. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5927.
This framework was changed when 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5913 was amended by the Act of June 29, 1989, P. L.
69, No. 16, to convert spousal incompetency in criminal
cases into a waivable privilege not to testify against a
then lawful spouse and to make the privilege unavailable
in certain types of cases. The amendment was in line
with the holding in Trammel v. United States, 445 U. S.
40 (1980). No comparable change was made with respect
to spousal incompetency in civil matters; in fact, the Act
of Dec. 19, 1990, P. L. 1240, No. 206, § 4, confirmed this
disqualification. In addition, the other provisions regard-
ing spousal rebuttal testimony in both criminal and civil
cases and full spousal competency in actions to recover or
protect separate property have been left undisturbed.
At early common law, all parties to the litigation and
all persons having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in
its outcome were incompetent. When this all-
encompassing disqualification was abolished in this coun-
try (this was accomplished in Pennsylvania by the enact-
ments now embodied in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5911 and 5921,
referred to above), one vestige of it was retained—the
dead man’s statutes. Pennsylvania’s version is found in
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5930 5933. Section 5930 provides gener-
ally that where any party ‘‘to a thing or contract in
action’’ has died or ‘‘been adjudged a lunatic’’ and his
right has passed ‘‘to a party on the record who represents
his interest in the subject in controversy’’ neither any
surviving party to such thing or contract nor ‘‘any other
person whose interest shall be adverse to such right of
the deceased or lunatic party’’ shall be competent to
testify to any matter occurring before the death or
adjudication of lunacy of said party. There are certain
exceptions in § 5930 relating to remaining partners, joint
promisors or promisees, persons claiming by devolution
and ejectment actions against several joint defendants. In
addition, under § 5932, one who would otherwise be
incompetent may be called to testify against his or her
own interest after which he or she becomes fully compe-
tent; the same section makes one fully competent upon
the filing of record of a release of his or her interest.
Finally, § 5933 allows one who would otherwise be
incompetent to testify to any relevant matter if the
matter occurred between him or her and another living
person who testifies at the trial against the interest of the
otherwise incompetent person. (Section 5931 is intended
to make clear that ‘‘the general language’’ of § 5930 does
not remove the incompetency created by certain other
specified statutes.) There is a special application of the
dead man’s statute in 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2209, which prohib-
its a surviving spouse from testifying to the creation of
the marital status in matters dealing with claims for the
elective share of a surviving spouse. For a discussion of
these statutes, see Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania Evi-
dence § 601.5.
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Section (b).—The tests for competency in this section
come into play with respect to persons suffering from
some mental defect and children of tender years. The
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules decided not to
include in F.R.E. 601 any mental or moral qualifications
for testifying. Notes of the Advisory Committee to Rule
601. Pennsylvania decisions have taken a different tack,
and section (b) is derived from those decisions.
The cases have not created any hard and fast rules; the
existence of a mental defect does not automatically
disqualify (Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d
258 (1974)), and no minimum age has been established
(compare Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307, 310
(1959), where there is a questionable intimation that a
child of four was incompetent per se, with Commonwealth
v. Stohr, 361 Pa. Super. 293, 522 A.2d 589 (1987),
upholding trial court’s determination that a child of four
and one-half years was competent). Instead, the compe-
tency of the mentally defective and of young children has
been determined by the standards set forth in section (b).
Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 447 A.2d 234
(1982) (mental capacity); Commonwealth v. Mazzoccoli,
475 Pa. 408, 380 A.2d 786 (1977) (minor witness). As
section (b) specifically provides, the application of the
standards is a factual question, to be resolved by the
court. The court’s determination should seldom, if ever, be
reversed. Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence,
§§ 601.6, 601.7. Expert testimony has been used when
competency under these standards has been an issue.
E.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 466 Pa. 479, 353 A.2d 454
(1976); Commonwealth v. Gaerttner, 355 Pa. Super. 203,
484 A.2d 92 (1984). Pa.R.E. 601(b) is intended to preserve
existing law and not to expand it.
Historically, the law in Pennsylvania was that neither a
husband nor a wife was competent to testify as to
non-access or absence of sexual relations if the effect
would be to ‘‘bastardize’’ a child born during their mar-
riage. Jane’s Estate, 147 Pa. 527, 23 A. 892 (1892);
Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 124 Pa. Super. 277, 188 A.
425 (1936). However, in Commonwealth ex rel. Leider v.
Leider, 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306 (1969), this holding was
limited. There, a wife sought support from her second
husband for a child conceived and born during her first
marriage. Both the wife and her first husband testified as
to non-access, and the wife testified that the second
husband was the child’s father. The Supreme Court
decided that the testimony concerning non-access was
competent, stating that it did not bastardize the child
because the subsequent marriage to the putative father
legitimized the child; hence the Court said it was not
necessary to question the rule.
What the Supreme Court avoided in Leider, the Supe-
rior Court met head on in Commonwealth ex rel. Savruk
v. Derby, 235 Pa. Super. 560, 344 A.2d 624 (1975), and
held that it was time to abandon the rule. But later, in
Commonwealth v. Ritchie, 324 Pa. Super. 557, 472 A.2d
220 (1984), remanded on another issue, 509 Pa. 357, 502
A.2d 148 (1985), modified, 480 U. S. 39 (1986), the
Superior Court cited both Leider and Savruk in allowing
a wife to testify to non-access. And in McKenzie v. Harris,
679 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1982), the Third Circuit held that
under Pennsylvania law a husband and wife were incom-
petent to testify to non-access.
The stigma and disability that once attached to illegiti-
macy, the reasons said to support the rule, have been
largely eliminated. Moreover, the actual parentage of a
child may be shown by other evidence. See, e.g., 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. Hence, there does not appear to be
any sound reason to continue to bar the spousal testi-
mony, and under Pa.R.E. 601, it will now be admissible.
Finally, there is the matter of the use of testimony
based upon hypnotically refreshed recollection. One of the
issues concerning such testimony is whether it raises a
question of competency or admissibility. The issue is
analyzed in Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure: Evidence, § 6011, and the authors conclude that it
is question of competency. However, as they point out,
there are no federal decisions that have used F.R.E. 601
as a basis for decision and many state and Federal courts
have relied upon admissibility rules concerning scientific
evidence or the principles underlying F.R.E. 403 (Pa.R.E.
403 is an exact counterpart), providing for the exclusion
of evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion or waste of time. It
could be said that the section (b)(3) of Pa.R.E. 601,
relating to impaired memory, applies (i.e., has the wit-
ness’ otherwise impaired memory been cured by the
hypnosis), and Pa.R.E. 602, requiring a finding that a
witness has personal knowledge of that about which he or
she proposes to testify, may be pertinent also (see the
Comment to that Rule).
The leading case in Pennsylvania tackled the issue as
one concerning scientific evidence. In Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), the Su-
preme Court rejected hypnotically refreshed testimony,
where the witness had no prior independent recollection,
because applying the test of Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for scientific testimony, it was not
convinced that the process of hypnosis as a means of
restoring forgotten or repressed memory had gained
sufficient acceptance in its field. Nazarovitch has been
applied in Commonwealth v. Smoyer, 505 Pa. 83, 476 A.2d
1304 (1984) and Commonwealth v. Romanelli, 522 Pa.
222, 560 A.2d 1384 (1989), both of which held that when
a witness has been hypnotized, he or she may testify
concerning those matters recollected prior to hypnosis,
but not about matters recalled only during or after
hypnosis. Pa.R.E. 601 is not intended to change these
results.
However, there is a constitutional limit on these deci-
sions. In Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, (1987), the
United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a
criminal case has a constitutional right to testify in his or
her own behalf and that a per se rule that prohibited
hypnotically refreshed testimony violated that right; the
reliability of that testimony must be examined on a
case-by-case basis. The Court stated that it was express-
ing no opinion concerning the testimony of witnesses
other than a defendant in a criminal case. Id. at 58, n.15.
Rule 602. Lack of Personal Knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness
has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove
personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the
witness’ own testimony. This Rule is subject to the
provisions of Rule 703 (relating to the basis of expert
testimony).
Comment
This Rule is identical to F.R.E. 602. Firsthand or
personal knowledge is a universal requirement of the law
of evidence. See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Co., 386 Pa. 513,
126 A.2d 720 (1956) (‘‘The primary object of a trial in our
American courts is to bring to the tribunal, which is
passing on the dispute involved, those persons who know
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of their own knowledge the facts to which they testify
. . . .’’). The reference to Rule 703 makes it clear that
there is no conflict between Rule 602 and that Rule,
allowing an expert to base an opinion on facts not within
the expert’s personal knowledge.
It is implicit in this Rule that the party calling the
witness has the burden of proving personal knowledge.
This is consistent with Pennsylvania law. Carney v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968).
As the Advisory Committee’s Notes to F.R.E. 602 put it,
‘‘the rule is a specialized application of the provisions of
Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy.’’ This supports the
conclusion that the issue of personal knowledge is a
question to be decided by the jury, and the judge may do
no more than determine if the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of such knowledge. Wright & Gold,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, § 6027. Al-
though it is not altogether clear, this appears to be
consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v.
Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 383 A.2d 858 (1978).
A witness having firsthand knowledge of a hearsay
statement, who testifies to the making of the statement,
satisfies Pa. R.E. 602; but the witness may not testify to
the truth of the statement if the witness has no personal
knowledge of that. Whether the hearsay statement is
admissible is governed by Pa.R.E. 801 through 805.
Generally speaking, the firsthand knowledge requirement
of Rule 602 is applicable to the declarant of a hearsay
statement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, supra,
and Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra. However, in
the case of admissions of a party opponent, covered by
Pa.R.E. 803(25), personal knowledge is not required.
Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942);
Carswell v. SEPTA, 259 Pa. Super. 167, 393 A.2d 770
(1978). Moreover, Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) explicitly dispenses
with the need for personal knowledge with respect to
statements of personal or family history, and Pa.R.E.
803(19), (20) and (21), dealing with statements of reputa-
tion concerning personal or family history, boundaries or
general history and a person’s character, respectively,
impliedly do away with the requirement.
This Rule has a bearing on the question of the admissi-
bility of testimony given after the witness has been
hypnotized. When the testimony concerns facts developed
entirely through the hypnotic process, can it be said that
the witness ‘‘has personal knowledge’’? The answer de-
pends upon whether hypnosis is accepted as a scientifi-
cally valid means of restoring the witness’ forgotten or
repressed memory of what was actually perceived. If it is
not, then there can be no finding that the witness ‘‘has
personal knowledge’’ as the rule requires. The law devel-
oped by the Pennsylvania cases is that the testimony of a
witness who has been hypnotized, which is based on prior
recollection, is admissible, but testimony arising com-
pletely from the hypnosis is not. Commonwealth v.
Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Smoyer, 505 Pa. 83, 476 A.2d 1304 (1984);
Commonwealth v. Romanelli, 522 Pa. 222, 560 A.2d 1384
(1989). These cases, and the constitutional limits imposed
upon them in criminal prosecutions by Rock v. Arkansas,
483 U. S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704 (1987), are discussed more
fully in the Comment to Pa.R.E. 601.
Rule 603. Oath or Affirmation.
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to
declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken
the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind
with the duty to do so.
Comment
This is the same as F.R.E. 603, which was designed to
be flexible enough to deal with all manner of religious
beliefs or lack thereof, mental defectives and children.
Notes of the Advisory Committee to Rule 603. An under-
standing of the obligation to tell the truth has been
required of both the mentally impaired and children.
Commonwealth v. Kosh, 305 Pa. 146, 157 A. 479 (1931)
and Commonwealth v. Mazzoccoli, 475 Pa. 408, 380 A.2d
786 (1977). The Rule does not conflict with 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5901 which provides that every witness ‘‘shall take an
oath in the usual or common form by laying the hand
upon an open copy of the Holy Bible or by lifting up the
right hand and pronouncing or assenting to’’ a specific
incantation set forth in the statute. That statute also
permits affirmation by a witness who desires to do so. See
also, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902, which provides that a person’s
capacity to testify ‘‘shall not be affected by his opinions on
matters of religion’’ and that no witness shall be ques-
tioned ‘‘concerning his religious beliefs.’’ Religious belief
as a ground for impeachment is treated in Pa. R.E. 610.
In Dunsmore v. Dunsmore, 309 Pa. Super. 503, 455 A.2d
723 (1983) and Commonwealth ex rel. Freeman v. Super-
intendent, 212 Pa. Super. 422, 431—432, 242 A.2d 903,
908 (1968), it was held to be error to allow a witness to
testify without oath or affirmation.
Rule 604. Interpreters.
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of Rule 702
(relating to qualification as an expert) and Rule 603
(relating to the administration of an oath or affirmation).
Comment
This Rule adopts the substance of F.R.E. 604, but
explicitly refers to Pa.R.E. 702 and 603 rather than the
general reference in the Federal Rule to ‘‘the provisions of
these rules.’’
The need for an interpreter whenever a witness’ natu-
ral mode of expression or the language of a document is
not intelligible to the trier of fact is well settled. 3
Wigmore, Evidence, § 911 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). Under
this Rule, an interpreter is treated as an expert witness
who must have the necessary skill to translate correctly
and who must promise to do so by oath or affirmation.
There are statutes in Pennsylvania providing for the
appointment of interpreters for a deaf party throughout
the proceeding in a civil case (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7103), and
in a hearing before a Commonwealth agency (2 Pa.C.S.A.
505.1) and for a deaf defendant throughout the proceed-
ing in a criminal case (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8701). (The applica-
tion of the latter statute was considered at length in
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 433 Pa. Super. 518, 641 A.2d
321 (1994).) Under each of these statutes, an interpreter
must be ‘‘qualified and trained to translate for an commu-
nicate with deaf persons’’ and must ‘‘swear or affirm that
he will make a true interpretation to the deaf person and
that he will repeat the statements of the deaf person to
the best of his ability.’’ Obviously, Pa.R.E. 604 is consis-
tent with these statutes. Pa.R.Crim.P. 264(b) authorizes
the presence of an interpreter while an investigating
grand jury is in session if the supervising judge deter-
mines this is necessary for the presentation of the
evidence. Finally, the Pennsylvania Code of Military
Justice provides (51 Pa.C.S.A. § 5507) that under regula-
tions prescribed by the governor, the convening authority
of a military court may appoint interpreters.
All of the foregoing deal with the use of interpreters in
special situations. Although there has been no general
statute or rule covering the appointment of interpreters
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to translate testimony or documents since the repeal of 17
P. S. § 1875 and 28 P. S. §§ 441—444 by the Judiciary
Repealer Act of 1978, the use of interpreters is well
established in practice. Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania
Evidence, § 604. Under Pennsylvania law, the decision to
use an interpreter is within the sound discretion of the
trial judge. Commonwealth v. Pana, 469 Pa. 43, 364 A.2d
895 (1976); Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 319 Pa. Super.
115, 465 A.2d 1256 (1983). Since this Rule makes an
interpreter subject to Pa.R.E. 702, under which the trial
judge will have to decide if an interpreter is needed to
‘‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence,’’ it will
not cause any disruption of the Pennsylvania practice.
The most common use of an interpreter is to translate
witness testimony or documents primarily for the trier of
fact, and it is to this situation that the rule is basically
directed. However, when a party in a civil case or a
defendant in a criminal case has difficulty speaking or
understanding English, it is that person, rather than the
trier of fact, who needs the interpreter. The statutes
dealing with interpreters for deaf parties and defendants
recognize this; they require the interpreter to be present
throughout the proceedings to translate both what the
deaf person might say for the benefit of the trier of fact
and what others participating in the proceeding (wit-
nesses, attorneys, the judge) might say for the benefit of
the deaf person. In a criminal case, a defendant’s need for
an interpreter in the circumstances posited, raises serious
constitutional questions, because without an interpreter,
the defendant’s rights to consult with counsel, to confront
witnesses against him or her, to be ‘‘present’’ at the trial
and to testify in his or her own behalf are placed in
jeopardy. These concerns were taken into account in
Commonwealth v. Pana, supra, where the court held that
when a defendant obviously has difficulties understand-
ing and expressing himself in English, even though he
has some familiarity with the language, the failure to
appoint an interpreter so that the defendant can testify in
Spanish is an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial.
See also, United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434
F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970); and cf. United States v. Carron,
488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 907, 94
S.Ct. 1613 (1974).
Rule 605. Competency of Judge as Witness.
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify as a
witness in that trial.
Comment
This Rule differs from F.R.E. 605; the phrase ‘‘in that
trial,’’ which follows the word ‘‘testify’’ in the first sen-
tence in the Federal Rule, has been moved to the end of
the sentence and the final sentence of the Federal Rule,
which dispenses with the need for an objection, has been
eliminated. Pa.R.E. 605 makes a judge absolutely incom-
petent to be a witness on any matter in any trial at which
the judge presides; it is one of the exceptions contem-
plated by Pa.R.E. 601.
Canon 3C of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct
requires a judge ‘‘to disqualify himself in a proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,’’
including where ‘‘he has . . . personal knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts . . . [or knows that he is] likely to
be a material witness in the proceeding.’’ (There are
similar provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 455.) From the phrases
‘‘knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts’’ and ‘‘likely to be
a material witness,’’ it can be argued that the Canon does
not require disqualification if the judge is to testify only
as to immaterial formal matters that are not in dispute.
This is the position taken in 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1909
(Chadbourn rev. 1976) and in the Model Code of Evidence,
Rule 302. Canon 3C was relied upon in Municipal
Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas, 507 Pa. 194,
489 A.2d 1286 (1985), which held that at a hearing on a
motion to recuse a judge, the judge himself may not
testify concerning the issues raised in the motion and
continue to preside at the hearing. Since the judge’s
testimony obviously went to the heart of the motion to
recuse, the decision sheds no light on the scope of the
Canon. But Pa.R.E. 605, like its Federal counterpart,
leaves no room for argument; it bars all testimony by a
presiding judge.
What is the meaning of ‘‘testify as a witness’’? There is
no Pennsylvania authority on the matter. However, based
upon the legislative history of F.R.E. 605, it has been
suggested that a judge may be said to ‘‘testify’’ even if he
has not been called to the witness stand, and the rule has
been so applied. See Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Evidence, § 6063, (citing United States v.
Lillie, 953 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1992) (judge in a bench
trial taking a view without the knowledge or presence of
counsel and the parties)); Jones v. Beneficial Trust Life
Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1986) (introduction at
trial of the judge’s pretrial ruling); and United States v.
Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1983) (judge’s comments
from the bench).
The final sentence of the Federal Rule provides, in
effect, an ‘‘automatic’’ objection to testimony by the pre-
siding judge. The stated purpose for this is that the
opponent of the testimony would otherwise have to choose
between waiver of a challenge to it or the risk of
offending the judge by making an objection. Notes of the
Advisory Committee to F.R.E. 605. This puts undue
emphasis on the sensibilities of trial judges. Moreover,
since the Rule has been applied to situations where the
trial judge has not been called to the stand, as pointed
out above, requiring an objection will often be the means
by which the judge may be ‘‘brought up short’’ and
provided with an opportunity to take corrective action
before it is too late. For these reasons, Pa.R.E. 605 takes
the opposite approach—an objection must be made to
preserve the issue of violation of the Rule. This is
consistent with the provisions of Pa.R.E. 103 that error
may not be predicated on a ruling admitting evidence in
the absence of a timely objection, motion to strike or
motion in limine. Of course, the court should provide an
opportunity for the making of the objection out of the
presence of the jury.
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness.
(a) At Trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a
witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which
the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the
opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object
out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict. Upon an inquiry
into the validity of a verdict, including a sentencing
verdict pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711 (relating to
capital sentencing proceedings), a juror may not testify as
to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
that or any other juror’s mind or emotions in reaching a
decision upon the verdict or concerning the juror’s mental
processes in connection therewith, and a juror’s affidavit
or evidence of any statement by the juror about any of
these subjects may not be received. However, a juror may
testify concerning whether prejudicial facts not of record,
and beyond common knowledge and experience, were
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improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror.
Comment
Section (a) of this Rule is the same as F.R.E. 606(a). It
is another of the incompetency exceptions to Pa.R.E. 601.
Section (a) is contrary to the traditional common law rule
(see 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1910 (Chadbourn rev. 1976)
and 1 McCormick, Evidence, § 68 (4th ed. 1992)), with
which the law of Pennsylvania is in accord. Howser v.
Commonwealth, 51 Pa. 332 (1866) (jurors are competent
witnesses in both civil and criminal cases); Common-
wealth v. Sutton, 171 Pa. Super. 105, 90 A.2d 264 (1952).
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules, most states have
enacted or promulgated provisions consistent with the
substance of section (a). Wright & Gold, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Evidence, § 6071, notes 59—73. Of course,
the calling of a juror as a witness will be a rarity; a
juror’s knowledge of facts relevant to a case will generally
be exposed on voir dire with the resultant disqualification
of the juror for cause.
Note that section (a) bars a jury member from testify-
ing ‘‘before that jury in the trial of the case in which the
juror is sitting.’’ The phrase ‘‘before that jury’’ did not
appear in the preliminary draft of F.R.E. 606(a); its
addition leads to the conclusion that a juror may testify
outside the presence of the rest of the jury on matters
occurring during the course of the trial. 3 Weinstein &
Berger, Evidence, ¶ 606[02], at p. 606—18. United States
v. Robinson, 645 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U. S. 875 (1981), held that on a motion for a mistrial,
the Federal Rule did not bar a juror from testifying, out
of the presence of the other jurors, concerning his obser-
vation of the accused being escorted from the court house
under guard. In United States v. Day, 830 F.2d 1099 (10th
Cir. 1987), the court, in a dictum, stated that a juror, who
was not called, could have been called to testify at a
hearing during the course of trial on the question of
whether bias arose from brief remarks passing between
the juror and the investigating F.B.I. agent. Current
Pennsylvania law is in accord; see Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 456 Pa. 265, 318 A.2d 737 (1974), where jurors
were permitted to testify at a hearing in chambers during
the trial on the question of whether they received im-
proper prejudicial information.
Section (b) of this Rule is based upon F.R.E. 606(b) with
certain language and organizational changes that do not
alter substance. This section, too, is an incompetency
exception to Pa. R.E. 601; but note that the incompetency
is limited to the three areas set forth in the first sentence
of the redrafted section. These areas are broadly stated to
embody all of the elements relevant to a jury’s delibera-
tions and decisions of which a juror would have personal
knowledge.
The reference to sentencing verdicts in capital cases
does not appear in the Federal Rule. It reflects existing
Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Williams, 514 Pa. 62,
522 A.2d 1058 (1987). The indicting grand jury has now
been abolished in all counties of Pennsylvania pursuant
to Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and 42
Pa.C.S.A. 8931(b) and criminal proceedings are now initi-
ated statewide by information. Accordingly, the word
‘‘indictment’’ which is in the Federal Rule, has been
removed throughout Pa.R.E. 601(b).
In the interest of simplification and the elimination of
redundancy, the language ‘‘as influencing the juror to
assent to or dissent from,’’ used in connection with effects
upon a juror’s mind or emotions, has been deleted in
favor of the phrase ‘‘in reaching a decision upon.’’ No
substantive change is intended.
The sentence structure of the Federal Rule has been
changed. The exceptions to juror incompetency appear as
the second sentence of section (b) and the provision
concerning juror affidavits and evidence of juror state-
ments, with minor language differences, has been moved
from the end of the section and placed at the end of the
first sentence since it is to the subjects thereof that it is
relevant. These structural changes should facilitate the
reading and understanding of the section.
Finally, the words ‘‘extraneous prejudicial information’’
in the first exception of the Federal Rule have been
replaced by ‘‘prejudicial facts not of record and beyond
common knowledge and experience.’’ This should make
clear that the exception is directed at evidence brought
before the jury, which was not presented during the trial,
and which was not tested by the processes of the
adversary system and subjected to judicial scrutiny for a
determination of admissibility. The qualification of ‘‘com-
mon knowledge and experience’’ is a recognition that all
jurors bring with them some common facts of life. See
generally, Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence, § 6075. A juror who brings facts not of record to
the jury’s attention is, in effect, testifying in violation of
section (a).
Section (b), like its Federal counterpart, is designed to
protect all ‘‘components of a jury’s deliberations, including
arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emo-
tional reactions, votes and any other feature of the
process,’’ while allowing juror testimony concerning extra-
neous matters that have the effect of subverting those
deliberations. Notes of the Advisory Committee to F.R.E.
606(b). The section is more detailed and expansive than
the rule articulated in the Pennsylvania cases. See Pitts-
burgh Nat’l. Bank v. The Mutual Ins. Co., 493 Pa. 96,
101, 425 A.2d 383, 386 (1981), and cases cited therein
(Pennsylvania rule is a ‘‘canon of ‘no impeachment’ with a
narrow exception of ‘allowing post-trial testimony of
extraneous influences which might have . . . [prejudiced]
the jury during deliberations’ ’’). Nevertheless, the results
of the cases are generally in accord with the section. The
decisions have consistently protected the elements of the
jury’s deliberations in the circumstances covered by the
first sentence of section (b). Commonwealth v. Pierce, 453
Pa. 319, 309 A.2d 371 (1973) (jurors not competent to
testify that two members of the jury took notes during
trial and brought them into jury room); Commonwealth v.
Zlatovich, 440 Pa. 388, 269 A.2d 469 (1970) (after verdict,
testimony could not be received that a juror was afraid to
return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
because of fear that defendant might be released later);
Commonwealth v. Patrick, 416 Pa. 437, 206 A.2d 295
(1965) (trial court correctly refused to consider juror’s
post-trial affidavit alleging coercion by other jurors);
Commonwealth v. Filer, 249 Pa. 171, 94 A. 822 (1915) (on
motion for new trial, court may not consider affidavits of
four jurors explaining what influenced them in reaching a
conclusion).
Pennsylvania cases have also recognized the exceptions
set forth in the second sentence of section (b). Carter v.
U. S. Steel Corp., 529 Pa. 409, 604 A.2d 1010 (1992), cert.
denied, 506 U. S. 864 (1992) (proper to conduct post-trial
hearing to determine whether newspaper article and
television broadcast concerning matters involved in the
case were brought to jury’s attention during delibera-
tions); Commonwealth v. Williams, supra, 514 Pa. at 75
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81, 522 A.2d at 1065—1068 (jurors competent to testify,
that during capital sentencing proceeding, they received
information through an alternate juror that defendant
had pending murder charges from another jurisdiction);
Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 387 A.2d 63 (1978)
(after verdict in a murder case, juror may testify that
another juror told her that she had learned, through what
was double hearsay, that defendant, although not a
religious person, had begun studying the Bible after his
wife’s death); Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 200 A.2d 67
(1938) (jurors permitted to testify that a tipstaff told jury,
which was engaged in extended deliberations, that trial
judge would give them ‘‘the devil’’ if they did not reach a
verdict promptly). Pittsburgh Nat’l. Bank v. The Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 493 Pa. 96, 425 A.2d 383 (1981), stands
against this array of decisions; it held that, after the
verdict in an automobile accident case, the trial court
correctly refused to take testimony concerning a juror’s
having examined a car similar to the one involved in the
case. See also, Friedman v. Ralph Brothers, Inc., 314 Pa.
247, 171 A. 700 (1934). This result would be changed
under the first exception of section (b). See cases cited in
Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence,
§ 6075, notes 18—19. In any event, the vitality of the
decision is questionable after the Carter case, supra.
Note that when jurors are permitted to testify about
facts not of record and outside influences, they may not
be questioned about the effect upon them of what was
improperly brought to their attention. Carter, 529 Pa. at
415—416, 604 A.2d at 1013—1014; see 3 Weinstein &
Berger, Evidence, ¶ 606[5] at pp. 606-53—606-55. More-
over, after hearing juror testimony, a verdict may still be
upheld on the grounds that there was no prejudice. See,
e.g., Carter 529 Pa. at 420—424, 614 A.2d at 1016—1018;
Sero, 478 Pa. at 448—449, 387 A.2d at 67.
Rule 607. Impeachment of Witness.
(a) Who May Impeach. The credibility of any witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling
the witness.
(b) Evidence to Impeach. The credibility of a witness
may be impeached by any evidence relevant to that issue,
except as otherwise provided by statute or these Rules.
Comment
Section (a) of this Rule is the same as F.R.E. 607; but
the Federal Rules have no provision similar to section (b).
Section (a).—The original common law view prohibited
a party from impeaching a witness called by that party,
and the prohibition applied to all forms of impeachment.
The reasons advanced in support of this view were that
the party calling the witness (1) was morally bound by
the testimony given, (2) vouched for the witness’ trust-
worthiness, and (3) could coerce desired testimony under
an implied threat of attacking the character of the
witness by impeachment. As the weakness of these
reasons became apparent, many exceptions to the com-
mon law rule were developed. See generally, 3A Wigmore,
Evidence, §§ 896—918 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 1 Mc-
Cormick, Evidence, § 38 (4th ed. 1992).
Pa. R.E. 607(a) abolishes the common law prohibition
completely. Numerous Pennsylvania decisions have con-
tinued to enunciate a general rule of no impeachment;
but many exceptions have been recognized. Thus, it has
been said that there is a difference between impeaching
one’s own witness and contradicting that witness by
presenting other evidence. Commonwealth v. Myrick, 468
Pa. 155, 360 A.2d 598 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mahoney,
460 Pa. 201, 331 A.2d 488 (1975). Note also that Pa.R.C.P.
4020(d) provides that ‘‘any party may rebut any relevant
evidence contained in a deposition whether introduced by
him or any other party.’’ It has also been held that the
prosecution in a criminal case may examine its own
witness as to matters bearing on the character, bias or
interest of the witness in anticipation of an attack by the
defense. Commonwealth v. Bricker, 525 Pa. 362, 581 A.2d
147 (1990) (existence and terms of a plea agreement with
the witness; but written agreement itself could not be
sent out with jury unless appropriately redacted); Com-
monwealth v. Garrison, 398 Pa. 47, 157 A.2d 75 (1959)
(criminal past of the witness). Impeachment by a prior
inconsistent statement (and this is what has been in-
volved in most of the cases) has been allowed if the
testimony of one’s own witness is unexpected, contradicts
the prior statement, harms the party calling the witness
and the impeachment is limited in scope. Commonwealth
v. Thomas, 459 Pa. 371, 329 A.2d 277 (1974). However,
the need for surprise has been dispensed with ‘‘when the
interests of truth and justice seem to require it.’’ Com-
monwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 134—35, 507 A.2d 66,
72 (1986), Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 136—137,
354 A.2d 875, 881 (1976). Moreover, under a long-
standing statute, a party in a civil case is permitted to
call an adverse party or a person having an adverse
interest as a witness ‘‘under the rules of evidence appli-
cable to cross-examination’’ and ‘‘shall not be concluded by
[the witness’] testimony.’’ 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5935. The last
quoted provision has been interpreted to mean that the
witness’ testimony may be rebutted or contradicted by
other evidence, but if it is not, it is conclusively taken to
be true. Kelly v. Oxgrove Development Corp., 456 Pa. 306,
319 A.2d 424 (1974); Rogan Estate. 404 Pa. 205, 171 A.2d
177 (1961).
If, then, there are any vestiges of the ‘‘no impeachment’’
prohibition remaining in Pennsylvania, Pa.R.E. 607(a)
sweeps them away, and no longer will there be any need
to resort to hair-splitting exceptions. The rule will allow
impeachment by all of the methods provided for in
Pa.R.E. 607(b), 608, 609 and 613. Under existing law,
impeachment evidence will have no substantive effect
unless it is an admission of a party opponent within
Pa.R.E. 803(25), a prior inconsistent statement covered by
Pa. R.E. 803.1(1), which reflects the holding in Common-
wealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), or a
statement of identification under Pa.R.E. 803.1(2).
Section (b).—The methods that may be used to impeach
credibility are tied to Pa.R.E. 401, which defines relevant
evidence. In United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal
Rules clearly contemplated that evidence of bias could be
used to impeach credibility even though nothing in those
Rules specifically covered the subject. The Court pointed
to F.R.E. 401, defining relevancy, and F.R.E. 402, provid-
ing for the admissibility of all relevant evidence, in
support of its holding. The Court commented that ‘‘[a]
successful showing of bias . . . would have a tendency to
make the facts to which [the witness] testified less
probable in the eyes of the jury than it would be without
such testimony.’’ Abel, 469 U. S. at 51.
Pa.R.E. 401 and 402 are similar to their Federal
counterparts, and they, too, support the impeaching of
credibility by any means having any tendency to cast
doubt on the witness’ testimony. However, the ‘‘except as
otherwise provided by statute or these Rule’’ language of
Rule 607(b) incorporates a number of provisions that
circumscribe the breadth of the Rule. See, e.g., the Rape
Shield Law, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104. Rule 403 also comes
into play, so that evidence relevant to credibility may be
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excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, etc. Next Rule 501, which
preserves all privileges ‘‘as they now exist or may be
modified by law,’’ must be taken into account. This would
exclude any evidence relevant to credibility that might be
covered by existing or later developed privileges, includ-
ing those created by case law. In addition, Rule 607(b) is
limited and supplemented by Rule 608 (dealing with
evidence of character and conduct of a witness), Rule 609
(relating to impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime), Rule 610 (covering religious beliefs or opinions)
and Rule 613 (regarding prior statements of witnesses).
However, the broad principle of relevance in Rule 607(b)
is not curtailed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918, which provides
that, with certain exceptions, a defendant who testifies in
a criminal case may not be questioned to show that he or
she has committed, been convicted of or charged with any
other offense or to show bad character or reputation. In
Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255
(1973), this statute was interpreted to apply only to
cross-examination. Hence it affects only the timing and
method of impeachment of a defendant; it does not bar
the impeachment entirely.
Since the credibility of any witness depends upon his or
her powers of perception, capacity to remember, ability to
communicate accurately and veracity or integrity, it may
always be attacked by showing shortcomings in any of
those areas. Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442
A.2d 236 (1982); Commonwealth v. Hamm, 474 Pa. 487,
378 A.2d 1219 (1977); 1 McCormick, Evidence, § 44 (4th
ed. 1992). These attacks may be carried out in a number
of ways.
A witness’ credibility may be challenged by questions
showing that he or she has a selective memory. Common-
wealth v. Perdue, 387 Pa. Super. 473, 564 A.2d 489 (1982).
Evidence of alcohol consumption by a witness may also be
considered by a jury as affecting perception and memory.
Hannon v. City of Philadelphia, 120 Pa. Cmwlth. 383, 548
A.2d 693 (1988). On the same theory, evidence of use of
drugs by a witness is admissible. Commonwealth v. Yost,
478 Pa. 327, 386 A.2d 956 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Skibicki, 402 Pa. Super. 160, 586 A.2d 446 (1990);
Commonwealth v. Duffy, 238 Pa. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 50
(1975). It should be noted that neither alcoholism nor
drug addiction in and of themselves is sufficient to
impeach; to be admissible, a witness’ consumption of
alcohol or use of drugs must have occurred at or near the
time of the event that is the subject of the witness’
testimony.
A mental defect or disability which affects a witness’
perception, memory, ability to communicate or truth
telling may also give rise to an assault on credibility.
Commonwealth v. Butler, 232 Pa. Super. 283, 331 A.2d
678 (1974). In Commonwealth v. Dudley, 353 Pa. Super.
615, 510 A.2d 1235 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 634,
522 A.2d 1104 (1987), the Superior Court held that it was
error to exclude evidence that a witness (a rape victim)
had received psychiatric treatment one month after the
event, had suffered a psychiatric episode two months
after the incident and six months before trial, and had
experienced hallucinations and mental instability. See
also, Commonwealth v. Chuck, 227 Pa. Super. 612, 323
A.2d 123 (1974) (treatment in a mental hospital within
seven months of the date of trial is enough to raise a jury
question as to the effect of a mental disorder on credibil-
ity).
Cohen v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 405 Pa. Super.
392, 592 A.2d 720 (1991), appeal denied 529 Pa. 644, 602
A.2d 855 (1992), was a medical malpractice case for an
alleged arm injury resulting from an improper intramus-
cular injection. Plaintiff testified about the injection and
the harm it produced. The Superior Court held that it
was error to exclude expert testimony that plaintiff
suffered from Munchausen Syndrome (the repeated fabri-
cation of illness in order to assume the role of a sick
person) because this bore directly upon plaintiff’s ability
to recount truthfully the event and symptoms of which he
complained. 405 Pa. Super. at 401—406, 592 A.2d at
724—727.
A witness may also be impeached by impugning his or
her honesty. This can be accomplished by showing bias
(prejudice against or hostility toward a party), interest
(some relation between the witness and the cause at
issue) or corruption (a conscious false intent). 3A
Wigmore, Evidence, § 945 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). In
Commonwealth v. Collins, 519 Pa. 58, 64—65, 545 A.2d
882, 885—886 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that ‘‘
. . . any witness may be impeached by showing his bias or
hostility or by proving facts which make such feelings
probable . . . ’’; see also United States v. Abel, supra.
In Commonwealth v. Dawson, 486 Pa. 321, 405 A.2d
1230 (1979), a detective testified about the defendant’s
confession, which defendant contended had been fabri-
cated. It was held that it was reversible error not to allow
the defendant to show that the detective was subject to
disciplinary action growing out of certain events involved
in the case. The Supreme Court said that ‘‘the alleged
misconduct and disciplining could have motivated [the
detective] to fabricate the confession and otherwise give
false testimony. Evidence thereon would have been rel-
evant to his motivation and credibility.’’ Id. at 324, 405
A.2d at 1231.
Commonwealth v. Baxton, 242 Pa. Super. 98, 363 A.2d
1178 (1976), held that the defendant could cross-examine
a prosecution witness, who had a juvenile record, to show
that he testified in return for the continuation of his
probationary status and an agreement that he would not
be prosecuted for the incident out of which the charges
against the defendant grew. Later, the same result was
reached under somewhat similar circumstances in Com-
monwealth v. Gay, 369 Pa. Super. 340, 535 A.2d 189
(1988).
Hatfield v. Continental Imports, Inc., 530 Pa. 551, 610
A.2d 446 (1972), was a products liability case in which
the original defendants joined the maker of the product
as an additional defendant. The Supreme Court held that
evidence of an agreement between the plaintiff and the
original defendants was an admissible to establish that
the latter would benefit if the plaintiffs prevailed and
therefore had an interest in the plaintiff’s success.
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of
Witness.
(a) Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of
a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in
the form of reputation as to character, but subject to the
following limitations:
(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truth-
fulness or untruthfulness; and
(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only
after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.
(3) A witness whose testimony is to be admitted under
this Rule may not be called at trial under this Rule
unless the party seeking to call the witness makes known
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to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet the evidence, the proponent’s
intention in calling the witness, the particulars of the
witness’ expected testimony, and the name and address of
the witness. The particulars of the witness’ expected
testimony should include the identity of any person the
witness spoke to in the community in order to reach a
conclusion about the person’s reputation for truthfulness,
the nature of the information provided by such person(s)
in the community, and what relationship, if any, the
person in the community has with the person whose
reputation for truthfulness was called into question.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except as provided in
Rule 609 (relating to evidence of conviction of crime),
(1) the character of a witness for truthfulness may not
be attacked or supported by cross-examination or extrin-
sic evidence concerning specific instances of the witness’
conduct; however,
(2) in the discretion of the court, the credibility of a
witness who testifies as to the reputation of another
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness may be at-
tacked by cross-examination concerning specific instances
of conduct (not including arrests) of the other witness, if
they are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; but
extrinsic evidence thereof is not admissible.
Comment
Section (a).—Pa.R.E. 608(a) differs from F.R.E. 608(a)
in that it permits character for truthfulness or untruth-
fulness to be shown by evidence only in the form of
reputation, whereas the Federal Rule allows evidence in
the form of opinion as well, and there is no counterpart to
subsection (3) in the Federal Rule. This Rule is one of the
specific exceptions to the prohibition in Pa.R.E. 404(a)
against the use of character to show action in conformity
therewith. It is well established in Pennsylvania that
evidence of a witness’ reputation for truthfulness or
untruthfulness may be used to support or attack credibil-
ity. Commonwealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 54 A. 489
(1903); In the Interest of Lawrence J., 310 Pa. Super. 351,
456 A.2d 647 (1983). This applies also to the accused in a
criminal case when he or she takes the stand. Common-
wealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967),
vacated on other grounds, 392 U. S. 647 (1968). Note that
reputation of a person’s character is covered by the
exception to the hearsay rule in Pa.R.E. 803(21). Pa.R.E.
608(a) is new. It is intended to eliminate surprise, and
unfair disadvantage to the party whose witness’ credibil-
ity is attacked by reputation evidence.
Section (a) of the Rule is also in accord with those
Pennsylvania cases that have held that evidence is not
admissible to bolster a witness’ character for truthfulness
until there has been an attack upon that character. See
e.g., Commonwealth v. Fowler, 434 Pa. Super. 148, 642
A.2d 517 (1994); Commonwealth v. Smith, 389 Pa. Super.
626, 567 A.2d 1080 (1989); Commonwealth v. Lemanski,
365 Pa. Super. 332, 529 A.2d 1085 (1987). However, there
is some intimation in Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa.
188, 436 A.2d 607 (1981) that where the accused in a
criminal case takes the stand, evidence of a good reputa-
tion for honesty is admissible even in the absence of an
attack on character; and compare Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1) allow-
ing the accused in a criminal case to offer ‘‘evidence of a
pertinent trait of character.’’ In allowing character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness to be proved only by
reputation, section (a) is consistent with existing Pennsyl-
vania law. Commonwealth v. Lopinson, supra, and Com-
monwealth v. Smith, supra.
Section (b).—Pa.R.E. 608(b) also differs from F.R.E.
608(b). Except for evidence of conviction of crime (Pa.R.E.
609 and F.R.E. 609), both ban all use of extrinsic evidence
of specific instances of conduct for the purpose of attack-
ing or supporting a witness’ credibility, but they diverge
in their treatment of cross-examination concerning spe-
cific instances of conduct.
Under the Federal Rule, in the discretion of the court,
and if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, specific
instances may be inquired into on cross-examination of a
witness concerning the witness’ own character or concern-
ing the character of another witness as to which the
witness being cross-examined has testified. In the latter
case, it can be argued that not only do the specific
instances undermine the credibility of the witness being
examined (the ‘‘character witness’’) but that they also
bear upon the truthfulness or untruthfulness of the other
witness (the ‘‘principal witness’’). See Wright and Gold,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence, § 6120.
Subsection (b)(1) of Pa.R.E. 608 prohibits all use of
specific instances of a witness’ own conduct for the
purpose of attacking his or her character for truthfulness.
Subsection (b)(2), like the Federal Rule, permits a charac-
ter witness to be cross-examined, in the discretion of the
court, concerning specific instances of conduct of the
principal witness. However, unlike the Federal Rule,
subsection (b)(2) makes it clear that those specific in-
stances affect the credibility of the character witness only,
and in addition, it excludes the use of arrests.
Section (b) is in accord with Pennsylvania law. Begin-
ning with Stout v. Rassel, 2 Yeates 334 (1798) and Elliot
v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65 (1857), the Courts, with two excep-
tions, have consistently stated that specific instances of a
witness’ own conduct, not resulting in a conviction, may
not be used to impeach that witness’ credibility. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 464, 309 A.2d
591, 593 (1973) ‘‘[w]e have long held that prior bad acts
not resulting in conviction are not available to impeach a
witness’ credibility . . .’’); Marshall v. Carr, 271 Pa. 271,
114 A. 500 (1922); Berliner v. Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Super.
254, 178 A.2d 330 (1935).
But in Downey v. Weston, the Supreme Court stated,
‘‘[i]t is true that evidence of . . . some past events
throwing light on human character is admissible on
cross-examination, but this is restricted to evidence which
bears directly on the witness’ ‘character for truth’. . . .’’
451 Pa. 259, 264, 301 A.2d 635, 639 (1973) (emphasis in
original.) The Court went on to hold that the connection
between an alleged breach of medical ethics and the
credibility of a physician witness was too tenuous. A
similar pronouncement was made in Commonwealth v.
Gaddy, 468 Pa. 303, 362 A.2d 217 (1976), and again the
Supreme Court held that the act in question (drug use
generally) was not sufficiently related to ‘‘character for
truth.’’
Later, however, in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 475 Pa.
564, 381 A.2d 418 (1977), in holding that it was error to
allow a witness to be cross-examined about his arrests,
the Supreme Court commented (with no reference to
Downey or Gaddy): ‘‘We have also held that a witness
may not be impeached by questions concerning criminal
activity not resulting in arrest.’’ 475 Pa. at 468, n. 4, 381
A.2d at 419, n.4. (citations omitted.) Later, in Common-
wealth v. Cragle, 281 Pa. Super. 434, 435—441, 422 A.2d
547, 548—550 (1980), the Superior Court held that it was
not error to preclude questioning of a prosecution witness
concerning his having received stolen goods on several
occasions. The Court considered the Downey case and
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after analysis of the decision, concluded that it was not
meant to overrule the well established existing law
banning resort to specific instances of conduct to impeach,
and the Court pointed to the reiteration of that principle
in Taylor, supra, as support for its position. Subsection
(b)(1) follows Taylor, Cragle and the earlier line of cases;
and see also Butler v. Flo-Ron Vending Co., 383 Pa.
Super. 633, 642, 557 A. 2d 730, 734 (1989). Subsection
(b)(1) is generally consistent with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5918,
which provides that a defendant who testifies in a
criminal case, may not be questioned to show that ‘‘he has
been of bad character or reputation unless’’ the defendant
has attempted to establish his or her own good character
or reputation or has testified against a co-defendant. See
Comment to Pa.R.E. 607 for a fuller description of this
statute.
Subsection (b)(2) of the Rule deals with challenges to
the credibility of a character witness who testifies con-
cerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness
of a principal witness. For this purpose, it provides that
the court, in its discretion, may allow cross-examination
of the character witness concerning specific instances of
the principal witness’ conduct (other than arrests), if they
are probitive of truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 513 A.2d 373
(1986), was an appeal from a death sentence imposed
following a conviction of first degree murder. Among other
issues, defendant asserted the ineffectiveness of his trial
counsel in not interviewing and presenting certain char-
acter witnesses. At a post-trial evidentiary hearing, coun-
sel explained that he did not delve into character testi-
mony because the prosecution had damaging evidence of
defendant’s bad character, consisting of facts gathered in
an investigation of defendant for fraud and evidence that
he had been discharged from the service for desertion and
later reenlisted under a false name. The Supreme Court
held that counsel had a reasonable basis for not pursuing
the character testimony because the potential harm from
cross-examination of the character witnesses concerning
defendant’s acts of misconduct outweighed any value from
their testimony. The Court said ‘‘. . . Although evidence of
good character may not be rebutted by evidence of specific
acts of misconduct,’’ a witness who testifies as to an
accused’s good character may be cross-examined regard-
ing the witness’ knowledge of particular acts of miscon-
duct by the accused ‘‘to test the accuracy of [the witness’]
testimony and the standard by which [the witness]
measures reputation . . .’’ 511 Pa. at 318, 513 A.2d at 382.
(citations omitted.) See also, Commonwealth v. Adams,
426 Pa. Super. 332, 626 A.2d 1231 (1993), where the
Superior Court held that a witness who had testified that
the accused in a criminal case had an excellent reputation
for being a peaceful, law abiding citizen could be asked on
cross-examination if he remembered telling the police
that he knew the accused sells bags of cocaine. The Court
stated that the question tested whether the witness
possessed a sound standard of what constitutes a good
reputation. This theory would apply also where the
character evidence concerned the accused’s truthfulness
and the specific instances were probative of that trait.
Under Peterkin, Adams, and subsection (b)(2), although
the cross-examination concerns the specific acts of the
principal witness, it is admitted not for its effect upon his
or her credibility, but only for its effect on the credibility
of the character witness. Because this type of inquiry is
subject to abuse, the cross-examination is not automatic;
its use is specifically placed in the discretion of the court,
and like all other relevant evidence, it is subject to the
balancing test of Pa.R.E. 403. Moreover, the court should
take care that the cross-examiner has a reasonable basis
for the questions asked. See Adams, 426 Pa. Super. at
337, 620 A.2d at 1234.
With the one exception (evidence of conviction of crime
under Pa.R.E. 609)) referred to in the introductory clause
to section (b), the use of specific acts of misconduct
provided for in subsection (b)(2) is limited to what can be
developed on cross-examination. If the character witness
denies knowledge of the alleged acts, that’s the end of the
matter; other witnesses can not be called to prove the
acts. This is in conformity with the usual practice. 1
McCormick, Evidence, § 41 (1992 ed.).
The exclusion of arrests in subsection (b)(2) is based
upon Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 188, 436 A.2d 607
(1981), where the Supreme Court, abrogating earlier case
law, held that it was error to rule that a proposed
witness, who would testify that an accused had a good
reputation for honesty and peacefulness, could be cross-
examined about the accused’s prior arrests that did not
result in convictions. The Court’s reasoning was that an
arrest alone is not inconsistent with innocence, yet it has
a great potential to create undue prejudice. See also,
Commonwealth v. Percell, 499 Pa. 589, 454 A.2d 542
(1982) and Commonwealth v. Jackson, 475 Pa. 604, 381
A.2d 438 (1977), applying the prohibition against the use
of arrests not resulting in convictions to the cross-
examination of a witness about the witness’ own arrests.
In the Peterkin case, supra, the Court distinguished the
Scott decision on the ground that it ‘‘was founded upon
the ‘undue prejudice’ inherent in the knowledge of prior
arrests,’’ whereas none of the conduct in the matter then
before the Court involved arrests. 511 Pa. at 319, n. 13,
513 A.2d at 383, n. 13.
The last paragraph of F.R.E. 608(b), which provides
that the giving of testimony by an accused or any other
witness is not a waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination when they are examined about matters
relating only to credibility, is not included in Pa.R.E. 608.
Since subsection (b)(1) of the Rule bars cross-examination
of any witness concerning specific acts of the witness’ own
conduct, the provision is not needed.
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction
of Crime.
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has
been convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement.
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule
is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release
of the witness from the confinement imposed for that
conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect.
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old
as calculated herein is not admissible unless the propo-
nent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest its use.
(c) Effect of Pardon or Other Equivalent Procedure or
Successful Completion of Rehabilitation Program. Evi-
dence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if
the conviction has been the subject of one of the following:
(1) a pardon or other equivalent procedure based on a
specific finding of innocence; or
THE COURTS 1301
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
(2) a pardon or other equivalent procedure based on a
specific finding of rehabilitation of the person convicted,
and that person has not been convicted of any subsequent
crime.
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. In a criminal case only,
evidence of the adjudication of delinquency for an offense
under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301 et seq., may
be used to impeach the credibility of a witness if convic-
tion of the offense would be admissible to attack the
credibility of an adult.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal
therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inad-
missible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is
admissible.
Comment
Section (a).—Subject to the time limitation set forth in
section (b), section (a) of this Rule and F.R.E. 609(a)(2)
both permit the impeachment of any witness by evidence
of conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement whatever the punishment for that crime may
be. However, this Rule rejects the use of evidence of
conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprison-
ment of more than one year, which is allowed under
F.R.E. 609(a)(1) subject to certain balancing tests. This
limitation on the type of crime is in accord with Pennsyl-
vania law. Commonwealth v. Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528
A.2d 1326 (1987); Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554,
307 A.2d 255 (1973).
Section (a) of this Rule, unlike F.R.E. 609(a)(2), specifi-
cally provides that a conviction based upon a plea of nolo
contendere may be used to impeach; this, too, is consis-
tent with Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Snyder,
408 Pa. 253, 182 A.2d 495 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S.
957 (1963). See also, Eisenberg v. Commonwealth Dept. of
Public Welfare, 512 Pa. 181, 516 A.2d 333 (1986), an
administrative proceeding to terminate a health provid-
er’s participation in Pennsylvania’s medical assistance
program on the grounds that the provider had been
‘‘convicted’’ of a Medicaid related criminal offense within
the meaning of 55 Pa. Code § 1101.77(a)(6). The Supreme
Court held that the imposition of sentence upon the
provider’s nolo plea to a charge of Medicaid mail fraud
was a ‘‘conviction’’ under the applicable regulation. The
Court quoted with approval from Sokoloff v. Saxbe, 501
F.2d 571, 574 (2 Cir. 1974) as follows: ‘‘Where . . . a
statute (or judicial rule) attaches legal consequences to
the fact of a conviction, the majority of courts have held
that there is no valid distinction between a conviction
upon a plea of nolo contendere and a conviction after a
guilty plea or trial.’’ Eisenberg, 512 Pa. at 187, 516 A.2d
at 336.
As a general rule, before sentence has been pronounced,
evidence of a jury verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere may not be used to impeach, Common-
wealth v. Zapata, 455 Pa. 205, 314 A.2d 299 (1974),
unless that evidence would support a claim of bias or
improper motive. Commonwealth v. Williams, 524 Pa.
218, 570 A.2d 75 (1990); Commonwealth v. Hill, 523 Pa.
270, 566 A.2d 252 (1989), reargument denied, 525 Pa.
505, 582 A.2d 587 (1990). Evidence of admission to an
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition program under
Pa.R.Crim.P. 176—186 may not be used to impeach
credibility. Admission to the program places the criminal
proceedings in abeyance subject to reactivation under
certain conditions; hence, there has been no conviction.
Commonwealth v. Krall, 290 Pa. Super. 1, 434 A.2d 99
(1981). The result should be the same for a drug depen-
dent offender admitted to the rehabilitation and treat-
ment programs provided for in The Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 708—117
and 708—118, where there is also no immediate adjudica-
tion and trial on the charges is deferred pending further
developments.
Where it is the accused in a criminal case whose
credibility is sought to be impeached, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5918, which is referred to in the Comments to Pa.R.E.
607 and 608, again comes into play. It was pointed out in
the former Comment that its prohibition against ques-
tioning a defendant who testifies about conviction ‘‘of any
offense other than the one for which he is on trial’’ has
been interpreted literally to apply only to cross-
examination. Hence, evidence of conviction of a crime may
be introduced in rebuttal after the defendant has testi-
fied. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d
255 (1973).
Section (b).—Pa.R.E. 609(b) is the same as F.R.E. 609(b)
and basically tracks what was said in Commonwealth v.
Randall, 515 Pa. 410, 528 A.2d 1326 (1987). Where the
date of conviction or last date of confinement is within
ten years of the trial date, evidence of the conviction of a
crime involving dishonesty or false statement is per se
admissible. If a period greater than ten years has
elapsed, the evidence may be used only after advance
written notice and the trial judge’s determination that its
probative value, supported by specific facts and circum-
stances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. In
Randall, the Supreme Court stated that the factors
enumerated in Bighum, and Commonwealth v. Roots, 482
Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978) would be relevant in deter-
mining whether convictions more than ten years old
should be admitted.
Section (c).—Although its language differs, section (c) of
this Rule is substantively similar to F.R.E. 609(c). There
are no Pennsylvania cases dealing squarely with the
matters covered by section (c). Where a pardon is based
upon a finding that a defendant was in fact innocent, the
conviction is a nullity and has no probative value whatso-
ever; accordingly, there is no basis to permit its use. A
pardon based upon a finding of rehabilitation is an
indication that the character flaw which gave rise to the
inference of untruthfulness has been overcome and so
should no longer be taken into account. A subsequent
conviction of any crime, whether or not it involves
dishonesty or false statement, casts substantial doubt on
the finding of rehabilitation and justifies disregarding the
finding. In the case of both types of pardon, the instru-
ment embodying the pardon must itself set forth the
finding of innocence or rehabilitation. A pardon granted to
restore civil rights or to reward good behavior does not
fall within section (c) of this Rule. However, Common-
wealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 A.2d 89 (1926), held
that where there is such a pardon, if the underlying
conviction is used to impeach, the pardon is admissible in
rebuttal.
Section (d).—Pa.R.E. 609(d) is different from F.R.E.
609(d). Under the latter, evidence of juvenile adjudica-
tions is generally inadmissible; however, the court may
allow such evidence in a criminal case against a witness
other than the accused to the same extent as it could be
used to attack the credibility of an adult, if satisfied that
this is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of
guilt or innocence. Section (d) of Pa.R.E. 609 permits a
broader use of juvenile adjudications; it is dictated by 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 6354, as amended by Act No. 13 of May 12,
1995, effective July 11, 1995, which changed the law of
Pennsylvania.
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Prior to Act No. 13, juvenile adjudications could not be
used to impeach the credibility of any witness. Common-
wealth v. Katchmer, 453 Pa. 461, 308 A.2d 591 (1973). As
a result of Act No. 13, in criminal cases, impeachment
with evidence of juvenile adjudications of delinquency for
an offense is put on the same basis as evidence of
conviction of a crime under Pa.R.E. 609(a), i.e., it may be
used to impeach any witness, including the accused, if the
offense involves dishonesty or false statement. Juvenile
adjudications continue to be inadmissible in civil cases for
impeachment purposes. However, both before and after
the passage of Act No. 13, a juvenile adjudication could be
used in civil cases where the juvenile put his or her
reputation or character in issue. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6354(b)(3). According to the 1976 Official Comment on
this provision, it ‘‘is intended to remove the shield from a
plaintiff in a civil proceeding where he places his reputa-
tion or character in issue, e.g., libel actions.’’
Finally, it should be noted that in a criminal case the
accused has a right under the confrontation clause of the
U. S. Constitution to use the juvenile record of a witness,
regardless of the type of offense involved, to show the
witness’ possible bias, e.g., that the witness is on proba-
tion under a juvenile adjudication. Davis v. Alaska, 415
U. S. 309 (1974); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 521 Pa.
218, 555 A.2d 860 (1989), and see cases referred to in
Comment to Pa.R.E. 607(b).
Section (e).—This part of this Rule is the same as
F.R.E. 609(e). According to the Notes of the Advisory
Committee, the provision that a pending appeal does not
preclude impeachment by evidence of a prior conviction is
based upon the ‘‘presumption of correctness that ought to
attend judicial proceedings.’’ This is the predominant
view. 1 McCormick, Evidence, § 42 (4th ed. 1992). The
second sentence of section (e) allows evidence of the
appeal to be offered to permit the jury to mitigate the
impeachment. United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 858 (1983).
Rule 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions.
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on
matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of
showing that by reason of their nature the witness’
credibility is impaired or enhanced.
Comment
This Rule is identical to F.R.E. 610. It is consistent
with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5902, which provides that religious
beliefs and opinions shall not affect a person’s ‘‘capacity’’
to testify and that no witness shall be questioned about
those beliefs or opinions, and no evidence shall be heard
on those subjects for the purpose of affecting ‘‘competency
or credibility.’’ Pennsylvania decisional law is the same.
Commonwealth v. Greenwood, 488 Pa. 618, 413 A.2d 655
(1980); Commonwealth v. Mimms, 477 Pa. 553, 358 A.2d
334 (1978).
The Rule bars evidence of religious beliefs or opinions
of a witness only when it is offered for the purpose of
showing that, because of their nature, the witness’ truth-
fulness is affected. Evidence introduced for other purposes
is not prohibited. McKim v. Phila. Transp. Co., 364 Pa.
237, 72 A.2d 122 (1950) (where plaintiffs alleged loss of
earnings from their occupations as religious ministers,
questions concerning religious affiliation could be asked
to explore impairment of earning power); Commonwealth
v. Riggins, 373 Pa. Super. 243, 542 A.2d 1004 (1988)
(where murder victim, in a dying declaration, said that
one of his assailants was a Muslim, prosecution could
elicit testimony that defendant was a Black Muslim for
purposes of identification); see generally, Commonwealth
v. Cottam, 420 Pa. Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988 (1992),
appeal denied, 535 Pa. 673, 636 A.2d 632 (1993).
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Interrogation and
Presentation.
(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reason-
able control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertain-
ment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time
and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
(b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination of a
witness other than a party in a civil case should be
limited to the subject matter of the direct examination
and matters affecting credibility; however, the court may,
in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into addi-
tional matters as if on direct examination. A party
witness in a civil case may be cross-examined by an
adverse party on any matter relevant to any issue in the
case, including credibility, unless the court, in the inter-
ests of justice, limits the cross-examination with respect
to matters not testified to on direct examination.
(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be
used on the direct or redirect examination of a witness
except as may be necessary to develop the witness’
testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permit-
ted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile
witness, an adverse party or a witness identified with an
adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions;
a witness so examined should usually be interrogated by
all other parties as to whom the witness is not hostile or
adverse as if under redirect examination.
Comment
Section (a) of Pa.R.E. 611 is the same as F.R.E. 611(a).
However, sections (b) and (c) of the Rule differ from those
sections of the Federal Rule.
Section (a).—This section places responsibility for how
the trial should be conducted squarely within the discre-
tion of the trial judge and spells out guidelines for the
exercise of that discretion. It follows Pennsylvania law.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246 (1988);
see also Pa.R.C.P. 223 (relating to the conduct of civil jury
trials) and Pa.R.C.P. 224 (relating to the order of proof in
civil cases).
Section (b).—F.R.E. 611(b) limits the scope of cross-
examination to matters testified to on direct, and matters
bearing on credibility, unless the court in its discretion
allows inquiry into additional matters as if on direct
examination. This has been the traditional view in the
Federal courts and many State courts. Except when the
accused in a criminal case is the witness, when cross-
examination is thus limited, the evidence sought to be
developed is not lost; its introduction is merely deferred.
The cross-examiner may present the evidence by calling
the witness as his or her own.
Pa.R.E. 611(b), which is based on Pennsylvania law,
applies the traditional view to all witnesses, other than a
party in a civil case, but allows the cross-examination of
the latter on all relevant issues, plus matters affecting
credibility. Agate v. Dunleavy, 398 Pa. 26, 156 A.2d 530
(1959); Greenfield v. Philadelphia, 282 Pa. 344, 127 A.
768 (1925). Note, however, that both of these decisions
state that the broadened scope of cross-examination of a
party in a civil case does not alter the long-standing rule
that a defendant may not put in his or her defense under
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cover of cross-examination of the plaintiff; the qualifying
clause in the last sentence of section (b) will give the trial
judge discretion to follow this rule.
In applying the rule of limited cross-examination in a
civil case to a non-party witness, the Supreme Court said
in Conley v. Mervis, 324 Pa. 577, 582, 188 A. 350, 353
(1936) that, ‘‘cross-examination may embrace any matter
germane to the direct examination, qualifying or destroy-
ing it, or tending to develop facts which have been
improperly suppressed or ignored by the [witness].’’
The use of the limited cross-examination rule to pre-
clude a defendant in a criminal case from cross-examining
a prosecution witness about matters beyond the scope of
the direct examination has been upheld in Common-
wealth v. Cessna, 371 Pa. Super. 89, 537 A.2d 834 (1988)
and Commonwealth v. Lobel, 294 Pa. Super. 550, 440 A.2d
602 (1982). The Superior Court pointed out that the
defendant may present the evidence sought on cross-
examination by calling the witness as a defense witness.
The defendant did this in the Lobell case, but failed to
exercise this prerogative in the Cessna case.
Under the first sentence of Pa.R.E. 611(b), the limited
cross-examination rule is applicable to witnesses in a
criminal case. When the accused is the witness, there is
an interplay between any rule of evidence regarding scope
of cross-examination and the accused’s privilege against
self-incrimination.
When the accused testifies generally as to facts tending
to negate or raise doubts about the prosecution’s evi-
dence, he or she has waived the privilege, and may not
use it to prevent the prosecution from bringing out on
cross-examination every circumstance relating to those
facts, and the prosecution may examine the accused on
any matters tending to refute all inferences or deductions
arising from the direct examination. Commonwealth v.
Green, 525 Pa. 424, 581 A.2d 544 (1990). However, the
outcome is different when the accused’s testimony is more
selective, e.g., in a trial on an information charging two
offenses, the accused chooses to testify about only one of
the charges, or in a case involving a confession, the
accused’s testimony is confined to the issue of voluntari-
ness of the confession.
The latter situation occurred in Commonwealth v.
Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971), cert. denied,
405 U. S. 1046 (1972). There the defendant was convicted
of murder in the second degree. The primary evidence
against him was his written confession. At the trial, the
defendant took the stand for the express purpose of
challenging the voluntariness of the confession, and testi-
fied only about the treatment accorded him and the
course of events leading up to his signing of the confes-
sion. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made ad-
verse references to the defendant’s failure to deny the
killing when he was on the stand. The Supreme Court
held that since the defendant had testified only about the
voluntariness of his confession, ‘‘the waiver of his privi-
lege was co-extensive with the permissible scope of cross-
examination relative to that subject; it was not a general
waiver . . . . ’’ 443 Pa. at 264, 277 A.2d at 331. Accord-
ingly, the prosecutor’s comment, inviting the jury to draw
an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to
testify as to his innocence, violated his rights under the
Fifth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. 443 Pa. at
268, 277 A.2d at 332—333. However, the Court went on to
hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The waiver issue arose also in Commonwealth v. Ulen,
414 Pa. Super. 502, 607 A.2d 779 (1992), rev’d. on other
grounds, 539 Pa. 51, 650 A.2d 416 (1994), a prosecution
for the possession of and attempt to deliver a controlled
substance. The defendant presented only one witness, the
tenor of whose testimony was that the drugs belonged to
another person. In rebuttal the prosecution called a
witness who testified that the defendant’s witness and
the defendant had tried to suborn her to give false
testimony about ownership of the drugs. Defendant then
took the stand and testified only to contradict the pros-
ecution’s rebuttal evidence. In his closing argument, the
prosecutor alluded to the limited scope of the defendant’s
testimony and his failure to controvert any of the evi-
dence relating to the events leading to his arrest. The
Superior Court, following the decision in the Camm case,
held that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper because
the defendant ‘‘did not waive entirely his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege by taking the stand to refute the Common-
wealth’s rebuttal evidence. The waiver occurred only with
respect to the area of inquiry opened by his surrebuttal
testimony.’’ 414 Pa. Super. at 526—27, 607 A.2d at
791—92. Here again, the Court held that the error was
harmless.
Section (c).—Pa.R.E. 611(c) makes two changes in the
comparable section of the Federal Rule. First of all, the
words ‘‘or redirect’’ do not appear in the first sentence of
the latter; they are intended to remove any doubt that
the rule on leading questions applies to redirect as well
as direct examination. Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh,
282 Pa. Super. 300, 422 A.2d 1126 (1980). Secondly, a
clause has been added to the last sentence of section (c) to
provide that the permission to use leading questions
given to a party who calls a hostile witness, an adverse
party or one identified with an adverse party, usually
should not be extended to other parties if the witness is
not hostile or adverse to them.
Section (c) is generally in accord with Pennsylvania
law. A leading question has been defined as one which
indicates or suggests the answer desired by the examiner.
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630
(1991), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 946 (1992); Commonwealth
v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981). As set
forth in section (c), leading questions should not be used
on direct examination, but may be employed on cross.
Rogan Estate, 404 Pa. 205, 171 A.2d 177 (1961). The right
to lead a witness on cross-examination is qualified in
section (c), as it is in the Federal Rule, by the word
‘‘ordinarily.’’ This qualification is meant to be a basis for
denying the use of leading questions when the cross-
examination is in form only rather than in fact, e.g., the
questioning of a party by his or her own attorney after
having been called by an opponent, or the cross-
examination of an insured defendant who is friendly to
the plaintiff. See Notes of the Advisory Committee to
F.R.E. 611.
Leading questions may be put to a hostile witness,
Commonwealth v. Settles, 442 Pa. 159, 275 A.2d 61
(1971), and to an adverse party. Agate 398 Pa. at 29, 156
A.2d at 531. Section (c) is consistent also with 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5935. That statute authorizes the calling and
cross-examination of an adverse party or a person having
an adverse interest; this, of course, embraces the use of
leading questions.
The reason a party who calls a hostile witness or
adverse party or one identified with the latter may use
leading questions is that such persons are ‘‘unfriendly’’ to
the party calling them, and there is little risk that they
will be susceptible to any suggestions inherent in the
questions. But that risk is present when any of those
1304 THE COURTS
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
witnesses is interrogated by a party as to whom the
witness is not hostile, an adverse party or one identified
with the latter. The last clause of section (c) restricts the
use of leading questions in those circumstances; however,
the word ‘‘usually’’ is meant to qualify the restriction so
that it may be set aside in an appropriate case; e.g., a
witness called and examined as a hostile witness by one
party, whose testimony substantially harms the interest
of another party with whom the witness is neither
friendly nor unfriendly.
Rule 612 Writing or Other Item Used to Refresh
Memory.
(a) Right to Refresh Memory and Production of Refresh-
ing Materials. A witness may use a writing or other item
to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying. If the
witness does so, either
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion deter-
mines it is necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing or other
item produced at the hearing, trial or deposition, to
inspect it, to cross-examine the witness on it and to
introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the
testimony of the witness.
(b) Redaction of Writing or Other Item and Sanctions.
If it is claimed that the writing or other item contains
matters not related to the subject matter of the testimony,
the court shall examine it in camera, excise any portion
not so related and order delivery of the remainder to the
party entitled to it. Any portion withheld over objections
shall be preserved and made available to the appellate
court in the event of an appeal. If a writing or other item
is not produced or delivered pursuant to an order under
this section, the court shall make any order justice
requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecu-
tion does not comply, the order shall be one striking the
testimony or, if the court in its discretion determines that
the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial, or
the court may use contempt procedures.
Comment
This Rule differs from F.R.E. 612 in the following
respects:
1. The subject matter of Pa.R.E. 612 and F.R.E. 612 is
the same but the former covers it in two sections whereas
the latter deals with it in one lengthy paragraph. The
organization of Pa.R.E. 612 is derived, in part, from the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 612 (1974).
2. The right to refresh memory which is implicit in the
Federal Rule is set forth explicitly at the beginning of
Pa.R.E. 612.
3. The reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act)
which appears in the Federal Rule has been eliminated
because it is inapposite.
4. In Pa.R.E. 612 the words ‘‘or other item’’ have been
added after the word ‘‘writing’’ wherever it appears.
5. The words ‘‘trial or deposition’’ have been added in
Pa.R.E. 612(a) after the word ‘‘hearing’’ primarily to
dispel any doubt about the applicability of the rule to
depositions. The addition of ‘‘trial’’ is for the sake of
completeness.
6. In the last sentence of Pa.R.E. 612(b), the words
‘‘elects not to’’ which appear after the word ‘‘prosecution’’
have been replaced by the words ‘‘does not’’ and ‘‘contempt
procedures’’ have been added to the sanctions which may
be employed in criminal cases.
Despite these changes, Pa.R.E. 612 and its Federal
counterpart are substantively equivalent.
Section (a).—The right of a witness to refresh his or her
memory provided for in section (a), is well established in
Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Payne, 455 Pa. 503, 317
A.2d 208 (1974). Although in most cases, it is a writing
that is used for this purpose, it is recognized that many
other things can spur one’s memory (e.g., photographs).
Most courts ‘‘adhere to the view that any memorandum or
other object may be used as a stimulus to present
memory, without restriction by rule as to authorship,
guarantee of correctness or time of making.’’ 1 Mc-
Cormick, Evidence, § 9 (4th ed. 1992). The addition of the
words ‘‘or other item’’ in section (a) takes this into
account.
This is consistent with Pennsylvania law. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteel, 346 Pa. Super. 336, 499 A.2d
637 (1985) (well settled that a witness ‘‘may use any
writing or other aid to refresh or revive his or her present
recollection of past events . . . ’’); Commonwealth v.
Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 195 A.2d 174 (1963) (means of
refreshing memory are almost unlimited). An item may be
used to refresh memory even though it is inadmissible in
evidence. Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 322
A.2d 343 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 937 (1974)
(dictum); Panik v. Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 88 A.2d 730 (1952);
Dean Witter, 346 Pa. Super. at 344, 494 A.2d at 641.
The procedures for refreshing a witness’ memory are
reviewed in Commonwealth v. Proctor, 253 Pa. Super.
369, 385 A.2d 383 (1978). The Superior Court stated that
it must be shown that the witness’ present memory is
inadequate, that a writing or other object could refresh
the witness’ memory and that reference to the writing or
other object does actually refresh the witness’ memory.
253 Pa. Super. at 373, 385 A.2d at 385. This was followed
in Solomon v. Baum, 126 Pa. Cmwlth. 646, 560 A.2d 878
(1989), holding that an accident investigation report could
not be shown to a police officer who testified that he had
an independent present recollection of the accident.
The theory of the memory refreshing process is that the
recollection of the hazy witness will be jogged by bringing
a writing or other item to the witness’ attention so that
he or she will then have a present recall of the past
events. It follows, therefore, that the witness must testify
from present memory and not from the writing or other
item, and having served its purpose, the writing or other
item may not be introduced into evidence by the propo-
nent of the testimony. Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa.
422, 311 A.2d 572 (1973). This process differs from the
exception to the hearsay rule for recorded recollection,
where a prior memorandum or other record, made by a
witness who has insufficient present memory to testify
accurately, is itself admitted into evidence if it meets the
requirements of Pa.R.E. 803.1(3).
When a witness is shown something for the purpose of
refreshing memory, there is a danger that what the
witness looks at will be unduly suggestive of what his or
her testimony should be, and that what is then put forth
as rekindled present recollection is in fact not that at all.
Giving the adverse party access to what was shown to the
witness to use in cross-examination and to introduce into
evidence is a way of protecting against this risk.
The 1972 proposed version of F.R.E. 612, which was
submitted to Congress, provided for access as of right to a
writing when it was used to refresh a memory both while
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testifying and before testifying. Notes of the Advisory
Committee on 1972 Proposed Rule 612. This was
amended by the House Judiciary Committee ‘‘so as still to
require the production of writings used . . . while testify-
ing but to render the production of writings used . . .
before testifying discretionary with the court in the
interests of justice.’’ Notes of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House Report No. 93 650. It was this version of
the Federal Rule that was finally adopted. Pa.R.E. 612(a)
takes the same approach, and this is consistent with the
Pennsylvania decisions.
In Proctor, 253 Pa. Super. at 374, 385 A.2d at 385—86,
the court said that it was clearly settled that once a
witness has resorted to a writing to refresh memory while
testifying, ‘‘the adverse party is entitled to inspect the
writing and have it available for reference in cross-
examining the witness.’’ Id. (emphasis added); see Com-
monwealth v. Allen, 220 Pa. Super. 403, 289 A.2d 476
(1972). However, when a writing is used to refresh
memory before testifying, production of it to the adverse
party is discretionary with the court. Commonwealth v.
Samuels, 235 Pa. Super. 192, 340 A.2d 880 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. at 47—50, 195
A.2d at 175—176. In the latter case, a policeman, who
testified without notes, admitted on cross-examination
that before trial he had refreshed his recollection by
reading the police file containing day by day reports of
the investigation. In holding that there was no abuse of
discretion in denying defendant access to the file, the
Superior Court pointed out that in view of the length and
scope of the file, the opportunity for abuse and confusion
was obvious, and there was a great likelihood of raising
many collateral issues with no real guide for limiting
cross-examination of the witness.
Pa.R.E. 612(a) is not intended to change the result in
Commonwealth v. Kantos, 442 Pa. 343, 276 A.2d 830
(1971). There the Supreme Court held that in a criminal
case, the defendant must be given the written statements
made by a witness to the police prior to trial, following
the testimony of the witness on direct examination, even
if the statements had not been used to refresh memory.
There is no Pennsylvania authority on the question of
whether the adverse party may introduce into evidence
the writing or other item used to refresh memory. Pa.R.E.
612(a), like F.R.E. 612, specifically provides that this may
be done. This will enable the trier of fact to put the whole
matter, i.e., what the witness was shown and how the
witness testified on direct examination and cross-
examination, in proper context. The evidence is received
only for impeachment purposes unless it comes within
one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule in Pa.R.E. 803,
803.1 and 804(b).
By its terms, Pa.R.E. 612(a) is made applicable to
testimony given at a deposition; this is not what was done
in F.R.E. 612, which refers only to having ‘‘the writing
produced at a hearing.’’ Nevertheless, most of the cases
have applied the Federal Rule to depositions based upon
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c), which states: ‘‘Examination and
cross-examination of witnesses [at a deposition] may
proceed as permitted at trial under the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.’’ Wright and Gold, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence, § 6183; see, e.g.,
Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U. S. 903.
There are no Pennsylvania cases considering this issue,
and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not
have a provision similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c). However,
by statute and procedural rules, Pennsylvania has pro-
vided for the introduction of deposition testimony at trial
in certain circumstances. The procedure for taking a
deposition outside of Pennsylvania by either the prosecu-
tion or defendant in a criminal case is set forth in 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5325, and a deposition taken pursuant to
that statute may be read into evidence at the trial of any
criminal matter under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5919, unless the
deponent is present at the trial, has been or can be
subpoenaed, or his or her attendance could otherwise be
procured. In addition, Pa.R.Crim.P. 9015 authorizes the
taking of a deposition upon order of the court or by
agreement of the parties to preserve the testimony of any
witness who may be unavailable for trial or ‘‘when due to
exceptional circumstances, it is in the interests of justice
that the witness’ testimony be preserved.’’ Pa.R.Crim.P.
9015A sets forth the procedures for videotaping the
deposition.
In civil cases, Pa.R.C.P. 4020(a)(3) provides that the
deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used at the trial by any party for any purpose if the
witness is unavailable within the terms of that Rule or
there are exceptional circumstances, and under subsec-
tion (a)(5) of that Rule, the deposition of a non-party
medical witness may be used for any purpose whether or
not the witness is available (and see also 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5936). Moreover, Pa.R.C.P. 4017.1(g) authorizes the use
at trial of a videotape deposition of a medical witness or
an expert witness, other than a party, for any purpose
even though the witness may be available.
Because of these statutes and procedural rules, there
are many possibilities for the introduction of a deposition
into evidence at the trial, and one can never be sure in
advance when these possibilities will become realities. In
view of this, the need of an adverse party to test a
deponent, who has used a writing or other item to refresh
memory, by getting access to the writing or other item
and cross-examining the deponent on it, is as great at the
deposition as it would be at trial. Apart from this, if
deposition testimony can be challenged, any suggestion
arising from the refreshing can be exposed immediately
with the result that it may be eliminated at the time of
trial. For these reasons, Pa.R.E. 612(a) is specifically
made applicable to depositions.
By its terms, Pa.R.E. 612(a) applies to the use of a
writing or other item to refresh memory ‘‘for the purpose
of testifying.’’ F.R.E. 612 contains the same phrase, and
the Advisory Committee explained that it was intended
‘‘to safeguard against using the rule as a pretext for
wholesale exploration of an opposing party’s files and to
insure that access is limited only to those writings which
may fairly be said in fact to have an impact upon the
testimony of the witness.’’ This view of the phrase was
recognized in Sporck, 759 F.2d at 317 19, in a case in
which a deposition witness had examined a large number
of documents, selected for him by counsel, in preparation
for testifying at the deposition.
Section (b).—Except for the changes noted above con-
cerning sanctions in criminal cases when the prosecution
fails to comply with an order to produce, Pa.R.E. 612(b) is
the same as the last three sentences of F.R.E. 612. An
adverse party has rights only to those parts of any
materials used to refresh memory that bear upon the
witness’ testimony. When the party who did the refresh-
ing contends that some part of what the witness was
shown goes beyond the scope of the testimony, section (b)
requires the court to make an in camera inspection and to
remove any extraneous matter. Of course, what is excised
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must be preserved in the event that the redaction is
challenged on appeal. This process is a well recognized
technique.
The last sentence of section (b) is aimed at what in all
probability will be the rare case of a failure to comply
with an order to produce. In a civil case, the court is
given broad discretion to deal with this. The problem is
akin to the failure of a party to comply with discovery
orders, and Pa.R.C.P. 4019 provides for a wide range of
sanctions in that case. Similarly, under section (b), the
court may employ a sanction best calculated to remedy
the harm caused by the failure to produce.
When the prosecution does not produce in a criminal
case, this interferes with the defendant’s right to confront
the witness by limiting cross-examination. Striking the
witness’ testimony will generally be a sufficient cure.
However, if the testimony is so significant that the jury
would be hard put to disregard it, despite its having been
stricken, a mistrial may be in order. Since declaring a
mistrial may create double jeopardy problems, which
could preclude a retrial (see, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U. S. 667 (1982)), care must be exercised in employing
this sanction.
The elimination of the word ‘‘elects,’’ which appears in
F.R.E. 612 in connection with the prosecution’s non-
compliance with an order to produce, is meant to remove
any implication that the prosecution has an option to
withhold refreshing materials. This complements the
inclusion in Pa.R.E. 612(b) of contempt procedures as an
additional sanction, thus providing the court with a
means of forcing compliance with an order to produce
when an occasion arises where the witness’ testimony or
what was shown to the witness is important to the
defendant’s theory of the case.
Rule 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses.
(a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement A
witness may be examined concerning a prior statement
made by the witness, whether written or not, and the
statement need not be shown or its contents disclosed to
the witness at that time, but on request the statement or
contents shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.
(b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement
of Witness. Unless the interests of justice otherwise
require, extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent state-
ment by a witness is admissible only if, during the
examination of the witness,
(1) the statement, if written, is shown to, or if not
written, its contents are disclosed to, the witness;
(2) the witness is given an opportunity to explain or
deny the making of the statement; and
(3) the opposite party is given an opportunity to ques-
tion the witness.
This section does not apply to admissions of a party-
opponent as defined in rule 803(25) (relating to admis-
sions by a party opponent).
(c) Evidence of Prior Consistent Statement of Witness.
Evidence of a prior consistent statement by a witness is
admissible for rehabilitation purposes if the opposite
party is given an opportunity to question the witness
concerning the statement, and the statement is offered to
rebut an expressed or implied charge of:
(1) recent fabrication, bias, improper influence or other
motive, and the consistent statement, or where there are
two or more consistent statements, at least one of the
statements was made before the charged fabrication, bias,
improper influence or other motive;
(2) faulty memory at the trial and the consistent
statement was made prior to the onset of any alleged
defect in memory; or
(3) inconsistent accounts arising from the admission of
evidence of an alleged prior inconsistent statement of the
witness, which the witness has denied or explained, and
under all the surrounding circumstances, the consistent
statement is related to or supports the witness’ denial or
explanation of the inconsistent statement.
Comment
This Rule differs from F.R.E. 613 both in organization
and in many substantive respects. Unlike its Federal
counterpart, it covers both impeachment by prior incon-
sistent statements and rehabilitation by prior consistent
statements; the Federal rule deals only with the former.
Section (a).—This section of the Rule is identical to
F.R.E. 613(a). By dispensing with the need to show the
prior statement or disclose its contents to the witness
before proceeding with an examination about it, section
(a) repudiates the decision in the Queen’s Case, 2 Br. & B.
284, 129 Eng. Rep. 9761 (1820). What scant authority
there is in Pennsylvania on this point is ambiguous. In
Kann v. Bennett, 223 Pa. 36, 72 A. 342 (1909), the
Supreme Court stated, relying only on 1 Greenleaf,
Evidence § 88 (Lewis ed. 1896), that before a witness
may be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent state-
ment, the witness must be shown the statement and
asked if he wrote it. But later, in Commonwealth v.
Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 329 A.2d 844 (1974), the Court,
overlooking the Kann case, said it never had had occasion
to consider the question, and found it unnecessary to
resolve the matter under the facts involved in the case
before it. Section (a) settles the matter.
Section (b).—The first sentence of section (b) of the Rule
differs from F.R.E. 613(b) by providing that extrinsic
evidence of a prior inconsistent statement may be intro-
duced only if the witness was confronted with or informed
of the statement during his or her examination, thus
providing the witness with a chance to deny or explain
the statement; the Federal Rule also provides for furnish-
ing the witness with this opportunity, but sets no particu-
lar time or sequence for when this must be done. Notes of
the Advisory Committee on Rule 613. Section (b) of the
Rule follows the traditional common law approach, and it
is different from the statements found in several Pennsyl-
vania decisions to the effect that it is not mandatory that
a witness be shown or be made aware of a prior
inconsistent statement before extrinsic evidence of it may
be introduced, but that the matter is one within the
discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Manning, 495 Pa. 652, 435 A.2d 1207 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Dennison, 441 Pa. 334, 272 A.2d 180 (1971). The
first sentence of section (b) changes the emphasis of these
cases by establishing the traditional common law ap-
proach as the preferred and usual manner of proceeding
in all cases except where the interests of justice would be
better served by a relaxation of the rule.
The rationale for the last sentence of section (b)
exempting certain admissions of a party opponent from
the requirements of the section is that ‘‘parties have
ample opportunities to testify and explain or deny state-
ments attributed to them.’’ Wright & Gold, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure: Evidence § 6205. The exemption is in
accord with Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth by Truscott
v. Binenstock, 358 Pa. 644, 57 A.2d 884 (1948); Common-
wealth v. Dilworth, 289 Pa. 498, 137 A. 683 (1927).
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Finally, it should be remembered, as noted in the
Comment to Pa.R.E. 607(a), that a prior inconsistent
statement may be used only for impeachment purposes
and not substantively unless it is an admission of a party
opponent under Pa.R.E. 803(25), the statement of a
witness other than a party opponent within the hearsay
exception of Pa.R.E. 803.1(1), which is a codification of
Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992),
or a statement of prior identification under the hearsay
exception of Pa.R.E. 803.1(2).
Section (c).—This section of this Rule covering the use
of prior consistent statements for rehabilitation purposes,
does not appear in F.R.E. 613. Instead, some consistent
statements are dealt with in the Federal Rules as part of
the definition of statements that are not hearsay. Under
F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), a prior statement of a declarant, who
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination, is not hearsay, and is substantive evidence,
when the statement is consistent with the declarant’s
testimony and it ‘‘is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication, or
improper influence or motive.’’ Section (c) adds ‘‘bias,’’
‘‘faulty memory’’ and ‘‘inconsistent accounts’’ to the kind of
charges that may be rebutted by a consistent statement.
In addition, it clearly provides in subsection (c)(1) that
the consistent statement must have been made before the
fabrication, bias, improper influence or other motive.
Although F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is silent on this point, the
U. S. Supreme Court recently held that it permits the
introduction of a declarant’s consistent statements as
substantive evidence only when they were made before
the challenged fabrication, influence or motive. Tome v.
United States, 513 U. S. 150 (1995).
It should be remembered that under section (c), a prior
consistent statement is always received for rehabilitative
purposes only and not as substantive evidence. See
Comment d. to Pa.R.E. 801 (relating to the definition of
hearsay).
Subsection (c)(1) is consistent with existing Pennsylva-
nia law. Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 556
A.2d 370 (1989) (use of consistent statement to rebut
charge of recent fabrication); Commonwealth v. Smith,
518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246 (1988) (use of consistent
statement to counter alleged corrupt motive); Common-
wealth v. McEachin; 371 Pa. Super. 188, 537 A.2d 883
(1988), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 603, 553 A.2d 965 (1988)
(use of consistent statement to negate improper influ-
ence). All of these cases require that the consistent
statement be made before the fabrication, corrupt motive
or improper influence, otherwise the statement does not
logically negate any of these charges.
Subsection (c)(2) is intended to cover those instances
where the accuracy of the witness’ memory at the trial is
attacked on the grounds that because of the passage of
time, some intervening mental deficiency or the like, the
trial testimony is suspect. Evidence of a prior consistent
statement made shortly after the event before there was
time to forget or before any intervening defect will
support the accuracy of the trial testimony. In Common-
wealth v. Swinson, 426 Pa. Super. 167, 626 A.2d 627
(1993), where there had been a searching cross-
examination of a robbery victim designed to cast doubt on
his memory, the prosecution was permitted to introduce
evidence of the victim’s prior consistent statement given
to the police two days after the robbery. See also, 1
McCormick, Evidence, § 47 at n. 18 (4th ed. 1992). As
previously noted, there is no counterpart to subsection
(c)(2) in the Federal Rules.
Subsection (c)(3) is directed at the situation of an
attack upon a witness with a prior inconsistent state-
ment. Note that this type of attack does not necessarily
connote that the witness has lied; it may indicate only
that the witness is mistaken, confused or generally
unreliable.
Subsection (c)(3) has some support in, but is not
completely congruent with, the Pennsylvania decisions. In
Commonwealth v. Berrios, 495 Pa. 444, 434 A.2d 1173,
1177 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a witness’
consistent statement can be used for rehabilitation pur-
poses to counteract the witness’ inconsistent statement
where the former is made prior to the latter. From the
Court’s statement of the facts, one could infer that the
witness was confronted with his inconsistent statements
and made no denial; however, the Court did not discuss
this in reaching the result. See also, Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 447 Pa. 405, 290 A.2d 262 (1972). The Court, in
Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 127 A.2d 101 (1956),
allowed the use of a consistent statement for rehabilita-
tion where it preceded the making of an inconsistent
statement that the witness had denied making.
However, in Commonwealth v. White, 340 Pa. 139, 16
A.2d 407 (1940), where the defendant in a murder case
admitted making a confession and offered a lame expla-
nation, the Court held that the defendant’s consistent
statement, made after his confession, was not admissible;
the Court placed no emphasis on either the explanation
or the timing of the consistent statement. The Court,
adopting language from the opinion of the trial judge,
said ‘‘[w]here as in the case of this defendant and his
witnesses, the self contradiction is conceded, it remains as
a damaging fact, and is in no sense explained away by
the consistent statement . . . . No matter how many times
the consistent story may have been told, the inconsistent
one is not erased.’’ Id. at 142—44, 16 A.2d at 408—09.
The White decision was distinguished in Commonwealth
v. Willis, 380 Pa. Super. 555, 552 A.2d 682 (1988), on the
ground that in that case, the witness’ consistent state-
ment was made after the admitted inconsistent state-
ment, whereas in the case before the court the consistent
statement came first, and under all the circumstances,
including the witness’ explanation, it buttressed the
witness’ credibility. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v.
Jubilee, 403 Pa. Super. 589, 589 A.2d 1112 (1991), appeal
denied, 529 Pa. 617, 600 A.2d 534 (1991), the Superior
Court refused to follow Willis, adhering instead to the
decision in White, in a case where the inconsistent
statement was admitted and explained and the consistent
statement came later.
The keys to admissibility of a consistent statement
under subsection (c)(3) are the witness’ denial or plausible
explanation of the alleged inconsistent statement and the
consistent statement’s relation to or support of the denial
or explanation. In view of the requirements of section (b),
it is unlikely that a witness will not have an opportunity
to deny or explain an alleged inconsistency. Where the
witness denies making the alleged inconsistent state-
ment, the consistent statement should almost invariably
be admitted, regardless of its timing. When the witness
admits and explains the inconsistent statement, the use
of the consistent statement will depend upon the nature
of the explanation and all of the circumstances that
prompted the making of the consistent statement; the
timing of that statement, although not conclusive, is one
of the factors to be considered. If the witness acknowl-
edges making the inconsistent statement and offers no
explanation, a consistent statement, whether made ear-
lier or later, should not be admitted.
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Usually, evidence of a prior consistent statement is
rebuttal evidence that may not be introduced until after
witness has testified on direct examination and an ex-
press or implied attack has thereafter been made on the
witness’ testimony in one of the ways set forth in
subsection (c). But in at least two situations, Pennsylva-
nia Courts have upheld the admission of a prior consis-
tent statement in anticipation of an attack on the wit-
ness.
In Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246
(1988), the Supreme Court, affirming a conviction of
murder, held that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion when he permitted the Commonwealth to
introduce prior consistent statements made by a witness
for the prosecution on direct examination of the witness.
The justification for this was that defense counsel, in his
opening address to the jury, suggested that the witness,
who had pled guilty to other lesser offenses in connection
with the murder, had motives to fabricate evidence
against the defendant in order to obtain a lenient sen-
tence for herself.
A similar preemptive use of a prior consistent state-
ment has been countenanced in rape cases where evi-
dence of a prompt complaint of rape by the alleged victim
may be introduced in the prosecution’s case in chief.
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 295 Pa. Super. 467, 477, 441
A.2d 1327, 1332 (1982). The Superior Court stated that
‘‘the testimony of a woman that she was raped is
automatically vulnerable to attack by the defendant as
recent fabrication in the absence of evidence of hue and
cry on her part.’’
Rule 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by
Court.
(a) Calling by Court. Consistent with its function as an
impartial arbiter, the court, with notice to the parties,
may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party
call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-
examine witnesses thus called.
(b) Interrogation by Court. Where the interest of justice
so requires, the court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party.
(c) Objections. An objection to the calling of a witness
by the court must be made at the time of the court’s
notice of an intention to call the witness. An objection to a
question by the court must be made at the time the
question is asked; when requested to do so, the court
shall give the objecting party an opportunity to make
objections out of the presence of the jury.
Comment
This Rule differs from F.R.E. 614 in several respects.
The phrase relating to the court’s ‘‘function as an impar-
tial arbiter’’ and the provision for notice have been added
in section (a), and the clause regarding ‘‘interest of
justice’’ has been added in section (b). The additions
dealing with the court as an ‘‘impartial arbiter’’ and the
‘‘interest of justice’’ are cautions to any trial judges who
might be inclined to inject themselves too much into the
trial of a case. The provision for notice of the court’s
intention to call a witness will give all parties an
opportunity to be heard upon the need for this, to object
thereto and to prepare for the cross-examination of the
witness.
Section (c) changes the Federal Rule by eliminating the
option of objecting to the calling or interrogation of the
witnesses by the court ‘‘at the next available opportunity
when the jury is not present.’’ The purpose of this option
is to relieve counsel of ‘‘the embarrassment’’ which might
arise by objecting to the judge’s questions in the jury’s
presence, a theory comparable to that which prompted
the ‘‘automatic’’ objection in F.R.E. 605 when the judge is
called as a witness. Notes of the Advisory Committee to
F.R.E. 614(c). The option has been removed from Pa.R.E.
614(c) just as the ‘‘automatic’’ objection was done away
with in Pa.R.E. 605. The appropriate time for objecting to
the calling of a witness by the court is when notice of the
court’s intention to do so is given as required by section
(a) of the Rule, and this should always take place out of
the presence of the jury.
When the court’s questions to a witness are thought to
be objectionable, the issue should be raised when the
questions are put. In this way, the jury will not hear the
evidence sought if the objections are sustained—a far
better course than an instruction to the jury to disregard
the evidence when the objections are not made until some
time after the questions have been asked and answered.
The fear of ‘‘embarrassment’’ from making the objections
in the jury’s presence is in all probability an exaggera-
tion; throughout a trial, jurors are accustomed to hearing
objections and the rulings thereon, and they are always
admonished that no inferences should be drawn from the
objections or the rulings. In the extreme case (e.g.,
persistent questioning thought to be objectionable), oppor-
tunity for a side-bar conference should be provided as set
forth in the final clause of section (c). In requiring
objections, section (c) is consistent with the provisions of
Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1) regarding objections generally.
Pa.R.E. 614 is basically consistent with Pennsylvania
law. It is well established that, ‘‘as a general rule, a trial
judge may in the exercise of a sound discretion call and
examine witnesses of his own accord . . .’’ Commonwealth
v. Crews, 429 Pa. 16, 239 A.2d 350 (1968); Commonwealth
v. DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449 (1967). The
leading case on the interrogation of witnesses by the
court is Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 508, 123
A.2d 486, 487 (1924) where the Supreme Court said:
‘‘Witnesses should be interrogated by the judge only when
he conceives the interest of justice so requires. It is better
to permit counsel to bring out the evidence and clear up
disputed points on cross-examination unaided by the
court; but where an important fact is indefinite or a
disputed point needs to be clarified, the court may see
that it is done by taking part in the examination . . . .
’’See also, Commonwealth v. Roldan, 524 Pa. 366, 572
A.2d 1214 (1990); see generally, 1 McCormick, Evidence,
§ 8 (4th ed. 1992).
When the court does question a witness, an instruction
that the jury should not conclude that the court has any
opinion concerning the merits of the case or the credibil-
ity of the witness is appropriate. Commonwealth v.
Blount, 387 Pa. Super. 603, 564 A.2d 952 (1989); Fleck v.
Durawood, Inc., 365 Pa. Super. 123, 529 A.2d 3 (1987).
Rule 615. Sequestration of Witnesses.
At the request of a party or on its own motion, the
court may order witnesses sequestered so that they
cannot learn of the testimony of other witnesses. This
section does not authorize sequestration of the following:
(1) a party who is a natural person or the guardian of a
party who is a minor or an incapacitated person;
(2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a
natural person (including the Commonwealth) designated
as its representative by its attorney; or
(3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be
essential to the presentation of the party’s cause.
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Comment
Besides using the term ‘‘sequestration’’ instead of ‘‘ex-
clusion,’’ and substituting ‘‘learn of ’’ for ‘‘hear’’ in the first
sentence, this Rule differs from F.R.E. 615 by placing
sequestration within the discretion of the court rather
than making it mandatory upon motion of a party and by
adding the guardian of a minor or incapacitated person to
the first category of those who may not be sequestered.
Sequestration, i.e., barring a witness from the court-
room during the testimony of certain other witnesses and
prohibiting direct and indirect communication both in and
out of the courtroom, is designed to prevent a witness
from learning what other witnesses have said or intend to
say as a means of discouraging and exposing fabrication,
collusion, inaccuracies and inconsistencies. 1 McCormick,
Evidence, § 50 (4th ed. 1992). This rule is in conformity
with Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510
Pa. 603, 619—620, 511 A.2d 764, 772 (1986) (‘‘The
decision of whether or not to sequester a witness is
within the province of the trial judge and, absent a clear
abuse of discretion, will not be reversed . . . .’’) Examples
of abuse of discretion may be found in Commonwealth v.
Fant, 480 Pa. 586, 391 A.2d 1040 (1978), cert. denied, 441
U. S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2180 (1979) and Commonwealth v.
Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952). In Fant, the
Court, in a murder case, denied the defendant’s motion to
sequester several prosecution witnesses who had made no
pretrial identifications of him, and permitted them to
make identifications in the courtroom. In Turner, an
important element in the prosecution’s case was an
alleged inculpatory statement made by defendant to two
detectives; defendant denied making the statements. His
motion to sequester the detectives was denied by the trial
court.
The three categories of persons who may not be seques-
tered are, with some slight differences, akin to those in
the Federal Rule. Clause (1) covers natural persons who
are parties; their exclusion would raise constitutional
problems of confrontation and due process. It also in-
cludes guardians of parties who are minors or incapaci-
tated persons; this brings the rule into conformity with
Pa.R.C.P. 2027 (minors) and 2053 (incapacitated persons),
which place the conduct of actions on behalf of those
parties under the supervision and control of their guard-
ians. Clause (2) applies to the designated representatives
of a party which is not a natural personal. The paren-
thetical phrase relating to the Commonwealth does not
appear in F.R.E. 615(2); it is meant to make clear what is
said to be intended by the Federal Rule, that in a
criminal case, the prosecution has a right to have the law
enforcement agent primarily responsible for investigating
the case at the counsel table to assist in presenting the
case, even though the agent will be a witness. See Notes
of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report No.
93—1274, and Notes of the Advisory Committee to F.R.E.
615(2). Clause (3) refers to persons such as the one who
handled the transaction involved in the case or an expert
relied upon by counsel for advice in managing the
litigation.
The trial court has discretion in choosing a remedy for
violation of a requestration order. Commonwealth v.
Smith, 464 Pa. 314, 346 A.2d 757 (1975). Remedies may
include ordering a mistrial, forbidding the testimony of
the offending witness, or an instruction to the jury.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 78, 436 A.2d 161 (1981).
ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT
TESTIMONY
Rule
701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
702. Testimony by Experts.
703. Basis of Expert Testimony.
704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue.
705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion.
706. Court Appointed Experts.
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the
witness’ testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is
limited to those opinions or inferences which are ratio-
nally based on the perception of the witness and helpful
to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 701 except for the
deletion of the (a) and (b) divisions within the text of the
rule. No substantive changes result from this deletion.
The Superior Court decision in Lewis v. Mellor, 259 Pa.
Super. 509, 393 A.2d 941 (1978) (en banc), adopted F.R.E.
701 and in doing so condensed and somewhat changed,
but did not specifically overrule, earlier Pennsylvania
evidence law. Prior to Lewis, there were four rules that
prohibited lay witness opinion testimony: Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Heppenstall, 360 Pa. 433, 61 A.2d 809 (1948) (no
lay opinion testimony where opinion requires special
training, education or experience); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa.
142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963) (no lay opinion testimony where
the opinion is not based on personal knowledge); Graham
v. Pennsylvania Co., 139 Pa. 149, 21 A. 151 (1891) (no lay
opinion testimony whenever the circumstances can be
fully and adequately described to the jury, and are such
that their bearing on the issue can be estimated by all
men without special knowledge or training); Starner v.
Wirth, 440 Pa. 177, 269 A.2d 674 (1970) (no lay opinion
testimony going to the ultimate issue in the case).
Under Lewis, lay opinion is admissible where it is
based on a witness’ first-hand knowledge, rationally
based on perception and ‘‘helpful’’ to the fact finder in
determining or clarifying facts in issue; it may embrace
the ultimate issue. If the trial judge decides that the
proffered opinion would not be helpful, or if even helpful,
would confuse, mislead, or prejudice the jury, or would
waste time, the trial judge may exclude it. Lewis, 259 Pa.
Super. at 523—24, 393 A.2d at 949. The trial judges
discretion in this regard will be reversed on appeal only
in cases where the discretion has been clearly abused,
and actual prejudice has occurred. Id. Pa.R.E. 701 is, for
the most part, consistent with Pennsylvania common law
which has long deviated from the traditional exclusionary
principal that witnesses may testify only to facts and not
to opinions or inferences. Lay witnesses have been per-
mitted to express opinions in such areas as intoxication,
Whyte v. Robinson, 421 Pa. Super. 33, 617 A.2d 380
(1992); mental capacity, Weir by Gasper v. Ciao, 364 Pa.
Super. 490, 528 A.2d 616 (1987), aff’d, 521 Pa. 491, 556
A.2d 819 (1989); mental condition/sanity, In re Owens
Estate, 167 Pa. Super. 10, 74 A.2d 705 (1950); Common-
wealth v. Young, 276 Pa. Super. 409, 419 A.2d 523 (1980)
(citing Commonwealth v. Knight, 469 Pa. 57, 364 A.2d 902
(1976)); physical condition, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hep-
penstall Co., 360 Pa. 433, 61 A.2d 809 (1948); speed,
Catina v. Maree, 498 Pa. 443, 447 A.2d 228 (1982); and
value, Richards v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 431 Pa. Super. 429,
636 A.2d 1162 (1994). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has not reviewed the decision in Lewis.
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Additionally, the Superior Court has permitted voice
identification through lay opinion testimony when the
witness is familiar with, and is able to identify, a voice by
its sound or tone quality. See Sterling v. Huey, 155 Pa.
Super. 398, 38 A.2d 515 (1944) (shooting victim identified
his assailant by voice, shouted from a distance greater
than 300 yards); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 201 Pa.
Super. 448, 193 A.2d 833 (1963) (multiple rape victims
identified their attacker by voice only because visual
identification was impossible in the darkness); Common-
wealth v. Woodbury, 329 Pa. Super. 34, 477 A.2d 890
(1984) (when a person was murdered in a hallway, a
witness identified the assailant by voice through her
closed apartment door). See also, United States v.
Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa.), aff’d, 503 F.2d
1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (one who first hears a person’s voice
over the telephone may later identify it as the one heard
in a face-to-face conversation).
See also, Pa.R.E. 602 (witness may not testify to a
matter unless witness has personal knowledge of it).
Rule 702. Testimony By Experts.
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
beyond that possessed by a layperson will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 702 is more restrictive than F.R.E. 702. Under
Pa.R.E. 702 expert opinion testimony, to be admissible,
must (1) ‘‘assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue’’ (the federal
standard for admissibility), and (2) pertain to specialized
knowledge ‘‘beyond that possessed by a layperson.’’
Case law in Pennsylvania has consistently rejected
expert opinion testimony pertaining to the credibility of a
witness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa.
211, 662 A.2d 621 (1995); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 529
Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992); Commonwealth v. Davis,
518 Pa. 77, 541 A.2d 315 (1988); Commonwealth v.
Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355 (1988); Common-
wealth v. Seese, 512 Pa. 439, 517 A.2d 920 (1986);
Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30
(1976).
Pa.R.E. 702 is consistent with explicatory language
contained in some of these cases stating that expert
opinion testimony is admissible only when its subject
matter is ‘‘beyond the knowledge or experience of the
average layman.’’ See Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa.
224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 529
Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992).
With respect to the admissibility of expert scientific
evidence, Pennsylvania, additionally, has heretofore ap-
plied the standard promulgated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of columbia in Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), i.e., the
evidence must have acquired ‘‘general acceptance’’ in the
relevant scientific community. See Commonwealth v.
Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977); Commonwealth
v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Dunkle, 529 Pa. 168, 602 A.2d 830 (1992).
The Frye standard was generally applied in the federal
courts, and in most states, until the United States
Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), held that it was super-
seded in the federal courts by the adoption of F.R.E. 702.
The new standard enunciated in the Daubert case makes
the admission of new or novel scientific evidence some-
what easier by providing that general acceptance in the
relevant scientific community is only one factor to be
considered in determining admissibility. Other factors
include whether the expert’s opinion is grounded in the
methods and procedures of science (as opposed to subjec-
tive belief or unsupported speculation), whether the tech-
nique or methodology used by the expert can be or has
been tested for ‘‘falsifiability, or refutability,’’ its known or
potential rate of error, the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s operation, and
whether the expert’s opinion has been subjected to peer
review and publication.
In Commonwealth v. Crews, 536 Pa. 508, n.2, 640 A.2d
395 (1994), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, after re-
viewing the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in the
Daubert case, said: ‘‘Whether or not the rationale of
Daubert will supersede or modify the Frye test in Penn-
sylvania is left to another day.’’
Adoption of Pa.R.E. 702 has not, in and of itself,
decided this issue. Whether Pennsylvania will adhere to
the Frye standard for admission of expert scientific
testimony, or whether it will adopt the Daubert standard,
awaits a ruling by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Case law in Pennsylvania is liberal in qualifying a
witness to testify as an expert. In Miller v. Brass Rail
Tavern, Inc., 541 Pa. 474, 480—81, 664 A.2d 525, 528
(1995), the Court said:
The test to be applied when qualifying a witness to
testify as an expert witness is whether the witness
has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowl-
edge on the subject under investigation. If he does, he
may testify and the weight to be given to such
testimony is for the trier of fact to determine.
Pa.R.E. 702 does not change Pennsylvania case law on
this point.
Expert testimony, like lay testimony, is subject to
Pa.R.E. 403, i.e., it is excludable if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or one or more of the other factors enumerated
therein.
Rule 703. Basis of Expert Testimony.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 703 is identical to F.R.E. 703 and consistent
with current Pennsylvania law. Historically, Pennsylvania
courts limited the facts or data upon which an expert
could base an opinion to those obtained from firsthand
knowledge or from the trial record. Collins v. Hand, 431
Pa. 378, 246 A.2d 398 (1968). Beginning in 1971 with
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693
(1971), Pennsylvania courts have endorsed and expanded
the principle that experts may base their opinions upon
evidence which is otherwise inadmissible as long as it is
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa.
340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bowser, 425
Pa. Super. 24, 624 A.2d 125 (1993); In Re Glosser Bros.,
THE COURTS 1311
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
Inc., 382 Pa. Super. 177, 555 A.2d 129 (1989); Bolus v.
United Penn Bank, 363 Pa. Super. 247, 525 A.2d 1215
(1987).
Pennsylvania courts follow such a rule and allow
experts to testify in such a manner for practical reasons.
An expert’s opinion may be based upon years of profes-
sional experience, schooling and knowledge, not all of
which can be presented on a firsthand basis in court.
Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa. Super. 41, 608 A.2d
515 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 641, 622 A.2d 1374
(1993). The fact that experts reasonably and regularly
rely on this type of information merely to practice their
profession lends strong indicia of reliability to source
material, when it is presented through a qualified ex-
pert’s eyes. Id. Thus, when the expert witness has
consulted numerous sources and uses that information,
together with his or her own professional knowledge and
experience, to arrive at an opinion, that opinion is
regarded as evidence in its own right and not hearsay in
disguise. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d
172 (1978). In Daniels, a forensic pathologist was permit-
ted to testify as to his opinion regarding the cause and
manner of the victims death based upon material which
such an expert customarily relies on in the practice of his
profession. This material included, in part, information
gathered in interviews with hospital residents, certain
hospital records, the death certificate, police reports, etc.
But this type of an exception is not limited to the medical
profession. In In Re Glosser Bros., Inc., the court allowed
opinion testimony by a stock valuation expert who used
appraisal reports, not admitted into evidence and con-
ducted by an independent appraisal company, to deter-
mine the value of shares in a leveraged buyout. Such
testimony was permitted because the appraisal was the
type of source material that an expert valuing stock
would reasonably rely on in forming an opinion. But see
Spotts v. Reidell, 345 Pa. Super. 37, 497 A.2d 630 (1985)
(testimony of defendant doctor as to preoperative conver-
sation with pathologist regarding nature of polyp to be
removed found not admissible under doctrine that expert
can express opinion based, in part, on reports of others
where hearsay was oral and not written, and was used to
justify course of action by defendant doctor).
When an expert testifies as to the underlying facts and
data that support the expert’s opinion and the testimony
would be otherwise inadmissible, the trial judge should
instruct the jury only to consider the testimony to explain
the basis for the expert’s opinion, and not as substantive
evidence.
However, an expert’s testimony is inadmissible if the
opinion given is not the opinion of the expert testifying
but rather a recitation or reaction to an opinion given by
another expert not testifying. See Dierolf v. Slade, 399
Pa. Super. 9, 581 A.2d 649 (1990) (medical expert’s
testimony inadmissible when merely a reaction to another
expert’s report rather than own medical opinion);
Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa. Super. 41, 608 A.2d
515 (1992) (expert may not act as a mere conduit or
transmitter of the content of an extra-judicial source);
Foster v. McKeesport Hospital, 260 Pa. Super. 485, 394
A.2d. 1031 (1978) (expert opinion based on belief that
another expert, since deceased, was a competent physi-
cian ruled inadmissible). The premise for this proposition
is that the basis for the expert’s opinion should be part of
the record in order for the jury to evaluate the expert’s
opinion and the credibility of the expert’s testimony.
Commonwealth v. Rounds, 518 Pa. 204, 542 A.2d 997
(1988); Allen v. Kaplan, 439 Pa. Super. 263, 653 A.2d
1249 (1995).
Evidence admitted under this rule is subject to the
balancing test as outlined in Pa.R.E. 403. Furthermore,
Pa.R.E. 104 authorizes the court, in its discretion, to
resolve any and all preliminary questions regarding the
admissibility of evidence under this rule.
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue.
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it em-
braces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 704 is substantively the same as F.R.E. 704(a)
and is consistent with current Pennsylvania law. How-
ever, this rule completely deletes F.R.E. 704(b) as dis-
cussed below.
The text of Pa.R.E. 704 does not limit opinion on the
ultimate issue to experts. Expert testimony on the ulti-
mate issue is already permitted in Pennsylvania. Com-
monwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978).
Pennsylvania law allows lay opinion on the ultimate issue
subject to the trial judges discretion based upon a
consideration of the helpfulness of the testimony tem-
pered by a consideration of whether its admission will
cause confusion or prejudice. Lewis v. Mellor, 259 Pa.
Super. 509, 393 A.2d 941 (1978) (en banc).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed expert
opinion testimony on the ultimate issue in Kozak v.
Struth, 515 Pa. 554, 531 A.2d 420 (1987). Kozak cited
Lewis v. Mellor, for the assertion that it is up to the judge
to decide if testimony which goes to the ultimate issue is
confusing for the jury. In Kozak, the court prohibited
expert testimony on the ultimate issue of causation and
due care. There is a long line of cases, however, including
Superior Court interpretations of Kozak, solidifying the
view that Pennsylvania permits expert testimony on the
ultimate issue where it will not be misleading or cause
confusion or prejudice. See Milan v. Commonwealth, 153
Pa. Commwlth. 276, 620 A.2d 721 (1993), appeal denied,
535 Pa. 650, 633 A.2d 154 (1993) (permitting an accident
reconstruction expert to testify on the ultimate issue as to
the causation of an accident because the opinion was
based on the contents of a police accident report and
other documents previously testified to by a trooper and
the driver); Porter v. Kalas, 409 Pa. Super. 159, 597 A.2d
709 (1991) (permitting a real estate lawyer to testify as
an expert and assist the trier of fact as to title searches
and deeds and opine about the ultimate issue of whether
an express easement was still valid); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 408 Pa. Super. 246, 596 A.2d 840 (1991) (permit-
ting a police officer, qualified as an expert, to testify to
the ultimate issue of whether, in his opinion, a defendant
possessed drugs with the intent to deliver rather than for
personal use); In Interest of Paul S., 380 Pa. Super. 476,
552 A.2d 288 (1988) (permitting the opinion of a case-
worker as to the ultimate issue of which parent should
get legal and physical custody of a minor child). Thus,
Pa.R.E. 704 does not change current Pennsylvania law.
Pa.R.E. 704 omits F.R.E. 704(b) which prohibits an
expert from testifying as to the mental state or condition
of a criminal defendant with regard to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or
of a defense thereto. When the Pennsylvania Superior
Court in Lewis v. Mellor, adopted F.R.E. 704 in 1978, it
only contained part (a). F.R.E. 704(b), or the ‘‘Hinkley
Rule,’’ was added on October 12, 1984, as part of the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, 18 U. S.C. § 17. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 12 (4th Ed. 1992).
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Pennsylvania law permits ultimate issue testimony
about the defendant’s mental state. In Commonwealth v.
Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976), the Supreme
Court held admissible expert psychiatric testimony con-
cerning the mental capacity to form the type of specific
intent required in a prosecution for first-degree murder.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently held
that expert psychiatric testimony is admissible to negate
the specific intent to kill which is essential to first degree
murder. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 410 Pa. Super. 524,
600 A.2d 577 (1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Terry, 513
Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398 (1987), cert. denied, 482 U. S. 920,
(1987)); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 505 Pa. 304, 479 A.2d
473 (1984); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360
A.2d 914 (1976). Thus, Pennsylvania law is quite different
from Federal law in that Pennsylvania courts have found
expert testimony as to mental state in first degree
murder cases both relevant and competent and therefore
admissible.
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying
Expert Opinion.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor; however, the expert must
testify as to the facts or data on which the opinion or
inference is based.
Comment
The text as well as the interpretation of Pa.R.E. 705
differs significantly from F.R.E. 705. The federal rule
generally does not require an expert witness to disclose
the facts upon which an opinion is based prior to
expressing the opinion. Instead, the cross-examiner bears
the burden of probing the basis of the opinion. In Kozak v.
Struth, 515 Pa. 554, 531 A.2d 420 (1987), the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court declined to adopt F.R.E. 705 stating
that ‘‘[we believe] that requiring the proponent of an
expert opinion to clarify for the jury the assumptions
upon which the opinion is based avoids planting in the
jurors mind a general statement likely to remain with
him in a jury room when the disputed details are lost.’’
Kozak, 515 Pa. at 560, 531 A.2d at 423. Relying on cross
examination to illuminate the underlying assumption, as
F.R.E. 705 does, may further confuse jurors already
struggling to follow complex testimony. Id.
Accordingly, Kozak requires disclosure of the facts used
by the expert in forming an opinion when not based on
personal knowledge. Such disclosure can be accomplished
in several ways. For example, the expert can be asked to
assume the truth of the testimony of a witness or
witnesses whose testimony the expert has heard or read.
The Kroeger Co. v. W.C.A.B., 101 Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 629,
516 A.2d 1335 (1986); Tobash v. Jones, 419 Pa. 205, 213
A.2d 588 (1965). Another option is to pose a hypothetical
question to the expert. Dietrich v. J.I. Case Co., 390 Pa.
Super. 475, 568 A.2d 1272 (1990); Hussy v. May Depart-
ment Stores, Inc., 238 Pa. Super. 431, 357 A.2d 635
(1976).
It is essential that the salient facts relied upon as the
basis of the opinion be in the record. Commonwealth v.
Rounds, 518 Pa. 204, 542 A.2d 997 (1988). The jury must
be able to evaluate the expert’s opinion and can only do
so if the facts on which the opinion is based are part of
the record. Id. See also, Pa.R.E. 703.
Further, the expert witness cannot be asked to state his
opinion upon the whole case, ‘‘because that necessarily
includes the determination of what are the facts, and this
can only be done by the jury’’ Kozak v. Struth, supra
(citing Yardley v. Cuthburtson, 108 Pa. 395, 450, 1 A. 765,
773 (1885)).
When an expert’s opinion is based on personal knowl-
edge and not on assumed facts, there is no requirement
that the expert be questioned in any particular manner.
Commonwealth v. Neil, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949).
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts.
Where the court has appointed an expert witness, the
witness appointed shall advise the parties of the witness’
findings, if any. The witness may be called to testify by
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling
the witness. In civil cases, the witness’ deposition may be
taken by any party.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 706 differs from F.R.E. 706. Unlike the federal
rule, Pa.R.E. 706 does not affect the scope of the courts
existing powers to appoint experts. This rule is limited to
providing the procedures for obtaining the testimony of
such experts, once appointed.
Currently, there are few instances allowing for the
court-appointment of expert witnesses. Experts are ap-
pointed in disputed paternity proceeding under 23 Pa.C.S.
5104, and, in equity proceedings under Pa.R.C.P. 1515
and 1530(e), the court may appoint accountants and
auditors as experts. A 1944 case did allow for the
appointment of experts in civil matters. Galante v. West
Penn Power Co., 349 Pa. 616, 37 A.2d 548 (1944). A later
decision pointed out the lack of statutory authority or
procedures for courts to appoint or compensate expert
witnesses in Pennsylvania. Poltorak v. Sandy, 236 Pa.
Super. 355, 345 A.2d 201 (1975) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
In criminal cases, the Superior Court recognized the trial
judge’s inherent power to appoint an expert under the
state constitution:
As a general rule a trial judge may in the exercise of
[a] sound discretion call and examine witnesses of his
own accord. In fact, under certain circumstances, it is
necessary and imperative for the court to do so. As
stated in 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2484 (3d ed. 1940),
‘‘The general judicial power itself, expressly allotted
in every State Constitution, implies inherently a
power to investigate as auxiliary to the power to
decide; and the power to investigate implies necessar-
ily a power to summon and question witnesses.’’
Commonwealth v. Correa, 437 Pa. Super. 1, 648 A.2d
1199, 1201 n.2 (1994), citing Commonwealth v.
DiPasquale, 424 Pa. 500, 230 A.2d 449, 450—451 (1967).
See also, Pa.R.E. 614 (Calling and Interrogation of
Witnesses By Court).
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY
Rule
801. Definitions.
802. Hearsay.
803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial.
803.1. Hearsay Exceptions; Testimony of Declarant Necessary.
804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable.
805. Hearsay Within Hearsay.
806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Declarant.
Comment
The Hearsay Problem
The problem with hearsay is that it is thought to be an
untrustworthy kind of evidence, so unreliable that it
should not be considered by the trier of fact in resolving
the issues in a case. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa.
577, 568 A.2d 600 (1989), the Supreme Court, reversing
the murder conviction and death sentence of a former
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high school principal on the ground that hearsay had
been admitted against him at trial, explained:
The predicate supporting the rejection of hearsay evi-
dence is its assumed unreliability because the declarant
from which the statement originates is not before the
trier of fact and therefore cannot be challenged as to the
accuracy of the information sought to be conveyed.
Testimony, ideally, should have the following three
indicia of reliability:
(1) it should be given under oath, subject to the penalty
of perjury;
(2) it should be given in the presence of the trier of
fact; and
(3) it should be subject to contemporaneous cross-
examination by parties-opponent.
All hearsay lacks one or more of the above characteris-
tics. Therefore, hearsay is a relatively untrustworthy kind
of evidence. This is true as a general rule. But the
exception proves the rule, and there are many exceptions.
From an evidential point of view, four main approaches
can be taken:
(1) Admit all hearsay in evidence, to be considered by
the trier of fact for what it is worth;
(2) Exclude all hearsay from evidence;
(3) Have the trial judge evaluate each individual item
of hearsay that is offered, and admit it if the judge thinks
that it is substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in
general, or that its admission is otherwise necessary in
order to do justice in the particular case at hand; and
(4) Classify hearsay into categories that, on the whole,
have substantially greater trustworthiness than hearsay
in general, and admit an item of hearsay only if it fits
within one of these categories.
Approaches (1) and (2) are easy to administer, but both
are rejected as too inflexible, and likely to lead to many
unjust results. Approach (3) has initial attractiveness, but
its implementation would require the exercise of too much
discretion by too many judges with too many personal
evidential points of view, thus making the admissibility of
a particular item of hearsay at trial too hard to predict.
All American jurisdictions have opted for approach (4),
i.e., they classify hearsay that they consider exceptionally
trustworthy into numerous categories and call them
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The number of exceptions
that there are depends upon the fineness with which they
are classified.
The Federal Rules of Evidence list 24 exceptions to the
hearsay rule in which the availability of the declarant is
immaterial, five exceptions in which the declarant must
be unavailable, and four exceptions to the definition of
hearsay (which are, in reality, exceptions to the hearsay
rule), for a total of 33.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, while following
the federal numbering system as far as possible, recog-
nize fewer exceptions, and arrange them more logically.
Article VIII of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence lists
16 exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the availability
of the declarant is immaterial, four exceptions in which
the declarant must be unavailable, and three exceptions
in which the testimony of the declarant is necessary, for a
total of 23.
Thus, the hearsay rule, considered together with its
many exceptions, is class oriented. An offered item of
hearsay is excepted to the hearsay rule if it fits within
one of the categorized exceptions thereto, regardless of
whether the offered item itself appears particularly trust-
worthy. Individualized trustworthiness is a criterion for
exception to the hearsay rule only when hearsay is
offered under the business records exception (Pa.R.E.
803(6)), the residual exception (Pa.R.E. 803(24)), or the
exception for a statement against penal interest (Pa.R.E.
804(b)(3)). It is also a criterion under the statutory
exceptions for public records (42 Pa.C.S. § 6104(b)), and
for certain statements concerning sexual abuse made by
children (42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1 applies in criminal cases;
42 Pa.C.S. § 5986 applies in dependency proceedings).
Defendant’s Constitutional Right of Confrontation
in Criminal Cases
The hearsay rule is applicable both in civil and criminal
cases. In a criminal case, however, hearsay that is offered
against a defendant under an exception to the hearsay
rule may sometimes be excluded because its admission
would violate defendant’s right ‘‘to be confronted with the
witnesses against him’’ under the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, or Article I, § 9, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
Constitutional provisions providing a right of confronta-
tion to a defendant in a criminal case are, many say, a
reaction to the infamous seventeenth century trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh. The redoubtable Raleigh was accused of
high treason. The Crown, over Raleigh’s objection, was
allowed to introduce in evidence an affidavit signed by
Lord Cobham, who was then imprisoned in the Tower of
London, in which Cobham asserted that both he and Sir
Walter were participants in a plot to overthrow Queen
Elizabeth and replace her on the throne with Arabella
Stewart. Raleigh was convicted. (He wasn’t beheaded,
though. That occurred many years later, as a punishment
for subsequent transgressions.)
The relationship between the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment was ex-
plained by the Supreme Court in California v. Green, 399
U. S. 149, 155—56, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 LEd.2d 489 (1970):
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay
rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally
designed to protect similar values, it is quite a
different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete
and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and
their exceptions as they existed historically at com-
mon law. Our decisions have never established such a
congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a
violation of confrontation values even though the
statements in issue were admitted under an arguably
recognized hearsay exception. . . .
Given the similarity of the values protected . . . the
modification of a State’s hearsay rules to create new
exceptions for the admission of evidence against a
defendant, will often raise questions of compatibility
with the defendant’s constitutional right to confronta-
tion.
More recently, in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U. S. 805, 814,
110 SCt 3139, 111 LEd2.d 638 (1990), the Supreme Court
said, ‘‘The Confrontation Clause . . . bars the admission of
some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under
an exception to the hearsay rule.’’
In short, when hearsay is offered against a defendant
in a criminal case, the defendant may interpose three
separate objections: (1) admission of the evidence would
violate the hearsay rule, (2) admission of the evidence
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would violate defendant’s right to confront the witnesses
against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and (3) admission of the evidence
would violate defendant’s right to confront the witnesses
against him under Article I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
As a rule of judicial economy, the court will usually, but
not always, rule upon the hearsay objection first, and
decide the constitutional issues only if it has to.
Rule 801. Definitions.
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A ‘‘statement’’ is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A ‘‘declarant’’ is a person who makes a
statement.
(c) Hearsay. ‘‘Hearsay’’ is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
(d) [See Comment]
Comment
Pa.R.E. 801 is identical to subsections (a), (b) and (c) of
F.R.E. 801. It is consistent with prior Pennsylvania law.
Subsection (d), which the federal rule entitles ‘‘State-
ments Which Are Not Hearsay,’’ is not adopted. The
subjects thereof, admissions and prior statements of
witnesses, are really exceptions to the hearsay rule. They
are covered in Pa.R.E. 803(25) and Pa.R.E. 803.1, respec-
tively. They are also discussed later in this Comment.
a. Statement
Subsection (a) defines ‘‘statement’’ as an oral or written
assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion.
It would have been simpler just to use the word assertion
to define hearsay. For the sake of uniformity, Pennsylva-
nia uses the federal formulation, as do most states.
Subsection (a)(2), which includes nonverbal conduct as
hearsay, when intended as an assertion, is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 529
Pa. 498, 605 A.2d 792 (1992), a prosecution for, inter alia,
aggravated assault. The victim testified that the man who
attacked her said that his hobby was making picture
frames out of cigarette boxes. A detective testified that he
went to defendant’s home and asked his mother if she
had any picture frames made by her son, and that she
then went upstairs and got a picture frame made out of
cigarette boxes. The Court, reversing a conviction, held
that the detective’s testimony was hearsay and its admis-
sion was reversible error.
b. Declarant
Subsection (b) is also consistent with prior Pennsylva-
nia law. For hearsay purposes, the ‘‘declarant’’ is the
person who makes an out-of-court assertion, not the
person who repeats it on the witness stand.
c. Definition of Hearsay
Subsection (c), which defines hearsay, is also consistent
with prior Pennsylvania decisional law. See Heddings v.
Steele, 514 Pa. 569, 573, 526 A.2d 349 (1987), in which
the Court said, ‘‘[h]earsay is an out-of-court statement
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.’’ See also, Commonwealth v. Rosario, 438 Pa.
Super. 241, 652 A.2d 354 (1994).
In short, the definition of hearsay is three-pronged.
Hearsay is:
1. an assertion,
2. made out of court, and
3. offered to prove its truth.
For hearsay purposes, an assertion is an intended
expression of fact or opinion. It may be (1) oral, (2)
written, or (3) behavioral. For example, a witness to a
crime may be asked by the police to pick out the culprit
from a lineup. The witness may say, ‘‘The man on the left
did it.’’ Or the witness may fill out a written form
designating the man on the left. Or the witness may
silently point to the man on the left. In all of these cases
the witness has made an assertion. If at trial a police
officer relates what the witness said or did at the lineup
to identify the culprit, the testimony of the officer is
hearsay.
For hearsay purposes, an assertion is considered out-of-
court unless ‘‘made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing.’’ Pa.R.E. 801(c).
Only some, not all, out-of-court assertions are hearsay.
As explained by the United States Supreme Court in
Anderson v. United States, 417 U. S. 211, 219 (1974):
Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only
when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
The upshot is that evidence of most out-of-court utter-
ances is not hearsay, either because the utterance is not
an assertion, or because it is not offered to prove its
truth.
Out-of-court utterances that are not assertions include
greetings, pleasantries, expressions of gratitude, ques-
tions, offers, instructions, warnings, demands, exclama-
tions, expressions of emotion, etc.
See, for example, Commonwealth v. DiSilvio, 232 Pa.
Super. 386, 335 A.2d 785 (1975), a prosecution for, inter
alia, bookmaking. The court, affirming a conviction, ap-
proved admission of testimony from police officers that,
while executing a search warrant at defendant’s premises,
they answered in excess of fifty telephone calls in which
the callers either asked to speak to defendant, or gave
instructions to place bets, or both. The callers’ utterances
were not assertions of fact or opinion, and thus not
hearsay. They had probative value, though, as circum-
stantial evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably infer that the premises were being used for
illegal gambling.
Out-of-court assertions that are not offered to prove
their truth include those that have direct legal signifi-
cance, regardless of their truth. These include assertions
that constitute all or part of a contract, deed, will, notice,
demand, disclosure, threat, obscenity, defamation, perjury,
warranty, representation allegedly relied upon, etc. In-
deed, when an out-of-court assertion is offered to prove
perjury or defamation, the offerer will attempt to prove
that the assertion is false.
Most out-of-court assertions that are not offered to
prove their truth are offered as circumstantial evidence
from which the existence or non-existence of a fact in
issue may be inferred.
For example, an assertion, regardless of its truth, may
be offered to prove the state of mind of the declarant. See,
In re Ryman, 139 Pa. Super. 212, 11 A.2d 677 (1940), a
proceeding to have a man declared incompetent and to
have a guardian of his property appointed. The court
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approved admission of testimony that the man had
asserted that his wife was unfaithful, that he was not the
father of some of her children, and that they were trying
to poison him. The assertions were not admitted to prove
their truth. Thus they were not hearsay. They were
admitted as circumstantial evidence that the declarant’s
mind was unbalanced.
See also, Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447 A.2d
250 (1982), in which the Court affirmed the second
conviction of Tony Boyle, a former president of the United
Mine Workers Union, for the murder of rival candidate
‘‘Jock’’ Yablonski, his wife, and his daughter. The Court
approved the Commonwealth’s introduction of certain
testimony that Boyle gave at his first trial, which the
Commonwealth later proved to be false, ‘‘as proof of a
consciousness of guilt.’’
Some non-hearsay assertions, particularly those that
accompany ambiguous conduct, are referred to as ‘‘verbal
acts.’’ For example, an assertion that accompanies a
transfer of property, regardless of its truth, may indicate
whether the transfer is a loan, a repayment of a loan, a
gift, or a bailment. If the transferor said, while transfer-
ring some money, ‘‘You are my favorite nephew. I never
forget your birthday,’’ this would be circumstantial evi-
dence that the transfer was a gift. (The assertions are not
hearsay because they are not offered to prove that the
recipient was declarant’s favorite nephew, or that
declarant never forgets his birthday.)
An out-of-court utterance may be offered to prove the
state of mind of one who heard it. See Commonwealth v.
Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 A 53, 56—58 (1918), in
which the Court, reversing a conviction of first degree
murder, held it reversible error to exclude, inter alia,
defendant’s offer to prove that the decedent, nine days
prior to the killing, told defendant that he was a member
of the dreaded ‘‘Black Hand Gang’’ sent over to murder
defendant. Such assertion, regardless of its truth, was
relevant to show that defendant reasonably feared the
victim and, if believed by the jury, might have resulted in
a verdict of acquittal (justifiable homicide by reason of
self-defense), or of voluntary manslaughter, instead of
murder.
See also, Wasserman v. Fifth & Reed Hospital, 442 Pa.
Super. 563, 660 A.2d 600, 607—08 (1995), a suit for
personal injuries by a lady who ingested oven cleaner
solution (it had been placed in a vinegar container) at the
defendant hospital’s cafeteria. Plaintiff, who suffered a
recurrence of a dormant ulcerative colitis condition follow-
ing her meal, testified that one of her treating physicians
told her that this created an increased risk that she
would eventually develop colon cancer. The court, affirm-
ing a substantial jury verdict for plaintiff, approved
admission of her testimony on the ground that the
physician’s assertion was not offered for its truth, and
thus was not hearsay. It was circumstantial evidence
from which the jury could infer that plaintiff suffered
significant mental pain and suffering, for which she was
entitled to be compensated.
Most nonverbal conduct is not assertive. Hence, most
evidence thereof is not hearsay.
d. Federal Rule Not Adopted
Pa.R.E. 801 does not include a counterpart to F.R.E.
801(d), which excepts all admissions by a party-opponent,
and some prior statements by witnesses, to the definition
of hearsay set forth in subsection (c). This internal
inconsistency of F.R.E. 801 adds an unnecessary and
confusing complexity to rules that are otherwise logically
arranged. Excepting an assertion to the definition of
hearsay does nothing more, nor less, than except it to the
hearsay rule. Exceptions to the hearsay rule belong in
Rules 803 and 804, not in Rule 801.
An admission by a party-opponent, which is considered
an exception to the hearsay rule at common law, and in
Pennsylvania decisional law, is covered by Pa.R.E.
803(25), thus placing it in the same rule (803) with other
exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the availability of
the declarant is immaterial.
Prior statements of a witness were not considered
substantive evidence at common law. Thus they were not
hearsay. Thus there was no reason to except them to the
hearsay rule. However, recent Pennsylvania decisional
law has recognized some prior inconsistent statements of
a witness, and statements of prior identification, as
substantive evidence, and has excepted them to the
hearsay rule. These prior statements, along with recorded
recollection, are covered by Pa.R.E. 803.1, which delin-
eates exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the current
testimony of the declarant is necessary.
Unlike the Federal Rules of Evidence, Pennsylvania
adheres to the common law and does not treat any prior
consistent statement of a witness as substantive evidence.
Therefore, no prior consistent statement comes within the
definition of hearsay in Pa.R.E. 801(c). Therefore, there is
no need to except any prior consistent statements from
the hearsay rule (or from the definition of hearsay).
The admissibility of a prior consistent statement is
governed by principles of relevance, not hearsay. See
Pa.R.E. 613(b).
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, or by statute.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 802 is similar to its federal counterpart. It
differs by referring to other rules prescribed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rather than the United
States Supreme Court, and by referring to statutes in
general, rather than Acts of Congress.
The words ‘‘not admissible’’ do not mean that hearsay
will automatically be excluded from evidence. An opposing
party must make a timely objection. As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained in Jones v. Spidle, 446 Pa. 103,
106, 286 A.2d 366, 367 (1971):
It is well established that hearsay evidence, admit-
ted without objection, is accorded the same weight as
evidence legally admissible as long as it is relevant
and material to the issues in question.
Generally, hearsay is excludable, if timely objected to,
unless it comes within one of the exceptions to the
hearsay rule enumerated in Pa.R.E. 803, 803.1, and 804.
Caveat: Just because hearsay comes within one of the
exceptions enumerated in these rules, does not mean that
it is admissible in evidence. All it means is that it cannot
be excluded by a hearsay objection. It may be excluded
because it is irrelevant, or inflammatory, or privileged, or
for a host of other reasons.
On occasion, hearsay may be admitted pursuant to
another rule promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. For example, in civil cases all or part of a
deposition may be admitted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No.
4020, or a videotape deposition of an expert witness
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 4017.1(g).
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Also, hearsay may be admitted pursuant to a state
statute. Examples include:
1. A public record may be admitted pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 6104. See Comment located at Pa.R.E. 803(8).
2. A record of vital statistics may be admitted pursuant
to 35 Pa.C.S. § 450.810. See Comment located at Pa.R.E.
803(9).
3. In an action arising out of a contract under the
Uniform Commercial Code, a document in due form
purporting to be a bill of lading, policy or certificate of
insurance, official weigher’s or inspector’s certificate, con-
sular invoice, or any other document authorized or re-
quired by the contract to be issued by a third party, may
be introduced as prima facie evidence of the document’s
own authenticity and of the facts stated therein by the
third party, pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S. § 1202.
4. In a civil case, a deposition of a licensed physician
may be admitted, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5936.
5. In a criminal case, a deposition of a witness may be
admitted, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5919.
6. In a criminal case, an out-of-court assertion of a
witness under 13 years of age, describing certain kinds of
sexual abuse, may be admitted, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5985.1.
7. In a dependency hearing, an out-of-court assertion of
a witness under 14 years of age, describing certain types
of sexual abuse, may be admitted, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5986.
8. In a prosecution for speeding under the Pennsylva-
nia Vehicle Code, a certificate of accuracy of an electronic
speed timing device (radar) from a calibration and testing
station appointed by the Pennsylvania Department of
Motor Vehicles may be admitted, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3368(d).
On rare occasion, hearsay may be admitted pursuant to
a federal statute. For example, when a person brings a
civil action, in either federal or state court, against a
common carrier to enforce an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission requiring the payment of dam-
ages, the findings and order of the Commission may be
introduced as evidence of the facts stated therein. 49
U.S.C. § 11704(d)(1).
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of
Declarant Immaterial.
The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression.
(2) Excited Utterance.
(3) Statement of Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or
Physical Condition.
(4) Statement Made for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
or Treatment.
(5) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(6) Record of Regularly Conducted Activity.
(7) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(8) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(9) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(10) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(11) Record of Religious Organization.
(12) Marriage, Baptismal, or Similar Certificate.
(13) Family Record.
(14) Record of Document Affecting an Interest in Prop-
erty.
(15) Statement in Document Affecting an Interest in
Property.
(16) Statement in Ancient Document.
(17) Market Report, Commercial Publication.
(18) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family His-
tory.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General
History.
(21) Reputation as to Character.
(22) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(23) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(24) [Vacant. See Comment.]
(25) Admission by Party-Opponent.
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or imme-
diately thereafter.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(1) is identical to F.R.E. 803(1). It is consis-
tent with prior Pennsylvania law.
For this exception to apply, declarant need not be
excited or otherwise emotionally affected by the event or
condition perceived. The trustworthiness of the assertion
arises from its timing. The requirement of contemporane-
ousness, or near contemporaneousness, reduces the
chance of premeditated prevarication or loss of memory.
For example, the assertions of a sportscaster describing
and explaining what he observes on a baseball field as a
game is taking place are quintessential present sense
impressions. However, the sportscaster’s between-innings
or post-game analysis does not qualify for this hearsay
exception.
If a present sense impression is made under stress of
excitement from the event or condition that it describes or
explains, then it overlaps the exception for an excited
utterance. See Pa.R.E. 803(2). This is often the case. For
example, if a sportscaster is excited by the sporting event
that he is watching, his play-by-play description qualifies
both as a present sense impression and as an excited
utterance. If he is bored by it, his description qualifies
only as a present sense impression.
The most common use of this exception in the federal
courts has been to permit a witness to relate assertions
that someone made immediately after participating in a
telephone conversation, repeating or summarizing what
was said on the phone. See United States v. Portsmouth
Paving Corp., 694 F2d 312, 321—23 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Peacock, 654 F2d 339, 350 (5th Cir 1981);
United States v. Earley, 657 F2d 195, 197—98 (8th Cir
1981); Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, 828
F.Supp. 379, (D.S.C. 1993), aff’d, 30 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.
1994).
In Pennsylvania an exception to the hearsay rule for a
present sense impression was first recognized in Chief
Justice Jones’ plurality opinion in Commonwealth v.
Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974).
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Subsequently, in a majority opinion, the Court said that
an exception to the hearsay rule for a present sense
impression is recognized in Pennsylvania under the ‘‘res
gestae’’ rubric. Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132,
383 A.2d 858, 860 (1978).
Later, in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 312,
513 A.2d 373 (1986), the Court, affirming a conviction of
murder, approved, under the present sense exception to
the hearsay rule, admission of testimony from a witness
for the prosecution that, shortly before the crime, one
victim made assertions to him over the telephone that
defendant was locking a door and getting into the car of a
second victim.
Accord: Commonwealth v. Harris, 422 Pa. Super. 6, 658
A.2d 392 (1995), a murder case. The court, affirming a
conviction, approved admission of testimony from a wit-
ness for the prosecution that the victim, during a tele-
phone conversation about one and one-half hours before
she was found dead, said her door bell was ringing, left
the phone briefly, then came back and whispered that it
was defendant at her door.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a star-
tling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(2) is identical to F.R.E. 803(2). It is consis-
tent with prior Pennsylvania law.
This exception has a more narrow base than the
exception for a present sense impression, because it
requires an event or condition that is startling. However,
it is broader in scope because an excited utterance (1)
need not describe or explain the startling event or
condition; it need only relate to it, and (2) need not be
made contemporaneously therewith, or immediately
thereafter. It is sufficient if the stress of excitement
created by the startling event or condition persists as a
substantial factor in provoking the utterance.
The prerequisite to an excited utterance is a startling
event or condition. The startling event or condition is
usually something dramatic, like an accident or a crime.
But it need not be, so long as it has an exciting effect on
the declarant.
A surprising discovery can precipitate an excited utter-
ance. A classic example occurred when the renowned
Greek mathematician, Archimedes, finally ascertained
how he could calculate the volume of an irregular solid.
One day he observed the amount of water that spilled
over the side of his full bathtub when he stepped into it.
He became excited and reportedly ran naked through the
streets of Syracuse, shouting, ‘‘Eureka! Eureka!’’ (I found
it!)
A more recent example appears in State v. Carlson, 311
Or. 201, 808 P.2d 1002 (1991), a drug case. A policeman
testified that, when responding to a report of a domestic
dispute at an apartment house, he asked defendant about
what appeared to be needle marks on his arm. Defendant
said that the marks were injuries that he had received
from working on a car. His wife, who overheard this,
broke in by yelling, ‘‘You liar, you got them from shooting
up in the bedroom with all your stupid friends!’’ The
court, affirming a conviction, approved admission of the
policeman’s testimony under Oregon Evid. Code § 803(2),
which is identical to Pa.R.E. 803(2). The court said that
while defendant’s lie to the policeman would not ordi-
narily cause excitement, in the particular circumstances
involved its actual effect on his wife was upsetting
(exciting). The court explained:
Whether an event or condition is sufficiently star-
tling cannot be determined from the nature of the
event or condition itself. For the purposes of the
excited utterance exception, an event or condition is
not inherently startling. The startling-nature compo-
nent is a relational concept, i.e., whether an event is
sufficiently startling to qualify cannot be determined
without focusing on the event’s effect on the
declarant. 311 Or. at 216, 808 P.2d at 1011.
There is no set time interval following a startling event
or condition after which an utterance relating thereto will
be ineligible for exception to the hearsay rule as an
excited utterance. Each case is governed by its individual
circumstances. The general rule is that an utterance
following a startling event or condition must be made
soon enough thereafter that it can reasonably be consid-
ered a product of the stress of excitement engendered
thereby, rather than of intervening reflection or delibera-
tion.
In Commonwealth v. Gore, 262 Pa. Super. 540, 547—48,
396 A.2d 1302, 1305 (1978), the court explained:
The declaration need not be strictly contemporane-
ous with the existing cause, nor is there a definite
and fixed time limit. . . . Rather, each case must be
judged on its own facts, and a lapse of time of several
hours has not negated the characterization of a
statement as an ‘‘excited utterance.’’ . . . The crucial
question, regardless of the time lapse, is whether, at
the time the statement is made, the nervous excite-
ment continues to dominate while the reflective
processes remain in abeyance.
In the federal courts the existence of a startling event
or condition may be inferred from the excited utterance
alone, or in combination with surrounding circumstances.
See Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U. S. 397, (1869); United
States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566 (7th Cir 1986).
However, Pennsylvania decisional law has required the
startling event or condition to be proved by extrinsic
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 310 Pa. Super.
480, 456 A.2d 1037 (1983), a prosecution for, inter alia,
robbing Lemuel Rock, a man who died prior to trial. A
policeman testified that, in response to a call on his radio,
he went to Rock’s apartment where Rock, in an excited
state, told him that defendant had entered Rock’s apart-
ment, assaulted Rock, and stolen $300. The court, revers-
ing a conviction, held it reversible error to admit the
policeman’s testimony. The court explained:
[T]he only evidence that a startling event had in
fact occurred was contained in the statement sought
to be admitted as a spontaneous reaction thereto. The
extra-judicial statement was the only evidence in the
case that Rock had been beaten or that any crime
had been committed. There was no independent
evidence that a forced entry of Rock’s apartment had
been made . . . no independent evidence that he had
$300 in his possession prior to the alleged robbery,
and no independent evidence that money in any
amount had been stolen . . . .
We are thus presented with the troublesome situa-
tion in which the excited utterance itself is being
used to prove that an exciting event did, in fact,
occur. This circuitous reasoning is unacceptable.
Where there is no independent evidence that a
startling event has occurred, an alleged excited utter-
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ance cannot be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule. 315 Pa. Super. at 485; 456 A.2d at 1039
40.
With the adoption of Pa.R.E. 104(a), it appears that the
court may now take the proffered excited utterance itself
into consideration, along with extrinsic evidence, in deter-
mining whether a sufficient foundation exists to permit
admission of the excited utterance as an exception to the
hearsay rule. See Pa.R.E. 104(a), and Comment thereun-
der.
Pennsylvania decisional law has also espoused the
minority position that an excited utterance may not be in
narrative form, or attempt to explain past events. See
Cody v. SKF Industries, Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772
(1972), a worker’s compensation case. The court, holding
that an assertion made by a man to his wife, after
returning home, that he had injured his head in an
accident at work, was not admissible as an excited
utterance, said:
The basis for the admission of the utterance is its
spontaneity, thus all utterances which do not display
the mandated instinctive naturalness must be ex-
cluded for fear that the words will emanate in whole
or in part from the declarant’s reflective faculties.
The declaration must be spoken under conditions
which insure that it is not the result of premedita-
tion, consideration or design, and it cannot be in the
form of a narration or attempted explanation of past
events. Id. at 564, 291 A.2d at 775.
Pennsylvania decisional law also holds that declarant’s
personal knowledge of the facts that he asserts cannot be
inferred from his excited utterance alone. There must be
other corroborating evidence introduced sufficient to en-
able the trier of fact reasonably to conclude that he
actually perceived the event of which he spoke. See
Carney v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 428 Pa. 489, 240
A.2d 71 (1968). On analysis, this is simply an application
of the separate evidential rule that a witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. See Pa.R.E. 602.
(3) Statement of Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or
Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant’s then
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain, and bodily health. A statement of memory
or belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed
is included in this exception only if it relates to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant’s will.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(3) is similar to F.R.E. 803(3). The wording
has been changed to improve readability, and to eliminate
a confusing double negative. The meaning remains the
same.
This exception combines what might otherwise be con-
sidered several different exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The common factor is that they are all sometimes re-
ferred to by the non specific phrase, ‘‘state of mind.’’
(Some out-of-court assertions that are not hearsay, be-
cause they are not offered to prove their truth, are also
referred to as ‘‘state of mind.’’)
Assertion of Then Existing Intent
This exception includes an assertion of the declarant’s
then existing intent, plan or design. The leading case is
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U. S. 285
(1892), a suit for the proceeds of insurance on the life of
John Hillmon. The defense was that the body found in a
miner’s camp was that of a man named Walters, not that
of Hillmon. Defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to introduce
evidence of letters written by Walters to his sister and
fiancee approximately two weeks before the body was
found, in which Walters declared his immediate intention
to accompany Hillmon on a westward journey. The United
States Supreme Court held it reversible error to exclude
this evidence, explaining:
A man’s state of mind or feeling can only be
manifested to others by countenance, attitude or
gesture, or by sounds or words, spoken or written.
The nature of the fact to be proved is the same, and
evidence of its proper tokens is equally competent to
prove it, whether expressed by aspect or conduct, by
voice or pen. When the intention to be proved is
important only as qualifying an act, its connection
with that act must be shown, in order to warrant the
admission of declarations of the intention. But when-
ever the intention is of itself a distinct and material
fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by
contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the
party.
The existence of a particular intention in a certain
person at a certain time being a material fact to be
proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at
that time is as direct evidence of the fact, as his own
testimony that he then had that intention would be.
After his death there can hardly be any other way of
proving it; and while he is still alive, his own memory
of his state of mind at a former time is no more likely
to be clear and true than a bystander’s recollection of
what he then said, and is less trustworthy than
letters written by him at the very time and under
circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresen-
tation. Id. at 295.
Only an assertion of present intent is encompassed by
this exception to the hearsay rule. An out-of-court asser-
tion of past intent remembered is excludable hearsay. See
Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 104—06 (1933), in
which the United States Supreme Court explained:
There are times when a state of mind, if relevant,
may be proved by contemporaneous declarations of
. . . intent. . . . Declarations of intention, casting light
upon the future, have been sharply distinguished
from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to
the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to
the rule against hearsay if the distinction were
ignored.
Pennsylvania has long recognized an exception to the
hearsay rule for an assertion of present intent. See
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301
(1926), a murder case. The Court, affirming a conviction,
approved admission of testimony that on the morning of
the day she was killed the victim told a fellow passenger
on a train that she was going to meet defendant that
evening. The Court explained:
Intention, viewed as a state of mind, is a fact, and the
commonest way for such a fact to evince itself is through
spoken or written declarations. It is therefore because of
the impossibility, in many cases, of proving intention
apart from personal declarations, that they are admitted.
The true basis of their admission, then, is necessity,
because of which an exception to the hearsay rule is
recognized, rather than that they are part of the res
gestae. Id. at 522; 135 A. at 304.
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See also, Commonwealth v. Henderson, 324 Pa. Super.
538, 472 A.2d 211 (1984).
See also, Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 1, 70 A.2d 630 (1950),
in which the court held admissible evidence of defendant’s
out-of-court assertion that he intended to stay in Florida.
This was relevant on the issue of his domicile at the time
that he filed for divorce from the plaintiff. There has been
a lot of academic debate over whether, under the ratio-
nale of the Hillmon case, evidence of an out-of-court
assertion of intent by A can be introduced as circumstan-
tial evidence of subsequent conduct by B. Whatever the
correct answer, this issue is one of relevance, not hearsay.
So far as the hearsay rule is concerned, if a person’s
intent at a particular point in time is relevant to an issue
in the case, evidence of the person’s then existing expres-
sion thereof is excepted to the hearsay rule.
Assertion of Then Existing Motive
This exception includes an assertion of the declarant’s
then existing motive. A leading case is Lawlor v. Loewe,
235 U. S. 522 (1915), a civil antitrust suit brought by hat
manufacturers against labor union organizers, under the
Sherman Act. The United States Supreme Court, affirm-
ing judgments for plaintiffs, approved admission of testi-
mony from plaintiffs’ salesmen that potential customers
told them that they would not buy plaintiffs’ hats because
of the boycott sponsored by defendants. The court, per
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, said, ‘‘The reasons given
by customers for ceasing to deal with sellers of the Loewe
hats, including letters from dealers to Loewe & Co., were
admissible.’’ Id. at 536.
However, evidence of an out-of-court assertion of the
facts behind the declarant’s motive is excludable hearsay.
See Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours
Powder Co., 248 U. S. 55 (1918).
Pennsylvania has long recognized evidence of a
declarant’s out-of-court assertion of his then existing
motive as an exception to the hearsay rule. See Ickes v.
Ickes, 237 Pa. 582, 591, 85 A. 885, 887—88 (1912), in
which the Court said:
When the court determines in any case that a
man’s state of mind, or the reason why he did a
certain act, is a relevant principal fact to be ascer-
tained, that is the particular thing under immediate
investigation, and what he may have said concerning
it is usually the best and only evidence that can be
obtained on the subject; but the proofs must always
be restricted to declarations indicating the state of
mind at the time of their utterance.
When evidence of this character is produced sufficient
to show a then present intention, or state of mind, it may
be assumed to have continued and formed the motive
which controlled the doing of a subsequent act following
closely thereafter, if, under all the surrounding circum-
stances, one would naturally associate the two together;
and it is for the jury to draw the conclusion.
See also, Adoption of Harvey, 375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276
(1953).
Assertion of Then Existing Physical or Emotional
Feeling
This exception includes an assertion of the declarant’s
then existing physical or emotional feeling. A leading case
is Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 104—05 (1933),
in which the Supreme Court explained:
There are times when a state of mind, if relevant,
may be proved by contemporaneous declarations of
feeling. . . . Thus, in proceedings for the probate of a
will, where the issue is undue influence, the declara-
tions of a testator are competent to prove his feelings
for his relatives, but are incompetent as evidence of
his conduct or of theirs. . . . In suits for alienation of
affections, letters passing between the spouses are
admissible in aid of a like purpose. . . . In damage
suits for personal injuries, declarations by the patient
to bystanders or physicians are evidence of suffering
or symptoms . . . but are not received to prove the
acts, the external circumstances through which the
injuries came about.
Under Pennsylvania decisional law evidence of a
declarant’s out-of-court assertion of his then existing
physical or emotional feeling is excepted to the hearsay
rule under the rubric of the non specific phrase, ‘‘res
gestae.’’ In Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 383
A.2d 858 (1978), the Court said that the res gestae
exception to the hearsay rule includes ‘‘(1) declarations as
to present bodily conditions; (2) declarations of present
mental states and emotions. . . .’’
See also, Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super.
201, 494 A.2d 426 (1985), in which a declarant’s out-of-
court assertion to a nurse, ‘‘I’m so frightened,’’ was held
admissible to prove his fright at the time.
Pennsylvania decisional law also includes this exception
to the hearsay rule under the rubric of the non specific
phrase, ‘‘state of mind.’’ See Adoption of Harvey, 375 Pa.
1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953).
Assertion of Memory or Belief Concerning
Declarant’s Will
This exception includes a declarant’s assertion of
memory or belief concerning declarant’s will. The excep-
tion has long been recognized in Pennsylvania, at least
when the declarant is dead. See Lappe v. Gfeller, 211 Pa.
462, 60 A 1049 (1905); Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393,
106 A 731 (1919).
In a more modern case, In Re Kirkander, 326 Pa.
Super. 380, 474 A.2d 290 (1984), two daughters chal-
lenged the probate of their father’s will. The court,
holding it reversible error to preclude the daughters from
introducing testimony as to assertions made by their
father shortly before his death, about what was in his
will, said:
A decedent’s utterance regarding his planned dispo-
sition of his estate, said after the questioned will was
supposedly executed, has been admitted in a will
contest; since, if a will is to be admitted to probate, a
decedent must have been aware of its contents. . . .
Therefore, contestants should have been allowed to
introduce testimony concerning statements allegedly
made by the decedent regarding his testamentary
scheme. Id. at 386, 474 A.2d at 293.
Pa.R.E. 803(3) makes it clear that the exception applies
whether or not the declarant is dead. Disputes concerning
wills, though, usually don’t arise until the testator
(declarant) dies.
(4) Statement Made for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis
or Treatment. A statement made for purposes of medical
treatment, or medical diagnosis in contemplation of treat-
ment, and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar
as reasonably pertinent to treatment, or diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment.
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Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(4) is similar to F.R.E. 803(4), with one
major difference. The federal rule excepts to the hearsay
rule assertions made for purposes of medical diagnosis,
whether or not treatment is contemplated. This means
that in the federal courts doctors or other medical
personnel who are hired to examine a party for litigation
purposes only can testify to what the party told them,
and this testimony will be admitted as substantive evi-
dence, excepted to the hearsay rule. Pa.R.E. 803(4), on
the other hand, includes assertions made for purposes of
medical diagnosis only when treatment is contemplated.
The rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule was
well set forth by Judge Learned Hand in Meaney v.
United States, 112 F2d 538, 539—40 (2d Cir 1940):
A man goes to his physician expecting to recount
all that he feels, and often he has with some care
searched his consciousness to be sure that he will
leave out nothing. If his narrative of present symp-
toms is to be received as evidence of the facts, as
distinguished from mere support for the physician’s
opinion, these parts of it can only rest upon his
motive to disclose the truth because his treatment
will in part depend upon what he says. . . .
The same reasoning applies with exactly the same
force to a narrative of past symptoms. . . . A patient
has an equal motive to speak the truth; what he has
felt in the past is as apt to be important in his
treatment as what he feels at the moment.
The assertion need not be made by the patient. It may
be made by someone else on the patient’s behalf, such as
a mother concerning her child, or a policeman concerning
an unconscious victim of an accident or crime.
The assertion need not be made to a doctor. It may be
made to a nurse, ambulance attendant, physical thera-
pist, admitting clerk at a hospital, etc., for relay to a
physician or other health care practitioner. It is the
purpose of the assertion, i.e., to aid in medical treatment,
or diagnosis leading to treatment, not the identity of its
immediate recipient, that qualifies it for exception to the
hearsay rule.
An assertion made for purposes of medical treatment,
or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment, has long been
excepted to the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania, at least
when it relates to the patient’s symptoms. See Freedman
v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York, 342 Pa. 404, 21
A.2d 81 (1941).
Pennsylvania decisional law has been ambiguous as to
whether assertions concerning the cause of a patient’s
injuries are included in the exception. In Ferne v. Chad-
derton, 375 Pa. 302, 305—06, 100 A.2d 854, 856 (1953),
the Court said:
It has long been the law in this commonwealth that
a doctor may testify to the symptoms and history of
anatomical violence related by a patient, which en-
able the doctor properly to treat and prescribe for the
patient.
However, in Cody v. SKF Industries, Inc, 447 Pa. 558,
291 A.2d 772 (1972), a worker’s compensation case, the
Court said that the law theretofore in Pennsylvania had
been that an assertion of symptoms that was made for
purposes of medical treatment was excepted to the hear-
say rule, but an assertion as to the cause of an injury was
not, unless it was part of the ‘‘res gestae.’’ The Court then
expanded the exception and approved admission, as sub-
stantive evidence, of testimony from the worker’s treating
physician that the worker, since deceased, said that he
had been struck over the head by a garage door at work
three days previously. The court said, in footnote 4, ‘‘We
leave for another time and appropriate case the question
of whether this rule would apply outside the workmen’s
compensation area.’’ Id. at 569, 291 A.2d at 77.
Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa.
Super. 426, 494 A.2d 201 (1985), a murder case, the
Superior Court, citing the Cody case, held admissible
evidence that the victim, who suffered from heart disease,
told a nurse at the hospital to which he was taken by
police that he was having trouble breathing, that he was
frightened, and that he had just been abducted at
gunpoint and robbed.
In Commonwealth v. Sanford, 397 Pa. Super. 581, 594
98, 580 A.2d 784 (1990), a prosecution for various crimes
arising out of the sexual assault of a three year old girl,
the victim was taken to the hospital with an inflamed
vagina. The Superior Court, again citing the Cody case,
approved admission of testimony from the girl’s treating
physician at the hospital relating her description to him
of the assault.
And, in Commonwealth v. Smith, Pa. , 681
A.2d 1288 (1996), the Supreme Court confirmed that its
holding in the Cody case, i.e., that an assertion as to the
cause of an injury or illness is encompassed by this
exception to the hearsay rule, is not limited to worker’s
compensation cases.
Pa.R.E. 803(4) is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
opinion in the Smith case, and makes clear that Pennsyl-
vania now excepts all assertions made for purposes of
medical treatment, or diagnosis in contemplation of treat-
ment, to the hearsay rule. This includes not only symp-
toms, past and present, but also the cause thereof.
Caveat: Any assertion as to the cause of a patient’s
injuries must be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment, to qualify for this exception to the hearsay
rule. In Commonwealth v. Smith, Pa. , 681
A.2d 1288, 1292 (1996), the Court explained:
By way of example, a person’s statement, ‘‘I was hit
by a car,’’ made for the purpose of receiving medical
treatment would come within the exception. It is
important for doctors to know how the person sus-
tained the injuries. However, a person’s statement, ‘‘I
was hit by the car which went through the red light,’’
would not come within the exception, or at least that
part of the statement which indicated that the car
‘‘went through the red light’’ would not. It is inconse-
quential and irrelevant to medical treatment to know
that the car went through the red light.
See also, Hreha v. Benscoter, 381 Pa. Super. 556, 554
A.2d 525 (1989).
Usually the identity of a person who inflicts harm on a
patient is not reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treat-
ment of the patient’s injuries. In Commonwealth v. Smith,
Pa. , 681 A.2d 1288 (1996), a prosecution for
aggravated assault, the Court held it reversible error to
permit a nurse to testify that a five year old girl told the
nurse that her father (the defendant) placed her under
scalding hot water.
No doubt one who is contemplating medical treatment
for illness or injuries has strong incentive to tell the truth
to his or her health care providers, and to be accurate in
doing so, to insure that the medical treatment will be
effective. Therefore, assertions that he or she makes for
this purpose are especially trustworthy, substantially
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more so than hearsay in general. This is what justifies
their exception to the hearsay rule.
This rationale is not valid when a physician, or other
health care provider, is consulted for a purpose unrelated
to medical treatment, such as an examination solely to
prepare the examiner to testify as a witness for one side
or the other. That is why Pennsylvania, like several other
states, departs from the federal rule, and does not include
within this exception to the hearsay rule assertions made
to health care providers unconnected with treatment.
Note: A physician, who is presented as an expert
medical witness, may testify to a patient’s assertions
concerning the patient’s symptoms, and the inception and
cause thereof, as part of the history upon which the
physician, in part, bases his or her opinion. See Pa.R.E.
703, 705. When offered only to help explain the founda-
tion for an expert witness’s opinion, the assertions are not
substantive evidence, i.e., are not hearsay. Thus, evidence
of assertions made by a patient to an examining physi-
cian will often come to the attention of the jury, regard-
less of its exception to the hearsay rule.
(5) [See Comment]
Comment
Recorded recollection, the subject of F.R.E. 803(5), is
dealt with in Pa.R.E. 803.1(3). It is an exception to the
hearsay rule in which the current testimony of the
declarant is necessary.
(6) Record of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by,
or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony
of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness. The term ‘‘business’’ as used in
this paragraph includes business, institution, association,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether
or not conducted for profit.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(6) is similar to F.R.E. 803(6), but with two
differences, one major and one minor. The major differ-
ence is that Pa.R.E. 803(6), consistent with prior Pennsyl-
vania decisional law, does not include opinions and
diagnoses in the exception. The minor difference is that
Pa.R.E. 803(6) allows the court to exclude business
records that would otherwise qualify for exception to the
hearsay rule if the ‘‘sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.’’ The fed-
eral rule allows the court to do so only if ‘‘the source of
information or the method or circumstances of prepara-
tion indicate lack of trustworthiness.’’
The biggest regularly conducted business activity is
that of government, federal, state and local. Governmen-
tal records are included within this exception to the
hearsay rule. That is one reason that Pennsylvania has
not adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), dealing with
public records. See Comment under Pa.R.E. 803(8).
For example, police reports are business records. See
Commonwealth v. Graver, 461 Pa. 131, 334 A.2d 667
(1975), a suit to enjoin the operation of a taproom as a
nuisance. The court approved admission of police depart-
ment records listing the dates, times, and names of
policemen dispatched to the area of the taproom, their
observations, and the actions that they took.
Pa.R.E. 803(6) differs only slightly from 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6108, which is an adaptation of the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act, a prototype statute that was
originally promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1936, but was
later withdrawn by it. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108 provides:
(a) Short title of section. This section shall be
known and may be cited as the ‘‘Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act.’’
(b) General Rule. A record of an act, condition or
event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evi-
dence if the custodian or other qualified witness
testifies to its identity and the mode of its prepara-
tion, and if it was made in the regular course of
business at or near the time of the act, condition or
event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the
sources of information, method and time of prepara-
tion were such as to justify its admission.
(c) Definition. As used in this section ‘‘business’’
includes every kind of business, profession, occupa-
tion, calling, or operation of institutions whether
carried on for profit or not.
Pa.R.E. 803(6) is worded a little broader than the
statute. By expressly referring to a ‘‘data compilation,’’
and including a record ‘‘in any form,’’ it clearly encom-
passes computerized data storage, a form of record reten-
tion that is assuming increased importance in this cyber-
netic age.
Both Pa.R.E. 803(6) and the statute define ‘‘business’’
broadly, but Pa.R.E. 803(6) expressly includes an associa-
tion, and the statute does not.
The wording of Pa.R.E. 803(6) also places the burden
on an opposing party to show that the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate that a business
record is untrustworthy, and thus does not qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule. The statute places the
burden on the proponent of the evidence to show circum-
stantial trustworthiness.
Other than that, there appears to be little difference
between Pa.R.E. 803(6) and the statute. Therefore, deci-
sional law under the statute should, by and large,
continue to be good precedent.
Pennsylvania decisional law holds that opinions con-
tained in business records are not excepted to the hearsay
rule. See Commonwealth v. DiGiacomo, 463 Pa. 449, 345
A.2d 605 (1975); Williams v. McClain, 513 Pa. 300, 520
A.2d 1374 (1987).
However, the line between opinion and fact is not
sharply defined. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Campbell,
244 Pa. Super. 505, 509—10, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976), a rape
case. The Commonwealth introduced an entry in a hos-
pital record asserting that spermatozoa was present in
the victim’s vagina. The Superior Court held, 5 to 2,
affirming a conviction, that this entry was one of fact, not
opinion.
Business records are considered by the part, not the
whole, for purposes of this exception to the hearsay rule.
One entry may be excepted to the hearsay rule, and
another may not, though both are contained in the same
document or other form of data compilation.
See Haas v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 580, 92 A.2d 171 (1952), a
suit for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident. A police report was introduced by defendant,
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pursuant to the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act (now 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108). The Court, reversing a jury
verdict for defendant, said that certain entries in the
report were admissible, such as the investigating police
officer’s observations as to the weather and the location of
the cars after the accident. But it was error to admit
entries describing how the accident happened that were
based on information obtained from unidentified wit-
nesses. In the language of the Uniform Business Records
As Evidence Act, the ‘‘sources of information’’ were not
such as to justify their admission.
To qualify for this exception to the hearsay rule, a
record must have been made ‘‘at or near the time’’ of the
act, event, or condition that it reports. However, there is
no set length of time after which an entry in a business
record will be too stale to qualify for exception to the
hearsay rule. As the Court explained in In Re Estate of
Indyk, 488 Pa. 567, 572, 413 A.2d 371, 373, n.2 (1979),
the appropriate test of contemporaneity is whether the
time span between the event and its entry ‘‘is so great
that it suggests a danger of inaccuracy resulting from
memory lapse.’’
See Henderson v. Zubik, 390 Pa. 521, 136 A22d 127
(1957), a suit by one former partner against another to
recover his share of the net profits of a business that
bought and sold steel and scrap iron. Under the account-
ing system employed by the partnership, no book entries
were made at the time that the material was purchased.
However, when it was sold entries were made naming the
purchaser, the sale price, and the original purchase price,
the latter item being dependent on the memory and
recollection of the entrant. The court, affirming a jury
verdict for plaintiff, held that the trial judge properly
exercised his discretion to admit the entries under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule, despite
the delay in recording the purchase prices.
To be excepted to the hearsay rule, a business record
must be authenticated by the testimony of a ‘‘custodian or
other qualified witness.’’ This often is, but need not be,
the person who made the entries in question, or the
custodian of the record at the time of trial. It is sufficient
if ‘‘the authenticating witness can provide sufficient infor-
mation relating to the preparation and maintenance of
the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness of
the business records.’’ Indyk, 488 Pa. at 573, 413 A.2d at
373—74.
Pennsylvania will not except an entry in a business
record to the hearsay rule if the subject matter of the
entry is extraneous to the purpose of the business. See
Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 325, 41 A.2d 688
(1945), a murder case. The court held that an entry in a
hospital record that the victim said that he had been shot
by a white man was not pathologically germane to the
hospital’s business. Therefore, it was not excepted to the
hearsay rule.
Pennsylvania may also refuse to except an entry in a
business record to the hearsay rule if the source of the
information contained in the entry is not known. See
Isaacson v. Mobile Propane Corp, 315 Pa. Super. 42, 461
A.2d 625 (1983), a suit for personal injuries allegedly
caused by an explosion. Defendant offered in evidence an
entry in the emergency room record of a hospital that
asserted that plaintiff’s legs had been run over by a fire
truck. The court approved exclusion of this evidence
because the source of the recorded information was not
known.
The exception to the hearsay rule for an entry in a
business record is one of the most important, and most
useful, of the hearsay exceptions. By avoiding the neces-
sity of calling as witnesses all those who supply, and all
those who record, information that a business regularly
collects, records, and keeps, trials are made easier,
shorter, and less expensive. And business enterprises are
less disrupted by the demands of litigation.
The right of the court to exclude from evidence an entry
in a business record that would otherwise qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule, because the circumstances
indicate that it is not trustworthy, is a valuable safeguard
with which few other hearsay exceptions are endowed.
Caveat: If offered against a defendant in a criminal
case, an entry in a business record, though excepted to
the hearsay rule, may be excluded if its admission would
violate defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against
him, under either the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or Article I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
See Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d
653 (1974), a murder case. The Court, reversing a
conviction, held that admission of an autopsy report
under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
(now 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108), to prove the cause of death,
violated defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation
under Article I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
(7) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(7), which
reads as follows:
Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance
With the Provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a
matter is not included in the memoranda, reports,
records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to
prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the mat-
ter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memoran-
dum, report, record, or data compilation was regu-
larly made and preserved, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
Principles of logic and internal consistency have led
Pennsylvania to reject this rule. The absence of an entry
in a record is not hearsay, as defined in Pa.R.E. 801(c).
Hence, it appears irrational to except it to the hearsay
rule.
Pennsylvania law is in accord with the object of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(7), i.e., to allow evidence of the
absence of a record of an act, event, or condition to be
introduced to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence
thereof, if the matter was one which would ordinarily be
recorded.
On analysis, absence of an entry in a business record is
circumstantial evidence, i.e., it tends to prove something
by implication, not assertion. Its admissibility is governed
by principles of relevance, not hearsay. See Pa.R.E. 401,
et seq.
For example, assume that in the ordinary course of its
business Harvard University records and preserves the
names of all its graduates. Evidence that the University’s
records do not list the name of Fred Zilch may be offered
as circumstantial evidence from which the trier of fact
may infer that Zilch did not graduate from Harvard.
See Klein v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 309 Pa. 320, 163 A.532
(1932), a suit for personal injuries caused by a fall in
defendant’s store. Morse, a witness for plaintiff, testified
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that he was defendant’s janitor at the time of the
accident, and had washed and oiled the floor, but had not
powdered it to make it reasonably safe to walk on.
Defendant’s bookkeeper then testified for defendant that
she kept payroll records of all defendant’s employees, and
that Morse’s name did not appear therein. The Court held
that this absence of a business entry was proper evidence
to be considered by the jury, along with other evidence in
the case, on the issue of whether Morse was defendant’s
employee at the time of the accident.
See also, Stack v. Wapner, 244 Pa. Super. 278, 368 A.2d
292 (1976), a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs alleged
that physicians at a hospital failed to monitor the admin-
istration of Pitocin (a labor inducing drug) to the wife-
plaintiff. The court, affirming judgments for plaintiffs,
held that plaintiffs properly overcame testimony from the
defendant physicians that they were present in the labor
room, by introducing evidence of the absence of entries to
that effect on the labor room chart. Plaintiffs had previ-
ously introduced evidence of an official hospital policy
requiring such entries.
(8) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(8), which
reads as follows:
Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, state-
ments, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Pennsylvania has not adopted the federal rule for
several reasons:
1. Experience with Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)
in the federal courts has not been exemplary. It has
spawned a lot of litigation, particularly over the
meaning and scope of terms like ‘‘law enforcement
personnel,’’ and ‘‘factual findings.’’ Conflicts abound in
reported federal cases over whether particular inves-
tigative findings and conclusions, such as those made
by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion, should be admitted under the rule.
2. Public records are business records. Therefore,
entries therein may be excepted to the hearsay rule
pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(6).
3. An exception to the hearsay rule for public
records is provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104:
(a) General rule.—A copy of a record of governmen-
tal action or inaction authenticated as provided in
section 6103 (relating to proof of official records) shall
be admissible as evidence that the governmental
action or inaction disclosed therein was in fact taken
or omitted.
(b) Existence of facts.—A copy of a record authenti-
cated as provided in section 6103 disclosing the
existence or nonexistence of facts which have been
recorded pursuant to official duty or would have been
so recorded had the facts existed shall be admissible
as evidence of the existence or nonexistence of such
facts, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
It is worthy of note that subsection (b) of the statute is
limited to ‘‘facts.’’ This is consistent with Pa.R.E. 803(6),
as well as Pennsylvania decisional law interpreting 42
Pa.C.S. § 6108 (Uniform Business Records As Evidence
Act). See Comment to Pa.R.E. 803(6).
Examples of public records that have qualified for
exception to the hearsay rule under the statute include a
computer printout obtained from the Pennsylvania Bu-
reau of Employment Compensation showing a schedule of
payments made to defendant (Commonwealth v. Visconto,
301 Pa. Super. 543, 448 A.2d 41 (1982)); a certified copy
of a report from the United States Weather Bureau (Haas
v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 580, 92 A.2d 171 (1952)); life expect-
ancy tables published by the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (Rosche v. McCoy, 397 Pa.
615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959)); and a chart on speed and
stopping distances contained in the Digest of Vehicle Code
of Pennsylvania, compiled and issued by the Pennsylva-
nia Department of Revenue (Finnin v. Neubert, 378 Pa.
40, 105 A.2d 77 (1954); DeMarco and Rose v. Ross, 392
Pa. 1, 139 A.2d 634 (1958); Grippo v. Pennsylvania Truck
Lines, Inc., 402 Pa. 1, 165 A.2d 618 (1960)).
The facts contained in a public record need not have
originated with a public employee. The facts may have
come from private individuals who were under a duty to
report to a public agency. See Commonwealth v. Visconto,
301 Pa. Super. 543, 448 A.2d 41 (1982), a prosecution for
making false statements to obtain public assistance. The
court, affirming a conviction, approved admission of a
document listing wages paid by the Pittsburgh Hilton
Hotels Corporation (Hilton) to a group of employees,
including defendant, that Hilton had filed with the
Pennsylvania Department of Welfare pursuant to statute.
The document was qualified by certification of an officer
in the Department, which had retained custody of the
document.
Pennsylvania has no counterpart to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), which excepts to the hearsay rule
‘‘factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law.’’
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, (1988),
the United States Supreme Court, resolving a conflict
among the federal circuits, held that the ‘‘factual findings’’
referred to in the rule include opinions, so long as the
opinions are based on factual investigations.
Adoption of this rule would conflict with long standing
Pennsylvania decisional law that favors subjecting all
those who express opinions, particularly expert witnesses,
to contemporaneous cross-examination, under oath, in the
presence of the trier of fact.
Investigational findings that are not in the opinion
category may qualify for exception to the hearsay rule
under Pa.R.E. 803(6). Examples include demographic
information that is gathered and recorded statistically by
the United States Bureau of the Census in the ordinary
course of its business, or information on the incidence and
mortality rates of various diseases that is gathered,
recorded and published by the United States Center for
Disease Control. But a governmental investigator’s con-
clusion as to the probable cause of an airplane crash,
which was the subject of the United State Supreme
Court’s opinion in the Rainey case, would not qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania.
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Note: Investigational findings by reputable persons or
organizations, private or governmental, may be relied
upon by an expert witness, in part, in forming the
witness’s opinion, if they are of a type reasonably relied
upon by other experts in the witness’s particular field of
expertise. They may thus be brought to the attention of
the trier of fact, though they will not be substantive
evidence. See Pa.R.E. 703.
(9) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(9), which
reads as follows:
Records of Vital Statistics. Records or data compila-
tions, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or
marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public
office pursuant to requirements of law.
Pennsylvania has not adopted the federal rule because
it is not needed, for the following reasons:
1. Records of vital statistics are business records.
Therefore, they may be excepted to the hearsay rule
pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(6).
2. Records of vital statistics are public records.
Therefore, they may be excepted to the hearsay rule
by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104:
(a) General rule.—A copy of a record of governmen-
tal action or inaction authenticated as provided in
section 6103 (relating to proof of official records) shall
be admissible as evidence that the governmental
action or inaction disclosed therein was in fact taken
or omitted.
(b) Existence of facts.—A copy of a record authenti-
cated as provided in section 6103 disclosing the
existence or nonexistence of facts which have been
recorded pursuant to official duty or would have been
so recorded had the facts existed shall be admissible
as evidence of the existence or nonexistence of such
facts, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
3. The Vital Statistics Law of 1953 (35 P. S.
§ 450.101 et seq.) provides for registration of births,
deaths, fetal deaths, and marriages, with the State
Department of Health. The records of the Depart-
ment, and duly certified copies thereof, are excepted
to the hearsay rule by section 810 of the statute (35
P. S. § 450.810):
Any record or duly certified copy of a record or part
thereof which is (1) filed with the department in
accordance with the provisions of this act and the
regulations of the Advisory Health Board and which
(2) is not a ‘‘delayed’’ record filed under section seven
hundred two of this act or a record ‘‘corrected’’ under
section seven hundred three of this act shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence of its contents, except that
in any proceeding in which paternity is controverted
and which affects the interests of an alleged father or
his successors in interest no record or part thereof
shall constitute prima facie evidence of paternity
unless the alleged father is the husband of the
mother of the child.
Most of the litigation arising out of this exception to the
hearsay rule involves death certificates. A death certifi-
cate is generally admissible to prove the fact of death, the
date of death, and the physical cause of death (e.g., heart
attack, infection, drowning, trauma). See Castor v. Ruff-
ing, 178 Pa. Super. 124, 112 A.2d 412 (1955), in which the
court held that a death certificate was properly admitted
to prove that the decedent died of heat exhaustion.
However, it has been held that a death certificate is not
prima facie evidence to prove the manner of death, i.e.,
whether it was natural, accidental, suicide, homicide, etc.
See Pittsburgh National Bank v. Mutual Life Insurance
Co. of New York, 273 Pa. Super. 592, 417 A.2d 1206
(1980), aff’d, 493 Pa. 96, 425 A.2d 383 (1981), a suit for
accidental death benefits under three life insurance poli-
cies. The court, affirming a jury verdict for defendant,
said that the trial judge correctly ruled that a death
certificate was not admissible to prove that the death was
accidental.
See also, Heffron v. Prudential Insurance Co., 137 Pa.
Super. 69, 8 A.2d 491 (1939).
In Kondrat v. W.C.A.B., 145 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
428, 603 A.2d 689 (1992), the court held that a death
certificate is not admissible to prove the physical cause of
death if it was signed by a lay coroner. However, the
validity of this holding has been called into question by
the Supreme Court’s more recent opinion in Miller v. The
Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 541 Pa. 474, 664 A.2d 525 (1995),
holding that a lay coroner may be qualified to give expert
opinion testimony with respect to time of death.
Extraneous matter entered in a record of vital statistics
is not excepted to the hearsay rule. See District of
Columbia’s Appeal, 343 Pa. 65, 21 A.2d 883 (1941), an
audit of the account of a trust. The court held that a
death certificate was admissible to prove the fact and
date of death, but not to prove the date of birth. The
recital of the date of birth was an extraneous entry.
See also, Meyers v. Metropolitan Insurance Co, 36 D. &
C.2d 479 (1964), in which the court held that a death
certificate could not be introduced to prove the circum-
stances leading up to the cause of death.
Marriage records of foreign countries are excepted to
the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania. See Estate of Loik, 493
Pa. 512, 426 A.2d 1134 (1981), a will contest. The court
held it reversible error to exclude a Soviet marriage
certificate offered as evidence that decedent married a
claimant on August 10, 1940.
(10) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(10), which
reads as follows:
Absence of Public Record or Entry. To prove the
absence of a record, report, statement, or data compi-
lation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexist-
ence of a matter of which a record, report, statement,
or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made
and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence
in the form of a certification in accordance with rule
902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to
disclose the record, report, statement, or data compi-
lation, or entry.
Pennsylvania has not adopted this rule for the same
reasons that it did not adopt F.R.E. 803(7). See Comment
under Pa.R.E. 803(7).
Pennsylvania law is in general accord with the object of
F.R.E. 803(10), i.e., to allow evidence of the absence of a
public record to be introduced to prove the nonoccurrence
or nonexistence of a matter of which a record would
normally be made and preserved by a public office or
agency. Such evidence may consist of (1) testimony that a
diligent search failed to disclose the record, or (2) a
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certificate that no such record exists prepared in accord-
ance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 6103.
Absence of an entry in a public record is circumstantial
evidence, i.e., it tends to prove something by implication,
not assertion. Its admissibility is governed by principles
of relevance, not hearsay. See Pa.R.E. 401, et seq.
A statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104(b), provides, in pertinent
part, for admissibility of evidence of the absence of an
entry in a public record to prove the nonexistence of a
fact:
(b) Existence of facts.—A copy of a record authenti-
cated as provided in section 6103 disclosing the . . .
nonexistence of facts which . . . would have been . . .
recorded had the facts existed shall be admissible as
evidence of the . . . nonexistence of such facts, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
For example, evidence that the taxpayer records of the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue for 1994 do not list
the name of Fred Zilch may be offered as circumstantial
evidence that Zilch did not file a tax return that year.
See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 275 Pa. Super. 46,
418 A.2d 603 (1980), a prosecution for carrying a firearm
without a license. The court, affirming a conviction,
approved admission of a certificate signed by the commis-
sioner of state police, as well as by the director of its
records division, asserting that the records of the state
police did not show that defendant had been issued a
license to carry a pistol. This evidence was admitted
pursuant to former 28 P. S. § 110, the predecessor of 42
Pa.C.S. § 6104.
Pennsylvania also has a complementary statute, 42
Pa.C.S. § 5328, entitled ‘‘Proof of Official Records,’’ which
provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Lack of records.—A written statement that
after diligent search no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records designated by
the statement, authenticated as provided in this
section in the case of a domestic record, or complying
with the requirements of this section for a summary
in the case of a record in a foreign country, is
admissible as evidence that the records contain no
such record or entry.
(11) Record of Religious Organization. Statements of
births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitmacy, ancestry,
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of
personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(11) is identical to F.R.E. 803(11). It is an
expansion of a more limited exception that was statuto-
rily adopted in Pennsylvania.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule.
These days public records are normally available to
prove pedigree, in the absence of knowledgeable live
witnesses. Introducing church records is pretty much
a last resort.
A limited exception to the hearsay rule for records
of a religious organization is provided by 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6110:
(a) General rule.—The registry kept by any reli-
gious society in their respective meeting book or
books of any marriage, birth or burial, within this
Commonwealth, shall be held good and authentic,
and shall be allowed of upon all occasions whatso-
ever.
(b) Foreign burials.—The registry of burials of any
religious society or corporate town, in places out of
the United States, shall be prima facie evidence of
the death of any person whose burial is therein
registered, and of the time of his interment, if the
time be stated in the registry, and extracts from such
registries, certified by the proper officers, in the mode
of authentication usual in the place in which they are
made and authenticated as provided in section 5328
(relating to proof of official records), shall be received
as copies of such registries, and be evidence accord-
ingly.
This is a time honored statute. Subsection (a) was
originally enacted in 1700, and subsection (b) in 1837.
For some unexplained reason, the statute provides for
the admission of records of burials that take place either
in Pennsylvania or a foreign country, but not burials that
take place in one of the other 49 states in this country.
Marriages and births must take place within Pennsyl-
vania to be covered by the statute. See In Re Garrett’s
Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531 (1952), in which the
court held that private church records from Hungary
were not admissible to establish the birth of individuals
or their parentage. (Such records would now be excepted
to the hearsay rule by Pa.R.E. 803(11)).
The adoption of Pa.R.E. 803(11) conforms Pennsylvania
evidential law to that prevailing in the federal courts, and
in at least eighty percent of the state courts throughout
the country.
(12) Marriage, Baptismal, or Similar Certificate. State-
ments of fact contained in a certificate that the maker
performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered
a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a
religious organization or by law to perform the act
certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time
of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(12) is identical to F.R.E. 803(12). It is
consistent with prior Pennsylvania law, though cases are
sparse.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule. It
encompasses only an assertion contained in a marriage,
baptismal, or similar certificate that the maker performed
the ceremony and the date thereof.
Proof that the maker of the certificate was authorized
to perform the ceremony is required. If the maker was a
public official, the court may take judicial notice thereof
under Pa.R.E. 201. However, if the maker was an official
of a religious organization, judicial notice is less likely,
and evidence thereof may have to be produced.
This exception to the hearsay rule was recognized in
District of Columbia’s Appeal, 343 Pa. 65, 73, 21 A.2d
883, 888 (1941), in which the court said:
The appellees argue the admissibility of the recitals
of birth dates in the baptismal records of Helen Fink
and Cora Fink . . . . It is settled in this state that such
certificates are admissible to prove the fact and date
of baptism . . . but not to prove the birth date . . . .
In Estate of Loik, 493 Pa. 512, 426 A.2d 1134 (1981), a
will contest, the Court held that a Soviet marriage
certificate was admissible to prove that a claimant was
married to the decedent.
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(13) Family Record. Statements of fact concerning per-
sonal or family history contained in family Bibles, gene-
alogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on fam-
ily portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones,
or the like.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(13) is identical to F.R.E. 803(13). It seems
to be consistent with prior Pennsylvania law, though
there are no recent reported cases.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule. These
days public records are normally available to prove
pedigree, in the absence of knowledgeable live witnesses.
Introducing something like an entry in a family bible, or
an engraving on an urn or tombstone, is pretty much a
last resort.
There is some time honored precedent for this exception
to the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania decisional law. In
Douglass’s Lessee v. Sanderson, 2 Dall. 116 (1791), the
Court approved admission of a leaf cut out of a family
bible on which were written the name and date of birth of
a man under whom the plaintiff’s lessor claimed title to
real estate.
(14) Record of Document Affecting an Interest in Prop-
erty. The record of a document purporting to establish or
affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of
the original recorded document and its execution and
delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been
executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an
applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents
of that kind in that office.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(14) is identical to F.R.E. 803(14). It seems
to be consistent with prior Pennsylvania law, though
cases are sparse.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule. Many
documents affecting an interest in property, such as
deeds, mortgages, security interests under the Uniform
Commercial Code, etc., are recorded, pursuant to statute.
A copy or other record of such a document, kept by the
public office in which the document is recorded, is
excepted to the hearsay rule if offered to prove the
content of the original and its proper execution and
delivery.
This exception to the hearsay rule has been recognized
in Pennsylvania decisional law. In David v. Titusville &
Oil City Railway Co., 114 Pa. 308, 6 A. 736 (1886), the
Court held that records of deeds that were recorded in
accordance with a Pennsylvania statute were admissible
to establish the contents of the originals and, inferen-
tially, to establish their due execution and delivery.
(15) Statement in Document Affecting an Interest in
Property. A statement contained in a document, other
than a will, purporting to establish or affect an interest in
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose
of the document, unless dealings with the property since
the document was made have been inconsistent with the
truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(15) is identical to F.R.E. 803(15), except
that Pennsylvania does not include a statement made in
a will.
Pa.R.E. 803(15) is consistent with 21 P. S. § 451, which
provides that an affidavit, swearing to matters delineated
in the statute, that may affect the title to real estate in
Pennsylvania, filed in the county in which the real estate
is located, shall be admissible evidence of the facts stated
therein.
Pa.R.E. 803(15) appears inconsistent with dictum in
Brock v. Atlantic Refining Co., 273 Pa. 76, 80, 116 A. 552,
553 (1922), that ‘‘recitals in deeds are mere hearsay, and
inadmissible as against third persons who claim by a
paramount title.’’ However, the holding in the Brock case
approved admission of such a recital on the ground that
there was an exception ‘‘in the case of ancient deeds
accompanied by possession.’’
Whatever the significance of the above cited ancient
dictum, unaccompanied by a collateral holding, Pa.R.E.
803(15) brings Pennsylvania law close to that which now
prevails in the great majority of jurisdictions in this
country.
Pennsylvania’s variation from the federal rule with
respect to wills is consistent with its more recent deci-
sional law. See In Re Estate of Kostik, 514 Pa. 591, 526
A.2d 746 (1987), a suit over a widow’s right to elect
against her late husband’s will. He disinherited her, and
asserted in his will that she had wilfully and maliciously
deserted him. The Court, holding for the widow, said that
statements contained in a will ‘‘have no evidentiary value
as proof of a fact in issue.’’ Id. at 595—96, 526 A.2d at 748
49.
Note: If a document purporting to establish or affect an
interest in property is 30 years old, an assertion therein
may qualify for exception to the hearsay rule under
Pa.R.E. 803(16) (statement in ancient document). If the
declarant is dead, or otherwise unavailable, an assertion
of pedigree in such a document may qualify for exception
to the hearsay rule under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) (statement of
personal or family history).
(16) Statement in Ancient Document. Statements in a
document in existence thirty years or more the authentic-
ity of which is established.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(16) is similar to F.R.E. 803(16), except that
Pennsylvania adheres to the common law view that a
document must be at least 30 years old to qualify as an
ancient document. The federal rule would reduce the age
to 20 years.
This is a venerable exception to the hearsay rule, one
long recognized at common law. For some reason, it seems
to be seldom utilized in Pennsylvania, if the dearth of
reported cases is any indication.
One fairly recent case is Louden v. Apollo Gas Co., 273
Pa. Super. 549, 417 A.2d 1185 (1980), in which the court
approved admission, as an ancient document, of an
unrecorded memorandum of agreement that granted a
natural gas transmission pipe line easement to defen-
dant’s predecessor in interest. The court emphasized that
it was (1) more than 30 years old, (2) free from suspicious
alterations and erasures, and (3) in the custody of the
party legally entitled to it.
There appears to be no good reason to reduce the age of
an ancient document, for hearsay purposes, to 20 years,
and compelling reasons not to do so. The case of Jarndyce
and Jarndyce, so eloquently chronicled by Charles
Dickens in Bleak House, is apocryphal, yet instructive
concerning the possibility that a particularly complex
item of litigation may, on occasion, grace the courts for a
score or more years. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission v. School District of Phila., 161 Pa.
Commonwealth Ct. 658, 638 A.2d 304 (1994). If the age of
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an ancient document were reduced to 20 years, it might
be possible for the plaintiff in such a case to introduce his
own complaint as substantive evidence, excepted to the
hearsay rule as an ancient document. And so with other
pleadings, exhibits and briefs.
Assertions in old documents are no more trustworthy
than assertions in new documents. The rationale for this
exception to the hearsay rule is necessity, i.e., the need to
prove facts when witnesses are no longer available to
testify about them. Life expectancies in this country, and
throughout most of the world, have increased over the
last century. Therefore, there is greater likelihood today
that witnesses will be available to testify to matters that
are memorialized in a 30 year old document than when
the common law rule was established. Therefore, a
lengthening, not a shortening, of the time span for
defining an ancient document would seem to be justified.
On the whole, it seems safer, and wiser, to reject the
federal formulation and retain the common law definition
of an ancient document, one that is at least 30 years old.
(17) Market Report, Commercial Publication. Market
quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other pub-
lished compilations, generally used and relied upon by the
public or by persons in particular occupations.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(17) is identical to F.R.E. 803(17). It is
consistent with prior Pennsylvania law.
A publication may be qualified for this exception by the
testimony of a knowledgeable witness. Alternatively, its
qualification for the exception may be judicially noticed
by the trial judge under Pa.R.E. 201.
This exception to the hearsay rule has been recognized
in Pennsylvania decisional law. See Rosche v. McCoy, 397
Pa. 615, 156 A.2d 307 (1959), holding that standard life
expectancy and annuity tables are excepted to the hear-
say rule.
More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
dictum, said that a trial judge could properly have taken
judicial notice of used car values contained in the
Redbook published by National Market Reports, Inc., if
only there had been evidence presented concerning the
condition of the car in question. See Savoy v. Beneficial
Consumer Discount Co., 503 Pa. 74, 458 A.2d 465 (1983).
When the price or value of goods that are regularly
bought and sold in a commodity market is at issue, the
Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted by all
states save Louisiana, not only excepts relevant market
reports and similar publications to the hearsay rule, but
expressly makes them admissible in evidence. Section 2
724 of the Code, which has been adopted in Pennsylvania
as 13 Pa.C.S. § 2724, provides:
Whenever the prevailing price or value of any
goods regularly bought and sold in any established
commodity market is in issue, reports in official
publications or trade journals or newspapers or peri-
odicals of general circulation published as the reports
of such markets shall be admissible in evidence. The
circumstances of the preparation of such a report
may be shown to affect its weight but not its
admissibility.
(18) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(18), which
reads as follows:
Learned Treatise. To the extent called to the attention
of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied
upon by the expert witness in direct examination, state-
ments contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other
science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert
testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be received
as exhibits.
Opinions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have
never discussed an exception to the hearsay rule for
learned treatises. However, in 1988 the Superior Court
said that Pennsylvania does not recognize an assertion in
a learned treatise as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Majdic v. Cincinnati Machine Co., 370 Pa. Super. 611, 537
A.2d 334 (1988).
Case law in Pennsylvania has allowed an assertion in a
learned treatise to be brought to the attention of the trier
of fact if an expert witness testifies that it is authorita-
tive. Nigro v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 432 Pa. Super.
60, 637 A.2d 983 (1993). The Superior Court said that the
passages from the book, though not admissible as sub-
stantive evidence to prove that the rifle was safe, were
properly admitted to bolster the credibility of Davis, since
they were consistent with his testimony that the rifle was
safe.
Also, under Pa.R.E. 703, an expert witness may base
his opinion, in part, on information obtained from a
publication, whether or not it has been qualified as a
learned treatise, so long as it is of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the witness’ particular field of
expertise in forming opinions or inferences on the subject.
In such case, the witness may bring the publication to the
attention of the trier of fact.
Moreover, an expert witness may be cross-examined
with a learned treatise so long as the witness, or any
other expert witness in the case, testifies that the treatise
is an authoritative publication on the subject at issue. See
McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 367 Pa. Super. 600,
533 A.2d 436 (1987).
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History.
Reputation among members of a person’s family by blood,
adoption, or marriage, or among a person’s associates, or
in the community, concerning a person’s birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by
blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar
fact of personal or family history.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(19) is identical to F.R.E. 803(19). It
changes prior Pennsylvania decisional law by expanding
the venue from which the reputation may be drawn to
include (1) a person’s associates, and (2) the community.
Prior Pennsylvania decisional law, none of which is
recent, limited the venue to the person’s family.
Reputation evidence is composite hearsay. It attempts
to persuade the trier of fact that something is true
because many people say so. Reputation, at least among
family members, has long been recognized at common law
as an exception to the hearsay rule for matters of
personal or family history, such as birth, marriage,
ancestry, etc. These things are generally referred to as
matters of pedigree.
A common example of this exception to the hearsay rule
is the testimony of a witness concerning his own age. A
witness, of course, has no personal recollection of his
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birth. His testimony as to his age, therefore, must be
based on reputation among his family, and, perhaps, close
friends and associates.
Time honored decisional law in Pennsylvania recognizes
this exception to the hearsay rule, but appears to limit it
to reputation among family members. See American Life
Insurance and Trust Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa. 507, 516
(1875), in which the court said:
The term pedigree includes not only descent and
relationship, but also the facts of birth, marriage and
death, and the times when these events happened.
These facts may be established by general repute in
the family, proved by a surviving member of it, in all
cases where they occur incidentally and in relation to
pedigree . . . .
In Picken’s Estate, 163 Pa. 14, 18, 29 A.875, 875 (1894),
the court, quoting from Wharton’s Treatise on Evidence,
declared:
Common reputation in a family connection as to
who are members of the family is admissible, when
no superior evidence is attainable, or in connection
with superior evidence, to prove pedigree, legitimacy,
and marriage.
The above decisional law from the nineteenth century
represents the old common law view that the venue from
which reputation may be drawn should be limited to the
family. Times, though, have changed. People travel more,
and, for good or ill, spend less time with their families.
They tend to work and socialize in other communities, to
which they have ever greater accessibility. Therefore, it
makes sense to expand the venue from which reputation
evidence of pedigree may be drawn.
At any rate, the federal courts and at least 80 percent
of our sister states have already done so. By adopting
Pa.R.E. 803(19), Pennsylvania conforms to what is now,
by far, the majority view in the country.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General His-
tory. Reputation in a community, arising before the
controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands
in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in
which located.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(20) is identical to F.R.E. 803(20). It is
consistent with prior Pennsylvania law, at least with
respect to boundaries of land.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule. Bound-
aries of land and easements thereon are usually proved
by reference to deeds and other documentary evidence.
Events of general history are often judicially noticed.
So far as this exception to the hearsay rule applies to
boundaries of land in the community, it is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law. See Hostetter v. Com-
monwealth, 367 Pa. 603, 606, 80 A.2d 719, 719 (1951), in
which the Court said ‘‘[m]aps, surveys, monuments, pedi-
gree and even reputation evidence have been held to be
admissible to establish boundaries . . . .’’
With respect to ‘‘customs’’ affecting lands in the commu-
nity, we have found no reported cases.
With respect to ‘‘events of general history,’’ we also have
found no reported cases. Courts generally take judicial
notice of events of substantial historical importance, most
of which are not controverted. However, when the histori-
cal event is of modest renown, formal proof may be
necessary. If the event took place so long ago that there
are no living witnesses to verify it, an exception to the
hearsay rule for reputation evidence concerning the event
can be justified on the basis of necessity.
F.R.E. 803(20) was adopted more than 20 years ago,
and at least 80 percent of the states have already
followed suit. There appears to be no good reason why
Pennsylvania should not now conform to what is, by far,
the majority rule in this country. Pa.R.E. 803(20) does
just that.
(21) Reputation as to Character. Reputation of a per-
son’s character among associates or in the community.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(21) is identical to F.R.E. 803(21). It is
consistent with prior Pennsylvania law. It is also consis-
tent with Pa.R.E. 404(a), 405(a), and 608(a).
In any case in which it is relevant to prove a trait of
human character, reputation evidence thereof may be
offered as an exception to the hearsay rule. This excep-
tion is recognized in all states, in addition to the federal
courts. (Cases conflict, however, concerning the breadth of
the community from which the reputation may be drawn,
and concerning the foundation that must be laid to
qualify a witness to testify to another’s reputation.) The
most common trait of character that is the subject of
reputation evidence is truthfulness. See Pa.R.E. 608(a).
In criminal cases, a trait of character that is often the
subject of reputation evidence is defendant’s law abiding
disposition. Defendant has a right to offer such evidence.
This is commonly called ‘‘placing his character in issue.’’
If defendant does so, the prosecution may, in rebuttal,
offer evidence of defendant’s bad reputation for a law
abiding disposition. A leading and often cited case is
Michelson v. United States, 335 U. S. 469 (1948). See
Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1).
(22) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(22), which
reads as follows:
Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a
final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove
any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the Government in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than im-
peachment, judgments against persons other than the
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown
but does not affect admissibility.
This exception to the hearsay rule is a relatively new
one. It was not recognized at common law, and it is not
recognized in Pennsylvania.
The mere fact that a judgment of criminal conviction
exists, as distinguished from the facts upon which it is
based, is sometimes relevant. It may be proved by (1)
persuading the court to take judicial notice of it pursuant
to Pa.R.E. 201, or (2) introducing a record of it. Such a
record qualifies for exception to the hearsay rule as a
business and public record. See Pa.R.E. 803(6) and 42
Pa.C.S. § 6104.
With respect to facts essential to sustain a judgment of
criminal conviction, there are four basic approaches that
a court can take:
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1. The judgment of conviction is conclusive, i.e.,
estops the party convicted from contesting any fact
essential to sustain the conviction.
2. The judgment of conviction is admissible as
evidence of any fact essential to sustain the convic-
tion, if and only if offered against the party convicted.
3. The judgment of conviction is admissible as
evidence of any fact essential to sustain the convic-
tion when offered against any party (this is the
federal rule with respect to a felony, except that the
Government cannot offer somebody else’s conviction
against the defendant in a criminal case, other than
for purposes of impeachment).
4. The judgment of conviction is neither conclusive nor
admissible as evidence to prove a fact essential to sustain
the conviction (common law rule).
With respect to a felony or other major crime, Pennsyl-
vania takes approach number one. In subsequent litiga-
tion, the convicted party is estopped from denying or
contesting any fact essential to sustain the conviction.
Once a party is estopped from contesting a fact, no
evidence need be introduced by an adverse party to prove
it. This is collateral estoppel. Pennsylvania applies it both
offensively and defensively.
The leading case is Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206
A.2d 624 (1965), an action to recover money extorted from
plaintiff by defendant, a labor leader. Defendant had
previously been convicted in federal court of violating the
Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Extortion
from plaintiff was a fact essential to sustain the criminal
conviction. The Court, affirming a directed verdict for
plaintiff, held that defendant was estopped from contest-
ing the alleged extortion.
See also, Folino v. Young, 523 Pa. 532, 568 A.2d 171
(1990), a suit for personal injuries arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. At a previous criminal trial defendant
was convicted of (1) driving at an unsafe speed (summary
offense), and (2) homicide by vehicle (misdemeanor of first
degree). The Court held that defendant was estopped
from contesting the allegation that he was driving at an
unsafe speed at the time of the accident. Thus he was
guilty of negligence per se. Though a summary offense is
not, in and of itself, a serious enough offense to trigger
collateral estoppel, it does so when a conviction thereof is
a necessary operative fact in a simultaneous conviction of
a more serious crime.
The Slayer’s Act prohibits any person who participates
in the wilful and unlawful killing of any other person
from profiting financially thereby. 20 Pa.C.S. § 8801 et
seq. It also provides that a record of conviction of having
participated in such a killing ‘‘shall be admissible in
evidence’’ against the slayer in a civil action. 20 Pa.C.S.
§ 8814.
In In re Kravitz Estate, 418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443
(1965), the widow of Max Kravitz, who was shot and
killed, made claim under his will. The Court, interpreting
similar language in the preceding Slayer’s Act, held that
admission of the record of the widow’s conviction of the
second degree murder of her husband estopped her from
denying that she wilfully and unlawfully killed her
husband. Therefore, the Slayer’s Act prevented her from
inheriting from his estate.
A judgment of conviction of a felony or other major
crime estops the party convicted from contesting any fact
essential to sustain the conviction, whether or not an
appeal is pending. The judgment is considered final
unless or until it is reversed. See Shaffer v. Smith, 543
Pa. 526, 673 A.2d 872 (1996).
With respect to a minor offense, Pennsylvania takes
approach number four, i.e., it applies the common law
rule. Evidence of a conviction thereof is inadmissible to
prove a fact necessary to sustain the conviction. See
Loughner v. Schmelzer, 421 Pa. 283, 218 A.2d 768 (1966),
a suit for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle
accident. The Court held it reversible error to admit
evidence that plaintiff was convicted of a traffic violation
(failing to drive on the right side of the road).
On analysis, evidence of a criminal conviction, if offered
to prove a fact essential to sustain the conviction, is
double hearsay, i.e., hearsay on two levels.
The first level of hearsay is the assertion of judge or
members of a jury that a fact necessary to sustain a
finding of guilty is true. This assertion is not only
excludable as hearsay, it is excludable for other reasons.
Assume, for example, that Zilch is convicted by a jury
of murder. If one of the jurors were called as a witness in
a subsequent case and asked whether Zilch poisoned his
wife, the juror’s testimony would be excludable under
Pa.R.E. 602 because the juror had no personal knowledge
of the matter. If the juror’s testimony on this point is
considered opinion, it would be excludable under Pa.R.E.
701 and 702, since the juror does not qualify as an expert
witness.
The second level of hearsay is the testimony of one or
more witnesses for the prosecution, who testified to facts
inculpating the defendant. It is the testimony of one or
more of these witnesses that is being introduced, second-
hand, via evidence of the criminal conviction. This consti-
tutes former testimony, which is excludable unless it
qualifies for exception to the hearsay rule under Pa.R.E.
804(b)(1).
Note: A plea of guilty to a crime is excepted to the
hearsay rule as an admission of all facts essential to
sustain a criminal conviction thereof, but only when
offered against the pleader by a party-opponent. See
Pa.R.E. 803(25).
A plea of guilty to a crime may also qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule as a statement against
penal interest, if the declarant is unavailable to testify at
trial. See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3).
(23) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(23), which
reads as follows:
Judgment as to Personal, Family, or General His-
tory, or Boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of
personal, family or general history, or boundaries,
essential to the judgment, if the same would be
provable by evidence of reputation.
This is a minor exception to the hearsay rule. It was
not recognized at common law. It is not recognized in
Pennsylvania.
The Comment to Pa.R.E. 803(22) applies here, also.
Moreover, there is an additional reason for rejecting
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(23). Judgments in divorce,
custody, and other domestic relations cases are often the
result of a stipulation of facts, agreement not to contest,
and general collusion between the parties. The facts
essential to support these judgments are less trustworthy
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than hearsay in general, not more so, and thus do not
qualify for exception to the hearsay rule under generally
accepted criteria therefor.
(24) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 803(24) which
reads as follows:
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically cov-
ered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
The Federal Rule is inconsistent with Pennsylvania
law, which does not recognize a catch-all exception to the
hearsay rule.
OPTION I
(25) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is
offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own
statement in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by
the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(25) is the same as F.R.E. 801(d)(2). The
federal rules, though, call an admission by a party-
opponent an exception to the definition of hearsay, and
place it in rule 801 under the heading of ‘‘Definitions.’’
Pennsylvania calls an admission by a party-opponent just
what it is called at common law, an exception to the
hearsay rule, and places it in rule 803 along with other
exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the availability of
the declarant is immaterial. The difference between the
federal and Pennsylvania formulations is organizational,
not ideological.
No assertion made by a party, if offered in evidence by
a party-opponent, may be excluded as hearsay. It may be
excluded because it is irrelevant, or privileged, or unduly
prejudicial, or for other reasons, but never because it is
hearsay.
An assertion made by a party in the pleadings, requests
for admission, pretrial memoranda, or certain other docu-
ments that are prepared in accordance with court rules, is
called a ‘‘judicial admission.’’ If offered in evidence by a
party-opponent, it is conclusive. It estops the party from
denying or contradicting the assertion.
See Nasim v. Shamrock Welding Supply Co., 387 Pa.
Super. 225, 563 A.2d 1266 (1989), in which the court held
it reversible error to permit defendant to introduce
evidence refuting an assertion that it made in a petition
to join an additional defendant. Defendant had asserted
in the petition that it was the supplier of a product that
plaintiff alleged was defective.
Cf. General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield In-
surance Co., 430 Pa. Super. 526, 635 A.2d 173 (1993), in
which the court held that an averment in a party’s
pleading was not admissible when offered by a party-
opponent who had denied the averment in a responsive
pleading. Apparently the two conflicting judicial admis-
sions canceled each other out.
A party’s plea of guilty to a crime is an admission, and
may be offered in evidence by a party-opponent. See
Cromley v. Gardner, 253 Pa. Super. 467, 385 A.2d 433
(1978), a wrongful death suit arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. The court held that defendant’s plea of
guilty to a charge of driving under the influence in a prior
criminal action was admissible when offered against him
by plaintiff as an admission by him that he was driving
while drunk, evidence that the jury was entitled to take
into account in determining whether he was negligent.
However, a plea of guilty that is later withdrawn, a
plea of nolo contendere, or assertions made in connection
with plea discussions, may not be admissible for public
policy reasons. See Pa.R.E. 410.
A statute provides that a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a summary offense under the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code is not admissible in a civil case
arising out of the same incident. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6142.
Most of the evidential problems that arise with admis-
sions by a party-opponent concern vicarious admissions,
i.e., assertions made by A that are offered as admissions
against B. Vicarious admissions include admissions by
adoption, by agent, and by a coconspirator.
It is sometimes said that a vicarious admission ‘‘binds’’
a party, or that a principal is ‘‘bound’’ by an agent’s
admission. This is incorrect. An admission (other than a
‘‘judicial admission,’’ which is discussed above) is just one
item of evidence to be considered by the trier of fact,
along with other evidence of record, to resolve matters at
issue. An admission may be denied, explained, contra-
dicted, or otherwise attacked by the party against whom
it is offered, just like any other item of evidence intro-
duced against the party.
An admission by a party-opponent qualifies for excep-
tion to the hearsay rule whether it be an assertion of fact
or opinion, and whether or not the declarant had personal
knowledge of the matter asserted.
See, e.g., Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445
(1942), a personal injury case arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. Defendant was not present at the acci-
dent, but was the owner of a truck involved therein. After
the accident he visited the plaintiffs and admitted that
the accident was his driver’s fault. The Court, affirming a
jury verdict for plaintiffs, approved admission of this
evidence and said ‘‘[p]ersonal knowledge . . . is not re-
quired in the case of an admission by a party.’’ Id. at 644,
23 A.2d at 446.
An admission by a party-opponent is sometimes re-
ferred to, inappropriately, as an ‘‘admission against inter-
est.’’ When an admission by a party-opponent is offered in
evidence, it was usually contrary to the interest of the
declarant at the time that it was made, but there is no
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requirement that this be so. (There is a separate, more
limited, exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
against interest. See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3)).
A. Party’s Own Statement
A party’s own assertion, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, is the most typical kind of admis-
sion by a party-opponent. If the party is a representative,
such as a trustee, or guardian, or personal representative
of an estate, there is no need to determine in what
capacity the party was acting when making the assertion,
at least for hearsay purposes. This is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law dealing with a real
party in interest.
See Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 400 Pa. 240,
161 A.2d 595 (1960), a wrongful death action by the
administrator of the estate of a motorist who was struck
and killed by defendant’s train at a grade crossing. After
a jury verdict for plaintiff, the trial court awarded
defendant a new trial. The Court, affirming, held that the
trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to
allow the railroad to introduce as substantive evidence a
statement signed by the motorist’s widow about two
months after the accident reciting various details concern-
ing the manner of the occurrence. The court said,
Decedent’s widow, while technically not a party of
record in her individual capacity, was a party benefi-
cially and directly interested and her prior admis-
sions or statements concerning material facts consti-
tuted substantive evidence. Such statements, thus
proven, should be admitted as substantive proof of
the facts asserted therein . . . .
Id. at 245, 161 A.2d at 598.
B. Adoptive Admission
On occasion a party will, expressly or impliedly, mani-
fest a belief in the truth of an assertion made by another.
The party thereby adopts the other’s assertion as the
party’s own, at least for purposes of the hearsay rule.
This is an adoptive admission. Its exception to the
hearsay rule is consistent with prior Pennsylvania deci-
sional law.
See Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 400 Pa. 240,
161 A.2d 595 (1960), a wrongful death action arising out
of a grade crossing accident. A claims agent for the
defendant railroad wrote a statement about the accident.
The decedent’s widow signed it, thus adopting it as her
own. The Court held it admissible as substantive evi-
dence, upon offer by the railroad, as an admission by a
party-opponent.
A party may adopt another’s assertion verbally or
behaviorally. For example, a party may adopt another’s
assertion by replying, ‘‘I agree.’’ Or the party may adopt
another’s assertion by nodding his head in assent. See
United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1990).
A party may also adopt another’s assertion behaviorally
by remaining silent in the face of accusation in circum-
stances in which the party would be expected to deny the
accusation were it not true, i.e., when assent appears to
be the most reasonable explanation for silence. See
United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, (1975); Common-
wealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425 A.2d 387 (1981).
See also, Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 371
Pa. 60, 88 A.2d 873 (1952), in which the Court said that
silence in the face of accusation constitutes assent ‘‘only
when no other explanation is equally consistent with
silence.’’ Id. at 63—4, 88 A.2d at 875.
And see Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192
A.2d 355 (1963), a civil assault and battery case. The
Court, affirming a jury verdict for plaintiff, said that
defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation that he
struck plaintiff was properly admitted as an admission of
a party-opponent.
Caveat: In a criminal case, a suspect’s silence in the
face of accusation, after the suspect has received Miranda
warnings, cannot be introduced against the suspect as an
adoptive admission without violating the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. See Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617—18, 96 SCt 2240, 49 LEd2d 91
(1976).
Moreover, in Pennsylvania a defendant’s post arrest
silence cannot be used substantively, or even to impeach
credibility if defendant elects to testify at trial, regardless
of whether Miranda warnings were given. See Common-
wealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (1982). The
Court based this ruling on Art I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which provides that an accused ‘‘cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself.’’
See also, Commonwealth v. Easley, 483 Pa. 337, 396
A.2d 1198 (1979).
C. Statement by Authorized Agent
An assertion made by an agent, if authorized to speak
for the principal, may be introduced against the principal
by a party-opponent as an admission. This is consistent
with prior Pennsylvania decisional law.
Lawyers are agents of their clients with, on occasion,
authority to speak for them. See McGarity v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59 A.2d 47 (1948), in
which the executors of a decedent’s estate sued to collect
accidental death benefits under life insurance policies.
The insured died without regaining consciousness after
an automobile accident in which the car that he was
driving went out of control and crashed against a house.
Thereafter, plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote a letter to the lady
who owned the damaged house, denying that the dece-
dent was liable therefor, and asserting that he had been
seen to slump at his wheel, apparently unconscious from
a heart seizure, prior to the accident. The Court, holding
that this improvident assertion by their lawyers was
admissible against plaintiffs as an admission, explained,
Counsel were clearly acting within the scope of
their authority in making such a statement, and
therefore, it being pertinent to the present issue, it
was admissible in evidence with the same force and
effect as if it had been made directly by plaintiffs
themselves . . . .
Id. at 314, 59 A.2d at 50.
Very few agents, though, have authority to speak for
their principals. They may have authority and responsi-
bility to do many things, but seldom authority to repre-
sent their principals in speaking to others about them.
Thus an exception to the hearsay rule for an assertion
made by an agent only when the agent was authorized by
the principal to speak about the matter has only limited
application.
D. Statement by Agent Concerning Matter Within
Scope of Agency
An assertion made by an agent may be introduced
against the principal if (1) it concerns a matter within the
scope of the agency, and (2) it was made during the
existence of the agency. This is a departure from prior
Pennsylvania law, but not a surprising one for the
following reasons:
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1. The old common law, which would not permit an
agent’s assertion to be admitted against the principal
unless the agent was authorized to speak on the princi-
pal’s behalf, has often been criticized on the ground that
it leads to unjust results. For example, after a bad traffic
accident, a bus driver may admit to an investigating
policeman that the accident was his fault and that he ran
a red light. The common law rule would preclude an
injured party from introducing the bus driver’s assertions
against the bus company. The bus company, the theory
goes, hired the bus driver to drive a bus, not to speak for
the bus company.
2. The federal courts and over eighty percent of the
states have abandoned the common law view in favor of
the view expressed in F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D). This is now, by
far, the majority rule, and experience with it throughout
the country has been good.
3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had occa-
sion to visit the issue for decades. The last reported case
in which it applied the old common law rule was Murray
v. Siegel, 413 Pa. 23, 195 A.2d 790 (1963). It did so there,
without discussion, in two short sentences at the end of
its opinion, citing cases from 1886 and 1930.
4. Pennsylvania has not been consistent in its applica-
tion of the common law rule. See, e.g., Treon v. W.A.
Shipman & Son, 275 Pa. 246, 119 A 74 (1922), a suit for
personal injuries. Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was hit by a car
driven by a partner in the defendant undertaking busi-
ness. Defendant denied lilability on the ground that the
partner was on a personal errand, not partnership busi-
ness, at the time of the accident. Plaintiff and his wife
testified that sometime after the accident the partner
(driver) appeared at plaintiff’s home and told them that
he was going to the casket works on business at the time
of the accident. The Court, reversing a judgment n.o.v.,
and reinstating a jury verdict for plaintiff, held that the
partner’s statement was admissible against the partner-
ship as an admission by its agent. The Court mentions
nothing about any showing that the partner had author-
ity to speak for the partnership when he visited the
injured plaintiff at his home.
5. In Carswell v. SEPTA, 259 Pa. Super. 167, 393 A.2d
770 (1978), Judge Spaeth, in a plurality opinion, proposed
a new exception to the hearsay rule for vicarious admis-
sions, outside the framework of party admissions.
6. In DeFrancesco v. Western Pennsylvania Water Co.,
329 Pa. Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984), the Superior
Court, in a lengthy, analytic opinion, referred to the
‘‘often harsh results’’ of the common law rule, reluctantly
applied it to the case at hand, and urged the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court to undertake ‘‘a forthright appraisal’’
of the subject, and consider adoption of a less restrictive
exception to the hearsay rule for vicarious admissions.
E. Statement by a Co-conspirator.
An assertion made by a co-conspirator of a party may
be introduced against the party as the party’s own
admission if the assertion was made in the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law.
An assertion by a co-conspirator is nothing more than a
special kind of assertion by a partner (agent), which is
admissible against a fellow partner (principal) as an
admission. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in
United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 608 (1910), ‘‘[a]
conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.’’
Like the partners that they are, coconspirators are
considered agents one for another, so that the assertion of
one, made in the course and scope of the conspiracy, is
the admission of all. In Anderson v. United States, 417
U. S. 211, 218 n.6, (1974), the Supreme Court said:
The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy ex-
ception and its limitations is the notion that con-
spirators are partners in crime . . . . As such, the law
deems them agents of one another. And just as the
declarations of an agent bind the principal only when
the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so
the declaration of a conspirator must be made in
furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be
admissible against his partner.
Moreover, when a person joins an existing conspiracy,
the person thereby adopts all the prior assertions of the
conspirators that were made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. These prior assertions are
excepted to the hearsay rule when offered in evidence by
a party-opponent. See United States v. Gypsum Co., 333
U. S. 364 (1948). This principle of law was explained
graphically in United States v. Baines, 812 F.d 41, 42 (1st
Cir 1987):
[A] conspiracy is like a train. When a party know-
ingly steps aboard, he is part of the crew, and
assumes conspirator’s responsibility for the existing
freight-or conduct-regardless of whether he is aware
of just what it is composed. . . . Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(2)(E) does not change the common law. . . .
In order to qualify an out-of-court assertion for excep-
tion to the hearsay rule as a statement of a coconspirator,
the offerer must prove, to the satisfaction of the court,
five things:
1. That a conspiracy existed;
2. That the party against whom the evidence is offered
participated in the conspiracy;
3. That the declarant participated in the conspiracy;
4. That the assertion was made in the course of the
conspiracy; and
5. That the assertion was made in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 (1987), the
Supreme Court, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a), said that (1) the trial judge must determine
whether the above five foundational factors exist, (2) the
judge must make this determination by a preponderance
of the evidence, and (3) the judge may consider the
proffered hearsay assertion itself in determining whether
the foundational factors exist to support its introduction
in evidence.
The Supreme Court expressly declined, though, to
decide whether the trial judge can rely solely on the
proffered out-of-court assertion, without corroborative ex-
trinsic evidence. Since then lower federal courts have
consistently held that such corroborative extrinsic evi-
dence is necessary. Such holdings are consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981).
See Pa.R.E. 104(a), and Comment thereto.
The United States Supreme Court has held that this
exception to the hearsay rule, as applied in the federal
courts, does not encompass assertions made by a cocon-
spirator after the central purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished, i.e., when the miscreants are in the
process of covering up the crime and taking care to escape
detection. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440
(1949); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391 (1957).
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Pennsylvania decisional law holds that an assertion
made by a conspirator in an attempt to conceal a
completed crime may be admitted against coconspirators
when the concealment of the crime was an integral part
of the common design to which the conspirators agreed.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271, 639
A.2d 421 (1994).
OPTION II
(25) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is
offered against a party and is (A) the party’s own
statement in either an individual or a representative
capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a
statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a
coconspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803(25) is similar to F.R.E. 801(d)(2). The
federal rules, though, call an admission by a party-
opponent an exception to the definition of hearsay, and
place it in rule 801 under the heading of ‘‘Definitions.’’
Pennsylvania calls an admission by a party-opponent just
what it is called at common law, an exception to the
hearsay rule, and places it in rule 803 along with other
exceptions to the hearsay rule in which the availability of
the declarant is immaterial. The difference between the
federal and Pennsylvania formulations is organizational,
not ideological. Pa.R.E. 803(25) also differs in that there
is no exception for ‘‘a statement by the party’s agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship.’’ This provision of the Federal rule is incon-
sistent with Pennsylvania law that admits statements by
agents only when the agent has been authorized to speak
on behalf of the principal. See Murray v. Siegal, 413 Pa.
23, 195 A.2d 790 (1963); Durkin v. Equine Clinics, Inc.,
376 Pa. Super. 557, 546 A.2d 665 (1988); appeal denied,
524 Pa. 608, 569 A.2d 1367 (1989); DeFrancesco v.
Western Pennsylvania Water Co., 329 Pa. Super. 508, 478
A.2d 1295 (1984).
No assertion made by a party, if offered in evidence by
a party-opponent, may be excluded as hearsay. It may be
excluded because it is irrelevant, or privileged, or unduly
prejudicial, or for other reasons, but never because it is
hearsay.
An assertion made by a party in the pleadings, requests
for admission, pretrial memoranda, or certain other docu-
ments that are prepared in accordance with court rules, is
called a ‘‘judicial admission.’’ If offered in evidence by a
party-opponent, it is conclusive. It estops the party from
denying or contradicting the assertion.
See Nasim v. Shamrock Welding Supply Co., 387 Pa.
Super. 225, 563 A.2d 1266 (1989), in which the court held
it reversible error to permit defendant to introduce
evidence refuting an assertion that it made in a petition
to join an additional defendant. Defendant had asserted
in the petition that it was the supplier of a product that
plaintiff alleged was defective.
Cf. General Equipment Manufacturers v. Westfield In-
surance Co., 430 Pa. Super. 526, 635 A.2d 173 (1993), in
which the court held that an averment in a party’s
pleading was not admissible when offered by a party-
opponent who had denied the averment in a responsive
pleading. Apparently the two conflicting judicial admis-
sions canceled each other out.
A party’s plea of guilty to a crime is an admission, and
may be offered in evidence by a party-opponent. See
Cromley v. Gardner, 253 Pa. Super. 467, 385 A.2d 433
(1978), a wrongful death suit arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. The court held that defendant’s plea of
guilty to a charge of driving under the influence in a prior
criminal action was admissible when offered against him
by plaintiff as an admission by him that he was driving
while drunk, evidence that the jury was entitled to take
into account in determining whether he was negligent.
However, a plea of guilty that is later withdrawn, a
plea of nolo contendere, or assertions made in connection
with plea discussions, may not be admissible for public
policy reasons. See Pa.R.E. 410.
A statute provides that a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to a summary offense under the Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code is not admissible in a civil case
arising out of the same incident. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6142.
Most of the evidential problems that arise with admis-
sions by a party-opponent concern vicarious admissions,
i.e., assertions made by A that are offered as admissions
against B. Vicarious admissions include admissions by
adoption, by agent, and by a coconspirator.
It is sometimes said that a vicarious admission ‘‘binds’’
a party, or that a principal is ‘‘bound’’ by an agent’s
admission. This is incorrect. An admission (other than a
‘‘judicial admission,’’ which is discussed above) is just one
item of evidence to be considered by the trier of fact,
along with other evidence of record, to resolve matters at
issue. An admission may be denied, explained, contra-
dicted, or otherwise attacked by the party against whom
it is offered, just like any other item of evidence intro-
duced against the party.
An admission by a party-opponent qualifies for excep-
tion to the hearsay rule whether it be an assertion of fact
or opinion, and whether or not the declarant had personal
knowledge of the matter asserted.
See, e.g., Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445
(1942), a personal injury case arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. Defendant was not present at the acci-
dent, but was the owner of a truck involved therein. After
the accident he visited the plaintiffs and admitted that
the accident was his driver’s fault. The Court, affirming a
jury verdict for plaintiffs, approved admission of this
evidence and said ‘‘[p]ersonal knowledge . . . is not re-
quired in the case of an admission by a party.’’ Id. at 644,
23 A.2d at 446.
An admission by a party-opponent is sometimes re-
ferred to, inappropriately, as an ‘‘admission against inter-
est.’’ When an admission by a party-opponent is offered in
evidence, it was usually contrary to the interest of the
declarant at the time that it was made, but there is no
requirement that this be so. (There is a separate, more
limited, exception to the hearsay rule for a statement
against interest. See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3)).
A. Party’s Own Statement
A party’s own assertion, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, is the most typical kind of admis-
sion by a party-opponent. If the party is a representative,
such as a trustee, or guardian, or personal representative
of an estate, there is no need to determine in what
capacity the party was acting when making the assertion,
at least for hearsay purposes. This is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law dealing with a real
party in interest.
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See Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 400 Pa. 240,
161 A.2d 595 (1960), a wrongful death action by the
administrator of the estate of a motorist who was struck
and killed by defendant’s train at a grade crossing. After
a jury verdict for plaintiff, the trial court awarded
defendant a new trial. The Court, affirming, held that the
trial judge committed reversible error when he refused to
allow the railroad to introduce as substantive evidence a
statement signed by the motorist’s widow about two
months after the accident reciting various details concern-
ing the manner of the occurrence. The court said,
Decedent’s widow, while technically not a party of
record in her individual capacity, was a party benefi-
cially and directly interested and her prior admis-
sions or statements concerning material facts consti-
tuted substantive evidence. Such statements, thus
proven, should be admitted as substantive proof of
the facts asserted therein . . . .
Id. at 245, 161 A.2d at 598.
B. Adoptive Admission
On occasion a party will, expressly or impliedly, mani-
fest a belief in the truth of an assertion made by another.
The party thereby adopts the other’s assertion as the
party’s own, at least for purposes of the hearsay rule.
This is an adoptive admission. Its exception to the
hearsay rule is consistent with prior Pennsylvania deci-
sional law.
See Geelen v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 400 Pa. 240,
161 A.2d 595 (1960), a wrongful death action arising out
of a grade crossing accident. A claims agent for the
defendant railroad wrote a statement about the accident.
The decedent’s widow signed it, thus adopting it as her
own. The Court held it admissible as substantive evi-
dence, upon offer by the railroad, as an admission by a
party-opponent.
A party may adopt another’s assertion verbally or
behaviorally. For example, a party may adopt another’s
assertion by replying, ‘‘I agree.’’ Or the party may adopt
another’s assertion by nodding his head in assent. See
United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1990).
A party may also adopt another’s assertion behaviorally
by remaining silent in the face of accusation in circum-
stances in which the party would be expected to deny the
accusation were it not true, i.e., when assent appears to
be the most reasonable explanation for silence. See
United States v. Hale, 422 U. S. 171, (1975); Common-
wealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425 A.2d 387 (1981).
See also, Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 371
Pa. 60, 88 A.2d 873 (1952), in which the Court said that
silence in the face of accusation constitutes assent ‘‘only
when no other explanation is equally consistent with
silence.’’ Id. at 63—4, 88 A.2d at 875.
And see Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192
A.2d 355 (1963), a civil assault and battery case. The
Court, affirming a jury verdict for plaintiff, said that
defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation that he
struck plaintiff was properly admitted as an admission of
a party-opponent.
Caveat: In a criminal case, a suspect’s silence in the
face of accusation, after the suspect has received Miranda
warnings, cannot be introduced against the suspect as an
adoptive admission without violating the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. See Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617—18, 96 SCt 2240, 49 LEd2d 91
(1976).
Moreover, in Pennsylvania a defendant’s post arrest
silence cannot be used substantively, or even to impeach
credibility if defendant elects to testify at trial, regardless
of whether Miranda warnings were given. See Common-
wealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537 (1982). The
Court based this ruling on Art I, § 9, of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which provides that an accused ‘‘cannot be
compelled to give evidence against himself.’’
See also, Commonwealth v. Easley, 483 Pa. 337, 396
A.2d 1198 (1979).
C. Statement by Authorized Agent
An assertion made by an agent, if authorized to speak
for the principal, may be introduced against the principal
by a party-opponent as an admission. This is consistent
with prior Pennsylvania decisional law.
Lawyers are agents of their clients with, on occasion,
authority to speak for them. See McGarity v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 359 Pa. 308, 59 A.2d 47 (1948), in
which the executors of a decedent’s estate sued to collect
accidental death benefits under life insurance policies.
The insured died without regaining consciousness after
an automobile accident in which the car that he was
driving went out of control and crashed against a house.
Thereafter, plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote a letter to the lady
who owned the damaged house, denying that the dece-
dent was liable therefor, and asserting that he had been
seen to slump at his wheel, apparently unconscious from
a heart seizure, prior to the accident. The Court, holding
that this improvident assertion by their lawyers was
admissible against plaintiffs as an admission, explained,
Counsel were clearly acting within the scope of
their authority in making such a statement, and
therefore, it being pertinent to the present issue, it
was admissible in evidence with the same force and
effect as if it had been made directly by plaintiffs
themselves . . . .
Id. at 314, 59 A.2d at 50.
Very few agents, though, have authority to speak for
their principals. They may have authority and responsi-
bility to do many things, but seldom authority to repre-
sent their principals in speaking to others about them.
Thus an exception to the hearsay rule for an assertion
made by an agent only when the agent was authorized by
the principal to speak about the matter has only limited
application.
D. Statement by a Co-conspirator.
An assertion made by a co-conspirator of a party may
be introduced against the party as the party’s own
admission if the assertion was made in the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law.
An assertion by a co-conspirator is nothing more than a
special kind of assertion by a partner (agent), which is
admissible against a fellow partner (principal) as an
admission. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained in
United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 608 (1910), ‘‘[a]
conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.’’
Like the partners that they are, coconspirators are
considered agents one for another, so that the assertion of
one, made in the course and scope of the conspiracy, is
the admission of all. In Anderson v. United States, 417
U. S. 211, 218 n.6, (1974), the Supreme Court said:
The rationale for both the hearsay-conspiracy ex-
ception and its limitations is the notion that con-
spirators are partners in crime . . . . As such, the law
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deems them agents of one another. And just as the
declarations of an agent bind the principal only when
the agent acts within the scope of his authority, so
the declaration of a conspirator must be made in
furtherance of the conspiracy charged in order to be
admissible against his partner.
Moreover, when a person joins an existing conspiracy,
the person thereby adopts all the prior assertions of the
conspirators that were made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. These prior assertions are
excepted to the hearsay rule when offered in evidence by
a party-opponent. See United States v. Gypsum Co., 333
U. S. 364 (1948). This principle of law was explained
graphically in United States v. Baines, 812 F.d 41, 42 (1st
Cir 1987):
[A] conspiracy is like a train. When a party know-
ingly steps aboard, he is part of the crew, and
assumes conspirator’s responsibility for the existing
freight—or conduct—regardless of whether he is
aware of just what it is composed. . . . Fed.R.Evid.
801(d)(2)(E) does not change the common law. . . .
In order to qualify an out-of-court assertion for excep-
tion to the hearsay rule as a statement of a coconspirator,
the offerer must prove, to the satisfaction of the court,
five things:
1. That a conspiracy existed;
2. That the party against whom the evidence is offered
participated in the conspiracy;
3. That the declarant participated in the conspiracy;
4. That the assertion was made in the course of the
conspiracy; and
5. That the assertion was made in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171 (1987), the
Supreme Court, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a), said that (1) the trial judge must determine
whether the above five foundational factors exist, (2) the
judge must make this determination by a preponderance
of the evidence, and (3) the judge may consider the
proffered hearsay assertion itself in determining whether
the foundational factors exist to support its introduction
in evidence.
The Supreme Court expressly declined, though, to
decide whether the trial judge can rely solely on the
proffered out-of-court assertion, without corroborative ex-
trinsic evidence. Since then lower federal courts have
consistently held that such corroborative extrinsic evi-
dence is necessary. Such holdings are consistent with
prior Pennsylvania decisional law. See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981).
See Pa.R.E. 104(a), and Comment thereto.
The United States Supreme Court has held that this
exception to the hearsay rule, as applied in the federal
courts, does not encompass assertions made by a cocon-
spirator after the central purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished, i.e., when the miscreants are in the
process of covering up the crime and taking care to escape
detection. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440
(1949); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, (1957).
Pennsylvania decisional law holds that an assertion
made by a conspirator in an attempt to conceal a
completed crime may be admitted against coconspirators
when the concealment of the crime was an integral part
of the common design to which the conspirators agreed.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271, 639
A.2d 421 (1994).
Rule 803.1. Hearsay Exceptions; Testimony of
Declarant Necessary.
The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant testifies
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement:
(1). Inconsistent Statement of Witness.
(2). Statement of Identification.
(3). Recorded Recollection.
(1) Inconsistent Statement of Witness. A statement by
declarant that is inconsistent with the declarant’s testi-
mony, and (a) was given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition, or (b) is a writing signed and adopted by the
declarant, or (c) is a verbatim contemporaneous recording
of an oral statement.
Comment
Subsection (a) is similar to F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), except
that Pennsylvania classifies the described inconsistent
statement as an exception to the hearsay rule, not an
exception to the definition of hearsay. See Comment to
Pa.R.E. 801.
Subsections (b) and (c) constitute an expansion of the
exception as defined in the federal rule, and are based on
recent Pennsylvania decisional law.
An out-of-court statement made by a witness, inconsis-
tent with the witness’s testimony at trial, may be offered
to impeach the witness’s credibility. In such event, it is
not hearsay, since it is not offered to prove its truth. It is,
instead, circumstantial evidence from which the trier of
fact may infer that the witness is not a reliable historian.
Its admissibility is governed by principles of relevance,
not hearsay. See Pa.R.E. 613.
Until recently Pennsylvania adhered to the common
law view that an inconsistent statement of a witness was
admissible for impeachment purposes only, never as
substantive evidence. See Commonwealth v. Waller, 498
Pa. 33, 39 n.2, 444 A.2d 653, 656 n.2 (1982).
Came then the seminal case of Commonwealth v.
Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66 (1986), in which
defendant was charged with murdering a security guard
during the course of a burglary at a plant. Later on the
day of the crime, defendant’s girl friend gave a recorded
statement to the police in which she asserted that she
witnessed the murder, and recounted the details thereof.
Prior to trial, however, she recanted and said that neither
she nor defendant entered the plant or had anything to
do with the murder. She so testified, to no one’s surprise,
when called by the prosecution as a witness at trial.
There was no confession, no other eyewitness, and not
enough circumstantial evidence to take the case to the
jury, unless, i.e., the trial judge would allow the witness’s
prior inconsistent statement to be introduced as substan-
tive evidence. The trial judge did so. Defendant was
convicted.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, affirming the convic-
tion, overturned close to two centuries of decisional law in
the Commonwealth and held that the witness’s recorded
statement, inconsistent with her testimony at trial, was
properly admitted as substantive evidence, and was ex-
cepted to the hearsay rule.
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In Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7
(1992), the Court fleshed out and clarified the exception
to the hearsay rule that it had adopted in the Brady case.
Pa.R.E. 803.1(1) is drafted in accordance therewith.
In Commonwealth v. Halsted, 542 Pa. 318, 666 A.2d
655, 661 (1996), a majority of the Supreme Court (concur-
ring opinion by Justice Zappala, joined by Justices
Flaherty, Cappy and Castille) said that ‘‘a verbatim
contemporaneous recording of an oral statement’’ qualifies
for this exception to the hearsay rule only if it is an
audiotape or videotape recording. It cannot be a police
officer’s handwritten notes.
Permitting some prior inconsistent statements of wit-
nesses to be introduced as substantive evidence, excepted
to the hearsay rule, has had an ancillary effect on
Pennsylvania trial practice. A party may now ‘‘set up’’ a
witness, i.e., call a witness whom the party knows will
testify adversely to the party for the sole purpose of
introducing the witness’s prior inconsistent statement as
substantive evidence. This is what the prosecuting attor-
ney did in the Brady case, supra.
See also, Commonwealth v. Carter, 443 Pa. Super. 231,
661 A.2d 390, 392 (1995).
However, if extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement is introduced in evidence, the witness must
usually be confronted with it and given an opportunity to
explain or deny it. See Pa.R.E. 613(b).
(2) Statement of Identification. A statement by a wit-
ness of identification of a person or thing, made after
perceiving the person or thing, provided that the witness
testifies to the making of the prior identification.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) differs from F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) in
several respects:
1. Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) classifies a statement of identi-
fication as an exception to the hearsay rule, not an
exception to the definition of hearsay. See Comment
to Pa.R.E. 801.
2. Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) is broader than its federal
counterpart in that it includes identification of a
thing, in addition to a person.
3. Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) is more restrictive than its
federal counterpart in that it requires the witness to
testify to making the identification.
Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) appears to be consistent with prior
Pennsylvania decisional law, though we have found no
reported cases dealing with prior identification of a thing,
as distinguished from a person.
Testimony by a witness that the witness previously
identified a person is often offered in evidence, particu-
larly in criminal cases. If the witness makes an in-court
identification, the previous identification is a prior consis-
tent statement, and may be admissible as corroborative or
rehabilitative evidence. See Pa.R.E. 613(c).
If a witness cannot make an in-court identification, the
witness’s prior statement of identification may be a prior
inconsistent statement. Such a statement is usually ad-
missible for impeachment purposes only, but if offered as
substantive evidence will sometimes qualify for exception
to the hearsay rule. See Pa.R.E. 803.1(1).
More importantly, evidence of a witness’s prior state-
ment of identification, if the witness testifies to making
the identification, may be offered and admitted as sub-
stantive evidence under this exception to the hearsay
rule.
It is a lamentable, but indisputable, fact of life: memory
fades with the passage of time. Experience teaches us
that a statement of identification made a short time after
an encounter is likely to be more reliable than one made
a long time thereafter.
For example, a woman who was robbed may not, a year
or so later, in the unfamiliar surroundings of a courtroom,
be able to identify the robber, who may have altered his
physical appearance and attire for the purpose of avoid-
ing recognition. But that same woman may be able to
testify with great assurance that she positively identified
the person who robbed her shortly thereafter at the
station house, or in a lineup, or from a photograph
presented to her by the police. This fresh identification by
the witness, when testified to by a police officer or other
observer, has substantially greater indicia of reliability
than hearsay in general, thus justifying its exception to
the hearsay rule.
If the woman who was robbed had promptly thereafter
drawn a sketch of the robber, or provided details for the
drawing of a sketch by a police artist, the sketch would be
excepted to the hearsay rule as the witness’s recorded
recollection, in the absence of a sufficient current recollec-
tion. See Pa.R.E. 803.1(3). Thus the exceptions to the
hearsay rule for a prior statement of identification and
that for recorded recollection are complementary.
The rationale for excepting a prior statement of identi-
fication to the hearsay rule is well explained in the
seminal case of People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 626, 354
P.2d 865, 867, 7 Cal Rptr 273, 275 (1960):
Evidence of an extra-judicial identification is ad-
missible, not only to corroborate an identification
made at the trial . . . but as independent evidence of
identity. Unlike other testimony that cannot be cor-
roborated by proof of prior consistent statements
unless it is first impeached . . . evidence of an
extra-judicial identification is admitted regardless of
whether the testimonial identification is impeached,
because the earlier identification has greater proba-
tive value than an identification made in the court-
room after the suggestions of others and the circum-
stances of the trial may have intervened to create a
fancied recognition in the witness’ mind. . . . The
failure of the witness to repeat the extra-judicial
identification in court does not destroy its probative
value, for such failure may be explained by loss of
memory or other circumstances. The extra-judicial
identification tends to connect the defendant with the
crime, and the principal danger of admitting hearsay
evidence is not present since the witness is available
at the trial for cross-examination.
Pennsylvania decisional law first recognized an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule for a prior statement of identifi-
cation in Commonwealth v. Saunders, 386 Pa. 149, 125
A.2d 442 (1956), though without much explanation.
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Ly, 528 Pa. 523,
532, 599 A.2d 613, 617 (1991), the Court said that ‘‘where
witnesses are in court and subject to cross-examination, a
police officer may testify concerning pre-trial identifica-
tion by the witness.’’
This exception to the hearsay rule was applied multiply
in Commonwealth v. Doa, 381 Pa. Super. 181, 553 A.2d
416 (1989), a prosecution for robbery and related crimes.
The court, affirming convictions, approved admission of
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testimony from a police detective that five witnesses, who
were unable to make in-court identifications of defen-
dants at trial, had identified them from photographic
arrays nine days after the robbery. The court also ap-
proved admission of testimony from an assistant district
attorney that one of the same witnesses identified defen-
dant Doa at his preliminary hearing.
For the same reasons that a statement of prior identifi-
cation of a person merits exception to the hearsay rule,
so, too, does a statement of prior identification of a thing.
For example, shortly after a robbery a witness may be
asked by the police to describe the robber. He may also be
asked to describe an article of stolen goods, or the
robber’s clothing, or a weapon brandished by the robber,
or the getaway car. At time of trial, when the witness’s
memory is no longer fresh, he may be unable to repeat
any of these identifications. Evidence that the witness
previously identified the robber’s automobile as a blue
Cadillac with New Jersey license plates and the right
rear tail light missing is just as reliable as evidence that
the witness previously identified the robber as a white
man in his twenties about six feet tall with long black
hair.
We have found no Pennsylvania cases that discuss prior
identification of a thing as an exception to the hearsay
rule. However, in United States v. Booz, 451 F2d 719 (3d
Cir 1971), which was decided prior to the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Third Circuit approved
admission of a witness’s prior identification of the license
number of a truck that he observed at the scene of a bank
robbery, which number he promptly relayed to an FBI
agent. At trial, testimony verifying the prior identification
was presented from the witness and the agent who wrote
the number down.
(3) Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record
concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable
the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have
been made or adopted by the witness when the matter
was fresh in the witness’ memory, providing that the
witness testifies that the record correctly reflects that
knowledge. If admitted, the memorandum or record may
be read into evidence and received as an exhibit, but may
be shown to the jury only in exceptional circumstances or
when offered by an adverse party.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) is similar to F.R.E. 803(5), but differs
in the following ways:
1. Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) classifies recorded recollection
as an exception to the hearsay rule in which the
testimony of the declarant is necessary, not as an
exception in which the availability of the declarant is
immaterial.
2. Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) makes clear that, in order to
qualify recorded recollection to the hearsay rule, the
witness must testify that the record correctly reflects
the knowledge that the witness once had, i.e., the
witness must vouch for the reliability of the record.
The federal rule is ambiguous on this point, and
federal cases thereunder are conflicting.
3. Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) allows the record to be received
as an exhibit, and grants the trial judge discretion to
show it to the jury in exceptional circumstances, even
when not offered by an adverse party.
Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) is consistent with prior Pennsylvania
decisional law.
The rationale for excepting recorded recollection to the
hearsay rule is much the same as that for excepting a
prior statement of identification. See Pa.R.E. 803.1(2) and
Comment thereto. The recorded past observation of a
witness, when the matter was fresh in the witness’s
memory, is more trustworthy than the present eroded
recollection of the witness, particularly if the witness
currently vouches for the correctness of the matter re-
corded.
Because the witness must testify at trial and vouch for
the correctness of the recorded information, and must be
willing to undergo cross-examination concerning it, the
trier of fact has substantial opportunity to gauge the
credibility of the witness, even though the witness testi-
fies to a faded, or fading, memory of the matters recorded.
This exception to the hearsay rule has proved useful to
the prosecution in criminal cases in dealing with a
‘‘turncoat witness,’’ i.e., one who makes a statement
implicating the defendant prior to trial, but who, when
trial comes, testifies to a loss of memory concerning the
crime.
See Commonwealth v. Shaw, 494 Pa. 364, 431 A.2d 897
(1981), a murder case. A witness, who was an accomplice
of defendant, made a confession that implicated defen-
dant. At trial the witness testified to a loss of memory
concerning some, but not all, of the assertions in his
confession. He also testified that what he had said in his
confession was the truth. The Court, affirming a convic-
tion, approved admission of the confession as recorded
recollection. The Court explained that recorded recollec-
tion qualifies for exception to the hearsay rule if the
declarant lacks ‘‘sufficient’’ present recollection of the
matter recorded. Declarant need not lack all present
recollection thereof.
See also, Commonwealth v. Cargo, 498 Pa. 5, 444 A.2d
639 (1982), another murder case. A witness was inter-
viewed by a police detective, who recorded his statement,
on the morning following the crime. At trial the witness
testified to a memory loss concerning the murder. He
said, at various times during his testimony, that he had
told the truth to the detective when his statement was
recorded, and that he didn’t remember whether he told
the detective the truth. The Court, affirming a conviction,
said that recorded recollection qualifies for exception to
the hearsay rule if the witness vouches for the correctness
of the recorded information at some time in his testimony.
If he gives conflicting testimony on the point, it goes to
the weight, not the admissibility, of the recorded recollec-
tion.
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavail-
able.
(a) Definition of Unavailability ‘‘Unavailability as a
witness’’ includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of
the declarant’s statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject
matter of the declarant’s statement despite an order of
the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of
the declarant’s statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing
because of death or then existing physical or mental
illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a
statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s
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attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under
subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or
testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemp-
tion, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence
is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent
of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness
from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay Exceptions The following statements, as
hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony.
(2) Statement Under Belief of Impending Death.
(3) Statement Against Interest.
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History.
(5) [Vacant. See Comment]
Comment
Pa.R.E. 804(a) is identical to F.R.E. 804(a). Though
there is no common definition of unavailability for hear-
say purposes in prior Pennsylvania law, the rule does not
conflict with case law applying the four hearsay excep-
tions that require unavailability.
Pa.R.E. 804(b) differs somewhat from F.R.E. 804(b). The
differences are explained in the Comments to the rule’s
subdivisions, which define individual exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
The exceptions to the hearsay rule in subsection (b)
apply only if the declarant is unavailable to testify in
person. It seems reasonable to apply the same definition
of unavailability to all of them. This definition is supplied
by subsection (a).
a. Definition of Unavailability
There is little that is controversial about the five kinds
of unavailability spelled out in this rule. They have been
culled from case law throughout the country, refined a
little, and categorized. The rule seems to have worked
satisfactorily in the federal courts, and in the many states
that have adopted rules patterned after it.
(1) Privilege. A ruling of court is required before a
witness becomes unavailable because of a privilege
not to testify. Assertion of a privilege by a witness, or
by a lawyer, is not enough, without a court ruling.
(2) Refusal to Testify. An order of court is required
before the refusal of a witness to testify makes the
witness unavailable. The witness’s refusal, in and of
itself, is not enough.
(3) Memory Loss. If a witness testifies, under oath,
to a memory loss concerning the subject matter of the
hearsay statement sought to be introduced under
Pa.R.E. 804(b), the witness is unavailable. It doesn’t
matter whether you believe the witness or not.
(4) Death or Illness. This is a common type of
unavailability. Death is fairly conclusive. However, a
ruling by the court may be necessary to determine
whether an illness, physical or mental, of a witness is
serious enough to prevent the witness from testifying
in person, thus making the witness unavailable.
(5) Absence of Witness. When the witness simply
doesn’t show up in court, the party who wants to
introduce evidence of the witness’s out-of-court asser-
tion under Pa.R.E. 804(b) has the burden of convinc-
ing the court that the party has used due diligence to
contact the witness, subpoena the witness if possible,
or persuade the witness to appear voluntarily if the
witness can’t be subpoenaed.
Moreover, if the hearsay sought to be introduced is a
dying declaration (Pa.R.E. 804(b)(2)), a statement against
interest (Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3)), or a statement of pedigree
(Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4)), the proponent must also convince the
court that he could not reasonably have taken the
deposition of the witness, either in the same or another
jurisdiction.
Caveat: Pa.R.E. 804(a) contains a proviso at the
end: if it can be shown that the offerer of hearsay
under Pa.R.E. 804(b) wrongfully caused the witness
to become unavailable, for the purpose of preventing
the witness from testifying in person, then the wit-
ness will not be considered unavailable. In other
words, the offerer forfeits the right to introduce the
hearsay.
b. Hearsay Exceptions
There are four exceptions to the hearsay rule in which
the offerer of the out-of-court assertion must show that
the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial, as unavail-
ability is defined in subsection (a). A Comment pertinent
to each of these exceptions follows its definition.
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at
another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
adequate opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1) is identical to F.R.E. 804(b)(1), except
that it adds the word ‘‘adequate’’ in front of opportunity.
It is consistent with prior Pennsylvania law.
Pennsylvania has two statutes, both of which enact
exceptions to the hearsay rule for former testimony, and
both of which are entitled, ‘‘Notes of evidence at former
trial.’’ 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917 applies only to criminal cases. 42
Pa.C.S. § 5934 applies only to civil cases. Both are
reenactments of statutes that were originally passed in
1887.
These two statutes, which are limited in scope, have
less significance than they might otherwise have because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized a
broader exception to the hearsay rule for former testi-
mony as a matter of its developing common law.
See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435, 372 A.2d
771 (1977), a murder case. The Court, affirming a
conviction, approved admission, upon offer by the Com-
monwealth, of testimony given by a witness at defen-
dant’s preliminary hearing. The witness refused to testify
at defendant’s trial on the ground of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
See also, Commonwealth v. Graves, 484 Pa. 29, 398
A.2d 644 (1979), a murder case. The Court, affirming a
conviction, approved admission, upon offer by the Com-
monwealth, of testimony given by a witness at a previous
trial of defendant. The Court held that the witness was
unavailable because he expressed a partial loss of
memory concerning pertinent events. The Court explained
that it was applying the common law exception to the
hearsay rule for former testimony, not 42 Pa.C.S. § 5917.
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The party against whom former testimony is offered
must have had a similar motive to examine or cross-
examine the witness at the prior hearing, not necessarily
the same motive.
Testimony given at a preliminary hearing in a criminal
case is a recurring problem. The issue at a preliminary
hearing is whether probable cause to prosecute defendant
exists. This is different than the issue at trial, which is
whether defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant’s motive to cross-examine a witness at a
preliminary hearing is sometimes the same as at trial,
i.e., to destroy the credibility of the witness. Sometimes,
though, defendant’s motive at a preliminary hearing is
one of discovery, particularly when defendant is convinced
that a finding of probable cause is a fait accompli.
Sometimes defendant may cross-examine cursorily, or not
at all, preferring, as a matter of strategy, to save his best
shots for trial.
Nonetheless, most cases have held that testimony given
at a preliminary hearing by a subsequently unavailable
witness is excepted to the hearsay rule when offered
against defendant at trial. See California v. Green, 399
U. S. 149 (1970); Commonwealth v. Clarkson, 438 Pa. 523,
265 A.2d 802 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa.
435, 372 A.2d 771 (1977).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Bazemore, 531 Pa. 582, 614 A.2d
684 (1992), a homicide case. The Commonwealth sought
to introduce testimony that a witness for the prosecution,
subsequently unavailable, gave at defendant’s prelimi-
nary hearing. At the time of the preliminary hearing,
defendant had not been informed (1) that the witness had
made a prior inconsistent statement, (2) that the witness
had a criminal record, and (3) that the district attorney
was, at that time, contemplating filing criminal charges
against the witness for homicide and conspiracy in con-
nection with the same incident that gave rise to the
criminal charges against defendant. The Court, ruling on
a motion in limine, excluded the evidence. Defendant, in
the circumstances, had not had an adequate opportunity
to cross-examine and impeach the credibility of the
witness at the preliminary hearing.
The Bazemore case is a good example of why the word
‘‘adequate’’ was added in front of the word ‘‘opportunity’’
in Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1).
Depositions
Depositions are the most common form of prior testi-
mony that is introduced at a modern trial. Their use is
provided for not only by Pa.R.E. 804(b)(1), but also by
statute and written rules of procedure promulgated by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Judicial Code provides for the use of depositions in
criminal cases. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5919 provides:
Depositions in criminal matters
The testimony of witnesses taken in accordance
with section 5325 (relating to when and how a
deposition may be taken outside this Commonwealth)
may be read in evidence upon the trial of any
criminal matter unless it shall appear at the trial
that the witness whose deposition has been taken is
in attendance, or has been or can be served with a
subpoena to testify, or his attendance otherwise pro-
cured, in which case the deposition shall not be
admissible.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5325 sets forth the procedure for taking
depositions, by either prosecution or defendant, outside
Pennsylvania. A prior statute, enacted in 1909, had
provided for the taking of such depositions by the defen-
dant only (former 19 P. S. § 611).
Again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as a matter of
common law development, has recognized an exception to
the hearsay rule for depositions that is broader than the
statute. In Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370
A.2d 350 (1977), the Court approved admission of a
videotape deposition of a sick witness who was located
within Pennsylvania. It was taken by the Commonwealth
pursuant to court order less than two weeks prior to trial.
In civil cases, the introduction of depositions, or parts
thereof, at trial is provided for by Pa.R.C.P. No. 4020(a)(3)
and (5):
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a
party, may be used by any party for any purpose if
the court finds
(a) that the witness is dead, or
(b) that the witness is at a greater distance than
one hundred (100) miles from the place of trial or is
outside the Commonwealth, unless it appears that
the absence of the witness was procured by the party
offering the deposition, or
(c) that the witness is unable to attend or testify
because of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment,
or
(d) that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena, or
(e) upon application and notice that such excep-
tional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in
the interest of justice and with due regard to the
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be
used.
(5) A deposition upon oral examination of a med-
ical witness, other than a party, may be used at trial
for any purpose whether or not the witness is
available to testify.
The term ‘‘medical witness’’ in Pa.R.C.P. No. 4020(a)(5)
is not limited to physicians. It includes, for example, a
registered nurse when testifying about her care of a
patient. See Russell v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 543
Pa. 532, 673 A.2d 876 (1996).
A videotape deposition of a medical witness, or any
expert witness, other than a party to the case, may be
introduced in evidence at trial, regardless of the witness’s
availability, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 4017.1(g).
By statute the testimony of a licensed physician, taken
by deposition in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure, is admissible in a civil case. There is
no requirement that the physician testify as an expert
witness. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5936 provides:
Medical testimony by deposition
(a) General rule.—The testimony of any physician
licensed to practice medicine may be taken by oral
interrogation in the manner prescribed by general
rule for the taking of depositions.
(b) Admissibilty.—A deposition taken under subsec-
tion (a) shall be admissible in a civil matter.
(2) Statement Under Belief of Impending Death. A
statement made by a declarant while believing that the
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declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be im-
pending death.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(2) is the same as F.R.E. 804(b)(2), except
that the Pennsylvania rule applies in all cases, not just in
homicide cases and civil actions. This is a departure from
prior Pennsylvania decisional law, which applied the
exception only to assertions made by the victim in a
criminal prosecution for homicide.
This is one of the more venerable exceptions to the
hearsay rule. It is usually referred to as the exception for
a ‘‘dying declaration.’’
The declarant doesn’t have to be dying, though. He just
has to think that he is. If he survives and is available to
testify at trial, his out-of-court declarations do not qualify
for this exception to the hearsay rule. If he doesn’t
survive, or survives and is not available to testify, as
availability is defined in Pa.R.E. 804(a), they do.
The rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule was
set forth in Commonwealth v. Smith, 454 Pa. 515,
517—18, 314 A.2d 224, 225 (1973):
The reliability of a dying declaration is provided
not by an oath, nor by cross-examination; rather, its
admissibility is based on the premise that no one
‘‘who is immediately going into the presence of his
Maker will do so with a lie upon his lips.’’ Luch, L.J.,
Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox C.C. 1, 3 (Eng. 1881).
True enough, if a man believes that hellfire and
brimstone will follow should he die with a lie on his lips,
his dying declaration will likely represent what he be-
lieves to be the truth. But this is far from a guarantee
thereof. A dying man, in extremis, may be less lucid than
normal. Or his dying declaration may be based on
suspicion, not personal knowledge. Like Sherlock Holmes,
he may be paranoid, and quick, without proof, to at-
tribute his ill fortune to an old enemy. ‘‘This is Moriarty’s
doing.’’
See Commonwealth v. Fugmann, 330 Pa. 4, 198 A 99
(1938), a murder case, in which the victim received a
bomb in the mail. Before he died, the victim said,
‘‘Fugmann done this.’’ The Court excluded evidence of this
assertion on the ground that the victim had no personal
knowledge of who sent the bomb. It wasn’t offered as a
dying declaration, but the court, in dictum, indicated that
the result would have been the same had it been so
offered.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in
Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 101 (1933):
Homicide may not be imputed to a defendant on
the basis of mere suspicions, though they are the
suspicions of the dying. To let the declaration in, the
inference must be permissible that there was knowl-
edge or the opportunity for knowledge as to the acts
that are declared . . . . The form is not decisive,
though it be that of a conclusion, a statement of the
result with the antecedent steps omitted. . . . ‘‘He
murdered me,’’ does not cease to be competent as a
dying declaration because in the statement of the act
there is also an appraisal of the crime. . . . One does
not hold the dying to the observance of all the
niceties of speech to which conformity is exacted from
a witness on the stand. What is decisive is something
deeper and more fundamental than any difference of
form. The declaration is kept out if the setting of the
occasion satisfies the judge, or in reason ought to
satisfy him, that the speaker is giving expression to
suspicion or conjecture, and not known facts.
In Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457, 470—71, 417
A.2d 128, 135 (1980), the Court said that to qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule, a dying declaration ‘‘must
be based on observations of the declarant and may not
merely be an expression of opinion based on reflection or
reasoning.’’
This is, on analysis, an application of a separate
evidential rule. If the circumstances indicate that
declarant does not have personal knowledge of the matter
asserted, the declaration is excludable. See Pa.R.E. 602.
The common law has traditionally, but illogically, ex-
cepted a dying declaration to the hearsay rule in a
criminal prosecution for homicide, but not in a criminal
prosecution for another crime, or in a civil case. Prior
Pennsylvania case law followed the common law. See
Commonwealth v. Antonini, 165 Pa. Super. 501, 69 A.2d
436 (1949).
Reasoned analysis dictates a change. If a dying declara-
tion is trustworthy enough to be introduced against a
defendant charged with murder, it should be trustworthy
enough to be introduced against a defendant charged with
attempted murder, or robbery, or rape. It should also be
trustworthy enough to be introduced against a party in a
civil case, where, presumably, the stakes are less impor-
tant than a person’s life.
The Advisory Committee appointed by the United
States Supreme Court to draft the Federal Rules of
Evidence drafted the dying declaration exception to apply
in all cases. Traditionalists objected. Congress, in its
wisdom, compromised and redrafted Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(2) so that it applies in homicide cases
and civil cases, but not in nonhomicide criminal cases.
This may have been good politics, but it is not good logic.
Nor is it good law.
Many states, 23 so far, that have adopted rules of
evidence patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence,
depart therefrom and apply the dying declaration excep-
tion to the hearsay rule in all cases. Pennsylvania now
joins them.
Note: A dying declaration will sometimes qualify for
exception to the hearsay rule as an excited utterance. See
Pa.R.E. 803(2). See also, Sadowski v. Eazor Express, Inc.,
213 Pa. Super. 471, 249 A.2d 842 (1968).
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was
at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant
against another, that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless believing it to be true. In a criminal case, a
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal
liability is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the state-
ment.
Comment
The first sentence of Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3) is identical to
the first sentence of F.R.E. 804(b)(3). The second sentence
differs in that it requires corroborating circumstantial
trustworthiness before an assertion against the
declarant’s penal interest can be introduced by either side
in a criminal case. The federal formulation requires such
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corroboration only when the statement is offered to
exculpate the defendant.
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3) is consistent with prior Pennsylvania
decisional law.
Indiscriminate and inappropriate use of the hybrid
term, ‘‘admission against interest,’’ has spawned confusion
between this exception to the hearsay rule and the
separate exception for an admission by a party-opponent.
The differences between the two exceptions are signifi-
cant.
An admission by a party-opponent (1) must be made by,
or attributed to, a party in the case, (2) may be intro-
duced only against the party who made the admission, or
a party to whom it is attributed, (3) may be introduced
whether or not the declarant is available, and (4) need
not be contrary to the declarant’s interest when made.
See Pa.R.E. 803(25).
A statement against interest (1) may be made by
anyone, (2) may be introduced against any party, (3) may
be introduced only if the declarant is unavailable, and (4)
must have been contrary to the declarant’s interest
(pecuniary, proprietary, or penal) when made.
The rationale for an exception to the hearsay rule for a
statement against interest is set forth in Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 298—99 (1973):
A number of exceptions have developed over the
years to allow admission of hearsay statements made
under circumstances that tend to assure reliability
and thereby compensate for the absence of the oath
and opportunity for cross-examination. Among the
most prevalent of these exceptions is the one appli-
cable to declarations against interest—an exception
founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely
to fabricate a statement against his own interest at
the time it is made.
At common law this exception to the hearsay rule
encompassed only an assertion against declarant’s pecuni-
ary or proprietary interest. It did not include an assertion
against declarant’s penal interest. This was the law in
the federal courts, and the majority view in the state
courts, prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) in 1975.
Currently the federal courts, and virtually all state
courts, recognize an exception to the hearsay rule for a
statement against the declarant’s penal interest, at least
in some circumstances. There are a number of variations.
Cases conflict concerning if, and when, circumstantial
corroboration of trustworthiness is required. A few states
do not include within the exception a statement that
implicates both declarant and defendant when offered
against the defendant in a criminal case.
Assertion Against Pecuniary or Proprietary
Interest
An assertion against pecuniary or proprietary interest,
by an unavailable declarant, has long been excepted to
the hearsay rule at common law. It has also long been
excepted to the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania, though
cases are few and far between.
‘‘Pecuniary’’ and ‘‘proprietary’’ interests are usually con-
sidered together, for purposes of the hearsay rule, and
rightly so, because there is a substantial overlap. An
assertion against a declarant’s proprietary interest, i.e.,
against the declarant’s legal interest in real or personal
property, will also be against the declarant’s pecuniary
interest, unless the property is worthless.
At any rate, Pennsylvania decisional law recognizes an
exception to the hearsay rule for an assertion against
either the declarant’s pecuniary interest, or proprietary
interest, or both. See Heddings v. Steele, 514 Pa. 569, 526
A.2d 349 (1987).
Assertion Against Penal Interest
Prior to 1973, Pennsylvania followed the common law
and did not recognize an exception to the hearsay rule for
an assertion against the declarant’s penal interest.
Then came Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284,
(1973), a murder case. The United States Supreme Court,
reversing a conviction, held that defendant’s constitu-
tional right to due process was violated because a Missis-
sippi state court would not permit him to introduce
out-of-court assertions against penal interest made by a
witness. The witness had confessed to others that he had
committed the crime with which defendant was charged.
Following hot on the heels of the Chambers case, the
Superior Court recognized an exception to the hearsay
rule for an assertion against penal interest in Common-
wealth v. Hackett, 225 Pa. Super. 22, 307 A.2d 334 (1973),
a drug case. The opinion appeared to limit the exception
to an assertion that was (1) offered by a defendant in a
criminal case for exculpation, and (2) made in circum-
stances that particularly indicated trustworthiness.
Next year the Supreme Court followed suit. In Com-
monwealth v. Nash, 457 Pa. 296, 324 A.2d 344 (1974), the
Court held it reversible error to preclude defendant from
introducing evidence that another person admitted that
he committed the robbery with which defendant was
charged. However, there was no majority opinion. The
members of the Court expressed differing views about the
scope of the exception.
A year later a plurality of the Supreme Court narrowed
the exception substantially. In Commonwealth v. Colon,
461 Pa. 577, 337 A.2d 554 (1975), a murder case,
defendant unsuccessfully sought to introduce the confes-
sion of one Jose Hernandez, in which Hernandez asserted
that he killed the victim while acting alone. The plurality
opinion for the Court, affirming a conviction, said that an
assertion against penal interest is severable, and only
that portion of the assertion that is against declarant’s
penal interest is excepted to the hearsay rule. Thus
Hernandez’ assertion that he acted alone was not ex-
cepted to the hearsay rule. (His assertion that he commit-
ted the murder was properly excluded as irrelevant, since
the prosecution’s theory was that he and defendant acted
in concert.)
(It turns out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
plurality was ahead of its time. In Williamson v. United
States, U. S. , 114 S.Ct 2431 (1994), the
United States Supreme Court, resolving a split in the
federal circuits, held that Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) does not except to the hearsay rule a non
self-inculpatory assertion, even when contained in a
narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The Supreme
Court explained:
The fact that a person is making a broadly self-
inculpatory confession does not make more credible
the confession’s non-self-inculpatory parts. One of the
most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with
truth, especially truth that seems particularly per-
suasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.
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114 S.Ct. at 2435.
In Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 447 A.2d
228 (1982), the Court, affirming a conviction of murder,
arson, and other crimes, approved admission, upon offer
by the prosecution, of testimony relating assertions
against penal interest that were made by the deceased
victim (he told a witness that defendant promised him
money to set fire to defendant’s restaurant, and that he
did so).
In Commonwealth v. Bracero, 515 Pa. 355, 528 A.2d
936 (1987), the Court, affirming a conviction of burglary,
approved exclusion of evidence offered by defendant that
somebody else, in the course of a social conversation that
occurred about a week after the burglary, confessed to the
crime. There was no majority opinion, though.
Then, in Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 640
A.2d 1251 (1994), the Court, affirming a conviction of
murder, held that testimony offered by defendant that an
inmate of a state prison subsequently confessed to the
crime was not excepted to the hearsay rule. The Court, in
a majority opinion, said, citing the Bracero case:
Declarations against penal interest are admissible
as an exception to the hearsay rule only where there
are existing circumstances that provide clear assur-
ances that such declarations are trustworthy and
reliable.
537 Pa. at 26 n.8, 640 A.2d at 1263 n.8.
Pa.R.E. 803(b)(3) follows this recent evidential pro-
nouncement from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
requires circumstantial corroboration of trustworthiness
before excepting an assertion against penal interest to the
hearsay rule in any criminal case, whether offered by
prosecution or defendant.
Courts, over the years, have expressed skepticism about
such evidence when offered by the defendant in a crimi-
nal case. Courts are particularly suspicious of post-
conviction evidence that a witness for the prosecution has
made an out-of-court recantation of incriminating testi-
mony given at trial, i.e., has admitted perjury. See
Commonwealth v. Woods, 394 Pa. Super. 223, 575 A.2d
601 (1990), in which the court refused to admit, as an
assertion against penal interest, a recanting affidavit of
the chief prosecution witness, at a postconviction hearing.
Courts have expressed skepticism about this type of
evidence when offered by the prosecution, too. For ex-
ample, a confessor’s assertion that incriminates another
may well be inspired by revenge, a natural proclivity to
pass the buck, a desire to curry favor with authorities, or
an attempt to divert attention to others.
If an assertion against penal interest was excepted to
the hearsay rule, without circumstantial corroboration of
its trustworthiness, and was offered against the defen-
dant in a criminal case, it would probably be excluded
because its admission would violate defendant’s right to
confront the witnesses against him under either the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, or Article
I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U. S. 530 (1986), a murder case.
The United States Supreme Court, reversing a conviction,
held that defendant’s constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him was violated when the government
was allowed to introduce a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession that implicated them both.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has agreed, unani-
mously, not to recognize an exception to the hearsay rule
for an assertion against social interest, an exception that
is recognized in at least ten states. See Heddings v.
Steele, 514 Pa. 569, 526 A.2d 349 (1987).
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. A state-
ment, made before the controversy arose:
(A) concerning the declarant’s own birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adop-
tion, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of
personal or family history, even though declarant had no
means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter
stated; or
(B) concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of
another person, if the declarant was related to the other
by blood, adoption, or marriage, or was so intimately
associated with the other’s family as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning the matter declared.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) is similar to F.R.E. 804(b)(4), except
that it requires the statement of pedigree to be made ante
litem motem. It represents a slight broadening of prior
Pennsylvania decisional law.
This is generally known as the exception to the hearsay
rule for a statement of ‘‘pedigree.’’ It is a minor exception
to the hearsay rule. These days matters of pedigree are
usually proved by public records, or by testimony from
knowledgeable witnesses.
When no record exists, and no knowledgeable witnesses
are available, assertions made by deceased, or otherwise
unavailable, family members, or persons intimately asso-
ciated therewith, may be the only evidence on the issue of
pedigree that exists. On the assumption that it is better
to have some evidence, hearsay though it is, than no
evidence at all, this exception to the hearsay rule is
justified.
Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) expands prior Pennsylvania decisional
law in two respects:
(1) The declarant no longer needs to be dead. The
exception applies if the declarant is unavailable, as
‘‘unavailability’’ is defined in Pa.R.E. 804(a).
(2) The declarant no longer needs to be related to
the family of which he spoke. The exception now
applies if the declarant ‘‘was so intimately associated
with the other’s family as to be likely to have
accurate information concerning the matter declared.’’
The primary reason for this expansion is to conform
Pennsylvania law more closely to the law in other
jurisdictions, i.e., the federal courts and at least eighty
percent of the states. This now represents, by far, the
majority view.
In addition, the expansion makes sense. The need for
the evidence is the same, whether the declarant is dead,
or whether the declarant is unavailable to testify for one
of the other reasons delineated in Pa.R.E. 804(a). And a
declaration concerning pedigree by one who is ‘‘so inti-
mately associated with the other’s family as to be likely
to have accurate information concerning the matter de-
clared,’’ should be as trustworthy, if not more so, than a
declaration by anybody that happens to be related to the
other by blood or marriage.
Pennsylvania has, though, retained the requirement
that an assertion of pedigree, to qualify for exception to
the hearsay rule, be made ante litem motem. This is an
important indicium of trustworthiness that outweighs the
desirability of uniformity among jurisdictions.
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An assertion of pedigree may also, on occasion, qualify
for exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to the excep-
tions for an entry in a business record (Pa.R.E. 803(6)), a
public record (42 Pa.C.S. § 6104), a record of a religious
organization (Pa.R.E. 803 (11)), a marriage, baptismal
and similar certificate (Pa.R.E. 803(12)), a family record
(Pa.R.E. 803(13)), a document affecting an interest in
property (Pa.R.E. 803(15)), an ancient document (Pa.R.E.
803(16)), reputation concerning pedigree (Pa.R.E.
803(19)), and an assertion against interest (Pa.R.E.
804(b)(3)).
The exception to the hearsay rule for an assertion of
pedigree is not employed often. When it is, it is usually in
an estate case.
A. Declarant’s Own Pedigree
In In re McClain’s Estate, 481 Pa. 435, 392 A.2d 1371
(1978), four alleged grandnieces of decedent challenged
the probate of his will, and the validity of several of his
inter vivos conveyances. To prove their relationship to
decedent, they offered testimony of a witness as to
declarations made by the testator himself about his
family and relatives. The trial judge excluded this testi-
mony because there was no proof, dehors the declarations
themselves, that the testator was related to the claim-
ants. The Court held it reversible error to exclude the
testimony. The Court said:
[W]hen the out-of-court declarant is the very per-
son whose pedigree is in issue, the declarations are
admissible under the pedigree exception to hearsay
upon a showing that (1) the declarant is dead, and (2)
the declarations were made before the controversy
arose.
Id. at 441, 392 A.2d 1374.
Note: Under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) the declarant does not
have to be dead. Unavailability, as defined in Pa.R.E.
804(a), will suffice.
B. Another Person’s Pedigree
In In re Garrett’s Estate, 371 Pa. 284, 89 A.2d 531
(1952), a wealthy widow died intestate. Nearly 26,000
claims were filed by persons alleging to be her next of
kin. The Court, affirming rejection of one such claim,
said:
Pedigree is an exception, arising ex necessitate, to
the hearsay rule. Pedigree may be proved by certain
limited types of hearsay evidence, including . . . decla-
rations of members of the family.. . .
Declarations as to pedigree are admissible if (1) the
declarant is dead; (2) the declarations were made
before the controversy arose or as is frequently said,
‘‘ante litem motam’’; and (3) the declarant was related
to the family of which he spoke, and this relationship
is proved by evidence dehors the declaration. The
rule does not require that the witness who testifies in
court must be related to the person whose pedigree is
under consideration, but that the declarant whose
statements are given in evidence by the witness was
so related . . . .
Id. at 287 88, 89 A.2d at 532—33.
Note: Under Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4), the declarant does not
have to be dead, nor does the declarant have to be related
to the family of which he spoke. See discussion, above.
(5) [See Comment].
Comment
Pennsylvania has not adopted F.R.E. 804(b)(5) which
reads as follows:
Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically cov-
ered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent’s intention to offer
the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
The Federal rule is inconsistent with Pennsylvania law,
which does not recognize a catch-all exception to the
hearsay rule.
Rule 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay
Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under
the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided
in these rules.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 805 is identical to F.R.E. 805. It is consistent
with prior Pennsylvania law.
See Commonwealth v. Galloway, 302 Pa. Super. 145,
448 A.2d 568 (1982), a prosecution for, inter alia, aggra-
vated assault. The victim, who was defendant’s wife,
appeared at a local hospital in a hysterical state, and was
ministered to by a nurse. At trial the nurse testified that
the victim said that defendant said that he was going to
kill her. The court, affirming a conviction, approved
admission of this testimony. The court explained:
As to the victim’s statements . . . concerning the
declaration made by Appellant that he was going to
kill the victim, Appellant claims this was hearsay on
hearsay.
First, the statement was admissible, as between
Appellant and victim, as an admission. See Common-
wealth v. Cooley, 484 Pa. 14, 398 A.2d 637 (1979).
Secondly, as between the victim and the witness, the
excited utterance exception . . . qualifies it for admis-
sion.
Therefore, Appellant’s claim is meritless.
Id. at 158—59, 448 A.2d 575.
Double, or multiple, hearsay is often encountered with
respect to business records. The assertion of the entrant
is one level of hearsay. If the entrant recorded informa-
tion supplied by somebody else, then somebody else’s
assertion is the second level of hearsay. If the person who
supplied the information was a person ‘‘with knowledge,’’
and if the person’s assertion was recorded and kept ‘‘in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity,’’
both levels of hearsay may be excepted to the hearsay
rule by Pa.R.E. 803(6). If not, then another exception to
the hearsay rule must be satisfied before the entry will be
excepted to the hearsay rule.
For example, a police officer may make a prompt
written report following a motor vehicle accident. So far
as an entry in the report reflects the officer’s own
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observations, it is a single level of hearsay and is
excepted to the hearsay rule by Pa.R.E. 803(6). If an
entry in the report relates a statement made by one of
the drivers of the vehicles involved, this is a second level
of hearsay. Such an entry is excepted to the hearsay rule
if offered by a party-opponent by Pa.R.E. 803(25). But if
an entry in the report relates a statement made by a
bystander, which lacks circumstantial indicia of reliabil-
ity, that entry would not be excepted to the hearsay rule.
See Haas v. Kasnot, 371 Pa. 580, 92 A.2d 171 (1952), a
suit for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident. A police report was introduced by defendant,
pursuant to the Uniform Business Records as Evidence
Act (now 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108). The Court, reversing a jury
verdict for defendant, said that certain entries in the
report were admissible, such as the investigating police
officer’s observations as to the weather and the location of
the cars after the accident. But it was error to admit
entries describing how the accident happened, since the
police obtained that information second hand from their
post accident interviews of unidentified witnesses.
As the court explained in Hreha v. Benscoter, 381 Pa.
Super. 556, 565, 554 A.2d 525, 529 (1989), ‘‘[w]here a
business record contains multiple levels of hearsay . . . it
is admissible only if each level falls within a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule.’’
Rule 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of
Declarant.
When a hearsay statement has been admitted in
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked,
and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had
testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct
by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant’s hearsay statement, is not subject to any
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded
an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against
whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the
declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine
the declarant on the statement as if under cross-
examination.
Comment
Pa.R.E. 806 is the same as F.R.E. 806, except that it
makes no reference to Rule 801(d)(2). That is because
there is no Pa.R.E. 801(d)(2). The subject matter of F.R.E.
801(d)(2) (admissions) is covered by Pa.R.E. 803(25). At
any rate, Pa.R.E. 806 has the same effect as F.R.E. 806.
Pa.R.E. 806 is consistent with prior Pennsylvania deci-
sional law.
Pa.R.E. 806 is a codification of common sense. If an
out-of-court assertion of a nontestifying witness is intro-
duced against a party, pursuant to an exception to the
hearsay rule, the party has no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness and thereby expose the weaknesses
of the witness’s assertion. The party, then, should have
the right to impeach the credibility of the witness by
whatever other means are available. This includes intro-
duction of any inconsistent statement that the witness
has made, in which case it would be impossible to enforce
the Rule in Queen Caroline’s Case, or the modified
version thereof set forth in Pa.R.E. 613(b). You can’t
confront a witness who isn’t there with an inconsistent
statement, or anything else.
See Commonwealth v. Davis, 363 Pa. Super. 562, 526
A.2d 1205 (1987), a murder case. Defendant introduced
testimony that a defense witness gave at defendant’s
preliminary hearing, after the witness became unavail-
able at trial. The Commonwealth then called a policeman
who read into evidence a prior inconsistent statement
that he took from the witness immediately following the
crime. The court, affirming a conviction, held, over a
hearsay objection, that this evidence was properly admit-
ted to impeach the credibility of the witness, whose
former testimony had been introduced by defendant.
The last sentence of Pa.R.E. 806 allows the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted to
call the declarant as a witness and cross-examine him or
her about the statement.
ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND
IDENTIFICATION
Rule
901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification.
902. Self-Authentication.
903. Subscribing Witness’ Testimony Unnecessary.
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identi-
fication
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentica-
tion or identification as a condition precedent to admissi-
bility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by
way of limitation, the following are examples of authenti-
cation or identification conforming with the requirements
of this rule:
(1) Testimony of Witness With Knowledge. Testimony
that a matter is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert
opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon
familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison
by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens
which have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appear-
ance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with cir-
cumstances.
(5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice,
whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or elec-
tronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances con-
necting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone Conversations. Telephone conversations,
by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned
at the time by the telephone company to a particular
person or business, if (A) in the case of a person,
circumstances, including self-identification, show the per-
son answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a
business, the call was made to a place of business and the
conversation related to business reasonably transacted
over the telephone.
(7) Public Records or Reports. Evidence that a writing
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact
recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public
record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, is from the public office where items of this nature
are kept.
(8) Ancient Documents or Data Compilation. Evidence
that a document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is
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in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its
authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic,
would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 30 years or
more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the
process or system produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods Provided by Law. Any method of authen-
tication or identification provided by statute or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Comment
Paragraph 901(a) is identical to F.R.E. 901(a). This
paragraph is consistent with Pennsylvania law. Although
the authentication or identification requirement has not
been authoritatively defined, Pennsylvania courts have
imposed the requirement. It may be expressed as follows:
When a party offers evidence contending either expressly
or impliedly that the evidence is connected with a person,
place, thing or event, the party must provide evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the contended connec-
tion. See Commonwealth v. Pollock, 414 Pa. Super. 66,
606 A.2d 500 (1992); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa.
620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980).
Authentication or identification is a category of rel-
evancy dependent upon the fulfillment of a condition of
fact. See Pa.R.E. 104(b). As such, the proponent of the
evidence must provide evidence sufficient to support a
finding of the contended connection. This is consistent
with Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter,
472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 806 (1977).
In some cases real evidence may not be relevant unless
its condition at the time of trial is similar to its condition
at the time of the incident in question. In such cases the
party offering the evidence must also offer evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the condition is
similar. Pennsylvania law treats this requirement as an
aspect of authentication. See Commonwealth v. Hudson,
489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Heller v. Equitable
Gas Co., 333 Pa. 433, 3 A.2d 343 (1939).
Demonstrative evidence such as photographs, motion
pictures, diagrams and models must be authenticated by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the demon-
strative evidence fairly and accurately represents that
which it purports to depict. See Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa.
107, 119 A.2d 530 (1956). Paragraph 901(b) is identical to
F.R.E. 901(b). The illustrations are not intended to be
all-inclusive or exclusive.
Paragraph 901(b)(1) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(1). It is
consistent with Pennsylvania law, in that the testimony
of a witness with personal knowledge may be sufficient to
authenticate or identify the evidence. See Commonwealth
v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Heller v.
Equitable Gas Co., 333 Pa. 433, 3 A.2d 343 (1939).
Paragraph 901(b)(2) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(2).
This paragraph is consistent with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111,
which also deals with the admissibility of handwriting.
Paragraph 901(b)(3) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(3).
This paragraph is consistant with Pennsylvania law.
When there is a question as to the authenticity of an
exhibit, the trier of fact will have to resolve the issue.
This may be done by comparing the exhibit to authenti-
cated specimens. See Commonwealth v. Gipe, 169 Pa.
Super. 623, 84 A.2d 366 (1951) (comparison of typewritten
document with authenticated specimen). Under this rule
the court must decide whether the specimen used for
comparison to the exhibit is authentic. If the court
determines that there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the specimen is authentic, the trier of fact is
then permitted to compare the exhibit to the authenti-
cated specimen. Under Pennsylvania law lay or expert
testimony is admissible to assist the jury in resolving the
question. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.
Paragraph 901(b)(4) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(4).
Pennsylvania law has permitted evidence to be authenti-
cated by circumstantial evidence similar to that discussed
in this illustration. The evidence may take a variety of
forms including evidence establishing chain of custody,
see Commonwealth v. Melendez, 326 Pa. Super. 531, 474
A.2d 617 (1984); evidence that a letter is in reply to an
earlier communication, see Roe v. Dwelling House Ins. Co.
of Boston, 149 Pa. 94, 23 A. 718 (1892); testimony that an
item of evidence was found in a place connected to a
party, see Commonwealth v. Bassi, 284 Pa. 81, 130 A. 311
(1925); phone call authenticated by evidence of party’s
conduct after the call, see Commonwealth v. Gold, 123 Pa.
Super. 128, 186 A. 208 (1936); and identity of speaker
established by content and circumstances of conversation,
see Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 422 Pa. Super. 556, 619 A.2d
1363 (1993).
Paragraph 901(b)(5) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(5).
Pennsylvania law has permitted the identification of a
voice to be made by a person familiar with the alleged
speaker’s voice. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 472 Pa.
510, 372 A.2d 806 (1977).
Paragraph 901(b)(6) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(6).
This paragraph appears to be consistent with Pennsylva-
nia law. See Smithers v. Light, 305 Pa. 141, 157 A. 489
(1931); Wahl v. State Workmen’s Ins. Fund, 139 Pa. Super.
53, 11 A.2d 496 (1940). See also, McCormick, Evidence
§ 226 (4th ed. 1992).
Paragraph 901(b)(7) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(7).
This paragraph illustrates that public records and reports
may be authenticated in the same manner as other
writings. In addition, public records and reports may be
self-authenticating as provided in Pa.R.E. 902. Public
records and reports may also be authenticated as other-
wise provided by statute. See paragraph 901(b)(10) and
its Comment.
Paragraph 901(b)(8) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(8)
except that the Pennsylvania rule requires thirty years,
while the Federal Rule requires twenty years. This
change was to make the rule consistent with Pennsylva-
nia law. See Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v. Ball, 277
Pa. 301, 121 A. 191 (1923); Jones v. Scranton Coal Co.,
274 Pa. 312, 118 A. 219 (1922).
Paragraph 901(b)(9) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(9).
There is very little authority in Pennsylvania discussing
authentication of evidence as provided in this illustration.
Such authority as there is, is consistent with the para-
graph. In Commonwealth v. Visconto, 301 Pa. Super. 543,
448 A.2d 41 (1982), a computer print-out was held to be
admissible. In Appeal of Chartier Valley School District,
67 Pa. Cmwlth. 121, 447 A.2d 317 (1982), computer
studies were not admitted as business records, in part,
because it was not established that the mode of preparing
the evidence was reliable. A similar approach has been
applied in Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188
A.304 (1936) (test for gun powder residue); and in other
cases to admit evidence of various kinds of scientific
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Middleton, 379 Pa. Super.
502, 550 A.2d 561 (1988) (electrophoretic analysis of dried
blood); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 413 Pa. Super. 498,
605 A.2d 1228 (1992) (results of DNA/RFLP testing).
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Paragraph 901(b)(10) differs from F.R.E. 901(b)(10) in
order to eliminate the reference to Federal law and to
make the paragraph conform to Pennsylvania law.
There are a number of statutes that provide for authen-
tication or identification of various types of evidence. See,
e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103 (official records within the
Commonwealth); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (domestic records
outside the Commonwealth and foreign records) 35 P. S.
§ 450.810 (vital statistics); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 (docu-
ments filed in a public office); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110
(certain registers of marriages, births and burials
records); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(c) (chemical tests for alco-
hol and controlled substances); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3368
(speed timing devices); 75 Pa.C.S.A, § 1106(c) (certificates
of title); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6151 (certified copies of medical
records); 23 Pa.C.A. § 5104 (blood tests to determine
paternity); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4343 (genetic tests to deter-
mine paternity).
In general, evidence may be authenticated or identified
in any manner provided by statute, these rules or deci-
sional law. In some situations decisional law has required
strict compliance with a statute providing for authentica-
tion or identification of evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Townsend, 418 Pa. Super. 48, 613 A.2d 564 (1992);
Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa. Super. 151, 563
A.2d 1229 (1989).
Rule 902. Self-Authentication.
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition prece-
dent to admissibility is not required with respect to the
following:
(1) Domestic Public Documents Under Seal. A docu-
ment bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United
States, or of any State, district, Commonwealth, territory,
or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone,
or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a
political subdivision, department, officer, or agency
thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation
or execution.
(2) Domestic Public Documents Not Under Seal. A
document purporting to bear the signature in the official
capacity of an officer or employee of any entity included
in paragraph (1) hereof, having no seal, if a public officer
having a seal and having official duties in the district or
political subdivision of the officer or employee certifies
under seal that the signer has the official capacity and
that the signature is genuine.
(3) Foreign Public Documents. A document purporting
to be executed or attested in an official capacity by a
person authorized by the laws of a foreign country to
make the execution or attestation, and accompanied by a
final certification as to the genuineness of the signature
and official position (A) of the executing or attesting
person, or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of
genuineness of signature and official position relates to
the execution or attestation or is in a chain of certificates
of genuineness of signature and official position relating
to the execution or attestation. A final certification may
be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the
United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United
States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all
parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of
official documents, the court may, for good cause shown,
order that they be treated as presumptively authentic
without final certification or permit them to be evidenced
by an attested summary with or without final certifica-
tion.
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. A copy of an
official record or report or entry therein, or of a document
authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually
recorded or filed in a public office, including data compila-
tions in any form, certified as correct by the custodian or
other person authorized to make the certification, by
certificate complying with paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this
rule or complying with any statute or rule prescribed by
the Supreme Court.
(5) Official Publications. Books, pamphlets, or other
publications purporting to be issued by public authority.
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals. Printed materials pur-
porting to be newspapers or periodicals.
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like. Inscriptions, signs,
tags, or labels purporting to have been affixed in the
course of business and indicating ownership, control, or
origin.
(8) Acknowledged Documents. Documents accompanied
by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the man-
ner provided by law by a notary public or other officer
authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Com-
mercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relat-
ing thereto to the extent provided by general commercial
law.
(10) Presumptions Authorized by Statute. Any signa-
ture, document or other matter declared by statute to be
presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.
Comment
This rule permits some evidence to be authenticated
without the need for the proffering party to present
extrinsic evidence to authenticate or identify the evi-
dence. In other words, the requirement of presenting
authentication identification evidence as a condition pre-
cedent to admissibility, as provided by Pa.R.E.901(a), is
not applicable to the evidence discussed in this rule. The
reasons for this treatment are that the risk of forgery or
deception is so small, and the likelihood of discovery of
forgery or deception is so great, that the cost of present-
ing extrinsic evidence and the waste of court time is not
justified. Of course, this rule does not preclude the
opposing party contesting the authenticity of the evi-
dence. In that situation, authenticity is to be resolved by
the finder of fact.
Paragraphs 902(1), (2), (3) and (4) deal with self-
authentication of various kinds of public documents and
records and are identical to F.R.E. 902(1), (2), (3) and (4).
These paragraphs are consistent with Pennsylvania
statutory law. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103 (official records
within the Commonwealth); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (domes-
tic records outside the Commonwealth and foreign
records) 35 P. S. § 450.810 (vital statistics); 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6106 (documents filed in a public office). It is not
intended that these paragraphs supersede the existing
statutory provisions.
Paragraphs 902(5), (6) and (7) are identical to F.R.E.
902(5), (6) and (7). There are no corresponding statutory
provisions in Pennsylvania, although 45 Pa.C.S.A. § 506
(judicial notice of the contents of the Pennsylvania Code
and the Pennsylvania Bulletin) is similar to 902(5).
Despite the fact that these paragraphs are new to
Pennsylvania, their adoption is amply supported by the
rationale for this rule. It is very unlikely that these items
would be forged. Such forgery would be reasonably discov-
erable with minimal effort by the opposing party, and the
cost and time consumption involved in proving authentic-
ity is not justified by the minimal risks.
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Paragraph 902(8) is identical to F.R.E. 902(8). It is
consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Sheaffer v.
Baeringer, 346 Pa. 32, 29 A.2d 697 (1943); Williamson v.
Barrett, 147 Pa. Super. 460, 24 A.2d 546 (1942). An
acknowledged document is a type of official record and
the treatment of acknowledged documents is consistent
with Paragraphs 902(1), (2), (3) and (4).
Paragraph 902(9) is identical to F.R.E. 902(9). Pennsyl-
vania law treats various kinds of commercial paper and
documents as self-authenticating. See, e.g., 13 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1202 (documents authorized or required by contract to
be issued by a third party); 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3505 (evidence
of dishonor of negotiable instruments).
Paragraph 902(10) differs from F.R.E. 902(10) in order
to eliminate the reference to Federal law and to make the
paragraph conform to Pennsylvania law. In some statutes,
the self-authenticating nature of a document is expressed
by language creating a ‘‘presumption’’ of authenticity. See
13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3505. In other statutes the self-
authenticating nature of a document is expressed by
language that the document is ‘‘prima facie’’ authentic or
genuine. See 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 1202. This paragraph recog-
nizes the continuing vitality of such statutes.
Rule 903. Subscribing Witness’ Testimony Unneces-
sary.
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary
to authenticate a writing unless required by the laws of
the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the
writing.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 903. The rule is consis-
tent with Pennsylvania law, in that there are no laws in
Pennsylvania requiring the testimony of a subscribing
witness to authenticate a writing.
ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS,
RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Rule
1001. Definitions.
1002. Requirement of Original.
1003. Admissibility of Duplicates.
1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents.
1005. Public Records.
1006. Summaries.
1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party.
1008. Functions of Court and Jury.
Rule 1001. Definitions
For purposes of this article the following definitions are
applicable:
(1) Writings and Recordings. ‘‘Writings’’ and ‘‘record-
ings’’ consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their
equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, print-
ing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, me-
chanical or electronic recording, or other form of data
compilation.
(2) Photographs. ‘‘Photographs’’ include still photo-
graphs, X ray films, video tapes, and motion pictures.
(3) Original. An ‘‘original’’ of a writing or recording is
the writing or recording itself or any counterpart in-
tended to have the same effect by a person executing or
issuing it. An ‘‘original’’ of a photograph includes the
negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a
computer or similar device, any printout or other output
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is
an ‘‘original.’’
(4) Duplicate. A ‘‘duplicate’’ is a copy produced by the
same impression as the original, or from the same matrix,
or by means of photography, including enlargements and
miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or
by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent tech-
niques which accurately reproduces the original.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1001, except that the
word ‘‘copy’’ in Pa.R.E. 1001(4) replaces the word ‘‘coun-
terpart’’ used in F.R.E. 1001(4).
Paragraph 1001(1) and (2) have no precise equivalent
in Pennsylvania law, but the definitions of the terms
writings, recordings and photographs are consistent with
lay and legal usage in Pennsylvania.
The definition of an original writing, recording or
photograph contained in paragraph 1001(3) appears to be
consistent with Pennsylvania practice.
The definition of an original of data stored in a
computer or similar device in paragraph 1001(3) is consis-
tent with Rule Pa.R.E. 901(b)(9) (authentication of evi-
dence produced by a process or system).
Paragraph 1001(4) defines the term duplicate. This
term is important because of the admissibility of dupli-
cates under Pa.R.E. 1003. This Rule differs from the
Federal Rule in that the word ‘‘counterpart’’ has been
replaced by the word ‘‘copy.’’ The word copy is used to
mean a copy that was not intended to have the same
effect as the original. Pennsylvania law has permitted the
use of duplicates produced by the same impression as the
original, as is the case with carbon copies. See Brenner v.
Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 373 Pa. Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, appeal
denied, 520 Pa. 596, 552 A.2d 250 (1988); Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd. v. Evolo, 204 Pa. Super. 225, 203 A.2d
332 (1964). Pennsylvania has not treated other duplicates
as admissible unless the original was shown to be
unavailable through no fault of the proponent. Hera v.
McCormick, 425 Pa. Super. 432, 625 A.2d 682 (1993);
Warren v. Mosites Construction Co., 253 Pa. Super. 395,
385 A.2d 397 (1978). For this reason, the definition of
duplicates, other than those produced by the same im-
pression as the original, is new to Pennsylvania law. The
justification for adopting the new definition is discussed
in the Comment to Pa.R.E. 1003.
Rule 1002. Requirement of Original.
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photo-
graph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is
required, except as otherwise provided in these rules, by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court, or by
statute.
Comment
This rule differs from F.R.E. 1002 in order to eliminate
the reference to federal law and to make the paragraph
conform to Pennsylvania law; Pa.R.E. 1002 is consistent
with Pennsylvania law.
This rule corresponds to the common law ‘‘best evidence
rule.’’ See Warren v. Mosites Construction Co., 253 Pa.
Super. 395, 385 A.2d 397 (1978). The rationale for the
rule was not expressed in Pennsylvania cases, but com-
mentators mentioned four reasons justifying the rule.
(1) The exact words of many documents, especially
operative or dispositive documents, such as deeds, wills or
contracts, are so important in determining a party’s
rights accruing under those documents.
(2) Secondary evidence of the contents of documents,
whether copies or testimony is susceptible to inaccuracy.
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(3) The rule inhibits fraud because it allows the parties
to examine the original documents to detect alterations
and erroneous testimony about the contents of the docu-
ment.
(4) The appearance of the original may furnish infor-
mation as to its authenticity.
5 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence § 1002(2)
(Sandra D. Katz rev. 1994).
The common law formulation of the rule provided that
the rule was applicable when the terms of the document
were ‘‘material.’’ The materiality requirement has not
been eliminated, but is now dealt with in rule 1004(4).
That rule provides that the original is not required when
the writing, recording or photograph is not closely related
to a controlling issue.
The case law has not been entirely clear as to when a
party is trying to prove the content of a writing, record-
ing, or photograph. However, writings that are viewed as
operative or dispositive have usually been considered to
be subject to the operation of the rule. Such writings
include deeds, see Gallagher v. London Assurance Corp.,
149 Pa. 25, 24 A. 115 (1892), contracts, see In re Reuss’
Estate, 422 Pa. 58, 220 A.2d 822 (1966), attachments,
L.C.S. Colliery, Inc. v. Globe Coal Co., 369 Pa. 1, 84 A.2d
776 (1951). On the other hand, writings are not usually
treated as subject to the rule if they are only evidence of
the transaction, thing or event. See Hamill-Quinlan, Inc.
v. Fisher, 404 Pa. Super. 482, 591 A.2d 309 (1991); Noble
C. Quandel Co. v. Slough Flooring, Inc., 384 Pa. Super.
236, 558 A.2d 99 (1989). Thus, testimony as to person’s
age may be offered; it is not necessary to produce a birth
certificate. See Commonwealth ex rel. Park v. Joyce, 316
Pa. 434, 175 A. 422 (1934). Or, a party’s earnings may be
proven by testimony; it is not necessary to offer business
records. See Noble C. Quandel Co. v. Slough Flooring,
Inc., 384 Pa. Super. 236, 558 A.2d 99 (1989).
Traditionally, the best evidence rule applied only to
writings. Photographs, which under the definition estab-
lished by Pa.R.E. 1001(2) include x-ray films, videotapes,
and motion pictures, are usually only evidence of the
transaction, thing or event. It is only rarely that a
photograph would be operative or dispositive, but in cases
involving matters such as infringement of copyright,
defamation, pornography and invasion of privacy the
requirement for the production of the original should be
applicable. See Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein’s Evi-
dence, § 1002(2) [01] (1993). There is some recent author-
ity for this treatment of photographs in Pennsylvania. See
Commonwealth v. Lewis, 424 Pa. Super. 531, 623 A.2d
355 (1993) (video tape); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 121
Pa. Cmwlth. 521, 550 A.2d 1049 (1988) (film).
Rule 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates.
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1003. This rule is a
modest extension of Pennsylvania law.
Under the traditional best evidence rule, copies of
documents were not routinely admissible. This view dated
back to the time when copies were made by hand copying
and were therefore subject to inaccuracy. On the other
hand, Pennsylvania courts have admitted copies made by
techniques that are more likely to produce accurate
copies. For example, when a writing is produced in
duplicate or multiplicate each of the copies is treated as
admissible for purposes of the best evidence rule. See
Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938);
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Evolo, 204 Pa.
Super. 225, 203 A.2d 332 (1964).
In addition, various Pennsylvania statutes have treated
some accurate copies as admissible. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6104 (governmental records in the Commonwealth); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (domestic records outside the Common-
wealth and foreign records); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 (docu-
ments recorded or filed in a public office); 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6109 (photographic copies of business and public
records); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6151 59 (certified copies of
medical records).
The extension of similar treatment to all accurate
copies seems justified in the light of modern practice.
Pleading and discovery rules such as Pa.R.C.P. 4009(a)
(requiring production of originals of documents and photo-
graphs etc.) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(B)(1)(f) and (g) (requir-
ing disclosure of originals of documents, photographs and
recordings of electronic surveillance) will usually provide
an adequate opportunity to discover fraudulent copies. As
a result, this rule should tend to eliminate purely techni-
cal objections and unnecessary delay. In those cases
where the opposing party raises a genuine question as to
authenticity or the fairness of using a duplicate the trial
court may require the production of the original under
this rule.
Rule 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Con-
tents.
The original is not required, and other evidence of the
contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is admis-
sible if—
(1) Originals Lost or Destroyed. All originals are lost or
have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or de-
stroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original Not Obtainable. No original can be ob-
tained by any available judicial process or procedure; or
(3) Original in Possession of Opponent. At a time when
an original was under the control of the party against
whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the
pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a
subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not
produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral Matters. The writing, recording, or photo-
graph is not closely related to a controlling issue.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1004.
Paragraph 1004(1) is consistent with Pennsylvania law
in that the original is not required when the original has
been lost or destroyed, unless the proponent lost or
destroyed it in bad faith. See Olson & French, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 266, 160 A.2d 401 (1960); Bren-
ner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938). When the
proponent of the evidence alleges that it is lost, there
should be evidence that a sufficient search was made. See
Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 2 A.2d 731 (1938); Hera v.
McCormick, 425 Pa. Super. 432, 625 A.2d 682 (1993).
Paragraph 1004(2) is consistent with Pennsylvania law
in that the original is not required when the original is
not obtainable by any available judicial process or proce-
dure. See Otto v. Trump, 115 Pa. 425, 8 A. 786 (1887).
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Paragraph 1004(3) is consistent with Pennsylvania law
in that production of the original is not required when the
original was under control of the party against whom it is
offered at a time when that party was put on notice that
the contents would be a subject of proof. See Abercrombie
v. Bailey, 326 Pa. 65, 190 A. 725 (1937).
Paragraph 1004(4) is consistent with Pennsylvania law
in that production of the original is not required where
the original is not closely related to a controlling issue.
See McCullough v. Holland Furnace Co., 293 Pa. 45, 141
A. 631 (1928); Durkin v. Equine Clinics, Inc., 313 Pa.
Super. 75, 459 A.2d 417 (1983).
Under F.R.E. 1004 there are no degrees of secondary
evidence. When production of the original is not required,
the proffering party need not offer a duplicate even if that
is available; the proffering party may present any evi-
dence including oral testimony. See F.R.E. 1004, Advisory
Committee’s Note. There is some authority in Pennsylva-
nia that seems to require the next best evidence when
presentation of the original is not required. See Otto v.
Trump, 115 Pa. 425, 8 A. 786 (1887); Stevenson, Bowen &
Nesmith v. Hoy, 43 Pa. 191 (1862). This approach,
creating a hierarchy of preferences, seems to add an
unnecessary level of complexity. The normal motivation of
a party to produce the most convincing evidence together
with the availability of discovery to uncover fraud seems
adequate to control abuse, and thus, Pa.R.E. 1004 follows
the approach of F.R.E. 1004.
Rule 1005. Public Records.
The contents of an official record, or of a document
authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or
filed, including data compilations in any form, if other-
wise admissible, may be proved by a copy as provided by
Pa.R.E. 901 or 902, by statute, or by testimony of a
witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evidence
of the contents may be given.
Comment
The language of the first sentence of this rule differs
somewhat from F.R.E. 1005 to conform more closely to
Pa.R.E. 901 and 902. The changes are not intended to be
substantive. This rule is consistent with Pennsylvania
law. There are several statutes that provide that copies of
various kinds of public documents and records are admis-
sible. See Comments to Pa.R.E. 901 and 902.
Rule 1006. Summaries.
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or
photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in
court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary,
or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made
available for examination or copying, or both, by other
parties at reasonable time and place. The court may order
that they be produced in court.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1006 and is consistent
with Pennsylvania law. See Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-
Standard Corp., 446 Pa. 280, 285 A.2d 451 (1971); Royal
Pioneer Paper Box Manufacturing Co. v. Louis Dejonge &
Co., 179 Pa. Super. 155, 115 A.2d 837 (1955); Keller v.
Porta, 172 Pa. Super. 651, 94 A.2d 140 (1953).
Rule 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of
Party.
Contents of writings, recordings, or photographs may be
proved by the testimony or deposition of the party against
whom offered or by that party’s written admission, with-
out accounting for the nonproduction of the original.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1007. There is no precise
equivalent to Pa.R.E. 1007 under Pennsylvania law, but
the rule is consistent with Pennsylvania practice.
Pa.R.C.P. 1019(h) requires a party to attach a copy of a
writing to a pleading, if any claim or defense is based on
the writing. A responsive pleading admitting the accuracy
of the writing would preclude an objection based on the
original writings rule. Similarly, Pa.R.C.P. 4014(a) per-
mits a party to serve any other party with a request for
admission as to the genuineness, authenticity, correct-
ness, execution, signing, delivery, mailing or receipt of
any document described in the request. Pa.R.C.P. 4014(d)
provides that any matter admitted is conclusively estab-
lished.
Pa.R.E. 1007 is somewhat more expansive but serves
the same purpose of eliminating frivolous objections.
Rule 1008. Functions of Court and Jury.
When the admissibility of other evidence of contents of
writings, recordings, or photographs under these rules
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the
question whether the condition has been fulfilled is
ordinarily for the court to determine in accordance with
the provisions of Pa.R.E. 104. However, when an issue is
raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever existed, or
(b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph
produced at the trial is the original, or (c) whether other
evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents, the
issue is for the trier of fact to determine as in the case of
other issues of fact.
Comment
This rule is identical to F.R.E. 1008 except for the
reference to ‘‘Pa.R.E.’’ instead of ‘‘rule.’’ There is no
equivalent to this rule under Pennsylvania law but this
approach appears to conform to Pennsylvania practice.
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-402. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
DISCIPLINARY BOARD OF
THE SUPREME COURT
Notice of Disbarment
Notice is hereby given that Frederick C. Creasy, Jr. has
been disbarred from the practice of law in the State of
Arizona by Order of the Supreme Court of Arizona dated
September 19, 1996. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
issued an order dated February 28, 1997 disbarring
Frederick C. Creasy, Jr. from the practice of law in this
Commonwealth, to be effective March 30, 1997.
ELAINE M. BIXLER,
Secretary
The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-403. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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Notice of Disbarment
Notice is hereby given that Llewellyn Dewitt has been
disbarred from the practice of law in the District of
Columbia by Order of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals dated October 3, 1996. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania issued an Order dated February 28, 1997
disbarring Llewellyn Dewitt from the practice of law in
this Commonwealth, to be effective March 30, 1997.
ELAINE M. BIXLER,
Secretary
The Disciplinary Board of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-404. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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RULES AND REGULATIONS
Title 67—TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[67 PA. CODE CH. 476]
Minimum Standards for Conducting Fixed Based
Operations at Commonwealth-Owned Airports
The Department of Transportation (Department), Bu-
reau of Aviation (Bureau), adopts Chapter 476 (relating to
minimum standards for conducting fixed base operations
at Commonwealth-owned airports). Notice of proposed
rulemaking was published at 24 Pa.B. 5236 (October 15,
1994), with an invitation to submit written comments
within 30 days of publication. The Department received
three comments.
Comments Received
The Department received comments from the Indepen-
dent Regulatory Review Commission (IRRC), Harrisburg
Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service. The follow-
ing is a summary of the comments received and the
Department’s response:
(1) IRRC did not believe that these minimum stan-
dards for fixed base operators (FBOs) should be promul-
gated and implemented as a regulation, and suggested
that these minimum standards instead be contained in a
Request for Proposal (RFP). IRRC believed an RFP to be
the more appropriate form in which to address these
standards since these standards only apply to FBOs that
contract with the Department to provide these services.
Averring that regulations are more appropriate for situa-
tions that apply to multiple locations and govern multiple
parties, IRRC strongly recommended the Department
withdraw the rulemaking.
According to the Office of the Budget’s Manual 215.1,
Contracting for Services, § 5.2 c(1), an RFP ‘‘will be used
to obtain consultant, professional, and other services
when the work statement is detailed, the agency is
seeking a contractor’s solution to a management problem,
and/or criteria, in addition to cost, will be used in
evaluating proposals.’’ The Department does not use the
RFP process since FBOs do not provide a service to the
Department; FBOs are tenants of the Department who
provide services to other airport tenants and airport
users. Further, the Department has never requested an
FBO to provide services at a Commonwealth-owned air-
port; instead, FBO applicants have historically ap-
proached the Department. In fact, in the last 6 months,
the Department has received inquiries from three entities
interested in becoming FBOs.
These regulations are similar to FBO minimum re-
quirements of other airports, none of which utilize an
RFP process. These airports include the following: Read-
ing Regional Airport; Johnstown-Cambria County Airport;
Lancaster Airport; Hazelton Municipal Airport; Wilkes-
Barre Scranton Airport; and Northeast Philadelphia Air-
port. These airports use minimum requirements to ensure
compliance with Federal regulations, satisfy grant assur-
ances to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and
to ensure that FBOs are treated equally. Obtaining FBOs
through the RFP process would prevent the Department
from turning down applicants who wish to pick and
choose the types of services they wish to provide. Further,
the possibility exists that an applicant would want to
provide certain of the services performed by an existing
FBO. Moreover, so long as there is property on which to
operate, there is no limit to the number of FBOs that
may operate at any one time at a particular airport. It is
up to the FBO applicant to decide whether there is
enough business at an airport to justify operating at that
airport.
Section 5301(a) of the Aviation Code, 74 Pa.C.S.
§ 5301(a) (relating to authority of department), directs
the Department to promulgate and enforce regulations as
necessary to execute the powers vested in the Depart-
ment. Further, subsection (b)(2) authorizes the Depart-
ment to operate and maintain airports which are owned
or leased by the Commonwealth. Therefore, the Depart-
ment believes it has adequate authority to promulgate
regulations relating to minimum standards for fixed base
operations at Commonwealth-owned airports.
Moreover, the Department, as an airport sponsor, has
committed to assurances required by the Airport and
Airway Improvement Act of 1982 (49 U.S.C.A. § 47101 et
seq.) which requires the Department to make its airport
facilities available for public use on fair and reasonable
terms and without unjust discrimination, to all types,
kinds and classes of aeronautical uses including FBOs
who shall be subject to the same rates, fees, rentals and
other charges as are uniformly applicable to all other
FBOs making the same or similar facilities. This act also
requires the Department to agree that it will not, either
directly or indirectly, grant or permit any persons, firms
or corporations the exclusive right at the airports owned
or controlled by the Department. However, Federal grant
assurances do authorize an airport sponsor to prohibit or
limit any given type, kind or class of aeronautical use of
the airport if the action is necessary for the sole operation
of the airport or necessary to serve the real aviation
needs of the public. Also, an airport sponsor may estab-
lish fair, equal and not unjustly discriminatory conditions
to be met by all users of the airport as may be necessary
for the safe and efficient operation of the airport.
Over the past 4 years, Harrisburg International Airport
has received an average of $2.15 million of entitlement
funds from the FAA each year. The Capital City Airport
receives discretionary money from the FAA under 49
U.S.C.A. § 47115 (relating to discretionary fund). The
Department uses these grant moneys for key infrastruc-
ture improvements at both facilities that are pertinent to
the continued economic growth and development of the
airports. The economic impact for both facilities includes
13,708 jobs, $233.4 million in payroll, and annual spend-
ing in the community of $594.3 million. By not providing
an impetus to a level playing field to like tenants, the
Department may be subjected to Federal sanctions, in-
cluding repayment of grant moneys and the denial of
future grant money. These sanctions would adversely
affect airport users, tenants, employes and the surround-
ing community.
Finally, the Department, on December 19, 1994, sent a
copy of IRRC’s comments to Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc.
and Stambaugh’s Air Service. In the accompanying letter,
the Department requested comment on whether these
regulations should be withdrawn as recommended by
IRRC. In a letter dated May 9, 1995, Stambaugh’s Air
Service commented that they believed the proposed regu-
lations were not stringent enough, however, they sup-
ported the Department’s efforts to establish minimum
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standards. In a letter dated May, 15, 1995, Harrisburg
Jet Center, Inc. indicated its support for the promulgation
of these regulations. These entities are FBOs at Harris-
burg International Airport and Capital City Airport,
respectively.
For all of these reasons, the Department believes it is
necessary to have these regulations in place. These
regulations will help ensure that FBOs, both existing and
future, will be dealt with fairly and equitably.
(2) Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air
Service noted that these regulations do not prohibit
persons other than FBOs from entering airport property
to engage in services listed under the definition of the
term ‘‘FBO’’ located at § 476.2 (relating to definitions).
The commentators were concerned that without this
prohibition, there will still be no control over unautho-
rized ‘‘pick up truck’’ services that have historically been
rendered on airport grounds. Further, these commenta-
tors believe that if a ‘‘pick up truck’’ operator was cited
for rendering services seen as FBO services, the operator
would assert that he is not an FBO because he does not
lease grounds from the airport. Therefore, the operator
would be free to continue providing services listed as
FBO-rendered services since these regulations do not
prohibit the operator’s actions.
Pick up truck entities are entities that come onto
airport grounds and attempt to provide services to airport
users who would otherwise engage the services of an
FBO. These entities have not entered into an agreement
with the Department to do business on airport property.
Further, by providing services that would otherwise be
performed by an FBO, these entities take business from
FBOs who are authorized to do business on airport
grounds. The Department views these entities as commer-
cial enterprises because the types of service they provide
are commercial in nature and require compliance with
applicable FAA regulations. Therefore, since an FBO is
defined as a commercial enterprise that has entered into
a lease agreement with the Department to provide spe-
cific services, pick up truck entities, by definition, are
prohibited from providing FBO services unless they com-
ply with the promulgated regulations. The Department,
therefore, believes that these regulations adequately ad-
dress the concerns of the commentators.
(3) IRRC, Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s
Air Service commented on the space allotted for aircraft
and automobile parking in §§ 476.11 and 476.12 (relating
to minimum facilities—Harrisburg International Airport;
and minimum facilities—Capital City Airport). An FBO
must provide a minimum of 50,000 square feet of aircraft
parking and 10,000 square feet for automobile parking at
Harrisburg International Airport, and 40,000 square feet
of aircraft parking and 10,000 square feet of automobile
parking at Capital City Airport. Harrisburg Jet Center,
Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service noted that the amount
of aircraft and automobile parking available to FBOs is
governed by the Airport Master Plan of each airport, and
suggested the Department acknowledge that the mini-
mum requirements are derived from these plans. IRRC
suggested the Department reconcile the amount of auto-
mobile parking with the Airport Master Plan of each
airport. Further, IRRC believed that, if the amount of
parking an FBO must require is controlled by the Airport
Master Plan, then this fact should be clarified in these
regulations.
The proposed regulations were prepared in accordance
with the Airport Master Plan for each airport. An Airport
Master Plan is a 20-year planning document that sets
forth the current layout of an airport. Under 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 47107(a)(16) (relating to project grant application ap-
proval conditioned on assurances about airport opera-
tions), the plan must be approved by the United States
Secretary of Transportation (Secretary). Alterations in the
airport or any of its facilities may not be made if they do
not comply with the plan approved by the Secretary, and
if the Secretary believes the alteration may adversely
affect the safety, utility or efficiency of the airport. The
Airport Master Plan may be revised or modified, however,
any revision or modification must be approved by the
Secretary before taking effect. Because of the ever chang-
ing environment of aviation, most Airport Master Plans
require revision every 4 to 5 years. Revisions to the
Airport Master Plan will not affect these regulations,
however, since the regulatory requirements will not
change, only the physical location of where the services
will be performed. These airports have property that has
not yet been developed. As demand increases, the Airport
Master Plans will be amended to utilize this unused
property. The regulatory requirements will be the same
for that property as they are for property presently in
use. The Department, therefore, believes it unnecessary
to amend these sections as requested.
(4) Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air
Service commented on the building sizes and door heights
set forth in §§ 476.11 and 476.12. Harrisburg Jet Center,
Inc. suggested that the building should be closer to 10,000
square feet since the services provided by the FBO would
require shop, storage and equipment parking space;
Stambaugh’s Air Service suggested 20,000 square feet.
Further, Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. recommended that
the tail height of the door should be a minimum of 24 feet
to allow for clearance of smaller aircraft that are over
12,000 pounds; Stambaugh’s Air Service suggested 21
feet.
The Department wants to ensure that all entities are
treated fairly and equitably. For this reason, the Depart-
ment has proposed these minimum standards. If an FBO
applicant wishes to increase the dimensions of a building
or hangar, it may do so. However, if the Department acts
on the suggestions of Stambaugh’s Air Service and Har-
risburg Jet Center, Inc., smaller entities will be precluded
from providing FBO services at Commonwealth-owned
airports. Smaller entities may not have the capital to
involve themselves in all the types of services provided by
existing FBOs. That is one of the reasons these regula-
tions provide a choice of services. Constructing buildings
and hangars larger than what the FBO applicant needs
will result in increased overhead, which will decrease
profit. Since the purpose of these regulations is to
encourage FBO applicants willing to provide all manner
of services, regardless of the applicant’s size, the Depart-
ment has refrained from amending these sections as
requested.
(5) Harrisburg Jet Service and Stambaugh’s Air Service
both commented on the mandatory services in § 476.13
(relating to mandatory services). This section sets forth
the services an FBO must provide: namely, aircraft
fueling and oil dispensing services, aircraft parking,
tie-down and hangar storage services, and two additional
services which are to be selected from a pool of five
additional services. The commentators believe that future
FBO applicants should provide the same types of services
provided by current FBOs. Current FBOs provide all the
mandatory and selective services provided for in the
proposed regulations. By allowing FBO applicants to
select certain services, the commentators believe these
regulations allow the applicants to pick and choose the
RULES AND REGULATIONS 1353
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
types of services they wish to provide, regardless of
whether they are capital intensive. Further, the commen-
tators believe that fuel service generates the income that
supports the other required services, which are capital
intensive and are employed less frequently. Therefore, the
commentators requested the Department amend the man-
datory services requirements by requiring fuel service
and a repair station certificate, and one other selection
from § 476.13.
This section presently requires FBOs to provide aircraft
fueling and oil dispensing services, thereby rendering the
need to amend this section to require these services
unnecessary. Further, these regulations set forth mini-
mum requirements that provide an FBO applicant with
the flexibility to decide what choice of services to provide
based upon what the market will bear. Since the purpose
of these regulations is to attract FBO applicants willing
to provide various levels of services, the Department has
refrained from amending this section as requested. By
providing the FBO applicant with a choice of two of the
five additional required services, the Department allows
the applicant to determine what services it has experi-
ence in providing, and what services it can afford to
provide. Amending this section as requested would hinder
smaller FBO applicants from providing services at
Commonwealth-owned airports since they may be unable
to afford providing certain suggested services, or they do
not have experience in those areas.
(6) IRRC commented on the use of the term ‘‘unsightly
aircraft’’ in § 476.15(1)(iii) (relating to aircraft parking,
tie-down and hangar storage services). This subparagraph
prohibits the parking of unsightly aircraft and leaves the
determination of what is unsightly to the Director of
Aviation. IRRC recommended the Department delete this
subparagraph, believing that if an aircraft is in proper
working condition, there should be no restrictions placed
on the aircraft regarding its appearance. Further, if the
Department decided to retain this subparagraph, IRRC
recommended the Department detail what is considered
unsightly, set forth specific criteria the Director will use
to make this determination, and explain how an ag-
grieved person can appeal the Director’s decision. Finally,
if this subparagraph is retained, IRRC requested the
Department justify the harm caused by the presence of
an unsightly aircraft.
Upon reviewing this subparagraph, the Department
understands the concern of IRRC and has replaced the
word ‘‘unsightly’’ with the word ‘‘unairworthy.’’ This term
is defined at § 476.2 as ‘‘an aircraft that does not meet its
FAA type certification or is in a condition that is unsafe
for operation in the air, and is not under the care and
control of an FBO for maintenance.’’ If an aircraft does
not meet either of these conditions, then it is an airwor-
thy aircraft, despite its outward appearance. The Depart-
ment believes that these amendments will help eliminate
any confusion caused by the use of the term ‘‘unsightly.’’
Moreover, the definition of the term ‘‘unairworthy’’ estab-
lishes criteria with which the Director may make his
determination as to whether an aircraft is ‘‘unairworthy.’’
The Department has refrained from including language
explaining how an aggrieved FBO may appeal a decision
of the Director since an applicant aggrieved by a decision
rendered under any provision of these regulations may
file an appeal in accordance with § 476.52 (relating to
appeal).
As to IRRC’s request for the Department to justify the
harm caused by the presence of an unairworthy aircraft,
unairworthy aircraft occupies space on already limited
aircraft parking ramp areas. The parking ramp areas are
used by many different types and sizes of aircraft. To
ensure that all airworthy aircraft have space in which to
park, the Department has established these provisions so
that unairworthy aircraft is allowed in aircraft parking
ramp areas only when absolutely necessary. Further,
more aircraft in these areas results in limited maneuver-
ability, which increases the potential for accidents. Ensur-
ing that unairworthy aircraft are not in these areas will
help decrease the potential for accidents.
(7) IRRC, Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s
Air Service all noted that § 476.16 (relating to airframe,
power plant and accessory services) does not require a
repair station to be certified. IRRC believed that, as a
minimum standard, an FBO providing maintenance ser-
vices should have a repair station certification. Harris-
burg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service be-
lieved the equipment requirement should be more
detailed, and that an FBO should have a repair station
certificate. These commentators opined that absent the
repair station certificate, these regulations would allow
the FBO to employ a minimum number of licensed
mechanics yet still be unable to provide the type of
maintenance and repair service contemplated by the
Department. Further, these commentators noted that
§ 476.17 (relating to radio and instrument services) does
not require necessary FAA licenses, and should specify
radio bench and repair equipment. Harrisburg Jet Center,
Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service believe that these
regulations will allow an FBO to provide fuel services
without competent or comprehensive additional services,
thereby not providing the type of even competition these
regulations are intended to promote.
The Department respectfully disagrees with the recom-
mendation of IRRC. Section 476.16(1) and (3) requires an
FBO to provide comprehensive maintenance services with
properly FAA-certified mechanics and FAA-trained per-
sonnel. Major repairs require the sign-off of an Inspection
Authorization Mechanic and regular maintenance re-
quires the sign-off of an Airframe & Power Plant Me-
chanic, both of whom are FAA-certified mechanics. While
these regulations do not specifically require that an FBO
applicant become an FAA-certified repair station, the
minimum requirements established by these regulations
set forth the types of maintenance and repair services
contemplated by the Department. It is not the intent of
these regulations to require all FBOs to be certified
repair stations. Certified repair stations generally handle
heavy aircraft maintenance and an FBO applicant may
not want to provide those types of services nor are those
services required. If an FBO applicant desires to become
a certified repair station, however, these regulations do
not preclude this.
(8) Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air
Service believed that § 476.19 (relating to flight training
services) should require compliance with 14 CFR Parts 61
and 141 (relating to certification: pilots and flight instruc-
tors; and pilot schools). Section 476.19 requires the FBO
to comply with applicable FAA statutes, regulations and
advisory circulars. These regulations are merely mini-
mum standards, and the Department is allowing the FBO
applicant to determine, to a certain extent, what services
it wishes to provide. Because of the numerous FAA
regulations applicable to the various services an FBO
may provide, the Department has refrained from specify-
ing the particular FAA regulation. The two mentioned by
the commentators are just two of many that may be
applicable, depending on the circumstances. The appli-
cable FAA regulation depends on the type of service the
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FBO wishes to provide. Once the Department is aware of
the type of services the FBO wishes to provide, the
Department will ensure that the FBO complies with the
applicable FAA regulations.
(9) Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air
Service disagreed with the exclusion of ground transpor-
tation for hire and vending machine services from FBO
leases. Section 476.23 (relating to specific exclusions
applicable to FBOs) lists various concessions excluded
from FBO leases. The commentators assert that the
remote location of FBO facilities requires that ground
transportation be a necessary service. Further, given the
layout of the airports, the commentators believe that
ground transportation services will not constitute compe-
tition with auto rental companies in the terminal area. As
for vending machine services, the commentators maintain
that these services are expected and necessary adjuncts
to a good FBO. Further, they opined that vending services
would not provide competition with vendors in the termi-
nal because of the remote location of FBO facilities.
Ground transportation for hire and vending machine
services are not FBO services; they are services provided
by other entities doing business at the airport. These
regulations simply provide that services of this type are
not to be considered when applying to provide FBO
services. There is nothing, however, to preclude the
Department from entering into a separate agreement
with the FBO for these types of non-FBO services. The
Department has, therefore, refrained from eliminating
ground transportation services and vending machine ser-
vices from the list of concessions excluded from FBO
leases.
(10) The IRRC commented on § 476.24 (relating to
application procedure for conducting fixed base opera-
tions), which requires an FBO applicant to submit a
written request to the Bureau. IRRC noted that the
proposed language does not indicate what information or
documentation an FBO applicant must provide to the
Bureau. For this reason, IRRC recommended the Depart-
ment clarify the information and documentation an FBO
applicant must submit as part of the application proce-
dure. Further, if there is an application the Department
has developed for this purpose, IRRC recommended the
Department reference it in these regulations.
Moreover, IRRC noted that § 476.24(b) does not provide
criteria as to how the Department will make a determina-
tion on the application. This subsection also does not
provide the maximum number of FBOs that may provide
services at each airport. Because of this, IRRC recom-
mended the Department amend this section by including
criteria used to determine the acceptance of an FBO and
the maximum amount of FBOs that will be allowed to
provide service at each airport.
After reviewing the proposed language, the Department
realized that guidance to the applicant was very limited.
Since the Department has not created an FBO service
application, the Department has amended § 476.24(a) to
clarify for FBO applicants what information they should
include in the application: specifically, the applicant must
detail how it plans to meet the requirements of this
chapter and the proposed timetable for meeting these
requirements. Further, § 476.24(b) has been amended as
suggested to set forth the criteria upon which the Depart-
ment will base its decision. The criteria are as follows: 1)
the applicant demonstrates that it can meet the require-
ments of this chapter; 2) the applicant demonstrates its
ability to comply with applicable Federal, State and local
regulations; and 3) the applicant demonstrates that a
need exists for additional FBO services to meet the
continued growth and development of the airport facility.
If an applicant satisfies these criteria, then the Depart-
ment will negotiate a lease agreement with the applicant
to provide FBO services at the designated facility. The
Department has not established a maximum number of
FBOs that may provide service at each airport since this
number depends upon the aviation industry and the
perceived need for FBO services at each airport.
(11) IRRC questioned why, in § 476.26(b) (relating to
existing fixed operating agreements), an airline that
provides the same service as an FBO is not subject to
these regulations. Believing that there should be a level
playing field between FBOs and the airlines, IRRC
recommended that, upon expiration of current airline
operating agreements, the Department should require
airlines to comply with these regulations if the airline
provides services that are also provided by an FBO.
Further, Stambaugh’s Air Service was concerned about
airlines that hire out their services to other airlines.
Specifically, Stambaugh’s Air Service noted that: 1) the
services provided by the airlines are not subject to these
regulations; 2) investment requirements of FBOs are not
required of airlines; and 3) existing FBO operations
performed by airlines are not subject to the sunsetting
imposed on other existing services. Stambaugh’s Air
Service believes that, by exempting airline operating
agreements, these regulations allow airlines to compete
with FBOs without having to pay fees to the Department,
since they do not have leases.
The rights and privileges afforded signatory airlines are
an industry standard. Signatory airlines not only under-
write airfield operation and maintenance expenses
through landing fees, they also underwrite the cost and
operation of the terminal facility and cannot be put in the
same category as an FBO. Further, the signatory airline
operating agreement allows the Department to collect
reasonable fees or commissions for services or facilities
provided by or for an airline in competition with conces-
sionaires and operators operating under an agreement
with the Department. Airlines and FBOs are not like
entities because airline services are limited in nature in
comparison to FBO services. FBOs provide specific ser-
vices to numerous entities whereas airlines generally
provide limited ground handling services to themselves as
well as other signatory airlines. New FBO applicants may
or may not elect to provide ground handling services. It is
because of these differences that the Department has not
amended these regulations as recommended by IRRC.
(12) IRRC, Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc. and
Stambaugh’s Air Service commented on the requirement
of § 476.27(b) (relating to compliance inspections) which
gives FBOs 24 hours to make corrections indicated on the
Department’s written report. Harrisburg Jet Center, Inc.
and Stambaugh’s Air Service both believed that the time
frame of 24 hours should be replaced with the word
‘‘reasonable.’’ These commentators noted that there may
be instances when 24 hours might not be a reasonable
time frame in which to make corrections. IRRC also
believed the 24-hour time period was too stringent,
especially since failure to take action within that time
will result in cancellation of the FBO’s agreement. As an
alternative, IRRC suggested the Department establish
time frames for corrections to be completed, based on the
severity of the deficiency. Finally, Harrisburg Jet Center,
Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service believed that failure to
make correction within the designated time frame should
constitute a default under the lease. These commentators
made this suggestion because they believe that regulatory
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cancellation based on a subjective enforcement clause will
only aggravate the legal processes that are employed by
both parties in these matters.
Section 476.27(c) addresses deficiencies that require
more than 24 hours to correct. In these instances, the
FBO must submit a proposed schedule of corrections to
the Bureau for approval. The written report provided to
the FBO will set forth the time frame in which the
proposed schedule is to be submitted to the Bureau.
Further, § 476.27(d) addresses the concerns of Harrisburg
Jet Center, Inc. and Stambaugh’s Air Service. This sub-
section states that failure to make required corrections
within the time frame specified by the Bureau will result
in cancellation of the FBO’s lease agreement. Since the
FBO is given time to submit a proposed schedule of
corrections, and the schedule is relied upon by the
Bureau in the event corrections are not made according to
schedule, the Department does not view this enforcement
clause as subjective. Therefore, since these regulations
presently address the concerns of the commentators, the
Department has refrained from further amending this
section as suggested.
(13) IRRC questioned why the Department excluded
Grand Canyon Airport, a Commonwealth-owned airport,
from these regulations. Although this airport is presently
operating efficiently, IRRC believes there is no reason for
the FBOs at Grand Canyon Airport not to be subject to
the same minimum standards as similarly situated FBOs
at other Commonwealth-owned airports. Therefore, IRRC
strongly recommended the Department include Grand
Canyon Airport in these regulations.
Grand Canyon Airport is a small general service facility
which is capable of handling only one FBO. Due to the
size of the airport and the amount of business handled,
this FBO can provide only limited services in comparison
to Capital City Airport and Harrisburg International
Airport. The size and amount of business at Grand
Canyon Airport have also made it necessary for the FBO
to assume the additional responsibilities of airport man-
ager and operator for the Department in order to remain
viable. Therefore, the FBO must also oversee the day-to-
day operations of the Grand Canyon Airport for the
Department. These additional responsibilities are not
those typically expected of an FBO.
The minimum standards proposed are designed for a
scheduled service facility—an airport that has scheduled
commercial airline operations—such as Harrisburg Inter-
national Airport, and a designated reliever facility—an
airport that provides relief from airport congestion of a
scheduled service facility—such as Capital City Airport.
Imposing similar requirements on Grand Canyon Airport
at this time is unnecessary and would impose undue
hardship on a facility that does not possess the marketing
potential of the other two airports. Further, an FAA
Circular, entitled Minimum Standards for Commercial
Aeronautical Activities on Public Airports, which outlines
recommended criteria for minimum standards, suggests
that care be taken not to impose standards that could
compel a service operator to extend its investment beyond
the economic potential of the airport. This could be the
result if these minimum standards were imposed at
Grand Canyon Airport. Therefore, the Department has
refrained from adding Grand Canyon Airport to these
regulations.
Additional Changes and Modifications
The final text of these regulations contains modifica-
tions, deletions and additions, none of which enlarges the
scope of these amendments as originally proposed, and
thus, may be published as final rulemaking. The follow-
ing represents a summary of the changes:
(1) Section 476.2 has been amended by deleting the
word ‘‘including’’ in the definition of the term ‘‘FBO’’ and
replacing it with the phrase ‘‘which may include the
following.’’ The purpose of this amendment is to clarify for
affected persons that an FBO does not need to provide all
of the listed services to qualify as an FBO. Further, the
definition of ‘‘tie-down’’ has been amended to clarify the
acceptable methods by which an aircraft may be secured.
The originally proposed language included the word ‘‘suit-
able,’’ a subjective term that provided no guidance to an
FBO. Moreover, a definition of the term ‘‘unairworthy
aircraft’’ has been added. This definition states that an
unairworthy aircraft is one that does not meet its FAA
type certification or is unsafe for operation in the air, and
is not under the care and control of an FBO for mainte-
nance. This criteria in this definition will be used by the
Bureau Director when determining whether an aircraft is
unairworthy under § 476.15(1)(iii). This definition is the
result of comments the Department received from IRRC.
(2) Section 476.11(1) (relating to minimum facilities—
Harrisburg International Airport) has been amended by
replacing the word ‘‘taxiout’’ with the word ‘‘taxi-out.’’
This amendment was necessary to provide consistency
between the definition of the term, at § 476.2, and the
term as used throughout this chapter. Section 476.12(1)
has been similarly amended for consistency purposes.
(3) Section 476.13 has been amended to simplify com-
prehension of the requirements of this section by dividing
the proposed language into two subsections. This section
was originally proposed to set forth the mandatory ser-
vices to be provided by all FBOs. There are two services
that all FBOs must provide, namely aircraft fueling and
oil dispensing services, and aircraft parking, tie-down and
hangar storage services. This requirement has been re-
structured as subsection (a). The newly-styled subsection
(b) requires the FBO to provide two of the five additional
services set forth in this section, namely airframe, power
plant and accessory services; radio and instrument ser-
vices; air taxi and charter services; flight training ser-
vices; and ground handling support services. The Depart-
ment has separated the originally proposed language into
two subsections to ensure that FBOs are aware that there
are two levels of mandatory services; the first level
consisting of two services that the Department has deter-
mined all FBOs must provide, and the second level
consisting of five services, two of which the FBO must
provide in addition to the first level of services.
(4) Section 476.14(3)(iv) (relating to aircraft fueling and
oil dispensing services) has been amended by adding the
word ‘‘bonding’’ after the word ‘‘grounding’’ since National
Fire Protection Agency addresses bonding in its publica-
tion entitled, Aircraft Fuel Service. The FAA addresses
grounding in its Advisory Circular entitled, Aircraft Fuel
Storage, Handling, and Dispensing on Airports. Ground-
ing constitutes a three-part procedure: a grounding cable
must be connected between the fuel truck and the surface
grounding point; a second grounding cable must be
connected between the fuel truck and the aircraft; and a
third grounding cable must be connected between the
aircraft and the grounding surface. Bonding refers to the
use of one grounding cable that connects the fuel truck to
the aircraft. The bonding procedure is used when an
aircraft has a fuel tank fill port on top of the wing. Since
both procedures are used when fueling aircraft, the
Department believes that both words should be used in
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these regulations. Further, to provide consistency
throughout this chapter, § 476.14(4)(iii) has been simi-
larly amended.
(5) Section 476.14(3)(vi) has been amended by deleting
the specific number of the FAA Advisory Circular and
replacing it with the word ‘‘entitled.’’ This amendment
was considered necessary since FAA Advisory Circulars
numbers are prone to change, although their titles are
not. To ensure that FBOs refer to the most recent FAA
publication, whatever its number, the Department has
amended this subparagraph to refer only to the title of
the publication. Further, to maintain consistency through-
out the chapter, §§ 476.14(4)(v), (5) and (6) and
476.15(1)(ii) and (2) have been similarly amended.
This subparagraph has been further amended for con-
sistency purposes to clarify what type of written records
the FBO must keep on file. Sections 476.14(4)(iv) and (v)
have been similarly amended. Finally, to clarify how long
written records should be kept, this subparagraph has
been further amended to require that written records be
kept for 1 year. Problems relating to fueling become
evident within a short period of time. Therefore, the
Department believes that record retention of one year will
provide adequate protection for those serviced by FBOs
while eliminating the necessity of FBOs retaining these
files for an inordinate amount of time. Section
476.14(3)(vii) and (4)(iv) and (v) have been similarly
amended for consistency purposes.
(6) Section 476.14(6) has been amended by adding the
phrase ‘‘(A. C. and D. C.)’’ immediately after the phrase
‘‘starting equipment’’ to clarify that an FBO engaging in
aircraft fueling and fuel dispensing services must provide
both alternate current and direct current electrical equip-
ment. This amendment was necessary since aircraft use
both types of electrical current for operation. These types
of current are used to start the aircraft engines, when
necessary, and to provide power during aircraft repairs.
By specifically setting forth the types of current the
starting equipment must be able to handle, the Depart-
ment hopes to eliminate any possible confusion about the
type of starting equipment an FBO must provide.
(7) Section 476.15 (relating to aircraft parking, tie-
down and hangar storage services) has been amended at
paragraph (1)(iii) by replacing the word ‘‘unsightly’’ with
the word ‘‘unairworthy.’’ This amendment, along with the
associated definition of the term ‘‘unairworthy aircraft’’
located at § 476.2, clarifies what type of aircraft can or
cannot be parked on the ramp area. This paragraph has
been further amended by adding the phrase ‘‘or a desig-
nee’’ immediately after the word ‘‘Director,’’ so that, in the
Director’s absence, a designee may determine whether an
aircraft is unairworthy. These amendments are the result
of comments received from IRRC, and the Department
appreciates its bringing these matters to its attention.
Further, paragraph (2) has been amended by deleting the
word ‘‘suitable’’ since this word provides no objective
guidance for an FBO. The FAA Advisory Circular entitled
‘‘Tie-Down Sense,’’ which is referred to in this paragraph,
will direct the FBO as to the correct method of securing
an aircraft. Finally, paragraph (3)(i) has been amended by
deleting the word ‘‘proper’’ since this word does not
provide additional guidance to an FBO.
(8) Section 476.16 has been amended at paragraph (3)
by deleting the word ‘‘adequately’’ since this word adds
nothing to the meaning of this paragraph. Further,
paragraph (4) has been amended by inserting the word
‘‘FAA-certified’’ immediately before the word ‘‘mechanic.’’
This amendment clarifies that the mechanic who must be
on call and available to respond to emergency customer
service requests must be certified by the FAA. By amend-
ing this paragraph, the Department will ensure that
FBOs are aware of the qualifications their mechanic must
have before providing airframe, power plant and acces-
sory services.
(9) Section 476.18(3) (relating to air taxi and charter
services) has been amended to clarify that a title or lease
agreement must exist for each operated aircraft owned or
leased by an FBO. The originally proposed language
made it unclear whether a written agreement was neces-
sary for an aircraft owned by an FBO, and did not specify
what type of written agreement was needed. The Depart-
ment is requiring a title or lease agreement for each
aircraft as evidence that the FBO has the authority to
exercise dominion and control over the aircraft the FBO
is operating. This affords the Department and airport
users adequate protection against use of an aircraft by
someone other than the rightful owner or authorized
operator. The amended language will make it clear that a
title or lease agreement must exist for each operated
aircraft whether it is owned by or leased to the FBO.
(10) Section 476.21 (relating to optional and special
services) has been amended to eliminate confusion and
promote consistency throughout the section by deleting
the word ‘‘activities’’ since this word is not used elsewhere
in this section. Further, this section has been amended to
clarify that the facilities to be used for optional services
must be capable of supporting the optional services
proposed. This amendment provides an objective standard
for the Director to use when deciding whether to approve
an application for the provision of optional or special
services.
(11) Section 476.22 (relating to negotiated services) has
been amended by replacing the words ‘‘this section’’ with
‘‘§§ 476.14—476.21.’’ This amendment was necessary
since this section does not contain any specific services,
and the referenced sections pertain to the various FBO
services which are the subject of these regulations. The
Department hopes that this amendment will eliminate
any confusion which may have resulted from this error.
(12) Section 476.24(a) (relating to application procedure
for conducting fixed base operations) has been amended
to clarify for FBO applicants what information they
should include in the application to become an FBO. This
subsection, as originally proposed, required only that the
applicant submit a written request. IRRC, in its com-
ments, noted that this subsection did not provide guid-
ance as to what information the FBO must provide.
Realizing this oversight, the Department has amended
this subsection to require an application detailing the
applicant’s plans to meet the requirements of this chap-
ter, and the timetable for meeting these requirements.
The Department may request additional information if
the application does not contain the schematics necessary
to carry out the requirements of this chapter. The Depart-
ment believes this description will give an FBO applicant
guidance as to what information to include in its applica-
tion. Further, this section has been amended by replacing
the phrase ‘‘written request’’ with the word ‘‘application’’
wherever the former term appears. This amendment more
accurately reflects the type of document the FBO appli-
cant must submit to the Department. Section 476.25(a)
(relating to lease agreements) has been similarly
amended to reflect this change.
(13) Section 476.24(b) has been amended to clarify that
the Department will submit a written response to the
applicant within 30 days of receipt of the application.
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Although the originally proposed language also conveyed
this intent, the Department believed clarity would be
better served by rewording the language to alleviate the
possibility of misinterpretation. Further, this section has
been amended by establishing the criteria the Depart-
ment will use to evaluate the FBO applications. The
Department will enter into a lease agreement with an
FBO applicant if the following criteria are met: the FBO
applicant demonstrates that it can meet the requirements
of this chapter; the FBO applicant demonstrates its
ability to comply with applicable Federal, State and local
regulations; and the FBO applicant demonstrates that a
need exists for additional FBO services to meet the
continued growth and development of the facility.
(14) Section 476.24(c) has been amended by deleting
the entire subsection. This subsection was proposed to
notify FBO applicants that they have the right to appeal
the Bureau’s decision, and referenced the appeal provi-
sions at § 476.52. Since § 476.52 provides for the right to
appeal any decision made pursuant to these regulations,
the Department has since decided that this subsection is
unnecessary.
(15) Section 476.25 has been retitled as ‘‘lease agree-
ment’’ and, accordingly, throughout the section where the
phrase ‘‘written agreement’’ appears. This amendment
more accurately reflects the type of agreement entered
into by the Department and the FBO applicant. Further,
subsection (c) has been amended by deleting the word
‘‘Bureau’’ immediately preceding the word ‘‘Director.’’ This
amendment was necessary since the word ‘‘Director’’ is a
defined term and the Department deemed the word
‘‘Bureau’’ an unnecessary modifier.
(16) Section 476.27(d) (relating to compliance inspec-
tions) has been amended by inserting the word ‘‘lease’’
before the word ‘‘agreement’’ wherever the latter word
appears. This amendment is designed to clarify the type
of agreement that will be canceled if an FBO fails to
make required corrections to its facilities within the time
frame specified by the Department.
(17) Section 476.52 has been amended by deleting the
phrase ‘‘to grant, deny or revoke the FBO’s lease.’’ This
deletion was necessary since it was not the Department’s
intent to limit the FBO’s ability to appeal any action
taken by the Department under these regulations. Re-
moving this language will help clarify for FBOs that they
have the right to appeal any action taken pursuant to
these regulations, not only the granting, denial or revoca-
tion of a lease.
Purpose of this Chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth minimum
standards for conducting FBOs operations at
Commonwealth-owned airports.
Purpose of these Regulations
The purpose of these regulations is to amend 67 Pa.
Code by adding Chapter 476. These regulations set forth
minimum standards for conducting FBOs at two of the
three Commonwealth-owned airports operated by the
Department’s Bureau: Harrisburg International and Capi-
tal City.
Minimum standards for Grand Canyon Airport are not
established in these regulations. Grand Canyon Airport is
presently leased to one airport operator who meets the
needs of current airport users. However, if development
occurs and the airport is expanded and an increased level
of service is determined necessary, appropriate minimum
standards may be proposed.
An FBO is a commercial enterprise performing
aviation-related services for airport customers who desire
to utilize the services provided by the FBO. These
regulations establish eligibility requirements and mini-
mum criteria for facilities and services including aircraft
and automobile parking, buildings, fuel service, repairs,
air taxi and charter services, flight training and ground
services. These regulations also establish hours of opera-
tion determined necessary to provide an adequate level of
service to airport customers. The Department reserves
the right to impose additional standards in the actual
lease agreements negotiated with prospective FBOs.
These regulations are necessary to ensure a minimum
level of customer service at Commonwealth-owned airport
facilities and are similar to the industry standards for
FBOs in place at airports Nationally. These regulations
propose minimum standards comparable to other simi-
larly sized airports. Airport users are accustomed to
having available standard services such as those men-
tioned above. The Department, in providing first-class
facilities and services, must meet demand of the airport
users. Also, in order to run a profitable business and
remain competitive, the Department must provide ser-
vices to attract users who may otherwise divert to nearby
airports.
Persons or Entities Affected
These regulations affect persons or entities who apply
to conduct FBOs at one of the Commonwealth-owned
airports: Harrisburg International in Middletown, Penn-
sylvania, and Capital City in New Cumberland, Pennsyl-
vania. These regulations also affect persons using these
airports.
Fiscal Impact
These regulations will not result in increased costs to
the Commonwealth, local governments, agencies or pri-
vate persons, nor will they require the preparation of
additional forms, reports or other paperwork.
Regulatory Review
Under section 5(a) of the Regulatory Review Act (71
P. S. § 745.5(a)), on October 4, 1994, the Department
submitted a copy of the notice of proposed rulemaking,
published at 24 Pa.B. 5236 to IRRC and to the Chairper-
sons of the House and Senate Committees on Transporta-
tion for review and comment. In compliance with section
5(b.1) of the Regulatory Review Act, the Department also
provided IRRC and the Committees with copies of the
comments received, as well as other documentation.
In preparing these final-form regulations, the Depart-
ment has considered the comments received from IRRC,
the Committees and the public.
These final-form regulations were deemed approved by
the House and Senate Committees on February 1, 1997.
IRRC met on February 6, 1997, and approved these
regulations in accordance with section 5(c) of the Regula-
tory Review Act.
Sunset Provisions
The Department is not establishing a sunset date for
these regulations, since these regulations are needed to
administer provisions required under 74 Pa.C.S. Part III
(relating to Aviation Code) (code). The Department, how-
ever, will continue to monitor these regulations for their
effectiveness.
Contact Person
The contact person is Dennis Hamsher, Chief; Pro-
grams and Policy Management Division; Bureau of Avia-
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tion; 208 Airport Drive; Harrisburg International Airport;
Middletown, PA 17057; (717) 948-3935.
Authority
The regulations hereby adopted are adopted under the
authority contained in sections 5301(a) and 5903(a)(7) of
the code (relating to authority of the department; and
authority of department). These statutory provisions,
respectively, direct the Department to promulgate and
enforce regulations necessary to execute its powers relat-
ing to aviation, airport and air safety within this Com-
monwealth; and authorize the Department to purchase,
contract for and maintain equipment, materials, services
and supplies necessary to operate or maintain an airport.
Findings
The Department finds that:
(1) Public notice of intention to amend the administra-
tive regulations amended by this order has been given
under sections 201 and 202 of the act of July 31, 1968
(P. L. 769, No. 240) (45 P. S. §§ 1201 and 1202), and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, 1 Pa. Code §§ 7.1
and 7.2.
(2) The amendment of the regulations of the Depart-
ment in the manner provided in this order is necessary
and appropriate for the administration and enforcement
of the authorizing statutes.
Order
The Department, acting under the authorizing statutes,
orders that:
(a) The regulations of the Department, 67 Pa.Code, are
amended by adding §§ 476.1, 476.2, 476.11—476.27,
476.51 and 476.52 to read as set forth in Annex A.
(b) The Secretary of the Department shall submit this
order and Annex A to the Office of Attorney General and
the Office of General Counsel for approval as to legality
as required by law.
(c) The Secretary of the Department shall certify this
order and Annex A and deposit them with the Legislative
Reference Bureau as required by law.
(d) This order shall take effect immediately upon publi-
cation in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
BRADLEY L. MALLORY,
Secretary
(Editor’s Note: For the text of the order of IRRC
relating to this document, see 27 Pa.B. 972 (February 22,
1997).)
Fiscal Note: Fiscal Note 18-322 remains valid for the
final adoption of the subject regulations.
Annex A
TITLE 67. TRANSPORTATION
PART I. TRANSPORTATION
Subpart B. NONVEHICLE CODE PROVISIONS
ARTICLE IV. AIR TRANSPORTATION
CHAPTER 476. MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CONDUCTING FIXED BASE OPERATIONS AT
COMMONWEALTH-OWNED AIRPORTS
GENERAL
Sec.
476.1. Purpose.
476.2. Definitions.
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
476.11. Minimum facilities—Harrisbur International Airport.
476.12. Minimum facilities—Capital City Airport
476.13. Mandatory services.
476.14. Aircraft fueling and oil dispensing services
476.15. Aircraft parking, tie-down and hangar storage services.
476.16. Airframe, power plant and accessory services.
476.17. Radio and instrument services.
476.18. Air taxi and charter services.
476.19. Flight training services.
476.20. Ground handling support services.
476.21. Optional and special services.
476.22. Negotiated services.
476.23. Specific exclusions applicable to FBOs.
476.24. Application procedure for conducting fixed based operations.
476.25. Lease agreements.
476.26. Existing fixed base operating agreements.
476.27. Compliance inspections.
WAIVER AND APPEAL
476.51. Waiver and appeal.
476.52. Appeal.
GENERAL
§ 476.1. Purpose.
This chapter sets forth the minimum standards for
conducting fixed base operations at Commonwealth-
owned airports.
§ 476.2. Definitions.
The following words and terms, when used in this
chapter, have the following meanings, unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise:
AVGAS—Aviation gasoline used in propeller-driven pis-
ton aircraft.
Apron—A defined area on an airport intended to accom-
modate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading
passengers or cargo, refueling, parking or maintenance.
Bureau—The Bureau of Aviation of the Department.
Code—74 Pa.C.S. Part III (relating to the Aviation
Code).
Department—The Department of Transportation of the
Commonwealth.
Director—The Director of the Bureau.
FAA—The Federal Aviation Administration.
FBO—fixed base operator—A commercial enterprise
that has entered into a lease agreement with the Depart-
ment to provide services which may include the following:
(i) Aircraft fueling and oil dispensing.
(ii) Aircraft, parking, tie-down and hangar storage.
(iii) Airframe, power plant and accessory service.
(iv) Radio and instrument service.
(v) Air charter and flight instruction for airport users.
(vi) Ground services.
Ground services—Services provided by the FBO includ-
ing:
(i) Aircraft towing.
(ii) Baggage handling.
(iii) Deicing—glycol.
(iv) Power starts—A. C. and D. C.
(v) Air start.
(vi) Lavatory service.
(vii) Potable water.
(viii) Aircraft cleaning—interior and exterior.
(ix) Cabin supplies.
NFPA—National Fire Protection Agency.
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Taxi-out—The movement of an airplane, under its own
power, from its fixed position at an apron or parking
position to the runway.
Tie-down—Securing of an aircraft by binding anchors or
ropes or other similar methods.
User—An airport customer who desires to utilize a
service offered by an FBO.
Unairworthy aircraft—An aircraft that does not meet
its FAA type certification or is in a condition that is
unsafe for operation in the air, and is not under the care
and control of an FBO for maintenance.
ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS AND CRITERIA
§ 476.11. Minimum facilities—Harrisburg Interna-
tional Airport.
The following are the criteria for the minimum facilities
an FBO shall provide for the Harrisburg International
Airport:
(1) Aircraft parking—paved apron. The FBO shall pro-
vide a minimum of 50,000 square feet to accommodate
aircraft parking and tie-downs, with taxi-out capability
including sufficient taxi clearances.
(2) Automobile parking. The FBO shall provide 10,000
square feet of space for automobile parking.
(3) Buildings. The FBO shall provide a lounge, public
restrooms, training and flight planning offices of at least
2,000 square feet, and a hangar of at least 10,000 square
feet. The hangar shall be used for aircraft maintenance
and storage and have aircraft door openings of at least 60
feet in width and at least 17 feet in height.
(4) Fuel service. The FBO shall provide fuel for one
grade of AVGAS in addition to appropriate jet fuel. Fuel
storage tanks, equipment and personnel shall comply
with applicable Federal, State and local regulations.
§ 476.12. Minimum facilities—Capital City Airport.
The following are the criteria for the minimum facilities
an FBO shall provide for the Capital City Airport:
(1) Aircraft parking—paved apron. The FBO shall pro-
vide a minimum of 40,000 square feet to accommodate
aircraft parking and tie-downs, with taxi-out capability
including sufficient taxi clearances.
(2) Automobile parking. The FBO shall provide 10,000
square feet of space for automobile parking.
(3) Buildings. The FBO shall provide a lounge, public
restrooms, training and flight planning offices of at least
2,000 square feet, and a hangar of at least 10,000 square
feet. The hangar shall be used for aircraft maintenance
and storage and have aircraft door openings of at least 60
feet in width and at least 17 feet in height.
(4) Fuel service. The FBO shall provide fuel for one
grade of AVGAS in addition to appropriate jet fuel. Fuel
storage tanks, equipment and personnel shall comply
with applicable Federal, State and local regulations.
§ 476.13. Mandatory services.
(a) Primary services. The FBO shall provide aircraft
fueling and oil dispensing services as set forth in
§ 476.14 (relating to aircraft fueling and oil dispensing
services), and aircraft parking, tie-down and hangar
storage services as set forth in § 476.15 (relating to
aircraft parking, tie-down and hangar storage services).
(b) Secondary services. In addition to the services set
forth in subsection (a), the FBO shall provide two of the
following services:
(1) Airframe, power plant and accessory services as set
forth in § 476.16 (relating to airframe, power plant and
accessory services).
(2) Radio and instrument services as set forth in
§ 476.17 (relating to radio and instrument services).
(3) Air taxi and charter services as set forth in
§ 476.18 (relating to air taxi and charter services).
(4) Flight training services as set forth in § 476.19
(relating to flight training services).
(5) Ground handling support services as set forth in
§ 476.20 (relating to ground handling support services).
§ 476.14. Aircraft fueling and oil dispensing ser-
vices.
The minimum requirements for aircraft fueling and oil
dispensing services are as follows:
(1) Compliance with applicable regulations. Fuel stor-
age and handling, including the storage and handling of
hazardous materials, shall be in compliance with appli-
cable Federal, State and local regulations.
(2) Fuel products. The FBO shall provide into-plane
retail delivery of an industry standard or recognized
brand of aviation fuel product required in the operation of
all types of aircraft normally frequenting the airport
facility. Pumps for dispensing the fuel shall be provided
at a location accessible to airport customers. The FBO
shall make mobile fuelers available and accessible at all
times to ensure that the same grades of fuel are dis-
pensed at any point at the airport facility as may be
required to accommodate the needs of other lessees or the
general public.
(3) Fueling facilities—storage area. The requirements
for storage area fueling facilities are as follows:
(i) The area shall be clearly defined and located away
from the aircraft parking area.
(ii) Tank filler caps shall be kept locked to avoid the
possibility of contamination or sabotage.
(iii) Fillers and pumps shall be color coded and
placarded as to octane or fuel grade, or both.
(iv) Electrical grounding/bonding shall be provided for
refueling operations.
(v) Fuel hoses and nozzles shall be stored in a clean,
sheltered area or protected in some manner from the
elements and contaminants.
(vi) Fuel shall be filtered. A regular inspection of the
filters shall be conducted in accordance with the most
current FAA Advisory Circular entitled, ‘‘Aircraft Fuel
Storage, Handling and Dispensing on Airports’’ or NFPA
Part 407, ‘‘Aircraft Fuel Service,’’ or both. Written records
of filter inspections shall be kept on file with the FBO for
1 year and shall be available for review by the Depart-
ment upon request.
(vii) Fuel tanks shall be checked daily, or prior to the
first refueling of the day, for water and contamination. A
written record of these inspections shall be kept on file
with the FBO for 1 year and shall be available for review
by the Department upon request.
(4) Fueling facilities—mobile fuelers. The minimum re-
quirements for mobile fueler fueling facilities are as
follows:
(i) A truck shall be provided with sufficient capacity to
refuel the largest general aviation aircraft likely to be
serviced for AVGAS and jet fuel.
1360 RULES AND REGULATIONS
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
(ii) The truck shall be clearly marked and labeled to
indicate types and grades of fuel dispensed.
(iii) The truck shall be equipped with adequate and
appropriate filling devices, meters and grounding/bonding
cables.
(iv) A regular inspection of the filters shall be con-
ducted in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular entitled,
‘‘Aircraft Fuel Storage, Handling, and Dispensing on
Airports’’ or NFPA 407 ‘‘Aircraft Fuel Servicing,’’ or both.
Written records of filter inspections shall be kept on file
with the FBO for 1 year and shall be available for review
by the Department upon request.
(v) Contamination separation devices shall be checked
daily, or prior to the first fueling of the day, for water and
contamination. Written records of these inspections shall
be kept on file with the FBO for 1 year and shall be
available for review by the Department upon request.
(5) Fueling procedures. Fueling procedures shall con-
form to recommendations and standards in the most
current FAA Advisory Circular entitled, ‘‘Aircraft Ground
Handling and Servicing.’’
(6) Aircraft service equipment. Energizers, standard
starting equipment (A. C. and D. C.), oxygen, appropriate
fire extinguishers, fueling equipment and deicing equip-
ment shall be provided.
(7) Personnel. Ramp service personnel trained and
qualified in accordance with applicable FAA regulations
shall be available during hours of fuel dispensing.
(8) Hours of operation. Fueling and oil dispensing
services shall be available as follows:
(i) Harrisburg International Airport. Fueling and oil
dispensing shall be available from 24 hours-a-day, 7 days-
a-week.
(ii) Capital City Airport. Fueling and oil dispensing
shall be available from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., 7 days a week.
§ 476.15. Aircraft parking, tie-down and hangar
storage services.
The minimum requirements for aircraft parking, tie-
down and hangar storage are as follows:
(1) Ramp area.
(i) The FBO shall provide taxi lines to refuel. Tie-down
and hangar areas shall be provided for directional conve-
nience and safety of transient and local based customer
aircraft.
(ii) FBO facilities shall comply with the most current
FAA Advisory Circular entitled, ‘‘Aircraft Ground Han-
dling and Servicing.’’
(iii) The parking of unairworthy aircraft is not permit-
ted. The Director or a designee will determine if an
aircraft is unairworthy.
(iv) The FBO is responsible for providing taxi pave-
ment marking lines and marking for parking transient
aircraft upon its leased ramp area. Entrance guidance
signs or pavement markings from adjoining taxiway, or
both, shall be the responsibility of the airport manage-
ment.
(2) Tie-down aircraft. The securing of an aircraft by
means of anchors or ropes shall be conducted as set forth
in the most current FAA Advisory Circular entitled,
‘‘Tie-Down Sense.’’
(3) Hangar storage—aircraft maintenance and storage.
(i) Sufficient hangar storage space shall be provided for
transient and local based customer aircraft. This space
shall be heated and shall have fire extinguishers. Em-
ployes shall be trained in the use of the fire extinguisher.
(ii) Equipment shall be available for moving aircraft
such as two tugs with tow bar attachments to fit general
aviation aircraft.
§ 476.16. Airframe, power plant and accessory ser-
vices.
The minimum requirements for airframe, power plant
and accessory services are as follows:
(1) General. The FBO shall provide comprehensive
maintenance services.
(2) Equipment. Sufficient equipment, supplies and
parts shall be provided to perform services in accordance
with the manufacturer’s recommendations or the equiva-
lent thereof.
(3) Personnel. Mechanics holding proper FAA certifica-
tion, along with other personnel—trained in accordance
with applicable FAA regulations—as may be required,
shall be available to perform maintenance services.
(4) Hours of operation. The minimum operating hours
shall be from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday. At
other times, an FAA-certified mechanic or Federal Com-
munications Commission licensed specialist, or both, shall
be on call and available to respond to emergency cus-
tomer service requests.
§ 476.17. Radio and instrument services.
The minimum requirements for radio and instrument
services are as follows:
(1) Personnel. Personnel trained and qualified in ac-
cordance with applicable FAA regulations shall be pro-
vided.
(2) Equipment. Sufficient equipment required to per-
form needed services shall be available.
§ 476.18. Air taxi and charter services.
The minimum requirements for air taxi and charter
services are as follows:
(1) General. The FBO shall hold a current FAA Air Taxi
Commercial Operator’s Certificate in accordance with the
FAA regulations at 14 CFR Part 135 (relating to air taxi
operators and commercial operators).
(2) Personnel. An FAA-certified crew shall be available
to conduct air taxi services for each aircraft.
(3) Aircraft. Aircraft shall comply with the require-
ments of the Air Taxi Commercial Operator Certificate
held. Each operated aircraft shall be owned by or leased
to the FBO, evidence of which shall be demonstrated by a
title or lease agreement. Leased aircraft shall be under
the exclusive control of the FBO. Maintenance of the
aircraft shall meet the applicable requirements of 14 CFR
Part 135.
(4) Hours of operation. Air taxi service shall be offered
subject to the availability of personnel and aircraft.
§ 476.19. Flight training services.
The minimum requirements for flight training services
are as follows:
(1) General. The FBO may engage in flight training.
Flight and ground school instruction shall be conducted in
conformance with FAA laws and regulations and with
recommended standards in advisory circulars applicable
to the types of training offered.
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(2) Personnel. FAA-certified flight instructors shall be
provided.
(3) Aircraft. FAA-certified aircraft shall be utilized and
shall be under the exclusive control of the FBO.
(4) Operation. Flight instruction shall be offered when
weather permits.
§ 476.20. Ground handling support services.
The minimum requirements for ground handling sup-
port services are as follows:
(1) Personnel. Personnel trained and qualified in ac-
cordance with applicable FAA regulations shall be pro-
vided.
(2) Equipment. Sufficient equipment required to per-
form services shall be available.
§ 476.21. Optional and special services.
General services or other services not specifically pro-
vided for in this section may be conducted by the FBO,
subject to application to and approval by the Director.
Written terms and conditions for the privilege of engaging
in these optional services shall be determined subsequent
to application and shall be commensurate with the nature
and scope of the services proposed, with consideration
given to the availability of facilities capable of supporting
the proposed services. Optional services may include:
(1) Aerial advertising.
(2) Aerial photography or survey.
(3) Power line or pipeline patrol.
(4) Aircraft sales. The FBO may offer for sale to the
public new and used aircraft. The FBO shall provide for
spare parts and repair service necessary to meet the
warranties for the make and model of aircraft for which
sales privileges are granted. The FBO, as a dealer/
distributor/broker, may be authorized to represent one or
more major aircraft manufacturers.
(5) Other operations not excluded from the FAA regula-
tions at 14 CFR Part 135 (relating to air taxi operators
and commercial operators).
§ 476.22. Negotiated services.
The Department reserves the right to negotiate for
specific services provided for in §§ 476.14—476.21, as
well as other services not specified in this chapter.
§ 476.23. Specific exclusions applicable to FBOs.
(a) Excluded operations. The following concessions and
their establishments are specifically excluded from the
lease of an FBO:
(1) Ground transportation for hire.
(2) Barber and valet services.
(3) Wholesale or retail sale of nonaviation products
including food and beverage sales through vending ma-
chines and newspapers.
(4) Automobile gasoline sales.
(5) Automobile maintenance and repair service for ve-
hicular equipment of the public or other tenants of the
airport.
(b) Activities excluded from Harrisburg International
Airport. Aircraft banner, aircraft glider towing and
untethered balloon activities are not permitted at Harris-
burg International Airport.
§ 476.24. Application procedure for conducting
fixed based operations.
(a) Request to conduct fixed base operations. A person
desiring to conduct fixed base operations at a
Commonwealth-owned airport shall submit an application
to the Bureau detailing the applicant’s plans to meet the
requirements of this chapter and the proposed timetable
for meeting these requirements. The Department may
request additional information from an applicant if the
application does not contain the schematics necessary to
meet the requirements of this chapter.
(b) Response to request application. The Bureau will
submit a written response to the applicant within 30 days
of receipt of the application. The Department’s decision
will be based on the following criteria:
(1) The applicant demonstrates it can meet the require-
ments contained in this chapter.
(2) The applicant demonstrates its ability to comply
with applicable Federal, State and local regulations.
(3) The applicant demonstrates the need for additional
fixed based operations services to meet the continued
growth and development of the airport facility.
(c) Right to appeal. If an applicant disagrees with the
Bureau’s decision, the applicant may elect to exercise
appeal rights provided for under § 476.52 (relating to
appeal).
§ 476.25. Lease agreements.
(a) Approval of application. Once an application to
conduct fixed base operations is granted by the Bureau,
the FBO and the Department will enter into a lease
agreement in accordance with this chapter and other
conditions upon which the Department and the FBO may
agree.
(b) Minimum standards. The standards contained in
this chapter are only minimum standards, and the De-
partment reserves the right to impose, by lease agree-
ment, more stringent standards than those in this chap-
ter.
(c) Questions or issues regarding terms of lease agree-
ment. If an FBO has a question or issue regarding the
lease agreement, the FBO shall submit a written proposal
concerning this matter to the Bureau. The Director or a
designee will issue a response in writing within 30 days
of receipt of the proposal.
(d) Offering of services. The FBO may not begin offer-
ing services until the lease agreement has been executed
by the Department and the Department has received the
required legal and fiscal approvals.
§ 476.26. Existing fixed base operating agreements.
(a) Existing agreement preemption. Fixed base operat-
ing agreements in place as of March 15, 1997, shall
preempt the minimum standards in this chapter until
those agreements terminate, unless the Department and
an FBO agree to amend an agreement to be consistent
with these minimum standards.
(b) Airline operating agreements. Privileges granted to
airlines in accordance with airline operating agreements
are excluded from this chapter.
§ 476.27. Compliance inspections.
(a) Inspection of FBO facilities. The airport manage-
ment shall conduct at least one compliance inspection of
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FBO facilities each year to ensure compliance with this
chapter and the lease agreement. Deficiencies detected
shall be reported to the FBO in writing within 5 days of
completion of the inspection.
(b) Corrections. The operator shall make corrections
within 24 hours of receipt of the written report and shall
provide the Bureau with written notice of completion.
(c) Proposed schedule of corrections. For deficiencies
requiring more than 24 hours to correct, the FBO shall
submit a proposed schedule of corrections to the Bureau
for approval. The FBO shall submit the proposed sched-
ule within the time frame designated by airport manage-
ment in the written report.
(d) Cancellation of lease agreement. Failure to make
required corrections within the time frame specified by
the Bureau will result in cancellation of the FBO’s lease
agreement.
WAIVER AND APPEAL
§ 476.51. Waiver.
The Department, for good cause, may waive compliance
with the criteria or requirements, or both, of this chapter
if the waiver is not inconsistent with the code. A waiver is
considered granted if the FBO submits a written request
to the Director and receives a formal written response
granting the request.
§ 476.52. Appeal.
An applicant aggrieved by a decision of the Bureau may
appeal by requesting an administrative hearing under 2
Pa.C.S. §§ 501—508 and 701—704 (relating to Administra-
tive Agency Law), 1 Pa. Code Part II (relating to general
rules of administrative practice and procedure) and Chap-
ter 491 (relating to administrative practice and procedure).
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-405. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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PROPOSED RULEMAKING
GAME COMMISSION
[58 PA. CODE CHS. 141 AND 147]
Training Dogs; Falconry Permits; Sale of Protected
Wildlife and Its Parts; and Dog Trial Permits
To effectively manage the wildlife resources of this
Commonwealth, the Game Commission (Commission), at
its January 14, 1997, meeting, proposed the following
amendments:
Delete § 141.16 (relating to training dogs on furbear-
ers) by removing current language.
Amend § 147.103 (relating to classes of permits) by
permitting the upgrading of an Apprentice or General
falconer during the permit year.
Amend § 147.141 (relating to the sale of wildlife and
wildlife parts) by providing a new fee structure.
Amend Chapter 147, Subchapter L (relating to permits
relating to dogs), by adding § 147.223 (relating to permits
for dog trials on privately-owned lands) outlining the
procedure to apply for dog trial permits to be held on
privately-owned lands.
These amendments will have no adverse impact on the
wildlife resources of this Commonwealth.
The authority for these proposed amendments is 34
Pa.C.S. (relating to the Game and Wildlife Code) (code).
These proposals were made public at the January 14,
1997, meeting of the Commission and comments on these
proposals can be sent to the Executive Director of the
Game Commission, 2001 Elmerton Avenue, Harrisburg,
PA 17110-9797 until April 4, 1997.
Proposed deletion of § 141.16
1. Introduction
Under the act of December 19, 1996 (P. L. 442, No. 184)
(Act 184), section 2382 of the code (relating to training
dogs on small game) was amended to allow dog training
any time of the calendar year. Although the amendment
provides for the Commission to provide otherwise by
regulation, the Commission is currently assessing
whether to apply restrictions. Until a decision is made,
the Commission at its January 14, 1997, meeting pro-
posed deleting § 141.16. The section would be deleted
under the authority contained in section 322 of the code
to fix seasons and section 2102 of the code (relating to
regulations) which authorizes the promulgation of regula-
tions.
2. Purpose and Authority
The code has been changed to allow the training of dogs
throughout the year. The Commission is authorized to
establish a closed season and it is considering doing so. If
the Commission does establish a closed season, it will do
so on a comprehensive basis, which means § 141.16
would be deleted in any case. Pending a decision on the
impact of year-around dog training, the Commission is
proposing to remove the restriction with regard to train-
ing dogs on furbearers contained in § 141.16.
Section 322(c) of the code (relating to specific powers
and duties) authorizes the Commission to fix seasons.
Section 2102 of the code authorizes the Commission to
promulgate regulations relating to the preservation and
management of game and wildlife and seasons. The
deletion is proposed under this authority.
3. Regulatory Requirements
The proposed deletion would eliminate a restriction.
4. Persons Affected
Individuals wishing to train dogs on furbearers would
be affected.
5. Cost and Paperwork Requirements
No additional paperwork will be required.
Proposed amendment to § 147.103
1. Introduction
To better provide for the administration of falconry
permits, the Commission at its January 14, 1997, meeting
proposed removing language from § 147.103 which re-
quires movement to the next higher classification upon
renewal of the permit. This change would be made under
the authority contained in section 2925(a) of the code
(relating to falconry permits).
2. Purpose and Authority
Currently, falconers who qualify for the next higher
classification must wait until the next permit renewal to
be upgraded. This often creates backlogs in the renewal
process. The proposed change to § 147.103 would allow
the upgrading of a permit as soon as a falconer qualifies
for the next higher classification.
Section 2925(a) of the code provides that: “The Commis-
sion may adopt regulations consistent with Federal fish
and wildlife laws and regulations concerning the sport of
falconry.’’ The proposed change, adopted under this au-
thority, is consistent with Federal law.
3. Regulatory Requirements
The proposed change would relax current requirements.
4. Persons Affected
The proposed change would affect those holding fal-
conry permits.
5. Cost and Paperwork Requirements
No additional paperwork will be required.
Proposed addition of § 147.223
1. Introduction
To better provide for the issuance of permits for field
dog trials, the Commission, at its January 14, 1997,
meeting, proposed adding § 147.223. This additional sec-
tion is proposed under the authority contained in section
2901(b) of the code (relating to regulations for permits).
2. Purpose and Authority
Sections 2943 and 2944 of the code (relating to field dog
trials; and field dog trials for retrievers), both require the
obtaining of a permit before holding field dog trials or
field dog trials for retrievers. Currently, many clubs and
organizations sponsoring these dog trials wait until the
last minute to apply for a permit and then expect
overnight issuance. The requests can be very disruptive.
The proposed section would require a written application
be submitted at least 30 days prior to the dog trial date.
Section 2901(b) of the code authorizes the Commission
to “ . . . promulgate regulations for the issuance of any
permit . . . ” This is the basis for the proposed section.
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3. Regulatory Requirements
Individuals, clubs or organizations wishing to sponsor
field dog trials or retriever field dog trials on privately-
owned lands would be required to submit a written
application on Commission forms at least 30 days in
advance of the trial date. Untimely applications are
subject to disapproval.
4. Persons Affected
Individuals, clubs and organizations sponsoring field
dog trials on privately-owned land will be affected by the
new requirements.
5. Cost and Paperwork Requirements
It is anticipated that there would be little additional
cost associated with the new requirement. A written
application on a Commission form will need to be submit-
ted.
Proposed amendment to § 147.141
1. Introduction
To more effectively manage the wildlife resources of
this Commonwealth, the Commission at its January 14,
1997, meeting proposed changes to § 147.141. The
changes, which would involve permits to possess wildlife
accidentally or illegally killed or orphaned or taken live
from the wild, would change or establish fees for some
species, provide for the sale of other species at public
auction or through sealed bid, and tighten qualifications
for possession of live deer. Section 2901(b) of the code
authorizes the Commission to adopt these changes.
2. Purpose and Authority
Occasionally wildlife will be accidentally or illegally
killed, shot for crop damage or be illegally taken from the
wild. Rather than have the wildlife wasted or destroyed,
the Commission will issue permits to individuals to
possess wildlife or wildlife parts. A committee formed to
study procedures and fees for issuing these permits has
recommended some changes to § 147.141.
Minimum fees for any live deer, a deer hide, other
small mammals, and bear would be increased and the fee
for a coyote would be reduced. A fee for the fisher would
also be established. Any unlisted species could be sold
through public auction or sealed bid. The changes also
call for an individual to have an existing propagation or
menagerie permit before they could receive a live deer
from the Commission.
Section 2901(b) of the code authorizes the Commission
to promulgate regulations for the issuance of a permit. In
addition, section 2904(18) of the code (relating to permit
fees) authorizes the Commission to set a reasonable fee
for a permit which is not specifically set forth.
3. Regulatory Requirements
Fees would be increased for certain Commission posses-
sion permits. In addition, an individual wishing to receive
a live deer would already need to be in possession of a
propagation or menagerie permit.
4. Persons Affected
Individuals wishing to obtain a permit to possess
wildlife from the Commission would be affected.
5. Cost and Paperwork Requirements
There would be increased fees for individuals seeking
permits under the changes. The number of the individu-
als would be small.
6. Effective Date
These changes would be effective on final publication in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin and would remain in effect
until changed by the Commission.
Contact Person
For further information on the proposed changes, con-
tact James R. Fagan, Director, Bureau of Law Enforce-
ment, 2001 Elmerton Avenue, Harrisburg, PA 17110-9797
(717) 783-6526.
DONALD C. MADL,
Executive Director
Fiscal Note: 48-98. No fiscal impact; (8) recommends
adoption.
Annex A
TITLE 58. GAME
PART III. GAME COMMISSION
CHAPTER 141. HUNTING AND TRAPPING
Subchapter A. GENERAL
§ 141.16. [ Training dogs on furbearers. ] (Re-
served).
[ Dogs may be trained on foxes and raccoons July
1 through the following April 30. ]
CHAPTER 147. SPECIAL PERMITS
Subchapter F. FALCONRY
§ 147.103. Classes of permits.
* * * * *
(b) General. A permittee shall be at least 20 years of
age.
(1) A permittee who has been licensed at least 2 years
as an apprentice falconer and has had a raptor in
possession for at least 12 months of that time may be
moved to the next higher classification [ upon renewal
of the next year’s permit. ] A sponsor for an apprentice
shall certify in writing that the apprentice is qualified to
become a general falconer.
* * * * *
(c) Master. A permittee shall be at least 25 years of
age.
(1) A permittee who has at least 5 years of falconry
experience in the practice of falconry at the general class
and had a raptor in possession for 30 months of this time
may be moved to the master classification [ upon re-
newal of the next year’s permit ].
* * * * *
Subchapter H. PROTECTED SPECIMEN
§ 147.141. Sale of wildlife and wildlife parts.
(a) Wildlife or parts of wildlife accidentally killed on
the highway or by other causes, illegally taken, shot for
crop damage or live deer [ and bear ] removed from the
wild, may be sold to a person under the following
minimum fee schedule:
* * * * *
(5) [ Adult ] Any live deer—[ $100 ] $150.
(6) Deer hide only—[ $3 ] $5.
* * * * *
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(8) Other small mammals—[ $10 ] $25.
(9) Turkey, beaver, coyote and fox—$50.
(10) Bobcat, [ coyote and ] otter and fisher—[ $200 ]
$100.
(11) [ Bear hides and carcass—adult bears up to
300 pounds—$50. Cub bears and bears in excess of
300 pounds will be sold at public auction by the
Commission ] Bears—minimum of $100.
(12) [ Bear, alive—$200 ] Any other species may be
sold at public auction or through sealed bid.
* * * * *
(c) Live deer may only be sold to persons holding [ a ]
an existing and current Wildlife Propagation or Wildlife
Menagerie Permit.
[ (d) Live bear may only be sold to persons hold-
ing a current Wildlife Dealer, Wildlife Possession or
Wildlife Menagerie Permit.
(e) ] (d) Except those accidentally killed by a vehicle,
sales of wildlife or wildlife parts may not be made to the
person who caused the death or removal from the wild of
the bird or animal or a member of the immediate
household, or a person acting on [ his ] their behalf.
Subchapter L. PERMITS RELATING TO DOGS
§ 147.223. Permits for dog trials on privately-owned
lands.
(a) Applications for permits to hold dog trials or
meets on privately-owned lands shall be made in
writing on Commission forms at least 30 days in
advance of the requested trial dates to the regional
office under whose jurisdiction the lands are lo-
cated.
(b) Applications for permits to hold trial for re-
trieving dogs on privately-owned land shall be
made in writing on Commission forms at least 30
days in advance of the requested trial dates to the
regional office under whose jurisdiction the lands
are located.
(c) Applications for permits for dog trials not
received at least 30 days in advance of the trial
dates are subject to disapproval.
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-406. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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STATEMENTS OF POLICY
Title 4—ADMINISTRATION
EXECUTIVE BOARD
[4 PA. CODE CH. 9]
Reorganization of the Liquor Control Board
The Executive Board approved a reorganization of the
Liquor Control Board effective February 27, 1997.
The following organization chart at 27 Pa.B. 1368
(March 15, 1997) is published at the request of the Joint
Committee on Documents under 1 Pa. Code § 3.1(a)(9)
(relating to contents of Code).
(Editor’s Note: The Joint Committee on Documents has
found organization charts to be general and permanent in
nature. This document meets the criteria of 45 Pa.C.S.
§ 702(7) as a document general and permanent in nature
which shall be codified in the Pennsylvania Code.)
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-407. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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Title 13—COMMERCE
AND TRADE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
[13 PA. CODE CH. 55]
Private Activity Bonds; Statement of Policy
The Department of Community and Economic Develop-
ment (Department) amends Chapter 55 (relating to pri-
vate activity bonds—statement of policy) to read as set
forth in Annex A. The statement of policy is amended
under authority of section 7(4) of the Tax-Exempt Bond
Allocation Act (act) (73 P. S. § 397.7(4)).
Background
The Federal Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC)
imposes a State ceiling on the aggregate amount of
private activity bonds that may be issued in each calen-
dar year by or on behalf of the Commonwealth and its
political subdivisions.
The General Assembly adopted the act in 1985 to
provide for the allocation of the State ceiling. The act
authorizes the Secretary of Community and Economic
Development to publish as a statement of policy the
county-by-county allocations.
The amended statement of policy provides for the 1997
allocation of the State ceiling. The amendments are
needed because the current statement of policy provides
allocations only for calendar year 1996.
Amendments
Section 55.5 (relating to allocations of tax-exempt bond
authority) is amended to establish the private activity
bond allocations for calendar year 1997.
Fiscal Impact
The amended statement of policy has no fiscal impact
on the Commonwealth, political subdivisions or the pub-
lic. The amended statement of policy does not affect the
total dollar amount of private activity bonds, as these
ceilings are determined by Federal law. No Common-
wealth funds are involved in the issuance of private
activity bonds. Costs of bond issuance are paid for by
bond proceeds or through funds of the issuer or borrower.
The amended statement of policy will result in the use of
private activity bonds to their maximum benefit, thereby
increasing available resources.
Paperwork Requirements
Additional paperwork requirements are not imposed as
a result of the amended statement of policy.
Contact Person
For further information regarding the amended state-
ment of policy, contact Jill B. Busch, Deputy Chief
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Department of Commu-
nity and Economic Development, Room 530 Forum Build-
ing, Harrisburg, PA 17120, (717) 783-8452.
Finding
The Department finds that:
(1) Delay in implementing the statement of policy will
have a serious adverse impact on the public interest.
Order
The Department acting under the authorizing statute,
orders that:
(a) The statement of policy of the Department, 13 Pa.
Code Chapter 55, is amended by amending § 55.5 to read
as set forth in Annex A, with ellipses referring to the
existing text of the statement of policy.
(b) The Secretary of Community and Economic Devel-
opment shall submit this order and Annex A to the Office
of General Counsel for approval as to form and legality as
required by law.
(c) The Secretary of Community and Economic Devel-
opment shall certify this order and Annex A and deposit
them with the Legislative Reference Bureau as required
by law.
(d) This order shall take effect upon publication in the
Pennsylvania Bulletin.
THOMAS B. HAGEN,
Secretary
Fiscal Note: 4-62. No fiscal impact; (8) recommends
adoption.
Annex A
TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
PART I. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER 55. PRIVATE ACTIVITY BONDS—
STATEMENT OF POLICY
§ 55.5. Allocations of tax-exempt bond authority.
The act allocates the Commonwealth’s tax-exempt bond
authority to five categories as follows:
* * * * *
(3) Qualified small issue bonds. An amount equal to
$152,800,000 will be allocated for qualified small issue
bonds under section 144(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
(26 U.S.C.A. § 144(a)). This amount will be allocated in
accordance with the formula in § 57.1(d) (relating to
allocations). Requests to apply this allocation to specific
projects or uses will be reviewed and may be approved or
disapproved by the Secretary. Application for allocations
shall be made to the Bonds Office in the Department. The
Secretary will provide allocations for qualified small issue
bonds utilizing the procedure and subject to the require-
ments in § 57.3 (relating to procedures).
County Allocation
Adams $400,000
Allegheny $6,347,000
Armstrong $400,000
Beaver $400,000
Bedford $2,310,000
Berks $8,934,000
Blair $6,201,000
Bradford $400,000
Bucks $8,365,000
Butler $2,677,000
Cambria $749,000
Cameron $400,000
Carbon $1,797,000
Centre $400,000
Chester $8,386,000
Clarion $400,000
Clearfield $1,797,000
Clinton $400,000
Columbia $400,000
Crawford $400,000
Cumberland $400,000
Dauphin $400,000
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County Allocation
Delaware $988,000
Elk $400,000
Erie $4,673,000
Fayette $400,000
Forest $400,000
Franklin $4,801,000
Fulton $400,000
Greene $400,000
Huntingdon $400,000
Indiana $400,000
Jefferson $400,000
Juniata $400,000
Lackawanna $598,000
Lancaster $400,000
Lawrence $2,755,000
Lebanon $2,589,000
Lehigh $1,331,000
Luzerne $5,069,000
Lycoming $3,607,000
McKean $610,000
Mercer $5,135,000
Mifflin $400,000
Monroe $1,327,000
Montgomery $15,421,000
Montour $400,000
County Allocation
Northampton $2,347,000
Northumberland $2,682,000
Perry $586,000
Philadelphia $4,291,000
Pike $400,000
Potter $400,000
Schuylkill $9,437,000
Snyder $400,000
Somerset $400,000
Sullivan $400,000
Susquehanna $400,000
Tioga $796,000
Union $400,000
Venango $400,000
Warren $400,000
Washington $9,280,000
Wayne $400,000
Westmoreland $8,355,000
Wyoming $400,000
York $4,539,000
Totals $152,800,000
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-408. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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NOTICES
DEPARTMENT OF BANKING
Action on Applications
The Department of Banking of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under the authority contained in the act of
November 30, 1965 (P. L. 847, No. 356), known as the Banking Code of 1965; the act of December 14, 1967 (P. L. 746, No.
345), known as the Savings Association Code of 1967; the act of May 15, 1933 (P. L. 565, No. 111), known as the
Department of Banking Code; and the act of December 19, 1990 (P. L. 834, No. 198), known as the Credit Union Code,
has taken the following action on applications received for the week ending March 4, 1997.
BANKING INSTITUTIONS
Consolidations, Mergers and Absorptions
Date Name of Bank Location Action
2-26-97 Mifflinburg Bank and
Trust Company
Mifflinburg
Union County
Mifflinburg Approved
Purchase of assets/assumption
of liabilities of one branch
office of Northern Central Bank,
Williamsport, located at:
Main Street (Route 35)
Richfield
Juniata County
Mutual Holding Company Reorganization
Date Name of Bank Location Action
2-28-97 Peoples Home Savings Bank
Beaver Falls
Beaver County
Beaver Falls Filed
Application represents reorganization into a mutual holding company to be known as ‘‘PHS Bancorp,
M.H.C.,’’ Beaver Falls.
Branch Applications
Date Name of Bank Location Action
6-24-96 Founders’ Bank
Bryn Mawr
Montgomery County
15 East Gay Street
West Chester
Chester County
Opened
3-3-97 Franklin First
Savings Bank
Wilkes-Barre
Luzerne County
15 S. Franklin St.
Wilkes-Barre
Luzerne County
(Trust Dept. Branch)
Filed
Branch Relocations
Date Name of Bank Location Action
2-28-97 Johnstown Bank and Trust
Company
Johnstown
Cambria County
To: Corner of Rambler Dr.
and Route 356
Sarver
Butler County
Filed
From: 111 South Pike Road
Sarver
Butler County
3-3-97 Fayette Bank
Uniontown
Fayette County
To: 3539 Washington Rd.
McMurray
Washington County
Approved
From: 3870 Washington Rd.
McMurray
Washington County
1371
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Date Name of Bank Location Action
3-3-97 Sun Bank
Selinsgrove
Snyder County
To: Corner of Routes
11 and 15 and
Kessler Avenue
Shamokin Dam
Snyder County
Approved
From: Routes 11 and 15
Shamokin Dam
Snyder County
Branch Discontinuances
Date Name of Bank Location Action
2-26-97 Northern Central Bank
Williamsport
Lycoming County
Main Street (Rte. 35)
Richfield
Juniata County
Approved
SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS
Consolidations, Mergers and Absorptions
Date Name of Association Location Action
2-28-97 Tioga-Franklin Savings
Association, Philadelphia,
and Wayne Junction Savings
Association, Ambler
surviving institution—
Tioga-Franklin Savings
Association, Philadelphia
Philadelphia Effective
3-4-97 Prudential Savings Bank, PaSA
Philadelphia
Philadelphia County
Philadelphia Approved
Purchase of assets/assumption of
liabilities of two branch offices
of Roxborough-Manayunk Federal
Savings Bank, Philadelphia,
located at:
1722 South Broad Street
Philadelphia
Philadelphia County
601 Morgan Avenue
Drexel Hill
Delaware County
Branch Applications
Date Name of Association Location Action
1-6-97 East Stroudsburg Savings
Association
Stroudsburg
Monroe
U. S. Highway 209 and
Edward F. Smith Blvd.
Bushkill
Middle Smithfield Twp.
Monroe County
Opened
CREDIT UNIONS
Conversions
Date Name of Credit Union Location Action
2-28-97 Plumbers Local # 27 Credit
Union
Pittsburgh
Allegheny County
Pittsburgh Effective
To:
Plumbers Local # 27 Federal
Credit Union
Pittsburgh
Allegheny County
Represents conversion from a State-chartered credit union to a Federally-chartered credit union.
RICHARD C. RISHEL,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-409. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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Maximum Lawful Rate of Interest for Residential
Mortgages for the Month of April 1997
The Department of Banking, under the authority con-
tained in section 301 of the act of January 30, 1974 (P. L.
13, No. 6) (41 P. S. § 301), hereby determines that the
maximum lawful rate of interest for residential mortgages
for the month of April is 9 1/4%.
The interest rate limitations under the State’s usury
statute were preempted to a great extent by Federal law,
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-221). Further preemption
was instituted with the signing of Pub. L. 96-399, which
overrode State interest rate limitations on any individual
who finances the sale or exchange of residential real
property which such individual owns and which such
individual occupies or has occupied as a principal residence.
Each month the Department of Banking is required by
State law to compute and announce the ceiling rate on
residential mortgages in Pennsylvania. This maximum
rate is determined by adding 2.50 percentage points to
the yield rate on long-term government bonds as pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Board and/or the U. S.
Treasury. The latest yield rate on long-term government
securities is 6.76 to which was added 2.50 percentage
points for a total of 9.26 that by law is rounded off to the
nearest quarter at 9 1/4%.
RICHARD C. RISHEL,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-410. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Applications, Actions and Special Notices
APPLICATIONS
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA CLEAN STREAMS LAW
AND THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
[National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Program (NPDES)]
DISCHARGE OF CONTROLLED INDUSTRIAL WASTE AND SEWERAGE WASTEWATER
(Part I Permits)
The following parties have applied for an NPDES permit to discharge controlled wastewaters into the surface waters of
this Commonwealth. Unless otherwise indicated on the basis of preliminary review and application of lawful standards
and regulations the Department of Environmental Protection proposes to issue a permit to discharge, subject to certain
effluent limitations and special conditions. These proposed determinations are tentative.
Where indicated, the EPA, Region III, Regional Administrator has waived the right to review or object to this proposed
permit action under the waiver provision 40 CFR 123.6E.
Persons wishing to comment on the proposed permit are invited to submit a statement to the Field Office indicated as
the office responsible, within 30 days from the date of this public notice. Comments received within this 30-day period
will be considered in the formulation of the final determinations regarding this application. Responses should include the
name, address and telephone number of the writer and a concise statement to inform the Field Office of the exact basis of
a comment and the relevant facts upon which it is based. A public hearing may be held if the Field Office considers the
public response significant.
Following the 30-day comment period, the Water Management Program Managers will make a final determination
regarding the proposed permit. Notice of this determination will be published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin at which time
this determination may be appealed to the Environmental Hearing Board.
The application and related documents, proposed effluent limitations and special conditions, comments received and
other information are on file and may be inspected and arrangements made for copying at the Field Office indicated
above the application.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the hearing and require an auxiliary aid, service or other accommodation
to participate in the proceeding should contact the Secretary to the Board at (717) 787-3483. TDD users may contact the
Department through the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Service at 1 (800) 654-5984.
Southwest Regional Office: Water Management Program Manager, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745,
telephone (412) 442-4000.
PA 0027430. Sewage, City of Jeannette Municipal Authority, P. O. Box 168, Jeannette, PA 15644.
This amendment is of the NPDES permit to discharge treated sewage from the Jeannette Wastewater Treatment Plant
in the City of Jeannette, Westmoreland County; subsequent to the issuance of the NPDES renewal permit on June 27,
1996, the Authority performed a chemical translator evaluation for lead. The results of that study are the basis for this
amendment.
The following effluent limitations change is proposed for discharge to the receiving waters, known as Brush Creek,
which are classified as a trout stocked fishery with existing and/or potential uses for aquatic life, water supply and
recreation. The first downstream potable water supply intake from this facility is the Pennsylvania American Water
Company Becks Run intake.
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Outfall 001: existing discharge, design flow of 3.3 mgd.
The existing effluent limitations for lead are as follows:
Concentration (mg/l)
Average Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Weekly Daily Maximum
Lead 0.007 0.014 0.0175
The proposed effluent limitations for lead are as follows:
Concentration (mg/l)
Average Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Weekly Daily Maximum
Lead 0.013 0.026 0.0325
Other Conditions: A change is being made on page 2b of 14 to correct a typographical error which put the mass
limitation lead in the ‘‘Average Weekly’’ column rather than under ‘‘Maximum Daily.’’
The EPA waiver is not in effect.
PA 0038237. Sewage, Rostraver Township Sewage Authority, P. O. Box 976, R. D. 4, Port Royal Road, Belle
Vernon, PA 15012.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit to discharge treated sewage from the Sweeney-Fellsburg Water
Pollution Control Plant in Rostraver Township, Westmoreland County.
The following effluent limitations are proposed for discharge to the receiving waters, known as the Youghiogheny River,
which are classified as a warm water fishery with existing and/or potential uses for aquatic life, water supply and
recreation. The first downstream potable water supply intake from this facility is the Westmoreland County Municipal
Authority, McKeesport Plant, on the Youghiogheny River.
Outfall 001: Existing average design flow of 0.40 mgd, effective until the sewage treatment plant expansion is
completed and operational.
Concentration (mg/l)
Average Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Weekly Daily Maximum
CBOD5 25 38 50
Suspended Solids 30 45 60
Fecal Coliforms
(5-1 to 9-30) 200/100 ml as a geometric mean
(10-1 to 4-30) 35,000/100 ml as a geometric mean
Total Residual Chlorine monitor and report
pH 6.0—9.0
Outfall 001: Proposed average design flow of 0.95 mgd, effective after the sewage treatment plant expansion is
completed and operational.
Concentration (mg/l)
Average Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Weekly Daily Maximum
CBOD5 25 38 50
Suspended Solids 30 45 60
Fecal Coliforms
(5-1 to 9-30) 200/100 ml as a geometric mean
(10-1 to 4-30) 15,000/100 ml as a geometric mean
Total Residual Chlorine(1) 0.5 1.6
pH 6.0—9.0
The EPA waiver is in effect.
(1) This limitation is effective if chlorination is used for disinfection for the expanded plant.
Northwest Regional Office: Water Management Program Manager, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville PA 16335-3481,
telephone (814) 332-6942
PA 0103250. Industrial waste, Urick Foundry Company, 15th and Cherry Streets, Erie, PA 16501.
This application is for renewal of an industrial waste NPDES permit to discharge untreated cooling water to the City of
Erie storm sewer, which discharges to Presque Isle Bay at the foot of Poplar Street and within the confines of Bay Harbor
Marina in the City of Erie, Erie County.
The receiving water is classified for warm water fishery, aquatic life, water supply and recreation. There is no potable
water supply affected by this discharge.
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The proposed effluent limits are based on an average design flow of 0.047 mgd for outfall 101 and 0.007 mgd for outfall
102.
Outfalls 101 and 102
Effluent Concentration (mg/l)
Average Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Maximum
Flow (mgd) monitor only
Total Suspended Solids monitor only
Iron, Total monitor only
Aluminum monitor only
Zinc monitor only
Temperature (°F) monitor only
pH 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
Outfalls 001, 002, 003, 004 and 005 consist solely of stormwater and are not monitored.
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0222208. Sewage, Frank Fiamella, 10247 West Main Street, North East, PA 16428.
This application is for the issuance of a sewage NPDES permit to discharge treated sewage from the Frank Fiamella
Subdivision sewage treatment plant to an unnamed tributary of Four Mile Creek in Greene Township, Erie County.
This is a new discharge.
The receiving water is classified for warm water fishery, aquatic life, water supply and recreation. There is no potable
water supply affected by this discharge.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001, based on average design flow of 0.0015 mgd, are:
Effluent Concentration (mg/l)
Average Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly Maximum
Flow monitor only
CBOD5 10 20
Total Suspended Solids 20 40
Total Residual Chlorine 0.5 1.2
Phosphorus as ‘‘P’’ 1.0
Dissolved Oxygen minimum of 3.0 mg/l at all times
Fecal Coliforms 200/100 ml as a geometric average
pH 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0222224. Sewage. Michael Zobrest, R. D. 1, Box 181, Sugar Grove, PA 16350.
This application is for a new Part I (NPDES) Permit to discharge treated sewage to unnamed tributary to Stillwater
Creek in Sugar Grove Township, Warren County. This is a new discharge.
The receiving water is classified for the following uses: cold water fishes, aquatic life, water supply and recreation. For
the purpose of evaluating effluent requirements for TDS, NO2-NO3, fluoride and phenolics, the existing/proposed
downstream potable water supply considered during the evaluation is the PA-NY State line located approximately 3 miles
below point of discharge.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall No. 001, based on a design flow of 0.0008 mgd, are:
Average Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
CBOD5 10 20
TSS 20 40
Fecal Coliforms
(Year Around) 200/100 ml as a geometric average
Total Residual Chlorine 1.5 3.5
pH 6.0—9.0 at all times
The EPA waiver is in effect.
Southeast Regional Office: Regional Manager, Water Management, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North Lane,
Conshohocken, PA 19428, telephone (610) 832-6130.
PA 0011649. Industrial waste, PECO Energy Company, 2301 Market Street, P. O. Box 8699, Philadelphia, PA
19101-8699.
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This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit to discharge noncontact cooling water and stormwater from
Richmond Generating Station located in the City of Philadelphia, Philadelphia County. This is an existing discharge to
Delaware River Estuary Zone 3.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fish, (maintenance only), migratory fish (passage only), potable water
supply, industrial water supply, livestock water supply, wildlife water supply, irrigation, boating, fishing and esthetics.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 102, containing noncontact cooling water from frequency converters, based on
an average flow of 1.5 mgd are as follows:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
Total Residual Chlorine 0.2 0.5
Suspended Solids 30 60 75
Oil and Grease 15 30
Temperature 110°F
pH within limits of 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 202, containing river water seepage from sump pump, based on an average flow
of 100 gallons per day are as follows:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
Suspended Solids 30 60 75
Oil and Grease 15 30
Iron, dissolved monitor/report monitor/report
The EPA waiver is in effect.
Thermal Requirements.
PA 0012599. Amendment No. 2, Industrial waste, Simpson Paper Company, 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900, Seattle,
WA 98101-3045.
This application is for amendment of an NPDES permit to discharge untreated stormwater from a closed sludge
impoundment; leachate from a closed impoundment and groundwater from a Simpson Paper Company site located in
Whitemarsh Township, Montgomery County, PA. This is an existing discharge to the Schuylkill River.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fish, migratory fish, potable water supply, industrial water supply,
livestock water supply, wildlife water supply, irrigation, boating, fishing, water contact sports and esthetics.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 018, based on an average flow of 0.144 mgd are as follows:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
CBOD5 monitor/report
Suspended Solids monitor/report
Oil and Grease monitor/report
pH monitor/report
COD monitor/report
Total Kjeldahl Nitrogen monitor/report
Total Phosphorus monitor/report
Iron Dissolved monitor/report
Total Arsenic monitor/report
Total Barium monitor/report
Total Cadmium monitor/report
Total Chromium monitor/report
Total Copper monitor/report
Total Lead monitor/report
Total Mercury monitor/report
Total Selenium monitor/report
The EPA waiver is not in effect.
Authorization to discharge stormwater runroff from closed sludge impoundment to Manor Creek at Outfall 017 is
eliminated.
PA 0054313. Sewage, Judy Landis and Grant Ziegler, 3176 Walnut Street, Springtown, PA 18081.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit to discharge treated sewage from Landis and Ziegler sewage
treatment plant in Springfield Township, Bucks County. This is an existing discharge to Cook Creek.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fish, potable water supply, industrial water supply, livestock water
supply, wildlife water supply, irrigation, boating, fishing, water contact sports, exceptional value waters and esthetics.
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The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001, based on an average flow of 800 gpd are as follows:
Average Average Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Weekly (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
CBOD5
(5-1 to 10-31) 10 15 20
(11-1 to 4-30) 20 30 40
Suspended Solids 10 15 20
Ammonia (as N)
(5-1 to 10-31) 3.0 4.5 6.0
(11-1 to 4-30) 9.0 14.0 18.0
Total Residual Chlorine monitor/report monitor/report monitor/report
Fecal Coliforms 200 colonies/100 ml as a geometric average
Dissolved Oxygen minimum of 6 mg/l at all times
pH within limits of 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0054551. Sewage, Paul J. Matthews, 4 Fox Run Lane, Newtown Square, PA 19073-1004.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit to discharge treated sewage from a single residence sewage
treatment facility in Willistown Township, Chester County. This is an existing discharge to the west tributary to Ridley
Creek.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fish, potable water supply, industrial water supply, livestock water
supply, wildlife water supply, irrigation, boating, fishing, water contact sports, high quality waters and esthetics.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001, based on an average flow of 400 gpd are as follows:
Average Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
CBOD5
(5-1 to 10-31) 10 20
(11-1 to 4-30) 20 40
Suspended Solids 10 20
Ammonia (as N)
(5-1 to 10-31) 3.0 6.0
(11-1 to 4-30) 9.0 18.0
Total Residual Chlorine 0.5 1.2
Fecal Coliforms 200 colonies/100 ml as a geometric average
Dissolved Oxygen minimum of 3.0 mg/l at all times
pH within limits of 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0057126. Industrial waste, Amerada Hess Corporation, 1 Hess Plaza, Woodbridge, NJ 07095-0961.
This application is for issuance of an NPDES permit to discharge treated groundwater from Hess SS No. 38291 in the
City of Coatesville, Chester County. This is a new discharge to an unnamed tributary of Brandywine Creek.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fish, migratory fish, potable water supply, industrial water supply,
livestock water supply, wildlife water supply, irrigation, boating, fishing, water contact sports and esthetics.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001, based on an average flow of 7,200 gpd are as follows:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
pH within limits of 6.0—9.0 standard units at all times
Benzene 0.001 0.002 0.0025
Total BETX 0.10 0.20 0.25
Ethylbenzene monitor/report monitor/report
Toluene monitor/report monitor/report
Total Xylene monitor/report monitor/report
The EPA waiver is in effect.
Southcentral Regional Office: Regional Water Management Program Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, telephone (717) 657-4590.
PA 0024457. Sewage, SIC: Code 4952, Halifax Municipal Authority, P. O. Box 443, Halifax, PA 17032.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit for an existing discharge of treated sewage to the Susquehanna
River, in Halifax Borough, Dauphin County.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fishery, recreation, water supply and aquatic life. For the purpose of
evaluating effluent requirements for TDS, NO2-NO3, fluoride and phenolics, the existing downstream potable water
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supply intake considered during the evaluation was Dauphin Consolidated Water Company located in Susquehanna
Township, Dauphin County. The discharge is not expected to impact any potable water supply.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001 for a design flow of 0.14 mgd are:
Average Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Weekly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
CBOD5 25.0 40.0 50.0
Total Suspended Solids 30.0 45.0 60.0
Total Residual Chlorine 1.5 2.5
Dissolved Oxygen minimum of 5.0 at all times
pH from 6.0—9.0 inclusive
Fecal Coliforms
(5-1 to 9-30) 200/100 ml as a geometric average
(10-1 to 4-30) 100,000/100 ml as a geometric average
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0084166. Industrial waste, SIC: 4941, City of Lebanon Authority (Lebanon Water Treatment Plant), 400 South
Eighth Street, Lebanon, PA 17042.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit for an existing discharge of treated industrial waste to an
unnamed tributary of Swatara Creek, in Swatara Township, Lebanon County.
The receiving stream is classified for warm water fishery, recreation, water supply and aquatic life. For the purpose of
evaluating effluent requirements for TDS, NO2-NO3, fluoride and phenolics, the existing downstream potable water
supply intake considered during the evaluation was Pennsylvania American Water Company located in South Hanover
Township, Dauphin County. The discharge is not expected to impact any potable water supply.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001 for a design flow of 0.40 mgd are:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
Total Suspended Solids 30.0 60.0 75.0
Total Iron 1.2 2.4 3.0
Total Aluminum 0.4 0.8 1.0
Total Manganese 1.0 2.0 2.5
Chloroform monitor and report monitor and report
pH (s.u.) from 6.0—9.0 inclusive
The EPA waiver is in effect.
PA 0082066. Industrial waste, SIC: 2048, Valley Proteins, Inc., 1444 Indian Hollow Road, Winchester, VA 22604.
This application is for renewal of an NPDES permit for an existing discharge of treated industrial waste to Muddy
Creek, in East Earl Township, Lancaster County.
The receiving stream is classified for trout stocking fishery, recreation, water supply and aquatic life. For the purpose of
evaluating effluent requirements for TDS, NO2-NO3, fluoride and phenolics, the existing downstream potable water
supply intake considered during the evaluation was Lancaster Municipal Water Authority located in Lancaster City,
Lancaster County. The discharge is not expected to impact any potable water supply.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001 for a design flow of 0.1 mgd are:
Average Maximum Instantaneous
Parameter Monthly (mg/l) Daily (mg/l) Maximum (mg/l)
BOD5
(5-1 to 10-31) 20 40 50
(11-1 to 4-30) 25 50 62.5
Suspended Solids 30 60 75
NH3-N
(5-1 to 10-31) 4.5 9 11
(11-1 to 4-30) 13.5 27 34
Total Phosphorus 2 4 5
Total Residual Chlorine 0.5 1.6
Oil and Grease 15 30
Fecal Coliforms
(5-1 to 9-30) 200/100 ml as a geometric average
(10-1 to 4-30) 400/100 ml
Dissolved Oxygen minimum of 5.0 at all times
pH from 6.0—9.0 inclusive
The EPA waiver is in effect.
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Northcentral Region: Environmental Program Manager, Water Management, 208 West Third Street, Williamsport, PA
17701-6448, telephone (717) 327-3666.
PA 0111333. SIC: 2869, Ruetgers-Nease Corporation, 201 Struble Road, State College, PA 16801.
This proposed action is for renewal of an NPDES permit for a discharge of treated industrial wastewater to an
unnamed tributary to Spring Creek in College Township, Centre County.
The receiving stream is classified for the following uses: cold water fishery, aquatic life, water supply and recreation.
For the purpose of evaluating effluent requirements for TDS, NO2-NO3, fluoride and phenolics, the downstream potable
water supply (PWS) considered during the evaluation is the proposed intake at Lock Haven.
The proposed effluent limits for Outfall 001, based on a design flow of 0.072 mgd, are:
Monthly Daily Instantaneous
Specific Substance Average (ug/l) Maximum (ug/l) Maximum (ug/l)
Kepone ND
Mirex ND
Xylenes (T) 2 4 5
Benzene 1 2 2.5
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 0.2 0.4 0.5
Tetrachloroethylene 0.7 1.4 1.8
1,2-Dichloroethylene 2 4 5
Trichloroethylene 2 4 5
Vinyl Chloride 0.02 0.04 0.05
Chlorobenzene 2 4 5
Ethylbenzene 2 4 5
Toluene 2 4 5
pH 6.0—9.0 at all times
The EPA waiver is in effect.
Southcentral Regional Office: Water Management Program, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA 17110, telephone
(717) 657-4590.
NPDES Facility County and Tributary New Permit
No. Name and Address Municipality Stream Requirements
PA0081299 Model Enterprises, Inc.
418 Pearl Street
Lancaster, PA 17063
Lancaster
Rapho Township
Little Chickies
Creek
TRC
PA0082317 Chesapeake Estates
of Grantville
575 Kohler School Rd.
New Oxford, PA 17350
Dauphin
E. Hanover Twp.
Bow Creek TRC
PA0083020 Forbes Road School Dist.
HC01 Box 222
Waterfall, PA 16689
Fulton
Taylor Twp.
Elders Branch TRC
PA0081841 Thousand Trails, Inc.
Hershey Preserve
2711 LBJ Freeway
Dallas, TX 75234
Lebanon
S. Annville
UNT of Gingrich
Run
TRC
DISCHARGE OF CONTROLLED INDUSTRIAL
WASTE AND SEWERAGE WASTEWATER
Applications under the
Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law
(Part II Permits)
The following permit applications and requests for plan
approval have been received by the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection.
Persons objecting on the grounds of public or private
interest to the approval of an application or submitted
plan may file a written protest with the Department of
Environmental Protection at the address indicated above
each permit application or plan. Each written protest
should contain the following: name, address and tele-
phone, identification of the plan or application to which
the protest is addressed and a concise statement in
sufficient detail to inform the Department of the exact
basis of the protest and the relevant facts upon which it
is based. The Department may conduct a fact-finding
hearing or an informal conference in response to any
given protest or protests. Each commentator will be
notified in writing of the time and place if a hearing or
conference concerning the plan or action or application to
which the protest relates is held. To insure consideration
by the Department prior to final action on permit applica-
tions and proposed plans, initial protests and additions or
amendments to protests already filed should be filed
within 15 calendar days from the date of this issue of the
Pennsylvania Bulletin. A copy of each permit application
and proposed plan is on file in the office indicated and is
open to public inspection.
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Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
hearing and require an auxiliary aid, service or other
accommodation to participate in the proceeding should
contact the Secretary to the Board at (717) 787-3483.
TDD users may contact the Department through the
Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Service at 1 (800) 654-5984.
Industrial waste and sewerage applications under
The Clean Streams Law (35 P. S. §§ 691.1—
691.1001).
Southwest Regional Office: Water Management Program
Manager, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-
4745, telephone (412) 442-4000.
A. 3297401. Sewerage, Cory C. and Misty E.
Widmar, Box 78, Dilltown, PA 15929. Application for the
construction and operation of a single residence sewage
treatment plant located in the Township of Buffington,
Indiana County to serve the Widmar residence.
Northwest Regional Office: Regional Water Management
Program Manager, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA
16335-3481, telephone (814) 332-6942.
WQM Permit No. 4397404. Sewage. Component
InterTechnologies, Inc., 2426 Perry Highway, Hadley,
PA 16130. This project is for the replacement of an
existing chlorination disinfection system with an ultravio-
let disinfection system at the existing domestic wastewa-
ter treatment plant serving the facility in Perry Town-
ship, Mercer County.
WQM Permit No. 2097401. Sewage. Department of
Transportation, District 1-0, 1140 Liberty Street,
Franklin, PA 16323. This proposed project is to replace an
existing sewage treatment facility at PaDOT Safety Rest
Area No. 20 with a new sewage treatment facility in
Cussewago Township, Crawford County.
Northeast Regional Office: Water Management Program
Manager, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-0790,
telephone (717) 826-2511.
A. 3997403. Sewerage. South Whitehall Township
Authority, 4444 Walbert Avenue, Allentown, PA 18104-
1699. Application to construct and operate the Cedar
Creek Relief Interceptor, located in Salsbury Township
and the City of Allentown, Lehigh County. Application
received in the Regional Office—February 4, 1997.
A. 5497401. Sewerage. Schuylkill County Municipal
Authority, 221 South Centre Street, Pottsville, PA
17901. Application to construct and operate a sewer
extension and pumping stations to serve the Schuylkill
Highridge Business Park, located in Cass and Foster
Townships, Schuylkill County. Application received in
the Regional Office—January 30, 1997.
Southcentral Regional Office: Water Management Pro-
gram Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, telephone (717) 657-4590.
A. 2197401. Sewage, Daniel J. Kyle, Six Bridgewater
Road, Newville, PA 17241 in North Newton Township,
Cumberland County to construct a small flow sewage
treatment facility was received in the Southcentral Re-
gion on January 30, 1997.
A. 0696412. Sewage, Maidencreek Associates, Inc.,
39 Cornerstone Drive, Mohrsville, PA 19541 in Centre
Township, Berks County to construct a sewage treat-
ment plant to serve 55 residential lot development was
received in the Southcentral Region on February 24,
1997.
INDIVIDUAL PERMITS
(PAS)
The following parties have applied for an NPDES
permit to discharge stormwater from a proposed construc-
tion activity into the surface waters of the Common-
wealth. Unless otherwise indicated on the basis of pre-
liminary review and application of lawful standards and
regulations, the Department of Environmental Protection
proposes to issue a permit to discharge, subject to certain
limitations set forth in the permit and special conditions.
These proposed determinations are tentative. Limitations
are provided in the permit as erosion and sedimentation
control measures and facilities which restrict the rate and
quantity of sediment discharged.
Where indicated, the EPA, Region III, Regional Admin-
istrator has waived the right to review or object to this
proposed permit action under the waiver provision 40
CFR 123.24(d).
Persons wishing to comment on the proposed permit
are invited to submit a statement to the Regional Office
or County Conservation District Office indicated as the
responsible office, within 30 days from the date of this
public notice. A copy of the written comments should be
sent to the County Conservation District Office. Com-
ments reviewed within this 30-day period will be consid-
ered in the formulation of the final determinations re-
garding this application. Responses should include the
name, address and telephone number of the writer and a
concise statement to inform the Regional Office of the
exact basis of a comment and the relevant facts upon
which it is based. A public hearing may be held if the
Regional Office considers the public response significant.
Following the 30-day comment period, the Water Pro-
gram Manager will make a final determination regarding
the proposed permit. Notice of this determination will be
published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin at which time this
determination may be appealable to the Environmental
Hearing Board.
The application and related documents, including the
erosion and sedimentation control plan for the construc-
tion activity, are on file and may be inspected at the
County Conservation District Office or the Department
Regional Office indicated above the application.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
hearing and require an auxiliary aid, service or other
accommodation to participate in the proceedings should
contact the specified program. TDD users may contact the
Department through the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Ser-
vice at 1 (800) 654-5984.
Southeast Regional Office, Regional Water Management
Program Manager, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North Lane,
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2233, telephone (610) 832-6130.
Northeast Regional Office, Regional Water Management
Program Manager, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA
18711-0790, telephone (717) 825-2511.
Southwest Regional Office, Regional Water Management
Program Manager, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA
15222-4745, telephone (412) 442-4000.
Southcentral Regional Office, Regional Water Manage-
ment Program Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harris-
burg, PA 17110, telephone (717) 657-4590.
Allegheny County Conservation District, District Man-
ager, 875 Greentree Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15220, telephone
(412) 921-1999.
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NPDES Permit PAS10A096. Stormwater. Bear Run
Village Apartments, 650 Washington Road, Pittsburgh,
PA 15228 has applied to discharge stormwater from a
construction activity located in Ohio Township, Alle-
gheny County, to Bear Run.
Berks County Conservation District, District Manager,
Agricultural Center, Leesport, PA 19533, telephone (610)
372-4657.
NPDES Permit PAS10C029. Stormwater. C F Farms
Partnership LTD, P. O. Box 216, Elverson, PA 19520
has applied to discharge stormwater from a construction
activity located in Caernarvon Township, Berks County,
to UNT to the Conestoga Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10C030. Stormwater. Greth De-
velopment Group, P. O. Box 305, Temple, PA 19560 has
applied to discharge stormwater from a construction
activity located in Brecknock Township, Berks County,
to UNT to the Allegheny Creek.
Blair County Conservation District, District Manager,
1407 Blair Street, Hollidaysburg, PA 16648, telephone
(814) 696-0877.
NPDES Permit PAS100618. Stormwater. Greg
Dempsie, 310 Orchard Avenue, Altoona, PA 16602 has
applied to discharge stormwater from a construction
activity located in Frankstown Township, Blair County,
to New Creek and UNT to Canoe Creek.
Bucks County Conservation District, District Manager,
924 Town Center, New Britain, PA 18901, telephone (215)
345-7577.
NPDES Permit PAS10D091. Stormwater. David
Cutler Group, 5 Sentry Parkway, Ste. 100, Blue Bell, PA
19422 has applied to discharge stormwater from a con-
struction activity located in Warwick Township, Bucks
County, to UNT to Neshaminy Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10D092. Stormwater. River-
woods Associates, 3326 Old York Road, Furlong, PA
18925 has applied to discharge stormwater from a con-
struction activity located in New Hope Borough, Bucks
County, to Aquetong.
NPDES Permit PAS10D093. Stormwater. Woodhill
Associates, c/o Trueblood Company, 904 Sumneytown
Pike, Springhouse, PA 19417 has applied to discharge
stormwater from a construction activity located in Upper
Makefield Township, Bucks County, to Jericho Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10D094. Stormwater. Pauna-
cussing Founders, Inc., Upper Mountain Road,
Buckingham, PA 18912 has applied to discharge
stormwater from a construction activity located in
Buckingham Township, Bucks County to Mill Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10D095. Stormwater. M J E
Builders, Inc., 320 Norristown Road, Horsham, PA
19044 has applied to discharge stormwater from a con-
struction activity located in Milford Township, Bucks
County, to Molasses Creek.
Chester County Conservation District, District Manager,
Gov. Serv. Ctr. Ste. 395, 601 Westtown Rd., West Chester,
PA 19382, telephone (610) 696-5126.
NPDES Permit PAS10G244. Stormwater. The
Hankin Group, 717 Constitution Drive, Ste. 201, Exton,
PA 19341 has applied to discharge stormwater from a
construction activity located in Uwchlan Township,
Chester County, to Shamona Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10G245. Stormwater. Stoltzfus
Enterprises, 26 E. Main Street, Elverson, PA 19520 has
applied to discharge stormwater from a construction
activity located in Elverson Borough, Chester County, to
the south branch of French Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10G246. Stormwater. Heritage
Square II Corporation, 443 South Street, Phoenixville,
PA 19460 has applied to discharge stormwater from a
construction activity located in East Vincent Township,
Chester County, to UNT to Stony Run.
NPDES Permit PAS10G247. Stormwater. Irish Oaks
Development, 1316 West Chester Pike, West Chester, PA
19382 has applied to discharge stormwater from a con-
struction activity located in West Brandywine Township,
Chester County, to UNT to Indian Creek and the east
branch of Brandywine.
NPDES Permit PAS10G248. Stormwater. T A G
Builders, P. O. Box 973, Paoli, PA 19301 has applied to
discharge stormwater from a construction activity located
in Willistown Township, Chester County, to Crum
Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10G249. Stormwater. P. Robert
Keeley Jr., 363 Brownbacks Church Road, Spring City,
PA 19475 has applied to discharge stormwater from a
construction activity located in East Vincent Township,
Chester County, to UNT to French Creek.
NPDES Permit PAS10G250. Stormwater. Realen
Homes, 725 Talamore Drive, Ambler, PA 19002 has
applied to discharge stormwater from a construction
activity located in West Pikeland Township, Chester
County, to Pickering Creek.
Lancaster County Conservation District, District Man-
ager, 1383 Arcadia Road, Lancaster, PA 17601, telephone
(717) 299-5361.
NPDES Permit PAS10-O-064. Stormwater. Char-
Mar Properties, 420 E. Conestoga Street, New Holland,
PA 17557 has applied to discharge stormwater from a
construction activity located in Caernarvon Township,
Lancaster County, to UNT to the Conestoga River.
NPDES Permit PAS10-O-065. Stormwater. Arm-
strong World Industries, Inc., 2500 Columbia Avenue,
Lancaster, PA 17604 has applied to discharge stormwater
from a construction activity located in Manor Township,
Lancaster County, to UNT to Little Conestoga Creek.
Monroe County Conservation District, District Manager,
8050 Running Valley Rd., Stroudsburg, PA 18360, tele-
phone (717) 629-3060.
NPDES Permit PAS10S052. Stormwater. Toby-
hanna Township Supervisors, P. O. Box 880, Pocono
Pines, PA 18350 has applied to discharge stormwater
from a construction activity located in Tobyhanna Town-
ship, Monroe County, to Red Run and Tobyhanna
Creek.
Montgomery County Conservation District, District
Manager, 1015 Bridge Rd., Ste B, Collegeville, PA 19426,
telephone (610) 489-4506.
NPDES Permit PAS10T076. Stormwater. Comrock
Associates, LP, c/o Matrix Realty Inc., Cn 4000, Forsgate
Drive, Cranbury, NJ 08512 has applied to discharge
stormwater from a construction activity located in
Horsham Township, Montgomery County, to an adja-
cent tributary to Park Creek.
Northampton County Conservation District, District
Manager, R. R. 4, Greystone Building, Nazareth, PA
18064, telephone (610) 746-1971.
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NPDES Permit PAS10U067. Stormwater. Jack Frey
and Richard Markovci, 563 Georgetown Road,
Nazareth, PA 18064 have applied to discharge stormwater
from a construction activity located in Lower Nazareth
Township, Northampton County, to Monocacy Creek.
SAFE DRINKING WATER
Application received under the Pennsylvania Safe
Drinking Water Act (35 P. S. §§ 721.1—721.17)
Northeast Regional Office: Sanitarian Regional Man-
ager, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-0790, tele-
phone (717) 826-2511.
3597501. Public water supply. Meadow Heights De-
velopment, Fred Samala, 130 Eastview Drive, Clarks
Summit, PA 18411. This proposal involves the modifica-
tion and permitting of an existing public water supply
system serving Meadow Heights Development. It is lo-
cated in Clarks Summit, Lackawanna County.
Engineer: E. Kenneth Acker, Acker Associates, Inc.,
P. O. Box 899, Moscow, PA 18444.
5897501. Public water supply. Gracious Living Es-
tates, Richard Serfass, President, R. R. 1, Box 226A,
Springville, PA 18844. This proposal involves the con-
struction of a new water supply system serving a pro-
posed 93 resident personal care home. The water supply
consists of a well with disinfection and storage.
Engineer: Paul Ehrenberg, 302 Main St., Great Bend,
PA 18821.
Northwest Regional Office: Sanitarian Regional Man-
ager, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA 16335-3481,
telephone (814) 332-6899.
A. 1097502. Public water supply. Villa Vista Estates,
R. D. 2, 178 Steiner Road, Valencia, PA 16059. This
proposal involves the construction of a new well (well no.
7) in Middlesex Township, Butler County.
LAND RECYCLING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION
Under Act 2, 1995
Preamble 1
Acknowledgment of Notices of Intent to Remediate
submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection
under the Land Recycling and Environmental Remedia-
tion Standards Act (35 P. S. §§ 6026.101—6026.908).
Sections 302 and 303 of the Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act (act) require
the Department of Environmental Protection to publish in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin an acknowledgment noting
receipt of any Notices of Intent to Remediate. An ac-
knowledgment of the receipt of a Notice of Intent to
Remediate identifies a site where a person proposes to, or
has been required to, respond to a release of a regulated
substance at a site. Persons intending to use the back-
ground or Statewide health standard to remediate a site
must file a Notice of Intent to Remediate with the
Department. A Notice of Intent to Remediate filed with
the Department provides a brief description of the loca-
tion of the site, a list of known contaminants at the site,
the proposed remediation measures for the site, and a
description of the intended future use of the site. A person
who demonstrates attainment of one or a combination of
the cleanup standards identified under the act will be
relieved of further liability for the remediation of the site
for any contamination identified in reports submitted to
and approved by the Department and shall not be subject
to citizen suits or other contribution actions brought by
responsible persons not participating in the remediation.
For further information concerning the content of a
Notice of Intent to Remediate, please contact the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection Regional Office under
which the notice appears. If information concerning this
acknowledgment is required in an alternative form, con-
tact the community relations coordinator at the appropri-
ate regional office listed. TDD users may telephone the
Department through the AT&T Relay Service at 1 (800)
654-5984.
The Department of Environmental Protection has re-
ceived the following Notices of Intent to Remediate:
Southcentral Regional Office: Environmental Cleanup
Program Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, (717) 657-4592.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation Highspire—Lower
Swatara Site, Highspire Borough and Lower Swatara
Township, Dauphin County. Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion, c/o Pennsylvania Steel Technologies, Inc., 215 South
Front Street, Steelton, PA 17113-2594 has submitted a
Notice of Intent to Remediate site soils contaminated
with heavy metals. The applicant proposes to remediate
the site to meet the background standard. A summary of
the Notice of Intent to Remediate was reported to have
been published in the Harrisburg Patriot News on or
about December 23, 1996.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation Steelton—Highspire
Site, Highspire Borough and Steelton Borough, Dauphin
County. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, c/o Pennsylvania
Steel Technologies, Inc., 215 South Front Street, Steelton,
PA 17113-2594 has submitted a Notice of Intent to
Remediate site soils contaminated with heavy metals. The
applicant proposes to remediate the site to meet the
background standard. A summary of the Notice of Intent
to Remediate was reported to have been published in the
Harrisburg Patriot News on or about December 23, 1996.
Northeast Regional Field Office: Joseph Brogna, Re-
gional Environmental Cleanup Program Manager, 2 Pub-
lic Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-0790, telephone (717)
826-2511.
Former Hook-Up, Inc. Facility, Lower Macungie
Township, Lehigh County. National Environmental
Technologies Corporation, P. O. Box 204, 2840 West
Clymer Avenue, Telford, PA has submitted a Notice of
Intent to Remediate (on behalf of its client, Hook-Up,
Inc., 1619 Schoeneck Road, Macungie, PA) site soils which
became contaminated with kerosene. The applicant in-
tends to remediate the site to meet the Statewide health
standard. A Final Report was simultaneously submitted.
Please refer to additional Pennsylvania Bulletin notice.
LAND RECYCLING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION
Under Act 2, 1995
Preamble 2
Acknowledgment of Notices of Intent to Remediate
submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection
under the Land Recycling and Environmental Remedia-
tion Standards Act (35 P. S. §§ 6026.101—6026.908).
Sections 304 and 305 of the Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act (act) require
the Department of Environmental Protection to publish in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin an acknowledgment noting
receipt of any Notices of Intent to Remediate. An ac-
knowledgment of the receipt of a Notice of Intent to
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Remediate is used to identify a site where a person
proposes to, or has been required to, respond to a release
of a regulated substance at a site. Persons intending to
use site-specific standard or who intend to remediate a
site in a Special Industrial Area must file a Notice of
Intent to Remediate with the Department. A Notice of
Intent to Remediate filed with the Department provides a
brief description of the location of the site, a list of known
contaminants at the site, the proposed remediation mea-
sures for the site, and a description of the intended future
use of the site. A person who demonstrates attainment of
one or a combination of the cleanup standards identified
under the act will be relieved of further liability for the
remediation of the site for any contamination identified in
reports submitted to and approved by the Department
and shall not be subject to citizen suits or other contribu-
tion actions brought by responsible persons not partici-
pating in the remediation.
Under sections 304(n)(1)(ii) and 305(c)(2) of the act,
there is a 30-day public and municipal comment period
for sites proposed for remediation using a site-specific
cleanup standard, in whole or in part, and for sites
determined to be located in Special Industrial Areas. This
period begins when a summary of the Notice of Intent to
Remediate is published in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the area by the person conducting remediation.
For the sites identified below, a municipality may request
to be involved in the development of the remediation and
reuse plans for the site if the request is made within 30
days of the date specified below. During this comment
period, a municipality may request that the person
identified below, as the remediator of a site, develop and
implement a public involvement plan. Requests to be
involved, and comments, should be directed to the
remediator of a site. For further information concerning
the content of a Notice of Intent to Remediate, please
contact the Department of Environmental Protection Re-
gional Office under which the notice appears. If informa-
tion concerning this acknowledgment is required in an
alternative form, contact the community relations coordi-
nator at the appropriate regional office listed. TDD users
may telephone the Department through the AT&T Relay
Service at 1 (800) 654-5984.
The Department of Environmental Protection has re-
ceived the following Notices of Intent to Remediate:
Southcentral Regional Office: Environmental Cleanup
Program Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, (717) 657-4592.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation Steelton-Highspire
Site, Highspire Borough and Steelton Borough, Dauphin
County. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, c/o Pennsylvania
Steel Technologies, Inc., 215 South Front Street, Steelton,
PA 17113-2594 has submitted a Notice of Intent to
Remediate site groundwater contaminated with solvents.
The applicant proposes to remediate the site to meet the
site-specific standard. A summary of the Notice of Intent
to Remediate was reported to have been published in the
Harrisburg Patriot News on or about December 23, 1996.
Northcentral Regional Office: Environmental Cleanup
Program Manager, 208 West Third Street, Suite 101,
Williamsport, PA 17701-6448, telephone (717) 321-6525.
Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc., Muncy Creek Township,
Lycoming County. Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc., Sherman
Street, Muncy, PA 17756 has submitted a Notice of Intent
to Remediate soils contaminated with BTEX, PAHs, PHCs
and solvents, and groundwater contaminated with sol-
vents and BTEX. The applicant proposes to remediate the
site to meet the Site-specific and Statewide Health Stan-
dards. A summary of the Notice of Intent to Remediate
was reported to have been published in the Williamsport
Sun-Gazette on February 14, 1997.
Southwest Field Office: John J. Matviya, Environmen-
tal Cleanup Program Manager, 400 Waterfront Drive,
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745, telephone (412) 442-5217.
Monessen Riverfront Development Project (Phase
I), City of Monessen, Westmoreland County. Redevelop-
ment Authority of the County of Westmoreland, 601
Courthouse Square, Greensburg, PA 15601 has submitted
a Notice of Intent to Remediate soil and groundwater
contaminated with lead and PAHs. The applicant pro-
poses to remediate the site to meet a special industrial
area standard. A summary of the Notice of Intent to
Remediate was reported to have been published in the
Greensburg Tribune Review on Wednesday, August 28,
1996.
Northwest Regional Office: John Fruehstorfer, Environ-
mental Cleanup Program Manager, 230 Chestnut Street,
Meadville, PA 16335, (814) 332-6648.
Former American Plating, Inc., 510 Grandview Av-
enue, Borough of Zelienople, Butler County, has submit-
ted a Notice of Intent to Remediate soil and groundwater.
The site has been found to be contaminated with heavy
metals and lead. The applicant proposes to remediate the
site to meet the Special Industrial Area Standard. A
summary of the Notice of Intent to Remediate was
reported to have been published in the Butler Eagle.
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
BENEFICIAL USE DETERMINATIONS
Beneficial Use Determinations received under the
Solid Waste Management Act (35 P. S.
§§ 6018.101—6018.1003) and the regulations for
municipal and residual waste.
Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Manager, One
Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA 17110.
THIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECTLY PUB-
LISHED IN THE FEBRUARY 22, 1997 BULLETIN.
BU30034. Borough of Palmyra, (325 South Railroad
Street, Palmyra, PA 17078-2400). On January 23, 1997
the Department received a beneficial use request to use
Class I Biosolids for land application and land reclama-
tion located in Borough of Palmyra, Lebanon County.
BU30035. Borough of Carlisle, 54 North Middlesex
Road, Carlisle, PA 17013. On January 17, 1997, the
Department received a beneficial use request to use Class
I Biosolids for land application and land reclamation
located in Borough of Carlisle, Cumberland County.
OPERATE WASTE PROCESSING OR DISPOSAL
AREA OR SITE
Applications submitted under the Solid Waste Man-
agement Act (35 P. S. §§ 6018.101—6018.103) and
regulations to operate solid waste processing or
disposal area or site.
Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Manager, 400
Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745.
A. 100421. A. M. Kennedy, Inc., Landfill, 50 West
State Street, Suite 1000, Trenton, NJ 08618. A. M.
Kennedy Landfill, Lemont Furnace, PA. Application for a
closure plan for a municipal waste landfill in North
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Union Township, Fayette County. Received in the Re-
gional Office on February 26, 1997.
Regional Office: Northeast Regional Office, Regional
Solid Waste Manager, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA
18711-0790, telephone (717) 826-2516.
Permit I. D. No. 301301. Knickerbocker Pit Ash
Demonstration, Reading Anthracite Company, 200
Mahantongo Street, P. O. Box 1200, Pottsville, PA 17901-
7200. An application for a Residual Waste Demonstration
Permit for the disposal of fly and bottom ash at this
facility, located in Mahanoy Township, Schuylkill
County. The application was found to be complete in the
Regional Office on February 14, 1997.
Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Manager, One
Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA 17110.
A. 101389. Frey Farm Landfill, Lancaster County
Solid Waste Management Authority, (P. O. Box 4425,
Lancaster, PA 17604). Application for major modification
for reduction of closure/post closure bond for a site in
Manor Township, Lancaster County. Application deter-
mined to be administratively complete in the Regional
Office February 20, 1997.
A. 400592. Lancaster County Resource Recovery
Facility, Lancaster County Solid Waste Management
Authority (P. O. Box 4425, Lancaster, PA 17604). Appli-
cation for major modification application including Form
S, Form R, increase of waste storage in pit, and direct
injection system. Application determined to be adminis-
tratively complete in the Regional Office February 20,
1997.
AIR POLLUTION
OPERATING PERMITS
Construct, modify or activate
air contaminant sources
25 Pa. Code § 129.1
Applications received for Operating Permits issued
under the Air Pollution Control Act, (35 P. S.
§§ 4001—4015) and regulations to construct,
modify or reactivate air contamination sources.
Northwest Regional Office: Air Quality Program, 230
Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA 16335.
10-318-014A. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to NAPCO, Inc. (P. O. Box 208,
Valencia, PA 16059-0208) for the operation of a coil
coating process in Middlesex Township, Butler County.
42-302-025. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Allegheny MDF, Ltd. Part.
(R. D. 1, Box 226, Kane, PA 16735) for the operation of a
thermal fluid heat plant in Sargeant Township, McKean
County.
42-399-025. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Allegheny MDF, Ltd. Part.
(R. D. 1, Box 226, Kane, PA 16735) for the operation of a
medium density fiberboard press line in Sargeant Town-
ship, McKean County.
62-329-005A. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Elkhorn Operating Com-
pany (8801 S. Yale/Suite 420, Tulsa, OK 74137) for the
operation of a natural gas engine in Sheffield Township,
Warren County.
43-304-014. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Hodge Foundry, Inc. (P. O.
Box 550, Greenville, PA 16125) for the operation of an
inoculation process in Hempfield Township, Mercer
County.
37-345-010. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to International Metals Recl.
Co. (P. O. Box 720, Ellwood City, PA 16117) for the
operation of a sludge/cake dryer in Ellwood City,
Lawrence County.
43-302-019. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to International Timber and
Veneer (Jackson Commerce Park, Mercer, PA 16137) for
the operation of a wood fired boiler in Jackson Township,
Mercer County.
20-313-020. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Lord Corporation
(Saegertown) (P. O. Box 556, Saegertown, PA 16433) for
the operation of a reactor and hold tank in Saegertown,
Crawford County.
10-313-046. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Mine Safety Appliances
Co. (R. D. 2, Evans City, PA 16033) for the operation of
an abatement system in Forward Township, Butler
County.
61-302-033A. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Pennzoil Products Com-
pany (2 Main Street, Rouseville, PA 16344) for the
operation of a low NOx burner in Cornplanter Township,
Venango County.
25-318-122. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality operating permit to Union City Chair Co. (18
Market St., Union City, PA 16438) for the operation of a
paint booth, in Union City, Erie County.
Northcentral Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality,
208 West Third Street, Suite 101, Williamsport, PA 17701-
6448.
18-310-002C. The Department intends to issue an op-
erating permit to Milestone Materials, Inc. (P. O. Box
231, Easton, PA 18044-0231) for the operation of a triple
deck screen in a stone crushing plant in Lamar Township,
Clinton County. The screen is subject to Subpart OOO
of the Federal Standards of Performance for New Station-
ary Sources.
19-399-013. The Department intends to issue an oper-
ating permit to The Magee Carpet Company (480 West
Fifth Street, Bloomsburg, PA 17815) for the operation of a
carpet dryer (No. 8) in the Town of Bloomsburg, Colum-
bia County.
08-303-005. The Department intends to issue an oper-
ating permit to Cole Construction, Inc. (809 North
Elmira Street, Sayre, PA 18840) for the operation of a
drum mix asphalt concrete plant and associated air
cleaning device (a fabric collector) in Athens Township,
Bradford County. This plant is subject to Subpart I of
the Federal Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources.
Notice of Intent to Issue State Only Operating
Permit # OP-03-026
Per 25 Pa. Code § 127.424, notice is here provided that
the Department intends to issue a facility-wide State
Only Operating Permit to Eljer Manufacturing for the
Ford City facility operating in Ford City Borough),
Armstrong County.
Permit conditions cover all equipment located at the
facility, including equipment covered in the Section A site
1384 NOTICES
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
inventory. Maximum allowable annual emissions (after
control) are established at 67 tons of NOx, 47 tons of CO,
and 38 tons of PM10.
Copies of the application, DEP’s analysis, and other
documents used in evaluation of the application are
available for public inspection during normal business
hours at the Department of Environmental Protection,
400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.
Any person wishing to either object to the operating
permit or a proposed condition thereof or provide the
Department with additional information which they be-
lieve should be considered prior to the issuance of this
permit, may submit the information to the Department at
the address shown above. A 30-day comment period, from
the date of publication, will exist for the submission of
comments. Each written comment must contain the fol-
lowing:
• Name, address and telephone number of the person
submitting the comments.
• Identification of the proposed permit (specify permit
# OP-03-026).
• Concise statements regarding the relevancy of the
information or objections to issuance of the permit.
A public hearing may be held, if the Department in its
discretion, decides that such a hearing is warranted
based on the information received. All persons submitting
comments or requesting a hearing will be notified of the
decision to hold a hearing by publication in the Pennsyl-
vania Bulletin, or by telephone, where the Department
determines such notification by telephone is sufficient.
Written comments or request for a public hearing should
be directed to Joseph Pezze, Regional Air Quality Man-
ager, Department of Environmental Protection, Southwest
Regional Office, Field Operations, 400 Waterfront Drive,
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745, phone (412) 442-4000. For
additional information contact R. Shawn Mendt, Air
Pollution Control Engineer II, Air Quality at the same
address.
Notice of Intent to Issue State Only Operating
Permit #OP-04-006
Per 25 Pa. Code § 127.424, notice is here provided that
the Department intends to issue a facility-wide State
Operating Permit to Brighton Electric Steel Casting Co.,
P. O. Box 206, Beaver Falls, PA 15010 for the Brighton
Electric Steel Casting Co. facility operating in Beaver
Falls, Beaver County.
Permit conditions cover all equipment located at the
facility, including sources and associated air cleaning
devices included in:
Unit Id No. Description
101 Two induction furnaces and casting floor
102 Three small shell sand molding machines
103 One large shell sand molding machine
104 Sand Reclamation Unit
105 Six grinders and one cutting saw
106 Two parts tumbling barrels
107 Nine natural gas-fired annealing furnaces
CO-1 Two 30,000 ACFM casting floor baghouses
CO-2 One 12,500 ACFM sand reclamation and
induction furnace baghouse
Unit Id No. Description
CO-3 One grinder baghouse
CO-4 One tumbler baghouse
Maximum allowable annual emissions (after control)
are established at 5 tons/year for particulate and 2
tons/year of VOC.
Copies of the application, DEP’s analysis and other
documents used in evaluation of the application are
available for public inspection during normal business
hours at the Department of Environmental Protection,
400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.
Any person wishing to either object to the operating
permit or a proposed condition thereof or provide the
Department with additional information which they be-
lieve should be considered prior to the issuance of this
permit may submit the information to the Department at
the address shown above. A 30-day comment period, from
the date of this publication, will exist for the submission
of comments. Each written comment must contain the
following:
• Name, address and telephone number of the person
submitting the comments.
• Identification of the proposed permit (specify permit #
OP-04-006).
• Concise statements regarding the relevancy of the
information or objections to issuance of the permit.
A public hearing may be held, if the Department in its
discretion, decides that such a hearing is warranted
based on the information received. All persons submitting
comments or requesting a hearing will be notified of the
decision to hold a hearing by publication in the Pennsyl-
vania Bulletin, or by telephone, where the Department
determines such notification by telephone is sufficient.
Written comments or request for a public hearing should
be directed to Joseph Pezze, Regional Air Quality Man-
ager, Department of Environmental Protection, Southwest
Regional Office, Field Operations, 400 Waterfront Drive,
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745, telephone (412) 442-4000. For
additional information contact Sheri L. Guerrieri, APCE
II Air Quality at the same address.
Notice of Intent to Issue Title V Operating Permit
#03-00125
Under 25 Pa. Code § 127.521, the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Protection (DEP) intends to
issue a Title V Operating Permit to The Peoples Natural
Gas Company for the Valley compressor station. Valley
compressor station is located in Cowanshannock Town-
ship, Armstrong County. The Peoples Natural Gas Com-
pany representative to contact regarding this application
is William Runyan, P. E., Safety, Environmental and
Compliance, 625 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-
3197.
The Valley compressor station is primarily used for the
storage and distribution of natural gas. As a result of the
levels of nitrogen oxides emitted, Valley is a major
stationary source as defined in Title I, Part D of the
Clean Air Act Amendments. The facility is therefore
subject to the Title V permitting requirements adopted in
25 Pa. Code, Chapter 127, Subchapter G.
Copies of the application, DEP’s analysis and other
documents used in evaluation of the application are
available for public inspection during normal business
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hours at Department of Environmental Protection, 400
Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222.
Any person wishing to provide the Department of
Environmental Protection with additional information
which they believe should be considered prior to the
issuance of this permit may submit the information to the
Department of Environmental Protection at the address
shown above. A 30-day comment period, from the date of
this publication, will exist for the submission of com-
ments. Each written comment must contain the following:
• Name, address and telephone number of the person
submitting the comments.
• Identification of the proposed permit (specify permit
#03-00125).
• Concise statements regarding the relevancy of the
information or objections to issuance of the permit. A
public hearing may be held, if the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection, in its discretion, decides that such
a hearing is warranted based on the information received.
All persons submitting comments or requesting a hearing
will be notified of the decision to hold a hearing by
publication in this newspaper or by the Pennsylvania
Bulletin, or by telephone, where the Department of
Environmental Protection determines such notification by
telephone is sufficient. Written comments or requests for
a public hearing should be directed to Joseph Pezze,
Regional Air Quality Program Manager, Department of
Environmental Protection, Southwest Region—Field Op-
erations, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-
4745, (412) 442-4000. For additional information you may
contact the following at the same address, Thomas J.
Joseph, Air Pollution Control Engineer III, Air Quality
Control.
PLAN APPROVALS
Plan Approvals received under the Air Pollution
Control Act (35 P. S. §§ 4001—4015) and regula-
tions to construct, modify or reactivate air con-
taminant sources.
Southwest Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality Con-
trol, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745.
PA-63-539A. Washington Power Company (7201
Hamilton Boulevard, Allentown, PA 18195) for a coal
waste fired cogeneration process at its L. P. Cogeneration
Facility located in Robinson Township, Washington
County.
PA-63-883A. PA Transformer Technology, Inc. (P. O.
Box 440, Canonsburg, PA 15317) for a transformer manu-
facturing process at its facility located in Canonsburg
Borough, Washington County.
PA-32-040A. GPU Generation, Inc. (1001 Broad
Street, Johnstown, PA 15907) for a NALCO NOxOut
Cascade System on Boiler 15 at its seward station facility
located in East Wheatfield Township, Indiana County.
PA-63-882A. Reliance Electric Company (320 Reli-
ance Drive, Washington, PA 15301) for a natural gas
burnout oven at its facility located in the City of Wash-
ington, Washington County.
PA-63-110B. Corning Consumer Products Com-
pany (100 Eighth Street, Charleroi, PA 15022) for the
Glass Melting Tank 56 at its Charleroi Plant facility
located in Charleroi Borough, Washington County.
PA-65-051A. Elliott Turbomachinery Co., Inc. (800
North Fourth Street, Jeannette, PA 15644) for a B&W
tube steam boiler at its Jeannette Facility located in Penn
Township, Westmoreland County.
PA-30-040A. Cyprus Cumberland Resources Cor-
poration (145 Elm Drive, P. O. Box 1020, Waynesburg,
PA 15370) for a coal preparation plant at its Cumberland
Mine located in Whitely Township, Greene County.
Notice of Plan Approval Application Minor Source
The following stationary sources have filed a request
for a plan approval with the Department of Environmen-
tal Protection (DEP), Bureau of Air Quality. Persons
wishing to file protests or comments on the proposed plan
approval have 30 days to submit the protest or comments
to the Regional Office at the address listed below. Inter-
ested persons may also request that a hearing be held
concerning the plan approval application by filing a
request with the Regional Office stating the reason for
the request.
The Department will evaluate and consider all protests
and comments received. The Department will, where
appropriate, modify the proposed plan approval based on
the protests and comments received.
The final plan approval will contain terms and condi-
tions to ensure that the source is constructed and oper-
ated in compliance with the Department’s regulations
contained in 25 Pa. Code Chapters 121 through 143 and
the requirements of the Federal Clean Air Act. A notice of
the Department’s final decision on the proposed plan
approval will be published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
Air contaminants emitted from these sources are less
than the amounts that would trigger major new source
review requirements. For additional information on the
following applications, contact Devendra Verma, Engi-
neering Services Chief, (814) 332-6940.
Northwest Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality Con-
trol, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA 16335.
PA-10-021A. The Department received a plan approval
application for the replacement of an existing formalde-
hyde storage tank (18,450 gallon capacity) by Indspec
Chemical Corp., (133 Main St., P. O. Box 307, Petrolia,
PA 16050) in Petrolia Borough, Butler County.
PA-10-220A. The Department received a plan approval
application for the installation of two magnesium ham-
mermills (893 lbs/hr) with cyclone collection by ESM II,
Inc. (955 Saxonburg Blvd., Clinton Industrial Park,
Saxonburg, PA 16056) in Saxonburg, Butler County.
PA-24-083A. The Department received a plan approval
application for the construction of a coke/graphite mill
(2,000 lbs/hr) with baghouse control by Carbone of
America (215 Stackpole St., St. Marys, PA 15857) in St.
Marys, Elk County.
PA-37-011A. The Department received a plan approval
application for installation of a candle burner type flare
to combust excess digestor gas from the waste water
treatment facility of Farmer’s Dairy Foods, Inc. (1274
Acorn St., Lemont, IL 60439) at the facility located at the
intersection of Rte. 208 and 18 in Wilmington Twp.,
Lawrence County.
REASONABLY AVAILABLE CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY
(RACT)
The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
will conduct a public hearing on Tuesday, April 15, 1997,
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beginning at 1 p.m. in the first floor conference room A at
the Meadville Regional Office located at 230 Chestnut
Street.
The hearing is for DEP to accept testimony concerning
the Department’s decision to approve, with conditions,
Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) plans
by:
GPU Generation Corporation, Warren Station, 2325
Penna. Ave. West Ext., Warren, PA.
To meet the requirements under 25 Pa. Code
§§ 129.91—129.95 (RACT), concerning the emissions of
oxides of nitrogen (NOx) and volatile organic compounds
(VOC) from various air contamination sources. The final
RACT proposals will be submitted to the U. S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) as a revision to Pennsyl-
vania’s State Implementation Plan.
The proposed SIP revision does not adopt any new
regulations. It incorporates the provisions and require-
ments contained in the RACT approval for the facility to
comply with current regulations.
The preliminary RACT determination, if finally ap-
proved, will be incorporated into Plan Approvals and/or
Operating Permits for the facility and will be submitted
to the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a
revision to Pennsylvania’s State Implementation Plan.
The following is a summary of the preliminary NOx
and VOC RACT determinations for the above listed
facility (major sources only):
GPU Generation Corporation, Warren Station
Source NOx RACT and emission limit VOC RACT
Boiler #1 —annual capacity factor of 65.1%
—bias firing
—NOx emission factor shall not exceed 0.62
lb/MMBTU
—NOx emissions shall not exceed 496.5 tpy
operated and maintained in accordance with
manufacturer’s recommendations
Boiler #2  
Boiler #3  
Boiler #4  
combustion turbine maintained and operated in accordance with
manufacturer’s specifications with an annual
cap on NOx emissions of 400 tons.
maintained and operated in accordance with
manufacturer’s recommendations
emergency diesel Presumptive RACT Emission Limitations of 25
Pa. Code Chapter 129.93(c)(5)
Presumptive RACT Emission Limitations of 25
Pa. Code Chapter 129.93(c)(5)
For the above facility, a public hearing will be held for
the purpose of receiving comments on the above proposed
Plan Approval and/or Operating Permit and the proposed
SIP revision. The public hearing is scheduled as follows:
Tuesday, April 15, 1997
1 to 3 p.m.
DEP Meadville Regional
Office
First Floor Conference Room
230 Chestnut Street
Meadville, PA.
Persons wishing to present testimony at the hearing
should contact Steve Curcio, Community Relations Coor-
dinator, DEP, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA 16335-
3494, (814) 332-6945 at least 1 week in advance of the
hearing to reserve a time to present testimony. Oral
testimony will be limited to a maximum of 10 minutes
and two written copies of the oral testimony are required.
Each organization is requested to designate one witness
to present testimony in its own behalf.
Persons with a disability who wish to comment and
require an auxiliary aid, service or other accommodations
to do so should by contacting Steve Curcio (814) 332-6945,
or the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Service at 1 (800)
654-5984 (TDD) to discuss how the Department may
accommodate their needs.
Those unable to attend the hearing but wish to com-
ment should provide written comments to Lori Cheplic,
(814) 332-6940, Air Pollution Control Engineer, Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, 230 Chestnut Street,
Meadville, PA 16335-3494. Comments should be submit-
ted within 30 days of the date of this publication notice.
All the pertinent documents (applications, review
memos and draft approvals) are also available for review
from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Meadville Regional DEP
Office (Air Quality). Appointments for scheduling a review
must be made by calling the DEP contact person noted
previously.
MINING
CONDUCT COAL AND NONCOAL ACTIVITIES
MINING ACTIVITY APPLICATIONS
Applications under the Surface Mining Conservation
and Reclamation Act (52 P. S. §§ 1396.1—1396.19a); the
Noncoal Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation
Act (52 P. S. §§ 3301—3326); The Clean Streams Law (35
P. S. §§ 691.1—691.1001); the Coal Refuse Disposal Con-
trol Act (52 P. S. §§ 30.51—30.66); The Bituminous Mine
Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (52 P. S.
§§ 1406.1—1406.21). Mining activity permits issued in
response to such applications will also address the appli-
cable permitting requirements of the following statutes:
the Air Pollution Control Act (35 P. S. §§ 4001—4015);
the Dam Safety and Encroachments Act (32 P. S.
§§ 693.1—693.27); and the Solid Waste Management Act
(35 P. S. §§ 6018.101—6018.1003).
The following permit applications to conduct mining
activities have been received by the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection. A copy of the application is avail-
able for inspection at the District mining office indicated
above each application. Where a 401 water quality certifi-
cation is needed for any aspect of a particular proposed
mining activity, the submittal of the permit application
will serve as the request for such certification.
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Written comments or objections, or requests for infor-
mal conferences on applications, may be submitted by any
person or any officer or head of any Federal, State or
local government agency or authority to the Department
at the same address within 30 days of this publication, or
within 30 days after the last publication of the applicant’s
newspaper advertisement, as provided by 25 Pa. Code
§§ 77.121—77.123 and 86.31—86.34 (relating to public
notices of filing of permit applications, opportunity for
comment, and informal conferences).
Where any of the mining activities listed below will
have discharges of wastewater to streams, the Depart-
ment will incorporate NPDES permits into the mining
activity permits issued in response to these applications.
Such NPDES permits will contain, at a minimum,
technology-based effluent limitations (as described in the
Department’s regulations—25 Pa. Code §§ 77.522, 87.102,
88.92, 88.187, 88.242, 89.52 and 90.102) for iron, manga-
nese, suspended solids, settleable solids, alkalinity and
pH. In addition to the above, more restrictive effluent
limitations, restrictions on discharge volume or restric-
tions on the extent of mining which may occur will be
incorporated into a mining activity permit when neces-
sary for compliance with water quality standards (in
accordance with 25 Pa. Code Chs. 93 and 95). Persons or
agencies which have requested review of the NPDES
permit requirements for a particular mining activity
within the above-mentioned public comment period will
be provided with a 30-day period to review and submit
comments on those requirements.
Written comments or objections should contain the
name, address and telephone number of persons submit-
ting comments or objections, application number and a
statement of sufficient detail to inform the Department
on the basis of comment or objection and relevant facts
upon which it is based. Requests for an informal confer-
ence must contain the name, address and telephone
number of requestor, application number, a brief sum-
mary of the issues to be raised by the requestor at the
conference and a statement whether the requestor desires
to have the conference conducted in the locality of the
proposed mining activities.
Bureau of District Mining Operations, R. D. 2, Box
603-C, Greensburg, PA 15601.
Coal Applications Received
65970101. M. B. Energy, Inc. (P. O. Box 1319, Indi-
ana, PA 15701-1319). Application received for commence-
ment, operation and reclamation of a bituminous surface
auger mine located in Ligonier Township, Westmoreland
County, proposed to affect 135.0 acres. Receiving
streams unnamed tributaries to Four Mile Run and
Loyalhanna Creek to Four Mile Run to Loyalhanna
Creek. Application received February 20, 1997.
65970102. V. P. Smith Co., Inc. (P. O. Box 242,
Ligonier, PA 15658). Application received for commence-
ment, operation and reclamation of a bituminous surface
mine located in Murrysville Borough, Westmoreland
County, proposed to affect 59.0 acres. Receiving streams
unnamed tributaries of Steels Run to Steels Run to Turtle
Creek to the Monongahela River. A social and economic
justification is included with this application. Application
received February 14, 1997.
63850111R. Twilight Industries (212 State Street,
Belle Vernon, PA 15012). Renewal application received for
continued operation and reclamation of a bituminous
surface mine located in Somerset Township, Washington
County. Receiving streams north branch of Pigeon Creek
to Pigeon Creek to the Monongahela River. Renewal
application received February 25, 1997.
63850112R. Twilight Industries (212 State Street,
Belle Vernon, PA 15012). Renewal application received for
continued operation of a bituminous surface mine located
in Somerset Township, Washington County. Receiving
streams north branch of Pigeon Creek to Pigeon Creek to
the Monongahela River. Renewal application received
February 25, 1997.
65970103. M. B. Energy, Inc. (P. O. Box 1319, Indi-
ana, PA 15701). Application received for commencement,
operation and reclamation of a bituminous surface mine
with limestone removal located in Derry Township, West-
moreland County, proposed to affect 110.0 acres. Re-
ceiving streams unnamed tributaries of McGee Run and
unnamed tributaries of Stony Run to McGee Run and
both contributory to the Conemaugh River. Application
received February 24, 1997.
63830103R. Joseph Rostosky Coal Co. (R. D. 3, Box
112, Monongahela, PA 15063). Renewal application re-
ceived for continued operation and reclamation of bitumi-
nous surface mine located in Somerset Township, Wash-
ington County. Receiving streams two unnamed
tributaries to north branch of Pigeon Creek to the
Monongahela River. Renewal application received March
3, 1997.
District Mining Operations, P. O. Box 669, Knox, PA
16232.
16920101. Doverspike Bros. Coal Co. (R. D. 4, Box
271, Punxsutawney, PA 15767). Renewal of an existing
bituminous surface strip operation in Monroe Township,
Clarion County affecting 27.4 acres. Receiving streams
two unnamed tributaries to Licking Creek. Application for
reclamation only. Application received February 10, 1997.
33920105. Doverspike Bros. Coal Co. (R. D. 4, Box
271, Punxsutawney, PA 15767). Renewal of an existing
bituminous surface strip operation in Porter Township,
Jefferson County affecting 80.0 acres. Receiving
streams two unnamed tributaries to Sugarcamp Run.
Application received February 10, 1997.
33850107. P & N Coal Company, Inc. (P. O. Box 332,
Punxsutawney, PA 15767). Renewal of an existing bitumi-
nous surface strip and auger operation in Henderson and
Gaskill Townships, Jefferson County affecting 211.0
acres. Receiving streams two unnamed tributaries to east
branch of Mahoning Creek and west branch of Mahoning
Creek. Application for reclamation only. Application re-
ceived February 13, 1997.
10970102. Aspen Minerals, Inc. (P. O. Box 269, Ship-
penville, PA 16254). Commencement, operation and resto-
ration of a bituminous surface strip operation in Oakland
Township, Butler County affecting 75.0 acres. Receiving
streams an unnamed tributary to Thorn Creek; two
unnamed tributaries to Lake Oneida and Lake Oneida.
Application to include a post-mining landuse change from
‘‘Forestland’’ to ‘‘Pastureland, Land Occasionally Cut for
Hay’’ on the lands of Donald L. and Judith Hays.
Application received February 12, 1997.
33910109. Colt Resources, Inc. (R. D. 3, Box 48A,
Clarion, PA 16214). Renewal of an existing bituminous
surface strip operation in Oliver Township, Jefferson
County affecting 51.5 acres. Receiving streams six un-
named tributaries to Big Run. Application for reclamation
only. Application received February 14, 1997.
37910107. East Fairfield Coal Company (P. O. Box
217, North Lima, OH 44452). Renewal of an existing
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bituminous surface strip operation in Little Beaver Town-
ship, Lawrence County affecting 165.1 acres. Receiving
streams unnamed tributaries to Sugar Creek. Application
received February 20, 1997.
Mining and Reclamation, 3913 Washington Road,
McMurray, PA 15317.
63971301. Hillsboro Coal Company, (P. O. Box 548,
Fredericktown, PA 15333), to operate the Hillsboro bitu-
minous deep mine in North Bethlehem Township, Wash-
ington County, new mine, receiving streams unnamed
tributary to Little Daniels Run, unnamed tributary to
Daniels Run, and unnamed tributary to Brush Run.
Application received February 3, 1997.
30841307. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corpora-
tion, (P. O. Box 1020, 145 Elm Drive, Waynesburg, PA
15370), to revise the permit for the Emerald No. 1
bituminous deep mine in Franklin Township, Greene
County to add permit and subsidence control plan acres
and renewal, no additional discharge. Application received
February 7, 1997.
Mineral Resources Management—District Mining,
Pottsville District Office, 5 West Laurel Boulevard,
Pottsville, PA 17901-2454.
54860109R2. Harriman Coal Corporation, (P. O.
Box 127, Valley View, PA 17983), renewal of an existing
anthracite surface mine operation in Tremont Township,
Schuylkill County affecting 35.0 acres, receiving stream
Lorberry Creek. Application received February 24, 1997.
District Mining Operations, 437 South Center Street,
P. O. Box 625, Ebensburg, PA 15931-0625.
Large Industrial Mineral Applications Received
56970301. Fieg Brothers (R. D. 3, Box 45, Stoystown,
PA 15563), commencement, operation and restoration of
industrial minerals mines in Black and Summit Town-
ships, Somerset County, affecting 173.0 acres, receiving
stream Casselman River, application received February
21, 1997.
Bureau of District Mining Operations, R. D. 2, Box
603-C, Greensburg, PA 15601.
Noncoal Applications Received
03970301. Seven Sisters Mining Co., Inc. (200 US
Route 22, Delmont, PA 15626). Application received for
commencement, operation and reclamation of a large
noncoal surface mine located in South Bend Township,
Armstrong County, proposed to affect 36.2 acres. Re-
ceiving streams Crooked Creek to the Allegheny River.
Application received February 21, 1997.
Mineral Resources Management—District Mining,
Pottsville District Office, 5 West Laurel Boulevard,
Pottsville, PA 17901-2454.
6575SM5C. Lehigh Portland Cement Company,
(7660 Imperial Way, Allentown, PA 18195), correction to
an existing noncoal surface mine operation to add 4.4
acres, in Ross Township, Monroe County affecting 37.4
acres, receiving stream Aquashicola Creek. Application
received February 19, 1997.
APPLICATIONS RECEIVED UNDER SECTION 401:
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
ENCROACHMENTS
The following Dam Safety and Encroachment permit
applications, requests for Environmental Assessment ap-
proval and requests for water quality certification have
been received by the Department of Environmental Pro-
tection. Section 401(a) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a)) requires the State to
certify that the involved projects will not violate the
applicable provisions of 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311—1313, 1316
and 1317, as well as relevant State requirements. Initial
requests for 401 certification will be published concur-
rently with the permit application. Persons objecting to
approval of a request for certification under section 401 or
to the issuance of a Dam Safety or Encroachment Permit
or the approval of Environmental Assessments must
submit any comments, suggestions or objections within 30
days of the date of this notice as well as any questions to
the office noted above the application.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
hearing and require an auxiliary aid, service or other
accommodation to participate in the proceedings should
contact the specified program. TDD users may contact the
Department through the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Ser-
vice at 1 (800) 654-5984.
Applications received under the Dam Safety and
Encroachments Act (32 P. S. §§ 693.1—693.27) and
section 302 of the Flood Plain Management Act
(32 P. S. § 679.302) and requests for certification
under section 401 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
Southwest Regional Office: Soils & Waterways Section,
400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745, tele-
phone (412) 442-4000.
E02-1179. Encroachment. Deer Run Golf Club, 3421
Monier Road, Gibsonia, PA 15044. To impact 0.04 acre of
wetlands by excavation, for the purpose of expanding an
impoundment (DEP Permit No. D02-111) used for irriga-
tion at the Deer Run Golf Course to increase irrigation
capacity. The project is located southwest of Monier Road
approximately 1,700 feet from the intersection of Monier
Road and Culverville Road (Red Belt) (Valencia, PA
Quadrangle N: 5.2 inches; W: 1.1 inches) in West Deer
Township, Allegheny County.
E02-1180. Encroachment. Joseph Bauccio, 2606 Lin-
coln Way, White Oak, PA 15131. To place and maintain
fill along the right bank of Long Run for a distance of 180
feet and to construct and maintain an outfall and a
one-story building with parking lot along Long Run Creek
located along Lincoln Way (SR 2031) approximately 500
feet east of the intersection of Lincoln Way and
Coulterville Road (McKeesport, PA Quadrangle N: 13.2
inches; W: 5.0 inches) in White Oak Borough, Allegheny
County.
E02-1181. Encroachment. Penn Center Manage-
ment, Penn Ctr West 2, Pittsburgh, PA 15276. To place
and maintain fill in a diminimus area of wetland (PEM)
less than or equal to 0.05 for the purpose of commercial
development. The site is located approximately 750 feet
from the intersection of Penn Center and Campbell’s Run
Road (Oakdale, PA Quadrangle N: 9.9 inches; W: 0.3 inch)
in Oakdale Borough, Allegheny County.
E03-361. Encroachment. Fish and Boat Commis-
sion, 450 Bellefonte Ln., Bellefonte, PA 16823-9620. To
construct and maintain a 20-foot wide, cast-in-place con-
crete boat launching ramp, a paved parking lot along the
river, 6 × 32 treated wood boarding dock, necessary
signs and drainage system along the Allegheny River
(WWF) for the purpose of developing a public fishing and
boating area located near intersection of Allegheny Av-
enue and SR 1030 (Templeton, PA Quadrangle N: 8.25
inches; W: 12.25 inches) in Pine Township, Armstrong
County.
NOTICES 1389
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
E03-362. Encroachment. Nautical Mile Marina at
Templeton, P. O. Box 334, Templeton, PA 16249. To
construct and maintain a boat launching ramp approxi-
mately 130 feet long and 24 feet wide in and along the
Allegheny River (WWF) and to construct and maintain a
boat docking/mooring area for purpose of converting an
industrial site to a recreational site located at mile
marker 54.25 (Templeton, PA Quadrangle N: 6.6 inches;
W: 12.0 inches) in Pine Township, Armstrong County.
E26-235. Encroachment. Fayette Industrial Fund, 2
West Main Street, Uniontown, PA 15401. To place and
maintain fill in a total of 4.56 acre of wetlands (3.56 acres
are PEM and 1.0 is PSS) as part of the development of
the Fayette Business Park Development Project located
on TR 0510 approximately 0.5 mile east of its intersection
with SR 0043 (Smithfield, PA Quadrangle N: 10.9 inches;
W: 3.70 inches) in Georges Township, Fayette County.
E26-236. Encroachment. Fay-Penn Industrial Devel-
opment Corp., P. O. Box 2101, Uniontown, PA 15401. To
repair, operate and maintain four railroad bridges (324,
327, 328, and 329) at various locations across Redstone
Creek (WWF) for the purpose of improving their struc-
tural integrity. The structural repair work will also
include stabilization, abutment and wingwall scour pro-
tection and cleaning of the channel. The project is located
in South Union Township and the City of Uniontown,
Fayette County.
E30-176. Encroachment. Scott R. Cole, 45 Crabapple
Dr., Waynesburg, PA 15370. To construct and maintain a
7 × 3 box culvert in Roberts Run to access applicant’s
property located off T-318 approximately 65 feet north of
intersection of SR 218 and T-318 (Oak Forest, PA Quad-
rangle N: 5.6 inches; W: 12.80 inches) in Wayne Town-
ship, Greene County.
E30-177. Encroachment. Greene County Commis-
sioners, Greene County Office Building, 93 East High
Street, Waynesburg, PA 15370. To remove existing struc-
ture and to construct and maintain a bridge with a
normal clear span of 80.0 feet and an underclearance of
7.8 feet over North Fork Dunkard Fork of Wheeling
Creek (TSF, stocked). The bridge is County Bridge No. 57
on T-356 Station 0+64.78 located just south of intersection
of T-356 and SR 3022 (Wind Ridge, PA Quadrangle N:
0.65 inch; W: 7.5 inches) in Richhill Township, Greene
County.
E63-424. Encroachment. Monongahela Iron & Metal
Co., Inc., P. O. Box 250, Monongahela, PA 15063-1401. To
construct and maintain a barge transloading facility
along the left bank of the Monongahela River (WWF) at
River Mile 32.8 (Monongahela, PA Quadrangle N: 12.8
inches; W: 4.8 inches) in Monongahela City, Washington
County.
Northcentral Regional Office: Soils and Waterways Sec-
tion, 208 W. Third St., Suite 101, Williamsport, PA 17701,
telephone (717) 327-3574.
E08-312. Encroachment. Athens Township Supervi-
sors, 184 Herrick Ave., Sayre, PA 18840. To remove and
maintain gravel from a site measuring approximately 80
feet wide by 800 feet west and east of the bridge located
on SR 1043, Riverside Drive, by a maximum of 6 feet
deep. The delta area is not included as part of this
project. The project center is located approximately 1,200
feet east of the confluence of the Susquehanna River and
Satterlee Creek (Sayre, PA Quadrangle N: 16.0 inches; W:
1.4 inches) in Athens Township, Bradford County.
Estimated stream disturbance is 800 feet of Satterlee
Creek; stream classification is cold water fisheries.
Northwest Regional Office: Soils and Waterways Sec-
tion, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA 16335-3481,
telephone (814) 332-6942.
E25-544. Encroachment. Metro Health Center, 252
West 11th Street, Erie, PA 16501. To place fill in a total of
1.22 acres of 7 separate wetland areas (PEM/PSS) for
development of a medical office facility, other professional
offices, retail facilities and senior living facilities. The
project is located directly north of Zimmerly Road, ap-
proximately 2,000 feet west of the intersection of I-79 and
Interchange Road SR 4012 (Interchange 180) (Erie South,
PA Quadrangle N: 12.0 inches; W: 1.0 inch) located in
Millcreek Township, Erie County.
E62-329. Encroachment. Pennsylvania-American
Water Company, 1789 Route 286 South, Indiana, PA
15701-3389. To remove an existing 10-inch potable water
line and to place and maintain approximately 1,750 linear
feet of 16-inch potable water line in roughly the same
location as the existing water line under Brown Run
(CWF-TSF) and Allegheny River (WWF, Scenic). The
project is located approximately 300 feet upstream of the
Glade Bridge (SR Business 0006) in the City of Warren
(Clarendon, PA Quadrangle N: 13.5 inches; W: 16.0
inches) located in the City of Warren, Glade Township
and Mead Township, Warren County.
Northeast Regional Office: Regional Soils and Water-
ways Section, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-
0790, telephone (717) 826-5485.
E13-102. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, District 5-0, 1713 Lehigh Street, Allentown, PA
18103. To repair and maintain the existing reinforced
concrete arch bridge having a span of 21.7 feet with an
underclearance of approximately 10 feet on a 15 degree
skew, to repair a deteriorated structure and widen the
bridge 7.8 feet across Sand Spring Run (HQ-CWF). The
project, associated with the S. R. 0534, Section 02B, is
located at the intersection of S. R. 0534 and Sand Spring
Run (Hickory Run, PA Quadrangle N: 9.1 inches; W: 4.7
inches) in Kidder Township, Carbon County (Philadel-
phia District, Army Corps of Engineers).
E39-333. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, District 5-0, 1713 Lehigh Street, Allentown, PA
18103. To maintain the existing 6-span steel I-beam
bridge having a total span of 673 feet with an underclear-
ance of 68 feet across the Lehigh River (TSF) and the
existing 4-span steel I-beam bridge having a total span of
510 feet with an underclearance of 58 feet across the
Lehigh Canal (TSF) (Catasauqua, PA Quadrangle N: 1.3
inches; W: 12.3 inches) and to maintain the existing 6-foot
× 6-foot reinforced concrete stream enclosure with work
consisting of the construction of a 16.5 foot extension on
the upstream side of the existing structure to have a total
length of 160 linear feet in a tributary to the Lehigh
River (CWF) (Catasauqua, PA Quadrangle N: 2.9 inches;
W: 8.7 inches). The project is associated with the S. R.
0022, Section 04M Project and is located at a beginning
point immediately west of the intersection of S. R. 0022
and the Lehigh River extending east 10.5 miles in
Hanover Township, Lehigh County (Philadelphia Dis-
trict, Army Corps of Engineers).
E45-318. Encroachment. Bruno and Palma DeCaro,
1338 East 32nd Street, Brooklyn, NY 11210. To place fill
in approximately 0.08 acre of PSO wetlands for the
purpose of constructing a single family dwelling and
gravel driveway on Lot 23 of Lake Naomi Estates resi-
dential subdivision. The project is located on the south
side of Tanglewood Drive, approximately 0.2 mile east of
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its intersection with T642 (Miller Drive) (Pocono Pines,
PA Quadrangle N: 20.8 inches; W: 8.9 inches) in
Tobyhanna Township, Monroe County (Philadelphia
District, Army Corps of Engineers).
E45-319. Encroachment. Jerry and Lynn Rosen-
bloom, 209 Remington Road, Broomall, PA 19008. To
place fill in approximately 0.06 acre of PSO wetlands for
the purpose of constructing a single family dwelling and
gravel driveway on Lot 31 of Lake Naomi Estates resi-
dential subdivision. The project is located on the north
side of Split Rock Lane, approximately 800 feet southwest
of its intersection with Tanglewood Drive (Pocono Pines,
PA Quadrangle N: 20.4 inches; W: 9.3 inches) in
Tobyhanna Township, Monroe County (Philadelphia
District, Army Corps of Engineers).
E45-320. Encroachment. Browning and Carolyn
Holcombe, 79 Bush Avenue, Greenwich, CT 06830. To
place fill in a de minimus area of PSO wetlands less than
or equal to 0.05 acre for the purpose of constructing a
single family dwelling and gravel driveway on Lot 8 of
Lake Naomi Estates residential subdivision. The project
is located along the northern shore of Lake Naomi, just
south of the intersection of Woodland Avenue and
Lakeview Drive (Pocono Pines, PA Quadrangle N: 21.1
inches; W: 10.6 inches) in Tobyhanna Township, Monroe
County (Philadelphia District, Army Corps of Engineers).
E54-230. Encroachment. Orwigsburg Borough, 209
North Warren Street, P. O. Box 128, Orwigsburg, PA
17961. To remove the existing structure, to construct and
maintain a 20 foot × 4 foot precast concrete box culvert in
the channel of Mahannon Creek (CWF) and to realign
approximately 120 L. F. of a tributary to Mahannon
Creek. This project is located along Ridge Road approxi-
mately 300 feet west of North Liberty Street (Orwigsburg,
PA Quadrangle N: 4.5 inches; W: 14.5 inches) in
Orwigsburg Borough, Schuylkill County (Philadelphia
District, Army Corps of Engineers).
Southeast Regional Office: Program Manager, Water
Management Program, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North
Lane, Conshohocken, PA 19428.
E15-538. Encroachment. Realen Homes, 725
Talamore Drive, Ambler, PA 19002. To perform the follow-
ing activities associated with construction of Windermere
Residential Subdivision (a.k.a. Sbarbaro Tract):
1. To construct and maintain the Road ‘‘A’’ Crossing
consisting of approximately 50 linear feet of 14.0-foot by
6.0-foot reinforced concrete box culvert, associated
endwalls, roadway approach fill and to realign approxi-
mately 90 feet of upstream watercourse across and along
an unnamed tributary to Pickering Creek (HQ-TSF)
impacting a total of approximately 0.33 acre of adjacent
wetlands (PFO);
2. To construct and maintain three utility line cross-
ings adjacent and downstream of the Road ‘‘A’’ Crossing;
The site is located just east of the intersection of
Conestoga Road (SR 0401) and Byers Road (SR 1022)
(Downingtown USGS Quadrangle N: 15.4 inches; W: 2.0
inches) in West Pikeland Township, Chester County.
This permit requires the construction of 0.33 acre of
replacement wetlands.
E09-742. Encroachment. Boro of Doylestown, 57
West Court Street, Doylestown, PA 18901. To operate and
maintain a twin 36-inch corrugated polyethylene pipe
culvert which replaced a dilapidated 38-inch by 57-inch
arch corrugated metal pipe culvert in and along an
unnamed tributary to the Neshaminy Creek (WWF-MF).
This site is located on East Street (T-351) approximately
250 feet north of its intersection with East State Street
(SR 0202) (Buckingham USGS Quadrangle N: 11.4 inches;
W: 16.2 inches) in Doylestown Borough, Bucks County.
Southcentral Regional Office: Water Management Pro-
gram, Soils and Waterways Section, One Ararat Boule-
vard, Room 126, Harrisburg, PA 17110, telephone (717)
657-4590.
E05-245. Encroachment. Chestnut Ridge Area Joint
Municipal Authority, Larry Fischer, R. D. 1, Box A320,
New Paris, PA 1554. To construct and maintain: (1) a
wastewater treatment facility within the right bank’s
100-year floodplain of Dunning Creek located about 1,900
feet upstream of US 220 bridge; (2) Camp Pleasant
wastewater pump station within the left bank’s 100-year
floodplain of Dunning Creek located about 1 mile north of
Spring Meadow Village; (3) Bobs Creek wastewater pump
station within the left bank’s 100-year floodplain of Bobs
Creek located about 1 mile south of Osterburg Village;
and, (4) Imler wastewater pump station within the right
bank’s 100-year floodplain of Scrubgrass Creek located
about 1,800 feet south of Imler Village. (The treatment
facility is in Bedford, PA Quadrangle N: 18.8 inches; W:
5.0 inches in East St. Clair Township, Bedford County).
(The Camp Pleasant and the Bobs Creek wastewater
pump stations are in Alum Bank PA Quadrangle N: 8.4
inches; W: 10.95 inches and N: 6.1 inches; W: 4.37 inches
respectively in East St. Clair Township, Bedford County).
The Imler pump station is in Alum Bank, PA Quadrangle
N: 14.05 inches; W: 3.7 inches in King Township,
Bedford County.
E22-364. Encroachment. Dauphin County Board of
Commissioners, Sally Klein, P. O. Box 1295, Harrisburg,
PA 17108. To replace an existing structure with a bridge
having a clear span of 65.0 feet and an underclearance of
8.17 feet and to fill 0.1 acre of wetlands across the
channel of Stony Creek at a point at Singer Lane (T-686)
(Halifax, PA Quadrangle N: 0.5 inch; W: 5.13 inches) in
Middle Paxton Township, Dauphin County. The wetland
impacts are deminimus and no replacement is required.
E31-139. Encroachment. Dept. of Transportation,
Engineering District 9-0, Alfred Laich, 1620 North
Juniata St., Hollidaysburg, PA 16648. To remove an
existing bridge and to construct and maintain a pre-
stressed concrete box beam bridge having a clear span of
45.92 feet and an underclearance of about 3.83 feet across
Globe Run located on SR 0305, Section 002, about 5 miles
of Petersburg Borough (Donation, PA Quadrangle N: 22.1
inches; W: 14.8 inches) in West Township, Blair County.
DAM SAFETY
Applications received under the Dam Safety and
Encroachments Act (32 P. S. §§ 693.1—693.27) and
section 302 of the Flood Plain Management Act
(32 P. S. § 679.302) and requests for certification
under section 401 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
DEP Central Office: Bureau of Waterways Engineering,
400 Market Street, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 8554, Harrisburg,
PA 17105-8554, telephone (717) 787-8568.
D67-493A. Dam. Kinsley Equities II Limited Part-
nership (R. R. 1, Box 131 AA, Seven Valleys, PA 17360).
To modify, operate and maintain an existing dam to
provide stormwater management for existing and pro-
posed commerical, office, and residential land use and
development. The modifications include raising and wid-
ening the existing dam, providing an access road over the
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dam, and extending the dam’s existing 48-inch spillway
pipe. The dam is located just east of Interstate 83 on a
tributary to Codorus Creek in York Township, York
County.
ACTIONS
FINAL ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER THE
PENNSYLVANIA CLEAN STREAMS LAW AND THE
FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT
[National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
Program (NPDES)]
DISCHARGE OF CONTROLLED INDUSTRIAL
WASTE AND SEWERAGE WASTEWATER
(Part I Permits)
The Department of Environmental Protection has taken
the following actions on previously received permit appli-
cations and requests for plan approval and has issued the
following significant orders.
Any person aggrieved by this action may appeal, under
section 4 of the Environmental Hearing Board Act (35
P. S. § 7514) and 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501—508 and 701—704
(relating to the Administrative Agency Law), to the
Environmental Hearing Board, 400 Market Street Floor
2, P. O. Box 8457, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8457, (717)
787-3483. Appeals must be filed with the Environmental
Hearing Board within 30 days of receipt of written notice
of this action unless the appropriate statute provides a
different time period. Copies of the appeal form and the
Board’s rules of practice and procedure may be obtained
from the Board. The appeal form and the Board’s rules of
practice and procedure are also available in braille or on
audiotape from the Secretary to the Board at (717)
787-3483. This paragraph does not, in and of itself, create
any right of appeal beyond that permitted by applicable
statutes and decisional law.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
hearing and require an auxiliary aid, service or other
accommodation to participate in the proceedings should
contact the specified program. TDD users may contact the
Department through the Pennsylvania AT&T Relay Ser-
vice at 1 (800) 654-5984.
Actions under The Clean Streams Law (35 P. S.
§§ 691.1—691.1001).
Permits Issued
Northwest Regional Office: Regional Water Management
Program Manager, 230 Chestnut Street, Meadville, PA
16335, telephone (814) 332-6942.
NPDES Permit No. PA 0037974. Sewage. Washing-
ton Township, 11800 Edinboro Road, Edinboro, PA
16412 is authorized to discharge from a facility located in
Washington Township, Erie County to an unnamed
tributary to Darrows Run.
WQM Permit No. 2596413. Sewage. Borough of
North East, 58 East Main Street, North East, PA 16428.
This project is for construction of improvements to the
existing wastewater treatment plant in North East Bor-
ough, Erie County.
WQM Permit No. 2597401. Sewage. Erie Sewer Au-
thority, c/o Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, P. C.,
120 West 10th Street, Erie, PA 16501. This project is for
the relocation of a section of the existing Westside
Interceptor Sewer Line in the City of Erie, Erie County.
WQM Permit No. 2597402. Sewerage, John and
Constance Lavery, SRSTP, 12885 McGahen Hill Rd.,
Waterford, PA 16441. Construction of John and Constance
Lavery SRSTP located in Waterford Township, Erie
County.
WQM Permit No. 4297401. Sewerage, Casey
Schweikart and Julie Meacham, SRSTP, R. D. 1, Box
11C, Eldred, PA 16731. Construction of Casey Schweikart
and Julie Meacham SRSTP located in Eldred Township,
McKean County.
Northcentral Regional Office: Regional Water Manage-
ment Program Manager, 208 West Third Street, Suite 101,
Williamsport, PA 17701.
NPDES PA0115363. Sewerage. Buffalo Township
Municipal Sewer Authority, R. R. 2, Box 284A,
Lewisburg, PA 17837. Approval has been granted to
renew the NPDES permit authorizing to discharge from a
facility located at Buffalo Township, Union County.
Permit No. PA0114677-A1. Industrial waste NPDES.
Coastal Aluminum Rolling Mills, 2475 Trenton Av-
enue, Williamsport, PA 17701. Permit transfer was ap-
proved for above referenced industrial facility. The facility
is located in Williamsport, Lycoming County.
Permit WQM No. 1796408. Sewerage. Decatur
Township, R. R. 1, Box 526, Osceola Mills, PA 16666.
Applicant was granted approval to construct a collection
system and pump stations to serve the following areas:
Decatur, Gearhartville, Laurel Run, Hudson and Pleasant
Hill. Location is Decatur Township, Clearfield County.
Permit WQM No. 1997401. Sewerage. Haddon
Craftsman Inc., c/o Suanne Richenderfer, 6260 Fourth
Street, Bloomsburg, PA 17815. Applicant was granted
approval to construct gravity collection system, pump
station and force main. Location is South Centre Town-
ship, Columbia County.
Permit WQM No. 1891401-T1. Sewerage. Allen J.
Dormuth, 201 East Walnut Street, Shiremanstown, PA
17011-6768. Transfer of permit for a single residence was
approved. Location is Chapman Township, Clinton
County.
INDIVIDUAL PERMITS
(PAS)
The following approvals for coverage under NPDES
Individual Permit for Discharge of Stormwater from
Construction Activities have been issued.
These actions of the Department of Environmental
protection (Department) may be appealed to the Environ-
mental Hearing Board (Board), Second Floor, Rachel
Carson State Office Building, 400 Market Street, P. O.
Box 8457, Harrisburg, PA 17105-8457, telephone (717)
787-3483, by any aggrieved person under The Environ-
mental Hearing Board Act (35 P. S. § 7514); 2 Pa.C.S.
§§ 501—508 and 701—704 (relating to the Administrative
Agency Law). Appeals must be filed with the Board
within thirty (30) days from the date of this issue of the
Pennsylvania Bulletin unless the appropriate statute pro-
vides a different time period. Copies of the appeal form
and the Department’s regulations governing practice and
procedure before the Board may be obtained from the
Board.
Northeast Regional Office: Regional Water Management
Program Manager, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA
18711-0790, telephone (717) 826-2511.
1392 NOTICES
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
NPDES Applicant Name County and Receiving
Permit No. and Address Municipality Stream
PAS10S049 Monroe County Transportation Authority
1856-B West Main Street
Stroudsburg, PA 18360
Pocono Township
Monroe County
A tributary to
Scot Run
Southwest Regional Office: Regional Water Management Program Manager, 400 Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA
15222-4745, telephone (412) 442-4000.
NPDES Applicant Name County and Receiving
Permit No. and Address Municipality Stream
PAS10A087 Hickory Heights Land Co.
1 River Front Ctr.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
S. Fayette
Allegheny County
Coal Run
PAS10A094 Timberglen Ltd.
1216 Southgate Dr.
Pittsburgh, PA 15241
N. Fayette
Allegheny County
Montour Run
PAS10L013 Turnpike Commission
P. O. Box 67676
Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676
Springhill Twp.
Fayette County
Rubbles Run
Grassy Run and
UNT
PAS10W051 Turnpike Commission
P. O. Box 67676
Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676
Fallowfield Twp.
Carroll Twp.
Washington County
Maple Creek, UNT
Taylors Run, UNT
PAS10W053 Turnpike Commission
P. O. Box 67676
Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676
Fallowfield Twp.
Washington County
S. Br. Maple Creek
Maple Creek
PAS10X068 DEP/Bur. of Aband. Mine Recl.
P. O. Box 149
Ebensburg, PA 15931
Maud Mining Co. Inc.
655 Church St.
Indiana, PA 15701
Fairfield and
Ligonier Twp.
Westmoreland County
Hanna Run, UNT
Southeast Regional Office: Regional Water Management Program Manager, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North Lane,
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2233, telephone (610) 832-6130.
NPDES Applicant Name County and Receiving
Permit No. and Address Municipality Stream
PAS10-G203 K. Hovnanian Company of PA
1210 Worthbrook Drive, Suite 100
Trevose, PA 19053
Thornbury Township
Chester County
Radley Run
INDIVIDUAL PERMITS
(PAR)
Approvals to Use NPDES General Permits
The following parties have submitted Notices of Intent (NOI) for Coverage under General NPDES Permits to discharge
wastewater into the surface waters of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Department of Environmental Protection
approves the following coverages under the specified General Permit. This approval is subject to applicable effluent
limitations, monitoring and reporting requirements and other conditions set forth in the respective General Permit.
The EPA Region III Regional Administrator has waived the right to review or object to this permit action under the
waiver provision: 40 CFR 123.24.
The application and related documents, effluent limitations and special conditions, and other information are on file
and may be inspected and arrangements made for copying at the contact office noted.
List of NPDES General Permits issued by Department of Environmental Protection:
NPDES General Permit Type
PAG-1 General Permit For Discharges From Stripper Oil Well Facilities
PAG-2 General Permit For Discharges of Stormwater From Construction Activities
PAG-3 General Permit For Discharges of Stormwater From Industrial Activities
PAG-4 General Permit For Discharges From Single Residence Sewage Treatment Plant
PAG-5 General Permit For Discharges From Gasoline Contaminated Ground Water
Remediation Systems
PAG-6 General Permit For Wet Weather Overflow Discharges From Combined Sewer
Systems
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Facility
Location
County and Applicant Name Receiving Stream Contact Office
Municipality Permit No. and Address or Body of Water and Telephone No.
Washington
Township
Jefferson County
PAR808327 Browning—Ferris Industries of
PA Inc.—DuBois District
P. O. Box O
Brockway, PA 15824
Unnamed Tributary
to Wolf Run
DEP
Water Management
Northwest Region
230 Chestnut St.
Meadville, PA 16335
Beaver County
Fallston Borough
PAR206135 Littell Steel Company
P. O. Box 298
New Brighton, PA 15066
Brady’s Run Southwest Regional
Office:
Water Management
Program Manager
400 Waterfront Drive
Pittsburgh, PA
15222-4745
(412) 442-4000
Bradford County
West Burlington
Township
PAR504802 NTSWA Landfill #2
P. O. Box 10
Burlington, PA 18814
Morris Run Creek
Tioga River
Northcentral Region
(717) 327-3664
Tioga County
Hamilton
Township
PAR504803 NTSWA Landfill #1
P. O. Box 10
Burlington, PA 18814
Mill Creek
Sugar Creek
Cameron County
Shippen Township
PAR204810 Sinter Metal Inc.
R. R. 2, Box 47
Emporium, PA 15834
Portage Creek to
Driftwood Branch Sinn.
Creek
Cameron County
Shippen Township
PAR204809 Sinter Metal Inc.
Barton Street Plant
R. R. 2, Box 47
Emporium, PA 15834
West Creek
Cameron County
Emporium
Borough
PAR204811 Pro America Mfg. Corp.
P. O. Box 391
Emporium, PA 15834
Sinnemahoning River
West Branch
Snyder Co.
Perry Twp.
PAR224816 R. J. Hoffman & Sons Lumber
R. R. 2, Box 350
Mt. Pleasant Mills, PA 17853
Tributary to
Mahantango Creek
(717) 327-3664
Northcentral
Clearfield Co.
Lawrence Twp.
PAR214804 Swisher Concrete Products Inc.
P. O. Box 55
Clearfield, PA 16830
W. Br. Susquehanna
River
Clearfield Co.
Huston Twp.
PAR304802 E. & L. Brokerage, Inc.
R. D. 1, Box 455
Morrisdale, PA 16858
Bark Camp Run
Transco Railway
Products Inc.
PAR804807 Transco Railway Products Inc.
Trenton Avenue
P. O. Box 4031
Williamsport, PA 17701
Fox Hollow Run Creek
Waterford Twp.
Erie County
PAG048423 John and Constance Lavery
12885 McGahen Hill Rd.
Waterford, PA 16441
Unnamed Tributary
of French Creek
DEP
Water Management
Northwest Region
230 Chestnut St.
Meadville, PA 16335
(814) 332-6942
Eldred Twp.
McKean County
PAG048422 Casey Schweikart and Julie
Meacham
R. D. 1, Box 11C
Eldred, PA 16731
Windfall Creek DEP
Water Management
Northwest Region
230 Chestnut St.
Meadville, PA 16335
(814) 332-6942
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Facility
Location
County and Applicant Name Receiving Stream Contact Office
Municipality Permit No. and Address or Body of Water and Telephone No.
Glade Twp.
Warren County
PAG048425 Bruce L. Abplanalp
858 Jackson Avenue Ext.
Warren, PA 16365
Unnamed Tributary
of West Branch
Glade Run
DEP
Water Management
Northwest Region
230 Chestnut St.
Meadville, PA 16335
(814) 332-6942
Clinton County
Chapman
Township
PAG044882 Allen J. Dormuth
201 E. Walnut Street
Shiremanstown, PA 17011-6768
Falling Springs Northcentral Region
(717) 327-3664
Montour County
Derry Township
PAG044923 June A. Braddock
225 Blee Hill Road
Danville, PA 17821
Tributary to
Mud Run
(717) 327-3664
Northcentral
Columbia County
Fishing Creek
Twp.
PAG044926 Joseph and Marilyn Gibbons
R. R. 2, Box 208C
Orangeville, PA 17859
Fishing Creek
Bedford County
Napier Township
PAG043563 Dennis Dull
R. D. 2, Box 669
Bedford, PA 15523
UNT to Raystown
Branch of
Juniata River
SCFO
(717) 657-4590
Cumberland
County
North Newton
Twp.
PAG043564 Daniel J. Kyle
6 Bridgewater Road
Newville, PA 17241
UNT to Green
Spring Creek
SCFO
(717) 657-4590
Penn Township
Perry County
PAG043565 Barry R. and Teresa M. Weaver, Jr.
279 Cove Road
Duncannon, PA 17020
Tributary to
Cove Creek
SCFO
(717) 657-4590
Allegheny County
O’Hara Township
PAG056101 Sun Company, Inc.
5733 Butler Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15201
Allegheny River Southwest Regional
Office
Water Management
Program Manager
400 Waterfront Drive
Pittsburgh, PA
15222-4745
(412) 442-4000
Lancaster County
Ephrata Borough
PAG053505 Sun Company Inc.
Twin Oaks Terminal
Sunoco A-Plus Mini Market
4041 Market Street
Aston, PA 19014
Cocalico Creek SCFO
(717) 657-4590
SAFE DRINKING WATER
Actions taken under the Pennsylvania Safe Drink-
ing Water Act (35 P. S. §§ 721.1—721.17).
Southwest Regional Office: Regional Manager, Water
Supply and Community Health, 400 Waterfront Drive,
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745, telephone (412) 442-4000.
Permit No. 3096501. Public water supply. Municipal
Authority of the Borough of Carmichaels, 104 North
Pine Street, Carmichaels, PA 15320.
Type of Facility: 557,821 gallon water storage tank,
2,200 feet of 12 inch PVC transmission lines, a pressure
reducing valve chamber and an altitude valve chamber.
Permit to Operate Issued: February 25, 1997.
Permit No. 5696502. Public water supply. Cone-
maugh Township Municipal Authority, 113 South
Main Street, Davidsville, PA 15928.
Type of Facility: 216,000 gal. water storage tank in
Jerome.
Permit to Operate Issued: February 26, 1997.
Permit No. 2696501. Public water supply. Pleasant
Valley Water Authority, 2320 Moyer Road, Con-
nellsville, PA 15425.
Type of Facility: Slonecker Hill Water System.
Permit to Construct Issued: February 26, 1997.
Permit No. 6396502. Public water supply. Pennsyl-
vania-American Water Company, 800 West Hershey
Park Drive, P. O. Box 888, Hershey, PA 17033.
Type of Facility: Booster pump station.
Permit to Construct Issued: February 24, 1997.
Southeast Regional Office: Sanitarian Regional Man-
ager, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North Lane,
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2233, telephone (610) 832-6130.
Permit No. 4696510. Public water supply, Philadel-
phia Suburban Water Company, Thomas L. Yohe, 762
West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010. This
proposal involves the installation of a corrosion control
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treatment system at well nos. 2, 3 and 4. The project
includes a solution tank, material pump and controls in
Perkiomen Township, Montgomery County.
Type of Facility: Water supply system.
Consulting Engineer: Philadelphia Suburban Water
Company, 762 West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA
19010.
Permit to Construct Issued: February 24, 1997.
Northcentral Field Operations: Environmental Program
Manager, 208 West Third Street, Suite 101, Williamsport,
PA 17701.
Permit No. 4196503. Muncy State Correctional In-
stitute, P. O. Box 598, Camp Hill, PA 17001, Clinton
Township, Lycoming County. A permit for operation of
wells no. 1 and no. 2 at the Muncy State Correctional
Institute located in Clinton Township, Lycoming County
has been issued.
LAND RECYCLING AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REMEDIATION
Under Act 2, 1995
Preamble 3
The following final reports were submitted to the
Department of Environmental Protection under the Land
Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act
(35 P. S. §§ 6026.101—6026.908).
Provisions of Chapter 3 of the Land Recycling and
Environmental Remediation Standards Act (act) require
the Department of Environmental Protection to publish in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin a notice of submission of any
final reports. A final report is submitted to document
cleanup of a release of a regulated substance at a site to
one of the act’s remediation standards. A final report
provides a description of the site investigation to charac-
terize the nature and extent of contaminants in environ-
mental media, the basis for selecting the environmental
media of concern, documentation supporting the selection
of residential or nonresidential exposure factors, a de-
scription of the remediation performed, and summaries of
sampling methodology and analytical results which dem-
onstrate that the remediation has attained the cleanup
standard selected.
For further information concerning the final report,
please contact the Environmental Cleanup Program in
the Department of Environmental Protection Regional
Office under which the notice of receipt of a final report
appears. If information concerning a final report is re-
quired in an alternative form, contact the community
relations coordinator at the appropriate regional office
listed. TDD users may telephone the Department through
the AT&T Relay Service at 1 (800) 654-5984.
The Department has received the following final re-
ports:
Southcentral Regional Office: Environmental Cleanup
Program Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, (717) 657-4592.
A Plus Printing, City of Altoona, Blair County. A
Plus Printing, Inc., Michael A. Colledge, Miriam K.
Colledge, and Alex Namey, 500 32nd Street, Altoona, PA
16602, have submitted a Final Report concerning
remediation of site soils and groundwater contaminated
with naphthalene, benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, total
xylene, m-, p-Xylene, and o-xylene. The report is intended
to document remediation of the site to meet the back-
ground standard.
Northeast Regional Field Office: Joseph Brogna, Re-
gional Environmental Cleanup Program Manager, 2 Pub-
lic Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-0790, telephone (717)
826-2511.
Former Hook-Up, Inc. Facility, Lower Macungie
Township, Lehigh County. National Environmental
Technologies Corporation, P. O. Box 204, 2840 West
Clymer Avenue, Telford, PA has submitted a Final Report
(on behalf of its client, Hook-Up, Inc., 1619 Schoeneck
Road, Macungie, PA) site soils which became contami-
nated with kerosene. The report is intended to document
remediation of the site to meet the Statewide health
standard. A Notice of Intent to Remediate was simulta-
neously submitted. Please refer to additional Pennsylva-
nia Bulletin notice.
SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
OPERATE WASTE PROCESSING OR DISPOSAL
AREA OR SITE
Permits issued under the Solid Waste Management
Act (35 P. S. §§ 6018.101—6018.1003), the Munici-
pal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduc-
tion Act (53 P. S. §§ 4000.101—4000.1904) and regu-
lations to operate solid waste processing or
disposal area or site.
Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Manager, Lee
Park, 555 North Lane, Suite 6010, Conshohocken, PA
19428.
Permit No. 101069. Southeastern Chester County
Refuse Authority, P. O. Box 221, Kennett Square, PA
19348. This permit was issued for the reconfiguration of
the existing northern area of the landfill and the elimina-
tion of Sedimentation Basin No. 3. Permit was issued in
the Southeast Regional Office on February 21, 1997.
London Grove Township (host municipality) submitted
technical review comments on the application including
an objection to the issuance of a permit. It is believed
that technical comments submitted by the Township’s
consultant were adequately addressed by the applicant.
The applicant’s response to these technical issues were
forwarded to the Township and no further correspondence
was received on the matter. The Township’s remaining
objections to issuance were related to local zoning and
land development ordinances. These local issues are not
subject to the Department’s review and are not cause for
denying an application. Permit Condition No. 2 of this
modification includes standard language informing the
permittee that this permit modification does not super-
sede, amend or authorize violation of any applicable local
law, ordinance or regulation that is not pre-empted by the
Pennsylvania Solid Waste Management Act. Facility lo-
cated in London Grove Township, Chester County.
Southcentral Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Pro-
gram Manager, One Ararat Boulevard, Harrisburg, PA
17110, telephone (717) 657-4588.
Permit No. 101644. Blair County Resource Recov-
ery Facility, Blair County Resource Recovery Facilities,
Inc., (R. D. 1, Box 938A, Altoona, PA 16601). Application
for construction and operation of a waste transfer station
in Logan Township, Blair County. Permit issued in the
Regional Office February 26, 1997.
Permits revoked under the Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act (35 P. S. §§ 6018.101—6018.1003) and
regulations to operate solid waste processing or
disposal area or site.
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Regional Office: Regional Solid Waste Manager, Suite
6010, Lee Park, 555 North Lane, Conshohocken, PA
19428.
Permit No. 400550. Fern Hill Company, 4459 W.
Swamp Road, Doylestown, PA 18901. This permit has
been revoked because the facility has indicated that they
are no longer operating their incinerator at the Fern Hill
Company. Permit revoked in the Southeast Regional
Office on February 21, 1997.
AIR POLLUTION
OPERATING PERMITS
Construct, modify or activate
air contaminant sources
25 Pa. Code § 129.1
Operating Permits issued under the Air Pollution
Control Act (P. S. §§ 4001—4015).
Southwest Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality, 400
Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745.
26-318-018. The Department intends to issue an Air
Quality Operating Permit to United Defense L. P.—
Fayette, (300 University Drive, Lemont Furnace, PA
15456) for a paint spray booth at its Paint Shop (SPB-1)
located in North Union Township, Fayette County.
Northwest Regional Office: Air Quality Program, 230
Chestnut St., Meadville, PA 16335.
37-309-051. The Department has issued an air quality
operating permit to Medusa Crescent, Inc. (2001 Port-
land Park, Wampum, PA 16157) for the operation of
cement kiln dust storage silos and baghouse in Wampum,
Lawrence County.
42-302-028. The Department has issued an air quality
operating permit to Kane Handle Co., Div. Ames Co.
(Box 760, Biddle St., Kane, PA 16735) for the operation of
a wood fired boiler in Kane, McKean County.
PLAN APPROVALS
Plan Approvals issued under the Air Pollution Con-
trol Act (35 P. S. §§ 4001—4015) and regulations to
construct, modify, reactivate and operate air con-
taminant sources or air cleaning devices.
Southwest Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality, 400
Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745.
PA-65-882A. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
was issued to CSM Industries, Inc., (R. R. 6, Box 21,
Center Drive, Building D, Latrobe, PA 15650) for an
electroplating operation at its Latrobe Facility located in
Unity Township, Westmoreland County.
PA-65-800A. On January 27, 1997, a Plan Approval
was issued to Columbia Gas Transmission Corpora-
tion, (P. O. Box 1273, Charleston, WV 25325) for recipro-
cating engines at its Delmont Compressor Station located
in Salem Township, Westmoreland County.
PA-04-061A. On January 27, 1997, a Plan Approval
was issued to Calgon Corporation, (P. O. Box 391,
Chem Road, Ellwood City, PA 16117) for a thermal
oxidizer at its Elwood City North Plant located in
Franklin Township, Beaver County.
PA-30-072A. On January 27, 1997, a Plan Approval
was issued to Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company,
(1800 Washington Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15241) for a coal
preparation plant at its Baily Preparation Plant located
in Richhill Township, Greene County.
Plan Approval extensions issued under the Air
Pollution Control Act (35 P. S. §§ 4001—4015) and
regulations to construct, modify, reactivate and
operate air contaminant sources or air cleaning
devices.
Southwest Regional Office: Bureau of Air Quality, 400
Waterfront Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4745.
32-305-053. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Senate
Coal Mines, Inc., (One Energy Place, Suite 5100,
Latrobe, PA 15650) for bituminous coal processing at its
Coral Tipple located in Burrell Township, Indiana
County.
11-305-032. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Senate
Coal Mines, Inc., (One Energy Place, Suite 5100,
Latrobe, PA 15650) for a crushing and screening device on
the Coal Refuse Reprocessing operation at its St. Michael
Pile located in Adams Township, Cambria County.
56-305-043. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Senate
Coal Mines, Inc., (One Energy Place, Suite 5100,
Latrobe, PA 15650) for a water truck for the coal refuse
reclaiming/screen at its Mine 36 located in Winber Bor-
ough, Somerset County.
03-000-027. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 1, 1997 for GPU
Generation Corporation (1001 Broad Street, Johns-
town, PA 15907) for Low NOx Burners on the steam
electric generator at its Keystone Generating Station
located in Plumcreek Township, Armstrong County.
26-305-032. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 1, 1997 for Mon
River Energy Corporation, (P. O. Box 466, Brier Hill,
PA 15415) for a coal refuse reprocessing plant at its Brier
Hill Site located in Redstone Township, Fayette County.
63-313-017A. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 1, 1997 for Flexsys
America L. P., (829 Route 481, Monongahela, PA 15063)
for a biofilter at its Monongahela Plant located in Carroll
Township, Washington County.
11-305-028. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Senate
Coal Mines, Inc., (One Energy Place, Suite 5100,
Latrobe, PA 15650) for a water truck on the wet coal
refuse reclaim plant at its Mine 42 located in Adams
Township, Cambria County.
26-310-017. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 1, 1997 for
Amerikohl Mining, Inc. (P. O. Box 427, Acme, PA
15610) for a portable stone crusher at its Jim Mountain
Quarry located in Springfield Township, Fayette
County.
32-329-004. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Three
Rivers Pipeline, (2030 William Pitt Way, Pittsburgh, PA
15238) for a catalytic converter on the Waukesha L7042-
GSI Engine at its Pennview Compressor Station located
in West Wheatfield Township, Indiana County.
63-000-016. On February 10, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 1, 1997 for West
Penn Power Company, (800 Cabin Hill Drive,
Greensburg, PA 15601) for a LNCFS III on the pulverized
coal-fired boiler at its Mitchell Station facility located in
Union Township, Washington County.
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04-000-446. On February 11, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to May 31, 1997 for Beaver
Valley Partners, Inc., (394 Frankfort Road, Monaca, PA
15061) for three cogeneration units at its Beaver Valley
Cogeneration Plant located in Potter Township, Beaver
County.
26-318-018. On February 13, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to September 30, 1997 for
United Defense L. P.—Fayette, (300 University Drive,
Lemont Furnace, PA 15456) for a paint spray booth at its
Paint Shop (SPB-1) facility located in North Union Town-
ship, Fayette County.
11-305-033. On February 13, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to July 1, 1997 for
Dunamis Resources, Inc., (One Energy Place, Suite
4000, Latrobe, PA 15650) for a coal crushing/screening
process at its South Fork Strip facility located in Adams
Township, Cambria County.
56-307-001F. On February 18, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to September 1, 1997 for
FirstMiss Steel, Inc., (P. O. Box 509, Holsopple, PA
15935) for a baghouse on the oxygen converter at its
Stony Creek Plant located in Quemahoning Borough,
Somerset County.
63-307-027. On February 19, 1997, a Plan Approval
expiration date was extended to June 19, 1997 for
American Iron Oxide Company, (Foster Plaza #7, 661
Anderson Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15220) for scrubbers and
a baghouse on the iron oxide production process at its
Allenport Plant located in Allenport Borough, Washing-
ton County.
MINING
CONDUCT COAL AND NON-COAL ACTIVITIES
MINING ACTIVITY ACTIONS
Actions on applications under the Surface Mining Con-
servation and Reclamation Act (52 P. S. §§ 1396.1—
1396.19a); the Noncoal Surface Mining Conservation and
Reclamation Act (52 P. S. §§ 3301—3326); The Clean
Streams Law (35 P. S. §§ 691.1—691.1001); the Coal
Refuse Disposal Control Act (52 P. S. §§ 30.51—30.66);
The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act (52 P. S. §§ 1406.1—1406.21). The final action on
each application also constitutes action on the request for
401 water quality certification. Mining activity permits
issued in response to such applications will also address
the applicable permitting requirements of the following
statutes: the Air Quality Control Act (35 P. S. §§ 4001—
4015); the Dam Safety and Encroachments Act (32 P. S.
§§ 693.1—693.27); and the Solid Waste Management Act
(35 P. S. §§ 6018.101—6018.1003).
District Mining Operations, 437 South Center Street,
P. O. Box 625, Ebensburg, PA 15931-0625.
Coal Applications Issued
56840110. Permit renewal, Fieg Brothers (3070
Stoystown Road, Stoystown, PA 15563-8164), commence-
ment, operation and restoration of a bituminous strip-
auger mine, valid for reclamation, only in Brothersvalley
Township, Somerset County, affecting 83.0 acres, receiv-
ing stream Stony Creek, application received December
31, 1996, permit issued February 24, 1997.
District Mining Operations, P. O. Box 669, Knox, PA
16232.
24820110. Fairview Coal Company (P. O. Box R,
Ridgway, PA 15853). Renewal of an existing bituminous
strip and auger operation in Jay Township, Elk County
affecting 255.0 acres. This renewal is issued for reclama-
tion only. Receiving streams unnamed tributary to Cherry
Run. Application received December 9, 1996. Permit
issued February 18, 1997.
16910106. C & K Coal Company (P. O. Box 69,
Clarion, PA 16214). Renewal of an existing bituminous
strip, tipple refuse disposal, and beneficial use of fly ash
operation in Perry and Toby Townships, Clarion County
affecting 255.0 acres. This renewal is issued for reclama-
tion only. Receiving streams two unnamed tributaries to
Cherry Run. Application received December 5, 1996.
Permit issued February 18, 1997.
33920101. Strishock Coal Company (P. O. Box 258,
Brockway, PA 15824). Renewal of an existing bituminous
strip operation in Pine Creek Township, Jefferson
County affecting 49.0 acres. Receiving streams four
unnamed tributaries to Little Mill Creek and one un-
named tributary of Mill Creek. Application received De-
cember 13, 1996. Permit issued February 18, 1997.
33920103. Strishock Coal Company (P. O. Box 258,
Brockway, PA 15824). Renewal of an existing bituminous
strip operation in Pine Creek Township, Jefferson
County affecting 143.5 acres. Receiving streams un-
named tributary to O’Donnell Run to Sandy Lick Creek
and three unnamed tributaries to Five Mile Run. Applica-
tion received December 13, 1996. Permit issued February
18, 1997.
Mining and Reclamation, 3913 Washington Road,
McMurray, PA 15317.
11861301. Rampside Collieries, Inc., (R. D. 1, Box
146, Hooversville, PA 15936), to revise the permit for the
Rampside Collieries No. 1 bituminous deep mine in
Richland Township, Cambria County to add 290 subsid-
ence control plan acres, no additional discharge. Permit
issued February 21, 1997.
03841302. Canterbury Coal Company, (R. D. 1, Box
119, Avonmore, PA 15618), to revise the permit for the
DiAnne bituminous deep mine in Kiskiminetas Township,
Armstrong County to add DiAnne No. 2 shaft site,
receiving stream unnamed tributary to Carnahan Run.
Permit issued February 21, 1997.
32841301. Mears Enterprises, Inc., (P. O. Box 157,
Clymer, PA 15728), to renew the permit for the Bear Run
No. 2 bituminous deep mine in Banks Township, Indiana
County, no additional discharge. Permit issued February
25, 1997.
03961301. Rosebud Mining Company, (R. D. 1, Box
379A, Kittanning, PA 16201), to operate the Tracy Lynne
bituminous mine in Kiskiminetas Township, Armstrong
County to include the statement ‘‘The permit application
has met the wetlands replacement by participating in the
Pennsylvania Wetland Replacement Program,’’ receiving
streams unnamed tributary to Roaring Run and Roaring
Run. Permit issued February 25, 1997.
32901601. Millcreek Processing, (110 Cidar Lane,
McMurray, PA 15317), to renew the permit for the
Challenger Coal Yard in East Wheatfield Township, Indi-
ana County, no additional discharge. Permit issued
February 27, 1997.
03851301. Rosebud Mining Company, (R. D. 1, Box
379A, Kittanning, PA 16201), to revise the permit for the
Rosebud No. 2 bituminous deep mine in Perry Township,
Armstrong County to add permit acres and revise
subsidence control plan per Act 54, no additional dis-
charge. Permit issued February 27, 1997.
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District Mining Operations, P. O. Box 669, Knox, PA
16232.
Noncoal Issued
37910303. McQuiston Coal Company (P. O. Box 31,
Bessemer, PA 16112). Renewal of NPDES #PA0208442,
North Beaver Township, Lawrence County. Receiving
streams unnamed tributary to Mahoning River, unnamed
tributary to Hickory Run and Hickory Run. Application
received March 27, 1996. Permit issued February 12,
1997.
20960301. R. Hunter, Inc. (29780 Hickory Corners
Road, Guys Mills, PA 16327). Commencement, operation
and restoration of a sand and gravel operation in Wood-
cock Township, Crawford County affecting 20.8 acres.
Receiving streams none. Application received June 14,
1996. Permit issued February 3, 1997.
Mineral Resources Management—District Mining,
Pottsville District Office, 5 West Laurel Boulevard,
Pottsville, PA 17901-2454.
Noncoal Permits Issued
5074SM4C3. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co.,
Inc., (P. O. Box 77, New Enterprise, PA 16664), correction
to an existing quarry operation and renewal of NPDES
Permit #PA0595888 in Fannett Township, Franklin
County affecting 40.25 acres, receiving stream tributary
to Dry Run. Correction/Renewal issued February 27,
1997.
28960301. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co., Inc.,
(P. O. Box 77, New Enterprise, PA 16664), commence-
ment, operation and restoration of a noncoal surface mine
operation in Fannett Township, Franklin County affect-
ing 68.10 acres, receiving stream tributary to Dry Run.
Permit issued February 27, 1997.
District Mining Operations, P. O. Box 669, Knox, PA
16232.
General Small Noncoal Authorizations Granted
16960808. Brooklyn Services (P. O. Box 297, Strat-
tanville, PA 16258), commencement, operation and resto-
ration of a small noncoal sandstone operation affecting
5.0 acres. Receiving streams none. Application received
October 28, 1996. Permit issued February 5, 1997.
District Mining Operations, 437 South Center Street,
Ebensburg, PA 15931-0625.
Industrial Minerals NPDES Permit Renewal
4074SM12. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co.,
Inc., (P. O. Box 77, New Enterprise, PA 16664), renewal
of NPDES Permit #PA0599352, Jefferson Township,
Somerset County, receiving streams unnamed tributar-
ies to Kooser Run and to Kooser Run. NPDES Renewal
Application received January 3, 1997, issued February 24,
1997.
ACTIONS TAKEN UNDER SECTION 401: FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
ENCROACHMENTS
The Department of Environmental Protection has taken
the following actions on previously received permit appli-
cations, requests for Environmental Assessment approval,
and requests for Water Quality Certification under sec-
tion 401 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33
U.S.C.A. § 1341(a)).
Any person aggrieved by this action may appeal, under
section 4 of the Environmental Hearing Board Act (35
P. S. § 7514) and 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501—508 and 701—704
(relating to the Administrative Agency Law), to the
Environmental Hearing Board, Second Floor, Rachel
Carson State Office Building, P. O. Box 8457, Harrisburg,
PA 17105-8457, (717) 787-3483. TDD users may contact
the Board through the Pennsylvania Relay Service, 1
(800) 654-5984. Appeals must be filed with the Environ-
mental Hearing Board within 30 days of receipt of
written notice of this action unless the appropriate stat-
ute provides a different time period. Copies of the appeal
form and the Board’s rules of practice and procedure may
be obtained from the Board. The appeal form and the
Board’s rules of practice and procedure are also available
in braille or on audiotape from the Secretary to the Board
at (717) 787-3483. This paragraph does not, in and of
itself, create any right of appeal beyond that permitted by
applicable statutes and decisional law.
Actions on applications filed under the Dam Safety
and Encroachments Act (32 P. S. §§ 693.1—693.27)
and section 302 of the Flood Plain Management
Act (32 P. S. § 679.302) and sections 5 and 402 of
the act of June 22, 1937 (P. L. 1987, No. 394) (35
P. S. §§ 691.5 and 691.402) and notice of final
action for certification under section 401 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1341(a)) (Note: Permits issued for Small
Projects do not include 401 Certification, unless
specifically stated in the description.)
Permits Issued and Actions on 401 Certifications
Southeast Regional Office: Program Manager, Water
Management Program, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North
Lane, Conshohocken, PA 19428.
E15-530. Encroachment. PECO Energy Company,
175 North Caln Road, Coatesville, PA 19320. To install
and maintain an 8-inch diameter high pressure steel gas
main inside an abandoned 14-inch cast iron water main
across Valley Creek located approximately 1,000 feet
north of the intersection of North Valley Road and
Swedesford Road (Valley Forge, PA Quadrangle N: 11.95
inches; W: 16.2 inches) in Tredyffrin Township, Chester
County. This permit was issued under section 105.13(e)
‘‘Small Projects.’’ This permit also includes 401 Water
Quality Certification.
E23-352. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, District 6-0, 200 Radnor-Chester Road, St. Davids,
PA 19087. To operate, modify and maintain two stream
enclosures which convey unnamed tributaries to east
branch Chester Creek (TSF) beneath Baltimore Pike. The
proposed project is associated with the roadway widening
and consists of extending one stream enclosure. This
enclosure is approximately 158-foot long, 72-inch by 42-
inch reinforced concrete arch pipe, which is to be ex-
tended upstream using a 13.6-foot long, 57-inch by 38-
inch arch corrugated steel pipe with precast concrete
endwall. The project also includes the replacement of
deteriorated 140-foot long, 30-inch diameter corrugated
steel pipe stream enclosure with a 151-foot long, 30-inch
diameter reinforced concrete pipe stream enclosure. Asso-
ciated activities include placement of fill material in 0.10
acre of adjacent wetlands (PFO). The site is located
approximately 1,600 feet northeast of the intersection of
Baltimore Pike (S. R. 0001) and S. R. 261, near the
junction of Darlington Road (S. R. 4005) and Baltimore
Pike, (Media, PA Quadrangle N: 4.1 inches; W: 14.0
inches) in Chester Heights Borough, Delaware County.
The permit applicant has met the wetland replacement
requirements by participating in the Pennsylvania
Wetland Replacement Project.
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E23-353. Encroachment. Harper Associates, P. O.
Box 384, Ridley Park, PA 19078. To construct, operate
and maintain an 874-foot long, 5-foot high by 10-foot wide
reinforced concrete box culvert stream enclosure in and
along a relocated alignment of an unnamed tributary to
Little Crum Creek (WWF). The enclosure will have an
attached precast concrete inlet section with wingwalls,
and 50-foot long riprap apron streambed protection. The
project is associated with the proposed Morton Avenue
Shopping Center redevelopment and also includes the
following work:
1. Removal of an existing 626-foot long CMP stream
enclosure.
2. Regrading and maintenance of an existing
stormwater management facility consisting of an earth
fill dam and an 180-foot long impoundment area exca-
vated in and along a tributary to Little Crum Creek and
the 100-year floodway.
3. Installation and maintenance of a proposed sanitary
sewer line and a storm water drainage outfall structure
within the 100-year floodway of the aforementioned tribu-
tary.
The project is located along east side of Morton Avenue
at a point approximately 500 feet south of MacDade
Boulevard (S. R. 2006) (Lansdowne, PA Quadrangle N: 1.8
inches; W: 11.1 inches) in Ridley Township, Delaware
County. The downstream 64-foot long segment of the
aforementioned stream enclosure, which extends beneath
Morton Avenue (S. R. 2025) is proposed for approval by
permit application No. E23-354, submitted by the Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation.
E23-354. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, 200 Radnor Chester Road, St. Davids, PA 19087. To
operate and maintain a 54-foot long section of a 5-foot
high by 10-foot wide reinforced concrete box culvert
stream enclosure in and along an unnamed tributary to
Little Crum Creek (WWF). This enclosure section extends
beneath Morton Avenue, and will have attached concrete
endwalls and a gabion outlet apron. The project also
includes construction, operation and maintenance of pro-
posed storm sewer lines along Morton Avenue to improve
drainage in this flood prone area. The project is located
along Morton Avenue, at a point approximately 500 feet
south of MacDade Boulevard (SR 2006) (Lansdowne, PA
Quadrangle N: 1.8 inches; W: 11.1 inches) in Ridley
Township, Delaware County. The aforementioned
stream enclosure section will be connected, at its up-
stream end, to a stream enclosure proposed for approval
by permit application E23-353, submitted by Harper
Associates.
E51-154. Encroachment. Rohm and Haas Company,
5000 Richmond Street, Philadelphia, PA 19137. To per-
form maintenance dredging along the western shoreline
of the Delaware River (WWF-MF) in approximately 0.44
acre of riverbed adjacent to the Rohm and Haas Plant
dock facility. This project also includes the modification of
the existing berth area by the installation of an addi-
tional mooring cluster. The purpose of this project is to
enlarge an existing mooring area to accommodate large
barges. This site is located at the 5000 Richmond Street,
Frankford Section of Philadelphia at a point, approxi-
mately 3/4 mile east from the intersection of I-95 and
Bridge Street (Camden, NJ-PA Quadrangle N: 22.6
inches; W: 8.75 inches) in the City of Philadelphia,
Philadelphia County.
E09-285A. Encroachment. Warminster Township
Board of Supervisors, Township Building, Henry and
Gibson Avenue, Warminster, PA 18974. To operate and
maintain 18 water obstructions and encroachments lo-
cated on the Warminster Five Pond public golf course in
and along a tributary to the Little Neshaminy Creek and
the adjacent wetlands, and to construct 2.35 acres of
replacement wetlands in this watershed. The golf course
is located at a point approximately 3,200 feet east of the
Warrington-Warminster Township Line and north of
Street Road (Hatboro, PA USGS Quadrangle N: 17.7
inches; W: 15.6 inches) in Warminster Township, Bucks
County. These activities modify and expand previously
permitted activities under Permit No. E09-285.
E09-735. Encroachment. The Cutler Group, 5 Sentry
Parkway West, Suite 100, Blue Bell, PA 19422. To
perform the following activities associated with the pro-
posed Rothrock Tract residential subdivision which will
impact 265 linear feet of an unnamed tributary of Mill
Creek (TSF) and 0.20 acre of adjacent wetland (PFO/SS):
1. To remove the existing outlet works of a dam, and
an existing driveway culvert. Also, to construct, operate
and maintain an on stream non-scope storm water man-
agement dam which includes Red Coat Farm Drive
roadway crossing along the dam crest.
2. To remove 16 linear feet of an existing 24-inch CMP
roadway culvert stream crossing and construct Red Coat
Farm Drive roadway stream crossing utilizing 80 linear
feet of 53-inch by 34-inch RCP culvert.
3. To remove 16 linear feet of an existing 24-inch CMP
culvert and construct an on-stream stormwater manage-
ment facility consisting of an excavated basin, an earth
fill non-scope storm water management dam embank-
ment, appurtenant outlet conduit, and a roadway crossing
for Pond View Drive along the downstream embankment
slope.
The permit application has met the wetland replace-
ment requirements by participating in the Pennsylvania
Wetland Replacement Project. This site is located on the
northeast side of Pickertown Road between Stump Road
and Lower State Road (Doylestown, PA Quadrangle N:
3.25 inches; W: 7.75 inches) in Warrington Township,
Bucks County.
Northeast Regional Office: Regional Soils and Water-
ways Section, 2 Public Square, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-
0790, telephone (717) 826-5485.
E45-306. Encroachment. Michael Berardi, Sr., R. R.
5, Box 5199, East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To place fill in
a man-made pond having a surface area of approximately
0.34 acre and a depth of 4.0 feet for the purpose of
eliminating the pond to facilitate commercial development
of the site. The project is located along a tributary to
Pocono Creek, approximately 300 feet west of S. R. 0611
and 0.75 mile south of the intersection of S. R. 0611 and
S. R. 0715 (Mount Pocono, PA Quadrangle N: 6.1 inches;
W: 7.4 inches) in Pocono Township, Monroe County.
E45-307. Encroachment. Locust Lake Village Prop-
erty Owners Association, HC 88, Box 121, Pocono
Lake, PA 18347. To construct and maintain six dry
hydrant intake structures: one in Pilgrim Lake, one in
East Lake, two in Locust Lake and two in ‘‘Pines Lake’’,
for the purpose of fire protection. Each intake structure
will consist of a screened 6-inch PVC intake pipe extend-
ing approximately 8 feet into the lake, at a depth of 2 feet
below the water surface. The project is located in Locust
Lake Village, on the north side of S. R. 0940, approxi-
mately 7 miles west of S. R. 0380 (Thornhurst, PA
Quadrangle N: 2 inches; W: 7 inches) in Tobyhanna
Township, Monroe County.
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E48-239. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, Engineering District 5-0, 1713 Lehigh Street, Allen-
town, PA 18103. To remove the existing structure and to
construct and maintain a road crossing of a tributary to
Little Bushkill Creek, consisting of dual 18.0-foot by
5.0-foot precast concrete box culverts with their inverts
depressed 1.0 foot below streambed elevation. The project
is located on S. R. 0512, Section 01B, approximately 1,000
feet northeast of the center of the interchange of S. R.
0033 and S. R. 0512 (Wind Gap, PA Quadrangle N: 15.5
inches; W: 6.5 inches), in Plainfield Township, North-
ampton County.
Southcentral Regional Office: Water Management Pro-
gram, Soils and Waterways Section, One Ararat Boule-
vard, Room 126, Harrisburg, PA 17110, telephone (717)
657-4590.
E05-242. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, Engineering District 9-0, Earl Neiderhiser, 1620
North Juniata Street, Hollidaysburg, PA 16648. To re-
move the existing structure and to construct and main-
tain a bridge having a clear span of 58.6 feet on a 55
degree skew with a minimum underclearance of 8.9 feet
across Scrubgrass Creek on SR 4034, Section 001, Seg-
ment 0030, offset 0759 located about 0.8 mile west of
Imler Village (Alum Bank, PA Quadrangle N: 15.5 inches;
W: 5.3 inches) in King Township, Bedford County. This
permit also includes 401 Water Quality Certification.
E06-485. Encroachment. Charles and Theresa
Ziegler, 1279 Powder Mill Hollow Road, Boyertown, PA
19512. To place fill in 0.18 acre of wetlands adjacent to
Ironstone Creek at a point along the north side of South
Reading Avenue approximately 300 feet west of the
intersection of South Reading Avenue and Mill Street
(Boyertown, PA Quadrangle N: 13.8 inches; W: 3.5 inches)
in Colebrookdale Township, Berks County. The permit
applicant has met the wetland replacement requirement
by participating in the Pennsylvania Wetland Replace-
ment Project.
E07-275. Encroachment. New Enterprises Stone &
Lime Co., Inc., P. O. Box 77, Church Street, New
Enterprise, PA 16664. To maintain a previously con-
structed foot bridge across Halter Creek having a span of
48 feet and a maximum underclearance of about 5.5 feet
to provide access from a parking area to office buildings
located approximately 500 feet east of SR 0036 about 1.0
mile north of the Roaring Spring Borough corporate
boundary (Roaring Spring, PA Quadrangle N: 17.3 inches;
W: 4.0 inches) in Taylor Township, Blair County. This
permit was issued under section 105.13(e) ‘‘Small
Projects.’’ This permit also includes 401 Water Quality
Certification.
E67-577. Encroachment. Department of Transporta-
tion, Engineering District 8-0, John Rautzahn, 2140 Herr
Street, Harrisburg, PA 17103. To remove existing struc-
ture and to construct and maintain a prestressed adjacent
plank beam bridge with a normal span of 24 feet and a
minimum underclearance of 5 feet, 6 inches over Fishing
Creek on SR 2031, Segment 0030, Offset 0272. A corner of
the masonary wall will be removed and replaced with a
reinforced concrete retaining wall at the confluence of the
tributary immediately upstream from the bridge (Red
Lion, PA Quadrangle N: 7.29 inches; W: 11.25 inches) in
Windsor Borough, York County. This permit was issued
under section 105.13(e) ‘‘Small Projects.’’ This permit also
includes 401 Water Quality Certification.
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
DEP Central Office: Bureau of Waterways Engineering,
400 Market Street, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 8554, Harrisburg,
PA 17105-8554, telephone (717) 787-8568.
Environmental Assessment Approvals and
Actions on 401 Certification
EA15-019C0. Environmental assessment. Sargio
DeMichiel (108 Joanne Way, Saginaw Farms, P. O. Box
1004, New London, PA 19360). To construct and maintain
a nonjurisdictional dam across a tributary to Hodgson
Run (HQ-TSF;MF) impacting approximately 0.13 acre of
wetlands (PSS) for the purpose of stormwater manage-
ment and access at the proposed Saginaw Farms subdivi-
sion. The proposed dam will replace an existing
nonjurisdictional dam and pond located approximately
1,100 feet northeast of the intersection of Saginaw Road
(SR 3020) and Mount Hope Road (Oxford, PA Quadrangle
N: 4.35 inches; W: 3.65 inches) in New London Township,
Chester County.
Southeast Regional Office: Program Manager, Water
Management Program, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North
Lane, Conshohocken, PA 19428.
WL4697302. 401. Matrix Realty, Inc., 100 Tourna-
ment Drive, Horsham, PA 19044. To enhance stormwater
management system on Lot 4 at the Commonwealth
Corporation Center, Horsham Township, Montgomery
County.
WATER QUALITY CERTIFICATION
Requests for Certification under Section 401 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act
The following requests have been made to the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection for certification under
§ 401(a) of the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a), that there is
reasonable assurance that the construction herein de-
scribed will not violate applicable Federal and State
water quality standards.
Prior to final approval of the proposed certification,
consideration will be given to any comments, suggestions
or objections which are submitted in writing 30 days of
the date of this Notice. Comments should be submitted to
the Department of Environmental Protection at the ad-
dress indicated above each of the following requests for
certification. All comments should contain the name,
address and telephone number of the person commenting,
identification of the certification request to which the
comments/objections are addressed, and a concise state-
ment of comments, objections or suggestions in sufficient
detail to inform the Department of the exact basis of the
proposal and the relevant facts upon which it is based.
The Department may conduct a fact-finding hearing or an
informal conference in response to any given comments if
deemed necessary to resolve conflicts. Each individual
will be notified in writing of the time and place of any
scheduled hearing or conference concerning the certifica-
tion request to which the protest relates. Maps, drawings
and other data pertinent to the certification request are
available for inspection and review at the address indi-
cated above each request for certification between the
hours of 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. on each working day.
Southeast Regional Office: Regional Water Management
Program Manager, Lee Park, Suite 6010, 555 North Lane,
Conshohocken, PA 19428-2233, telephone (610) 832-6130.
NOTICES 1401
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
Certification Request Initiated By: Department of the
Army, Philadelphia District, Corps of Engineers,
Wanamaker Building, 100 Penn Square East, Philadel-
phia, PA 19107-3390.
Project Description/Location: The project consists of the
discharge of no more than 6 mgd from the Fort Mifflin
Dredge Disposal Site to Zone 4 of the Delaware Estuary.
The existing 401 Certification allows a discharge of 26
mgd from this facility. Sampling requirements may also
be modified.
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-411. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Availability of Technical Guidance
Governor’s Office List
Once a year on the first Saturday in August, the
Governor’s Office publishes a list of the nonregulatory
guidance documents of all State agencies in the Pennsyl-
vania Bulletin. The first publication of this list was in the
August 3, 1996, edition of the Bulletin. The next publica-
tion of this list will be in the August 2, 1997, Pennsylva-
nia Bulletin.
DEP’s Technical Guidance Document Inventory
DEP publishes a list of its technical guidance docu-
ments in its Technical Guidance Document Inventory
twice a year. The most recent edition of the Inventory is
the December 1996 edition. This edition is now available
on DEP’s World Wide Web site. DEP’s Web address is
http://www.dep.state.pa.us. To go to the location of the
Inventory once on the DEP home page, persons should
choose the Public Participation Center/Technical Guid-
ance Document/Basic Inventory.
Bound paper copies of the Inventory are available now
for those who do not have access to the Web site. DEP
automatically mails a paper copy of the December 1996
Inventory to persons who received a bound paper copy of
the June 1996 Inventory. Persons who wish to add their
address to the mailing list should call Nina Huizinga at
(717) 783-8727.
DEP’s Technical Guidance Documents on the World Wide
Web
DEP’s Web address is http://www.dep.state.pa.us. To go
to the location of DEP’s Technical Guidance Documents
once on the DEP home page, persons should choose the
Public Participation Center. The Center contains several
links to DEP’s Technical Guidance Documents. Persons
should look under the heading ‘‘Proposals Open to Com-
ment’’ for the link to ‘‘Draft Technical Guidance.’’ Persons
should look under the heading ‘‘Proposals Recently Final-
ized’’ for the link to ‘‘Technical Guidance.’’ Persons should
look under the heading ‘‘Technical Guidance’’ for one link
to the ‘‘Basic Inventory’’ and a second link to ‘‘Final
Guidance.’’ The final documents menu will list DEP’s
bureaus. Persons should click on the name of the bureau
to get to the list of the documents from that bureau that
are currently on the Web. Then, to get to see a document,
persons should click on the ID number of the document.
DEP will be adding its revised documents to the Web
throughout 1997.
Help Protect the Environment: Use the Web and Save
Trees
DEP encourages members of the public who read these
announcements in the Pennsylvania Bulletin and DEP’s
UPDATE and who have access to the World Wide Web to
avoid the needless duplication of paper copies of DEP’s
technical guidance documents. Persons can download
those DEP documents which are posted on DEP’s Web
site onto their computers and read them electronically.
This method saves both paper and money.
Ordering Paper Copies of DEP Technical Guidance
Although DEP promotes the use of electronic copies of
its technical guidance rather than paper copies, there are
still reasons for DEP to continue to provide members of
the public with paper copies: 1) It may be more conve-
nient to use some documents in a paper form, 2) Not
everyone has access to the World Wide Web and 3) Not all
DEP documents are on DEP’s Web site yet. Persons can
order an unbound paper copy of the latest Inventory or an
unbound paper copy of any of the final documents listed
on the Inventory by calling Elwyn, Inc. (the printer) at
(800) 804-4020 if calling in Pennsylvania or (610) 497-
5826 if calling from outside Pennsylvania. Elwyn’s fax
number is (610) 497-5932.
In addition, bound copies of some of DEP’s documents
are available as DEP publications. Persons should check
with the appropriate bureau for more information about
the availability of a particular document as a publication.
Changes to Technical Guidance Documents
Between publication of its Inventory, DEP announces
changes to its technical guidance documents in its weekly
newsletter, the UPDATE and the Pennsylvania Bulletin.
Here is the current list of recently finalized documents,
draft documents and notices of intended changes to
technical guidance.
Persons who have any questions or comments about a
particular document should call the contact person whose
name and phone is listed with each document. Persons
who have questions or comments about the Inventory, the
documents on the World Wide Web, the availability of
paper copies from the printer or the technical guidance
document process in general should call Nina Huizinga at
(717) 783-8727.
Final Technical Guidance Documents—Minor Revisions
DEP ID: 012-0900-002. Title: Electronic Copies of Tech-
nical Guidance. Description: This document has been
updated to reflect DEP’s effort to make its documents
available to the public and its staff using appropriate
electronic media. Page Length: 6 pages. Location: Volume
1, Tab 3A. Contact: Nina Huizinga at (717) 783-8727.
Draft Technical Guidance
DEP ID: 563-2100-216. Draft Title: Permit Renewals.
Background: This guidance relates to the coal mine
permit renewal requirements of 25 Pa. Code § 86.55.
Revisions to the guidance are necessary to conform with
changes in this regulation. Deadline for Submittal of
Comments: April 15, 1997. Contact: Nevin Strock at (717)
783-8845.
DEP ID: 563-2112-224. Draft Title: Certification Guide-
lines for Beneficial Uses of Coal Ash. Background: This
document provides the information and procedures for
coal ash to be certified by the Department for beneficial
uses at active coal mine and abandoned mine sites. This
document is being developed as a requirement of the coal
ash beneficial use regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§ 287.663
and 287.664. Deadline for Submittal of Comments: April
7, 1997. Contact: Alfred Dalberto at (717) 783-8845.
DEP ID: 563-2112-225. Draft Title: Beneficial Uses of
Coal Ash. Background: This document provides the tech-
nical information for beneficial uses, coal ash placement,
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coal ash alkaline addition, coal ash as a soil substitute or
soil additive, and coal ash as low permeable material at
active coal mine and abandoned mine sites. This docu-
ment is being developed as a requirement of the coal ash
beneficial use regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§ 287.663 and
287.664. Deadline for Submittal of Comments: April 7,
1997. Contact: Alfred Dalberto at (717) 783-8845.
Notice of Intent to Develop Technical Guidance—New
Guidance
Draft Title: Alternative Testing Methodology for
Dredged Sediment Proposed for Unrestricted Onsite Use
or Approved Offsite Use. Background: This guidance has
been developed to simplify chemical evaluation of dredged
sediment for construction and maintenance dredging
projects. The current approach of running a broad spec-
trum series of tests based on the RCRA Appendix IX list
of hazardous substances is cost prohibitive and not
necessary for the safe handling and use of the material if
the use of the material does not worsen the existing
contamination at proposed onsite or offsite disposal loca-
tions, is properly managed for stormwater control, and
does not allow drainage of suspended material back into
the waterway. The alternative testing methodologies iden-
tified in the guidelines require analysis of only a limited
number of parameters based on general indicator param-
eters and specific common contaminants. They incorpo-
rate the Interim Statewide Health Standards, as listed in
the Act 2 Technical Guidance Manual, the Department’s
Clean Fill Policy and the Final Lead Policy including
other statutory requirements and standards found in the
Safe Drinking Water Act. The analytical screening meth-
ods described here do not apply to remediation dredging
projects. Anticipated Effective Date: June 1, 1997. Antici-
pated Draft Development Date: March 1, 1997. Proposed
Development and Review Process: Guidelines will be
developed internally by Department staff with input from
the Department’s Regional and Field Operation staff.
Then, the draft will be announced for comment by the
public. Contact: Manny Miller and Joseph Chnupa at
(412) 442-4000.
Draft Title: Guidance for Road Project Right-of-Way
Soil and Groundwater Screening Analyses with Alterna-
tives for Testing. Background: A basic approach to evalua-
tion and remediation of highway right-of-ways is needed
so that unnecessary cost to Pennsylvania taxpayers is
avoided, while the health of highway construction work-
ers, highway users, and adjacent property owners is
protected. This can be accomplished by addressing the 3
key areas, namely, hazardous/residual waste assessment,
OSHA workplace requirements, and contaminated media.
This technical guidance provides a clear outline for soil
screening analyses with reasonable alternative testing
methodologies, onsite ambient air monitoring to protect
workers and adjoining properties, and interfaces with the
Department’s ‘‘Clean Fill Policy,’’ ‘‘Final Lead Policy,’’ and
Act 2 remediation standards to determine excavated soil
disposal or ‘‘accepted use’’ authorization. Anticipated Ef-
fective Date: June 1, 1997. Anticipated Draft Develop-
ment Date: March 1, 1997. Proposed Development and
Review Process: Guidelines will be developed internally
by Department staff with input from the Department’s
Central Office, Regional and Field Operation staff. Then,
the draft will be announced for public comment. Contact:
Manny Miller and Joseph Chnupa at (412) 442-4000.
Notice of Intent to Rescind Technical Guidance
DEP ID: 253-0200-616. Title: Greenfields Program
Implementation. Reason for Rescission: The former DER
issued this 1993 document to encourage the reuse or
redevelopment of vacant industrial premises. It has been
superseded by Act 2 of 1995. Regulations and technical
guidance to implement Act 2 are being drafted. Contact:
Josephine Valencia at (717) 787-9870.
Notice of Intent to Remove Technical Guidance from the
Inventory—Bureau of Land Recycling and Waste Man-
agement
The following documents contain purely administrative
and internal operating procedures with no impact on the
regulated community or the public. They will be included
in the Bureau of Land Recycling and Waste Manage-
ment’s operating procedures manual for internal guid-
ance, rather than on the DEP Technical Guidance Docu-
ment Inventory. The removal of other similar documents
by the Bureau were announced in the August 17, 1996,
Pennsylvania Bulletin. Contact: Josephine Valencia at
(717) 787-9870.
DEP ID Title
250-3140-507 WQM Guidance for Compliance with
Acts 101 and 108
250-4110-306 Issuance of Notice of Violation
250-5500-204 Review of CDBG/Small Community
Project Grant Applications
251-2000-701 Hazardous Waste Permit Review Proce-
dures
251-2000-711 Joint Review of Hazardous Waste Facil-
ities Requiring WM/AQC Permits
251-2000-714 Responding to Applications for RCRA
Emergency Permits
252-2200-514 Approval of Alternate Recycling Pro-
gram
252-3100-513 Annual Facility Reports from Municipal
Waste Facilities
253-0600-607 MOU between HSCA, Chief Engineer
and Field Operations
253-3100-602 Property Access to Hazardous Sites
253-4000-601 Guidance for Application of Section
1301 under HSCA
253-4100-605 Gathering Information under Section
503 of HSCA
253-4100-617 Searches for Responsible Persons under
HSCA
253-4100-630 Implementation of Section 708 NBAR
Provision of HSCA
253-4130-640 Mixed Funding Settlements under Sec-
tion 505(h) of HSCA
253-4500-611 Statement of Decision and Response to
Public Comment
253-4500-619 Listing Sites on Pennsylvania Priority
List
253-4500-624 Response Category Selection
253-4500-637 Development of Administrative Records
under HSCA
253-4500-645 Policy and Procedure for Periodic Post-
Remediation Review under HSCA
253-5800-622 Interim Incident Report
253-5800-623 Daily Activity Report
253-5800-627 Weekly Activity Report
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DEP ID Title
253-5800-631 Requesting Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Program Contractual Services
253-5800-636 Workplan/Procedure for IRSC and
GTAC Contracts
254-2158-745 Issuance of Emergency Municipal
Waste Transfer Approvals
254-2163-719 Approval of Beneficial Use Order of
DEP
254-4000-315 Forfeiture of Vehicles as Authorized by
Act 101
254-4180-304 Mandatory Civil Penalty Provisions of
Municipal and Residual Waste Regs
Notice of Intent to Rescind Technical Guidance—Bureau of
Land Recycling and Waste Management
The Bureau announced its intention to rescind the
following technical guidance documents as part of its
Regulatory Basics Initiative Report published August
1996. Subsequently, these documents were not listed on
the December 1996 Inventory. However, the Notice of
Intent to Rescind is being published now in DEP’s
UPDATE and the Pennsylvania Bulletin for the sake of
clarity. Contact: Josephine Valencia at (717) 787-9870.
DEP ID Title
250-2100-746 Permit Exemption for Use of Food Pro-
cessing Sludge
251-0600-710 Joint Permit Review of Hazardous
Waste Incinerators, BWM and AQC
253-5800-618 Change Orders for Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Program Contract Manage-
ment
253-5800-629 Prevailing Minimum Wage
254-2153-722 Use of Double Liners on Slopes of Ex-
isting Landfills
254-2153-724 Permitting of Passive Gas Systems for
Municipal Waste Landfills
254-2157-716 Disposition of Existing Permitted
Construction/Demolition Landfills
JAMES M. SEIF,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-412. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
DEPARTMENT OF
GENERAL SERVICES
Design Professional Selections
The Selections Committee for the Department of Gen-
eral Services will meet to consider selections of Design
Professionals for the following projects:
Project No. DGS A 414-155. Feasibility Study—Swope
Hall Renovations, West Chester University, Chester
County, PA. Design Fee: $50,000. The scope of work
includes, but is not limited to, a feasibility study to
determine the extent of renovations required to Swope
Hall, which houses the School of Music, and establish cost
estimates and schedules for construction. The study will
examine issues of compliance with applicable building
codes; remaining service life of existing systems; life-
cycle and maintenance costs; features for the disabled;
energy conservation; safety and security; communications
systems; drainage and landscaping; space needs of the
school; acoustic performance and aesthetic concerns.
Project No. DGS A 960-86. Military Instruction Facil-
ity Barracks, Fort Indiantown Gap, Annville, Lebanon
County, PA. Construction Cost: $14,310,000. The scope of
work includes, but is not limited to, construction of two
dormitory-style barracks to accommodate 240 and 330
students, respectively, and a new Dining Hall and kitchen
facilities for approximately 620 students. Also included
will be day rooms, laundry (student) facilities, and appro-
priate mechanical, custodial and storage spaces. Sanitary
sewer, water, electric, and telecommunications are avail-
able at the site, which is identified as Area 8. (See Note
under Requirements and Information regarding Special
Conditions.)
Requirements and Information
Note—Special Conditions
Special Conditions for Project No. DGS A 960- 86: The
construction contract documents must be completed for
advertising by June 1998 in order to secure the 100%
Federal funding. Design is subject to approval of State
Agencies as well as the Department of Defense.
Instructions for Filing Application
Professionals will not be considered by the Committee
until all of the following requirements are met.
(a) Signed Revised 1994 Form 150, not more than 1
year old as of the deadline date stated in paragraph (d)
below, must be filed with the Department of General
Services for the requesting professional firm and the
designated key consultants listed on the requesting pro-
fessional firm’s application (Form 150-S). All signatures
on Form 150 must be original signatures. Consultants
listed on the requesting professional firm’s application
(Form 150-S) shall be deemed to be designated key
consultants. If these documents are not on file with the
Department, the requesting professional firm must sub-
mit them with firm’s application (Form 150-S). A photo-
copy of Form 150 without an original signature of a
principal of the firm is not acceptable. Revised 1994 Form
150, Architect/Engineer Questionnaire, may be obtained
upon request to the Selections Committee, Department of
General Services, Room 104, 18th and Herr Streets,
Harrisburg, PA 17125, telephone (717) 783-8468.
(b) The requesting professional firm shall obtain from
each consultant listed in the requesting professional
firm’s application (Form 150-S) a signed letter of certifica-
tion on the consultant’s letterhead, attesting to the firm’s
consent to participate in the requesting professional
firm’s application (Form 150-S) for the specific project.
Signed letters of certification from consultants are re-
quired and constitute a part of the requesting profes-
sional firm’s application (Form 150-S) for the specific
project. All signatures on letters of certification must be
original signatures.
(c) The requesting professional firm must submit six
signed copies of Revised 1994 Form 150-S, Specific Project
Form, for each project herein advertised in which the firm
is interested and qualified to perform. All signatures on
Form 150-S must be original signatures. For architectural
projects and, when appropriate, for engineering projects,
the Professional shall supply photographs showing a
maximum of two different views of each of the three
projects described in Question 14, Page 5 of the applica-
tion (Form 150-S). The requesting professional firm or
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oint Venture members must be the Professional of
Record for the projects described in Question 14, Page 5
of the application (Form 150-S). It is not acceptable to list
work performed by key consultants. The identification
and appropriate supportive information concerning each
photograph shall include the name, project title, location
and the name of the Professional of Record. Renderings
and brochures will not be accepted in lieu of photographs.
The photographs shall be attached to each copy of the
application, (Form 150-S). The pages of each copy of
revised 1994 Form 150-S must be stapled with photo-
graphs and consultant’s letters of certification followed by
photocopies of licenses of registered professionals included
as the last section of the application. Do not bind the
application (Form 150-S) in any way to any other docu-
mentation. Do not bind the application (Form 150-S) in a
binder of any type. Revised 1994 Form 150-S may be
obtained upon request to the Selections Committee, De-
partment of General Services, Room 104, 18th and Herr
Streets, Harrisburg, PA 17125, telephone (717) 783-8468.
(d) A complete project submission, which consists of
documents described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above,
must be received on or before the close of business (5
p.m.) Tuesday, March 25, 1997, and addressed to the
Selections Committee, Department of General Services,
Room 104, 18th and Herr Streets, Harrisburg, PA 17125.
Fax applications are not acceptable.
Project submissions must be made on the current 1994
forms. Outdated forms are not acceptable.
(e) The Selections Committee may at its discretion
establish interviews with any or all of the Professionals
who have requested consideration for appointment as
designer for the above projects. If an interview is re-
quired, the Professional will be notified by the Committee
as to the date, time and location.
(f) Additional information, in writing, may be requested
by the Committee as required.
Additional Services—Indoor Air Quality Assessment Pro-
gram and Hazardous Materials
The Professional firm selected to design a project will
be expected to perform and administer, when required by
the Department as Additional Services, an Indoor Air
Quality Assessment Program during Building or Renova-
tion Commissioning and the sampling, testing, inspection
and monitoring for removal of any asbestos, other hazard-
ous waste or contaminants encountered during project
design or construction, unless otherwise stated in the
Scope.
The professional agrees to comply with the terms of the
Agreement and specifically as it relates to the Profes-
sional Liability Insurance and the General Liability In-
surance Requirements.
The Selections Committee encourages responses from
small firms, minority firms, women-owned firms and
firms who have not previously performed State work, and
will consider Joint Ventures, which will enable them to
participate in this program.
All applications submitted are subject to review by the
Selections Committee. The Selections Committee dis-
claims any liability whatsoever as to its review of the
applications submitted and in formulating its recommen-
dations for selection. All recommendations for selection
made by the Committee shall be final under the act of
July 22, 1975 (P. L. 75, No. 45).
GARY E. CROWELL,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-413. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
State Surplus Property Program Bid Items
Under the provisions of section 510 of The Administra-
tive Code of 1929 (P. S. 165, No. 67), the Department of
General Services, State Surplus Property Program is
offering for sale to counties, boroughs, incorporated
towns, cities and townships the following items:
Item Make Equip. No. Location
Gas Fork Lift Hyster 168-07-0001 DPW—Selinsgrove Center
Cleveland Grader Mdl. D-581 177-09-0001 DCNR—James Creek
Caterpillar Loader Mdl. 920 102-08-0190 DCNR—Petersburg
Gladco Compactor Mdl. 4400 GLA-00-0003 DCNR—Tobyhanna
Truckster, 3 wheel Cushman MIX-00-0971 DCNR—Tobyhanna
1964 Farm Tractor Ford 104-01-0138 PEMA—Annville
1979 Farm Tractor Massey Ferg. 136-07-0221 PEMA—Annville
Farm Tractor “M” Farmall 67624 Corrections—Graterford
Farm Tractor “M” International 67625 Corrections—Graterford
Farm Tractor “404” International 67626 Corrections—Graterford
Farm Tractor “656” International 106-03-0452 Corrections—Graterford
Farm Tractor “730” Case 114-05-0094 Corrections—Graterford
Road Grader Austin West. 67619 Corrections—Graterford
1965 Loader Michigan 144-06-0005 Corrections—Muncy
Artic. Loader J. D. 544A 092-1385 PA Dot—Mifflintown
Tractor Mower International 417-6915 PA Dot—Mifflintown
Wheel Loader Case W-14 150-1056 PA Dot—Mifflintown
Excavator Koehring 013-6368 PA Dot—Mifflintown
Front End Loader Ford 085-8058 PA Dot—Bear Creek
Backhoe, Mdl 680H Case 274-6056 PA Dot—Norristown
Grader Austin West. 281-2671 PA Dot—Lewisbury
Tractor Loader Caterpillar 050-1387 PA Dot—York
The above will be sold to the highest responsible bidder by sealed bid sale. Those political subdivisions which are
interested in procuring one or more of these items should contact the Department of General Services, State Surplus
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Property Division, P. O. Box 1365, Harrisburg, PA 17105 or call (717) 787-4085 prior to the bid opening on April 7, 1997,
at 1 p.m. to receive a bid proposal.
GARY E. CROWELL,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-414. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Changes to Spousal Notification Policies and
Guidelines under Section 8(a) of the Ryan White
CARE Reauthorization Act of 1996
Section 8(a) of the 1996 Federal Ryan White CARE
Reauthorization Act (P. L. 104—146), requires that states,
in order to receive funding under the act, take ‘‘adminis-
trative or legislative action to require that a good faith
effort be made to notify a spouse of a known HIV-infected
patient that such spouse may have been exposed to the
human immunodeficiency virus and should seek testing.’’
42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-27a(a). A spouse is defined by this
law as, ‘‘any individual who is the marriage partner of an
HIV-infected patient or who has been the marriage
partner of that patient at any time within the 10-year
period prior to diagnosis of HIV infection.’’ 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300ff-27a(b)(i). The Department of Health, Bureau of
HIV/AIDS, has revised its existing partner notification
policies and guidelines to comply with this new require-
ment. This policy revision will go into effect on April 1,
1997. Persons who have any questions regarding this
change of policy, or who have a disability and require an
alternative format of this information (for example, large
print, audio tape, braille), should contact Susan Harding,
Department of Health, P. O. Box 90, Harrisburg, PA
17108, Bureau of HIV/AIDS, (717) 783-0574; TDD (717)
783-6514.
DANIEL F. HOFFMANN, FACHE,
Acting Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-415. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
Contemplated Sale of Land No Longer Needed for
Transportation Purposes
The Department of Transportation, under 71 P. S.
§ 513(e)(7), intends to sell certain land owned by the
Department.
The following is a list of properties available for sale by
the Department.
1. Parcel B—City of McKeesport, Allegheny County.
This parcel contains 13.53± acres of unimproved land
situated along S. R. 0048 in the City of McKeesport.
Minimum price, $8,100.
2. Parcel D—White Oak Borough, Allegheny County.
This parcel contains 2.83± acres of unimproved land
situated along Lincoln Way in the Borough of White Oak.
Minimum price $24,700.
3. Parcel I—White Oak Borough, Allegheny County.
This parcel contains 2.43± acres of unimproved land
situated along Lincoln Way in the Borough of White Oak.
Minimum price of $24,350.
It has been determined that the land is no longer
needed for present or future transportation purposes.
Interested public entities are invited to express their
interest in purchasing the site within 30-calendar days
from the date of publication of this notice to Henry M.
Nutbrown, P.E., District Engineer, Department of Trans-
portation, Engineering District 11-0, 45 Thoms Run Road,
Bridgeville, PA 15017.
BRADLEY L. MALLORY,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-416. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION
Public Hearing Opinions
The Human Relations Commission, under section 7(o)
of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (P. L. 744, No.
222) hereby announces the publication of the Stipulations
of Fact, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final
Decision and Order, made after a public hearing under
section 9(e)—(g) of the act, in the following cases:
Joann Carper v. Lawrence County Prison Board; Docket
No. E61268D (Pennsylvania Human Relations Commis-
sion, January 27, 1997); Sex-based refusal to hire; Ruling
for Complainant, 10-0 decision; 37 pages.
Herman L. Harris II v. Loretta Cupani and Joseph
Tomalonis; Docket No. H6571 (Pennsylvania Human Re-
lations Commission, February 25, 1997); Race-based re-
fusal to negotiate for the rental of a housing accommoda-
tion; Ruling for Complainant, 9-0 decision, one
abstention; 16 pages.
Dennis R. Duffy v. Pitt Ohio Express, Inc.; Docket No.
E56433 (Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
February 24, 1997); Disability-based refusal to hire; Rul-
ing for Complainant, 9-1 decision; 28 pages.
The final orders in the above-listed cases are subject to
appeal to Commonwealth Court, and if appealed are
subject to being affirmed, reversed or modified, in whole
or part.
A copy of the opinions listed in this notice may be
obtained by mailing a request indicating the opinions
desired, accompanied by a check or money order in the
amount of 10 cents per page (the number of pages in the
opinion is set forth at the end of the case listing), to
Laura J. Treaster, Information Director, Human Relations
Commission, 101 South Second Street, Suite 300, Harris-
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burg, PA 17101. The check or money order should be
made payable to the ‘‘Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.’’
HOMER C. FLOYD,
Executive Director
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-417. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY REVIEW
COMMISSION
Notice of Filing of Final-Form Rulemakings
The Independent Regulatory Review Commission re-
ceived, on the dates indicated, the following final-form
regulations for review. The regulations will be considered
within 30 days of their receipt at a public meeting of the
Commission. To obtain the date and time of the meeting,
interested parties may contact the office of the Commis-
sion at (717) 783-5417. To obtain a copy of the regulation,
interested parties should contact the agency promulgating
the regulation.
Reg. No. Agency/Title Received
4-61 Department of Community and
Economic Development
Private Activity Bonds—
Allocations
3/3/97
JOHN R. McGINLEY, Jr.,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-418. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
Viola Cozart; Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund; Doc.
No. CF97-03-004
The hearing on the above-captioned appeal is hereby
scheduled for 2 p.m., May 7, 1997, in the Administrative
Hearing Room 200, 901 North Seventh Street, Harris-
burg, PA 17120.
The proceedings in this matter will be governed by 2
Pa.C.S. §§ 501—508, 701—704 (relating to the Adminis-
trative Agency Law) and 1 Pa. Code Part II (relating to
general rules of administrative practice and procedure).
The claimant may appear with or without counsel and
offer relevant testimony or evidence to support her posi-
tion. The representative of the CAT fund must bring
relevant claim files and any other necessary evidence.
The claimant must bring all documents, photographs,
drawings, witnesses, and the like, necessary to substanti-
ate the case.
Pending hearing, parties shall informally attempt to
resolve undisputed facts by stipulation, exchange pro-
posed exhibits, the names of witnesses, and provide an
offer of proof with respect to each witness.
All documents, motion and pleadings shall be filed with
Heidi L. Barry, Assistant Docket Clerk, Administrative
Hearing Office, Room 200, 901 North Seventh Street,
Harrisburg, PA 17102 on or before April 18, 1997.
LINDA S. KAISER,
Insurance Commissioner
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-419. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Prudential Insurance Company; Rate Revision for
Homeowners Insurance
On February 24, 1997, the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department received from Prudential Insurance Company
a filing of rates for homeowners insurance.
The company requests an overall 7.1% increase,
amounting to $3,765,000 annually, to be effective June 13,
1997 for new business and July 18, 1997 for renewals.
Unless formal administrative action is taken prior to
April 25, 1997, the subject filing may be deemed approved
by operation of law.
Copies of the filing are available for public inspection
during normal working hours, by appointment, at the
Insurance Department’s offices in Harrisburg, Philadel-
phia, Pittsburgh and Erie.
Interested parties are invited to submit written com-
ments, suggestions or objections to Rick Pawelski, Insur-
ance Department, Office of Rate and Policy Regulation,
Bureau of Property and Casualty Insurance, Actuarial
Review Division, 1311 Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA
17120, within 30 days of publication of this notice in the
Pennsylvania Bulletin.
LINDA S. KAISER,
Insurance Commissioner
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-420. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Review Procedure Hearings; Cancellation or Re-
fusal of Insurance
The following insureds have requested a hearing, as
authorized by section 9(a) of the act of June 5, 1968 (P. L.
140, No. 78) (40 P. S. § 1008.9(a)) in connection with their
company’s termination of the insured’s automobile poli-
cies.
The hearings will be held in the Capitol Associates
Building, 901 North Seventh Street, Second Floor Hear-
ing Room, Harrisburg, PA 17102.
Appeal of Farbacher, Jeffrey and Elizabeth; file no.
97-308-70217; Erie Insurance; doc. no. PI97-03-002; April
8, 1997, at 9 a.m.;
Appeal of Sidle, Lorraine and Adam; file no. 97-280-
30292; Nationwide Insurance Company; doc. no. PH97-02-
042; April 21, 1997, at 1 p.m.;
Appeal of Sweeney, David and Renee; file no. 97-198-
00281; Allstate; doc. no. P97-02-034; April 21, 1997, at 2
p.m.;
Appeal of Meshach, Nancy; file no. 96-121-08674; Royal
Insurance Company of America; doc. no. P97-02-043; April
28, 1997, at 11 a.m.;
Appeal of Daily, Dennis and Elizabeth; file no. 96-215-
38528; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company; doc. no.
PH97-02-041; April 28, 1997, at 1 p.m.;
NOTICES 1407
PENNSYLVANIA BULLETIN, VOL. 27, NO. 11, MARCH 15, 1997
Appeal of Sfedu, Gheorghe; file no. 97-280-30210;
Pennland Insurance Company; doc. no. PH97-02-040;
April 28, 1997, at 2 p.m.;
Appeal of McGarvey, Joseph and Michelle; file no.
96-215-38130; Prudential Property & Casualty; doc. no.
PH97-02-039; April 29, 1997, at 11 a.m.;
Appeal of Kennedy, Michael; file no. 97-264-30145;
Allstate Insurance Company; doc. no. PH97-02-038; April
29, 1997, at 1 p.m.;
Appeal of Haggard, Paul; file no. 97-407-90044; State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; doc. no.
E97-02-037; April 29, 1997, at 2 p.m.
Parties may appear with or without counsel and offer
relevant testimony or evidence to support their respective
positions. The representative of the company must bring
relevant claims files, documents, photographs, drawings,
witnesses and the like necessary to substantiate the case.
The insured must bring any evidence which the insured
may want to offer at the hearing. The hearing will be
held in accordance with the requirements of sections 9
and 10 of the act (40 P. S. §§ 1008.9 and 1008.10) and 1
Pa. Code Part II (relating to the General Rules of
Administrative Practice and Procedure).
After the hearing, the Insurance Commissioner will
issue a written order resolving the factual issues pre-
sented at the hearing and stating what remedial action, if
any, is required. The Commissioner’s Order will be sent to
those persons participating in the hearing or their desig-
nated representatives. The order of the Commissioner is
subject to judicial review by the Commonwealth Court.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
above-referenced administrative hearing and require an
auxiliary aid, service or other accommodation to partici-
pate in the hearing should contact Tracey Pontius, Agency
Coordinator at (717) 787-4289.
LINDA S. KAISER,
Insurance Commissioner
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-421. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Review Procedure Hearings under The Unfair In-
surance Practices Act
The following insureds have requested a hearing as
authorized by section 8 of The Unfair Insurance Practices
Act (40 P. S. § 1171.8) in connection with their company’s
termination of the insured’s policies.
The hearings will be held in the Capitol Associates
Building, 901 North Seventh Street, Second Floor Hear-
ing Room, Harrisburg, PA 17102.
Appeal of Arms, David and Janet; file no. 96-121-09010;
Boyertown Mutual Insurance Company; doc. no. P97-02-
045; April 28, 1997, at 9 a.m.;
Appeal of Seiple, Donald and Patsy, file no. 97-121-
00096; Donegal Mutual Insurance Company, doc. no.
P97-02-044; April 29, 1997, at 9 a.m.
Both parties may appear with or without counsel and
offer relevant testimony or evidence to support their
respective positions. The representative of the company
must bring relevant claims files and other necessary
evidence. The insured must bring all documents, photo-
graphs, drawings, witnesses and the like necessary to
substantiate the case. The hearing will be held in accord-
ance with the requirements of 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501—508 and
701—704 (relating to the Administrative Agency Law);
section 8 of The Unfair Insurance Practices Act (40 P. S.
§ 1171.8) and the regulations set forth at 31 Pa. Code
§ 59.7(e) (relating to appeal procedures). Under 31 Pa.
Code § 59.7(e)(5), procedural matters will be in conform-
ance with 1 Pa. Code Part II (relating to General Rules of
Administrative Practice and Procedure) unless specific
exemption is given.
After the hearing, the Insurance Commissioner will
issue a written order resolving the factual issues pre-
sented at the hearing and stating what remedial action, if
any, is required. The Commissioner’s Order will be sent to
those persons participating in the hearing or their desig-
nated representatives. The order of the Commissioner is
subject to judicial review by the Commonwealth Court.
Persons with a disability who wish to attend the
above-referenced administrative hearing and require an
auxiliary aid, service or other accommodation to partici-
pate in the hearing should contact Tracey Pontius, Agency
Coordinator at (717) 787-4289.
LINDA S. KAISER,
Insurance Commissioner
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-422. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU
Documents Filed But Not Published
The Legislative Reference Bureau accepted the follow-
ing documents during the preceding calendar month for
filing without publication under 1 Pa. Code § 3.13(b)
(relating to contents of Bulletin). The Bureau will con-
tinue to publish on a monthly basis either a summary
table identifying the documents accepted during the
preceding calendar month under this subsection or a
statement that no such documents have been received.
For questions concerning or copies of documents filed, but
not published, call (717) 783-1530.
Governor’s Office
Management Directive No. 230.13—Commonwealth
Corporate Card Program, Revision No. 1 dated January
24, 1997.
Management Directive No. 230.14—Foreign Areas Sub-
sistence Allowances, dated February 4, 1997.
Management Directive No. 315.20—Taxability of the
Use of State-Provided Vehicles—Revision No. 1, Dated
January 24, 1997.
Management Directive No. 505.28—Family Care Ac-
count Program, Amended February 10, 1997.
Management Directive No. 525.11—Dual Employ-
ment—Amended February 10, 1997.
Management Directive No. 525.15—Overtime—
Amended February 10, 1997.
Management Directive No. 530.27—Leave Related Poli-
cies for Employes Excluded From Earning Leave and
Leave Service Credit—Amended February 7, 1997.
Management Directive No. 535.2—Physicians and Re-
lated Occupations Specialty Board Certification Pay-
ments—Amended January 29, 1997.
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Management Directive No. 580.18—Pennsylvania Resi-
dency and United States Citizenship Requirements for
the Classified Service—Amended February 14, 1997.
Management Directive No. 590.2—Confidential Posi-
tions and Employes—Amended January 29, 1997.
Management Directive No. 610.8—Acquisition and Dis-
position of Graphic Services Equipment—Revision No. 1,
Dated January 22, 1997.
Administrative Circular No. 97-6—Mandatory Use of
Corporate Card for FOSCEP, Dated January 27, 1997.
Administrative Circular No. 97-7—Availability of State
Surplus Real Property for Transfer to Commonwealth
Agencies—Franklin County, Dated January 28, 1997.
Administrative Circular No. 97-8—Closing Instruction
No. 1, Fiscal Year 1996-97 Submission of Purchasing
Documents—Dated January 29, 1997.
Administrative Circular No. 97-9—Calendar Bases, Cal-
endar Refills, Diaries, and Date Books for 1998, Dated
February 3, 1997.
Administrative Circular No. 97-10—Availability of State
Surplus Real Property for Transfer to Commonwealth
Agencies—Dauphin County—Dated February 12, 1997.
GARY R. HOFFMAN,
Director
Pennsylvania Bulletin
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-423. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD
Expiration of Leases
The following Liquor Control Board leases will expire:
Allegheny County, Wine and Spirits Shoppe # 0273, 3202
Brighton Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15212-2340.
Lease Expiration Date: March 31, 1998
Lease retail commercial space to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Proposals are invited to provide the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board with approximately 3,000
net useable square feet of new or existing retail commer-
cial space near the intersection of Brighton Road and
Woods Run Avenue, City of Pittsburgh.
Proposals due: April 11, 1997, at 12 noon
Department: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
Location: Bureau of Real Estate, State Office
Building, Room 408, 300 Liberty Av-
enue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Contact: George Danis, (412) 565-5130
Allegheny County, Wine and Spirits Shoppe # 0281, 1700
Mt. Royal Boulevard, Glenshaw, PA 15116-2115.
Lease Expiration Date: March 31, 1998
Lease retail commercial space to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Proposals are invited to provide the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board with approximately 3,000
net useable square feet of new or existing retail commer-
cial space on Mount Royal Boulevard between East Penn
View Street and Wetzel Road in Shaler Township. Good
loading facilities and off-street parking required.
Proposals due: April 11, 1997, at 12 noon
Department: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
Location: Bureau of Real Estate, State Office
Building, Room 408, 300 Liberty Av-
enue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Contact: Tom Deal, (412) 565-5130
Allegheny County, Wine and Spirits Shoppe # 9210, Com-
munity Plaza, 1103 Milltown Road, Verona, PA 15147-
3716.
Lease Expiration Date: March 31, 1998
Lease retail commercial space to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Proposals are invited to provide the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board with approximately 3,000
to 3,500 net useable square feet of new or existing retail
commercial space in Penn Hills or Plum Borough within
1.25 miles of the intersection of Unity Center Road and
Universal Road. Good loading facilities and off-street
parking required.
Proposals due: April 11, 1997, at 12 noon
Department: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
Location: Bureau of Real Estate, State Office
Building, Room 408, 300 Liberty Av-
enue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Contact: Tom Deal, (412) 565-5130
Crawford County, Wine and Spirits Shoppe # 2002, 126 S.
Martin Street, Titusville, PA 16354-1850.
Lease Expiration Date: March 31, 1998
Lease retail commercial space to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Proposals are invited to provide the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board with approximately 2,500
net useable square feet of new or existing retail commer-
cial space in a shopping center environment in Titusville.
Good loading facilities and free parking required.
Proposals due: April 11, 1997, at 12 noon
Department: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
Location: Bureau of Real Estate, State Office
Building, Room 408, 300 Liberty Av-
enue, Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Contact: George Danis, (412) 565-5130
Philadelphia County, Wine and Spirits Shoppe # 5158,
6824 Rising Sun Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-3902.
Lease Expiration Date: September 30, 2000
Lease retail commercial space to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Proposals are invited to provide the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board with approximately 4,900
net useable square feet of new or existing retail commer-
cial space on Rising Sun Avenue, north of Cheltenham
Avenue, and south of Cottman.
Proposals due: April 11, 1997, at 12 noon
Department: Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
Location: Bureau of Real Estate, 4501 Kelly
Drive, Philadelphia, PA 19129-1794
Contact: Robert Jolly, (215) 560-5310
JOHN E. JONES, III,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-424. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSION
Service of Notice of Motor Carrier Applications
The following temporary authority and/or permanent
authority applications for the right to render service as a
common carrier or contract carrier in this Commonwealth
have been filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission. Publication of this notice shall be considered
as sufficient notice to all carriers holding authority from
this Commission. Applications will be considered without
hearing in the absence of protests to the application.
Protests to the applications published herein are due on
or before April 7, 1997, as set forth at 52 Pa. Code
§ 3.381 (relating to applications for transportation of
property and persons). The protest shall also indicate
whether it applies to the temporary authority application
or the permanent application or both.
Applications of the following for approval of the
beginning of the exercise of the right and privi-
lege of operating as common carriers for trans-
portation of persons as described under each
application.
A-00113748. Tri-Star Enterprises, Inc., t/d/b/a
Supershuttle (333 Jenkintown Commons, Old York Road
and Wyncote Road, Jenkintown, Montgomery County, PA
19046), a corporation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia—persons in limousine service. Attorney: Alan I.
Moldoff, Suite 1900, Two Penn Center Plaza, Philadel-
phia, PA 19102-1799.
Property, Excluding Household Goods in Use
The following applications for the authority to transport
property, excluding household goods in use, between
points in Pennsylvania, have been filed with the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utility Commission. Public comment to these
applications may be filed, in writing with the Secretary,
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, P. O. Box 3265,
Harrisburg, PA 17105-3265 on or before March 31, 1997.
A-00113223, F. 2 Alson Concrete Systems, Inc.,
t/d/b/a Alexander Trucking
15 Claybaugh Road, Thorton, DE
19373
A-00113405, F. 2 James W. Andrews, t/d/b/a
Andrews Construction
R. R. 1, Box 170A, Forest City, PA
18421
A-00113774 Daniel A. Heller
R. R. 1, Box 216-B1, Laceyville, PA
18623
A-00113775 Lynn K. Fetterolf, t/d/b/a
Fetterolf Trucking
P. O. Box 46, Centre Hall, PA 16828
A-00113776 Fargo Loomis & Co.
16225 Park Ten Place, Suite 600,
Houston, TX 77084: Stephen Clif-
ford, Esquire, Four Embarcadero
Center, Suite 1500, San Francisco,
CA 94111
A-00113779 Michael Russo, t/d/b/a
Michael Russo Paving
405 Brookmeade Drive, West
Chester, PA 19382
A-00113781 James R. Hughes
R. R. 1, Box 306-A, Birdsboro, PA
19508
A-00113782 Terry Sacks
P. O. Box 169, 8 Big Road,
Zieglerville, PA 19492
A-00113783 Key Well Services, Inc.
One Oxford Center, Suite 890, Pitts-
burgh, PA 15219: Rose Schmidt,
Hasley & Disalle, P.C., Attention:
Kimberly A. Petrolo, 900 Oliver
Building, Pittsburgh, PA 15222-2310
A-00113784 Greiner, Inc.
P. O. Box 204, Uwchland, PA 19480:
Al Massey, Esquire, Thirty Darby
Road, Paoli, PA 19301
A-00113785 Carl W. Reed
R. R. 1, Box 171-A, Thompsontown,
PA 17094
A-00113003, F. 2 Professional Transportation, Inc.,
t/d/b/a Professional Carriers
P. O. Box 5205, Evansville, IN
47715: Andrew K. Light, 10 West
Market Street, Suite 1777, India-
napolis, IN 46204-2971
A-00113777 Dean E. Earle
P. O. Box 328, Emporium, PA 15834
A-00113778 Irene H. Rankin, t/d/b/a Rankin
Trucking
P. O. Box 217, Elerton, PA 15736
A-00113780 David Erb Contractors, Inc.
2930 Felton Road, Norristown, PA
19401
A-00113786 Packard Transportation Corp.
1460 Bradley Lane, Warminster, PA
18974
JOHN G. ALFORD,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-425. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Telecommunications Service
Without Hearing
A-310213F0005. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.
and TCG-Pittsburgh. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.
and TCG-Pittsburgh, by its counsel, filed on February 25,
1997, at the Public Utility Commission, a Joint Applica-
tion for approval of an Interconnection Agreement under
sections 251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.
Interested parties may file comments concerning the
application and agreement with the Secretary, Pennsylva-
nia Public Utility Commission, P. O. Box 3265, Harris-
burg, PA 17105-3265. All such comments are due on or
before 20 days after the date of publication of this notice.
Copies of the Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. and TCG-
Pittsburgh Joint Application are on file with the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utility Commission and are available for
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public inspection. The contact person is Cheryl Walker
Davis, Director, Office of Special Assistants, 787-7466.
JOHN G. ALFORD,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-426. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Telecommunications Service
Without Hearing
A-310489. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. and
Cellco Partnership. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.
and Cellco Partnership d/b/a Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mo-
bile, by its counsel, filed on February 25, 1997, at the
Public Utility Commission, a Joint Application for ap-
proval of an Interconnection Agreement under sections
251 and 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Interested parties may file comments concerning the
application and agreement with the Secretary, Pennsylva-
nia Public Utility Commission, P. O. Box 3265, Harris-
burg, PA 17105-3265. All such comments are due on or
before 20 days after the date of publication of this notice.
Copies of the Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. and Cellco
Partnership d/b/a Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile Joint
Application are on file with the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission and are available for public inspec-
tion. The contact person is Cheryl Walker Davis, Director,
Office of Special Assistants, 787-7466.
JOHN G. ALFORD,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-427. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Telecommunications Service
Without Hearing
A-310481F0002. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc.
and Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc. Bell Atlantic-
Pennsylvania, Inc. and Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc.,
by its counsel, filed on February 25, 1997, at the Public
Utility Commission, a Joint Application for approval of an
Interconnection Agreement under sections 251 and 252 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Interested parties may file comments concerning the
application and agreement with the Secretary, Pennsylva-
nia Public Utility Commission, P. O. Box 3265, Harris-
burg, PA 17105-3265. All such comments are due on or
before 20 days after the date of publication of this notice.
Copies of the Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc. and Van-
guard Cellular Systems, Inc. Joint Application are on file
with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and are
available for public inspection. The contact person is
Cheryl Walker Davis, Director, Office of Special Assis-
tants, 787-7466.
JOHN G. ALFORD,
Secretary
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-428. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL
PORT AUTHORITY
Request for Proposals
The Philadelphia Regional Port Authority (PRPA) will
accept proposals until 2 p.m. on Thursday, April 3, 1997,
for Project No. 97-077-001 (Asphalt Materials), and
Project No. 97-077-002 (Trash Removal).
The Bid Documents can be obtained from the Procure-
ment Administrator, PRPA, 210 West Washington Square,
13th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106, (215) 928-9100 and
will be available March 18, 1997. PRPA is an equal
opportunity employer. Contractor will be required to
comply with all applicable equal opportunity laws and
regulations.
JAMES T. MCDERMOTT,
Executive Director
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-429. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
TURNPIKE COMMISSION
Request for Bids
The Turnpike Commission is requesting a sealed bid
for: Refractor Door Frame Assembly. Open Date: April 1,
1997, at 11 a.m.
Bids will be received by the Purchasing Manager not
later than the time indicated above. Bid proposal Forms
and Conditions may be obtained, free of charge, by
communicating with the Bid Clerk, Purchasing Depart-
ment, (717) 939-9551, Ext. 2830.
JAMES F. MALONE, III,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-430. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Request for Bids
The Turnpike Commission is requesting a sealed bid
for: Toll Collector Uniform Shirts. Open Date: April 1,
1997, at 11:30 a.m.
Bids will be received by the Purchasing Manager not
later than the time indicated above. Bid proposal Forms
and Conditions may be obtained, free of charge, by
communicating with the Bid Clerk, Purchasing Depart-
ment, (717) 939-9551, Ext. 2830.
JAMES F. MALONE, III,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-431. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Request for Proposals
Sealed proposals will be received by Jeffrey L. Hess,
Purchasing Manager, at the Administration Building,
Harrisburg-East Interchange near Highspire, PA (Mailing
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Address: P. O. Box 67676, Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676)
and publicly opened and read at the date and time
indicated below for the following contract:
Contract No. 94-004-FT23. Structural demolition
and/or removal for the Mon/Fayette Expressway in
Fayette County, PA.
Bid Opening Date: April 15, 1997, 11 a.m.
Bid Surety: 5%.
Plans, specifications and contract documents will be
available and open to the public inspection at the Admin-
istration Building. Copies may be purchased upon pay-
ment of $25 per set (do not add State tax) by check or
Post Office Money Order (no cash) to the Turnpike
Commission, Attention: Secretary-Treasurer’s Office, P. O.
Box 67676, Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676. No refund for any
reason will be made for plans, specifications and contract
documents.
A mandatory prebid site review of the project will be
made March 27, 1997. The inspection party will meet at
Haydontown Fire Hall, south of Fairchance, PA, just west
of Route 857, at 10 a.m. and will proceed to each site
under the direction of authorized Commission personnel.
A Prequalification Certification and Maximum Capacity
Rating assigned by the Prequalification Committee of the
Department of Transportation is a necessary prerequisite
for bidding on this project.
Contact the Purchasing Manager for listing of other
locations where plans and specs can be inspected.
JAMES F. MALONE, III,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-432. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
Request for Proposals
Sealed proposals will be received by Jeffrey L. Hess,
Purchasing Manager, at the Administration Building,
Harrisburg-East Interchange near Highspire, PA (Mailing
Address: P. O. Box 67676, Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676)
and publicly opened and read at the date and time
indicated below for the following contract:
Contract No. 02-058-CT16. Construction of Beaver
Valley Expressway, Section 44, Passive Wetland Treat-
ment, Hickory Run Discharge, located at M. P. B12.5 on
the Beaver Valley Expressway, PA Turnpike toll 60, in
Lawrence County, PA.
Bid Opening Date: April 9, 1997, 11 a.m.
Bid Surety: 5%.
Plans, specifications and contract documents will be
available and open to the public inspection at the Admin-
istration Building. Copies may be purchased upon pay-
ment of $25 per set (do not add State tax) by check or
Post Office Money Order (no cash) to the Turnpike
Commission, Attention: Secretary-Treasurer’s Office, P. O.
Box 67676, Harrisburg, PA 17106-7676. No refund for any
reason will be made for plans, specifications and contract
documents.
A Prequalification Certification and Maximum Capacity
Rating assigned by the Prequalification Committee of the
Department of Transportation is a necessary prerequisite
for bidding on this project.
Contact the Purchasing Manager for listing of other
locations where plans and specs can be inspected.
JAMES F. MALONE, III,
Chairperson
[Pa.B. Doc. No. 97-433. Filed for public inspection March 14, 1997, 9:00 a.m.]
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STATE CONTRACTS INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES
Notices of invitations for bids and requests for proposals on State contracts for services and commodities for
which the bid amount is reasonably expected to be over $10,000, are published in the State Contracts Information
Section of the Pennsylvania Bulletin prior to bid opening date. Information in this publication is intended only as
notification to its subscribers of available bidding and contracting opportunities, and is furnished through the
Department of General Services, Vendor Information and Support Division. No action can be taken by any
subscriber or any other person, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not liable to any subscriber or any other
person, for any damages or any other costs incurred in connection with the utilization of, or any other reliance
upon, any information in the State Contracts Information Section of the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Interested persons
are encouraged to call the contact telephone number listed for the particular solicitation for current, more detailed
information.
EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1985, A VENDOR’S FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (NUMBER ASSIGNED
WHEN FILING INCOME TAX DOCUMENTS) OR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IF VENDOR IS AN
INDIVIDUAL, MUST BE ON ALL CONTRACTS, DOCUMENTS AND INVOICES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMONWEALTH.
Act 266 of 1982 provides for the payment of interest penalties on certain
invoices of ‘‘qualified small business concerns’’. A qualified small business
concern is an independently owned, operated for profit, business employing
100 or fewer employes and is not a subsidiary or affiliate of a corporation
otherwise not qualified.
Such penalties apply to invoices for goods or services when payments are
not made by the required payment date or within a 15 day grace period
thereafter. The small business concern must include on every invoice
submitted to the Commonwealth: ‘‘(name of vendor) is a qualified small
business concern as defined at 4 Pa. Code § 2.32’’.
For information on the required payment date and annual interest rate,
please call the Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Small Business Action
Center, 483 Forum Building, 783-5700.
Reader’s Guide
1 Service CodeIdentification Number
2 Commodity/Supply orContract Identification No.
B-54137. Consultant to provide three 2-day training sessions, covering
the principles, concepts, and techniques of performance appraisal and
standard setting with emphasis on performance and accountability,
with a knowledge of State Government constraints.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Pa. 3 Contract
Duration: 12/1/93-12/30/93 Information
Contact: Procurement Division
787-0000 4 Department
7
(For Commodities: Contact:)
Vendor Services Section
717-787-2199 or 717-787-4705
5 Location
6 Duration
REQUIRED DATA
DESCRIPTIONS
1 Service Code Identification Number:
There are currently 39 state service
and contractural codes. See descrip-
tion of legend.
2 Commodity/Supply or Contract Iden-
tification No.: When given, number
should be referenced when inquiring
of contract of Purchase Requisition.
If more than one number is given,
each number represents an addi-
tional contract.
3 Contract Information: Additional in-
formation for bid preparation may be
obtained through the departmental
contracting official.
4 Department: State Department or
Agency initiating request for adver-
tisement.
5 Location: Area where contract perfor-
mance will be executed.
6 Duration: Time estimate for perfor-
mance and/or execution of contract.
7 Contact: (For services) State Depart-
ment or Agency where vendor inquir-
ies are to be made.
(For commodities) Vendor Services
Section (717) 787-2199 or (717)
787-4705
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GET THAT COMPETITIVE EDGE—FOR FREE!
Do you want to do business with your state government? The Treasury Department’s office of Contract Information
Services can assist you by providing you with information that may be helpful to you in successfully bidding on State
contracts.
Act 244 of 1980 requires Commonwealth departments and agencies to file with the Treasury Department a copy of all
contracts involving an expenditure of $5,000 or more.
These fully executed contracts usually contain the vendor’s name, dollar value, effective and termination dates and
contract specifications. Some contracts also include the names of other bidding vendors and the bid proposal compiled
by the awarded vendor. There is a minimal cost for photocopying contracts.
Allow the Treasury Department to ‘‘make a difference for you.’’ For contract information call the office of Contract
Information Services TOLL-FREE (in Pennsylvania) at 1-800-252-4700 or (717) 787-4586. Or you may write or visit the
office at Room G13, Finance Building, Harrisburg, Pa. 17120.
BARBARA HAFER,
State Treasurer
Online Subscriptions At http://www.statecontracts.com 1-800-334-1429 x340
Commodities
0018-03 General highway county maps.
Department: Transportation
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
0023-03 Tax booklets.
Department: Revenue
Location: Various
Duration: 8/1—7/31
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
0042-03 PennDOT continuous cut card forms.
Department: Transportation
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
0048-03 Pinfeed pressure sensitive labels.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
2550-07 Auto repair and maintenance Ford, no substitute.
Department: State Police
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
2550-09 Auto repair and maintenance GM, no substitute.
Department: State Police
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
2805-01 Engine parts, no substitute.
Department: Transportation
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
4210-01 Fire extinguishers.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
5680-01 Crack and joint sealing materials.
Department: Transportation
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
7220-01 Matting, floor.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
7920-07 Scouring pads.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: 6/1—5/31
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
7930-06 Laundry products/service.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
8110-01 Cans, No. 10 and covers, beaded.
Department: Correctional Industries
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
8405-02 Rainwear.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
8430-04 Shoes, canvas.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/15—7/14
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
8960-01 Water, drinking (Cap. Complex and 20 mile radius).
Department: Capitol Complex and 20 Mile Radius
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
9110-01 Coal, anthracite.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
9110-02 Coal, bituminous.
Department: All using agencies
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
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9905-06 Reflective/non reflective sheeting and accessories.
Department: Transportation
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
9905-08 Signs/plastic/work area and stop/slow paddles.
Department: Transportation
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
9905-10 Light arrow boards, towed.
Department: Transportation
Location: Various
Duration: 7/1—6/30
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1753356 Chemicals and chemical products—various quantities; specialty and liquid
gases are required to operate all laboratory instrumentation used to analyze environ-
mental samples.
Department: Environmental Protection, Labs
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1707116 Computer equipment and supplies—1 lot, Microsoft Windows based auto-
mated time and attendance system. Installed at four (4) different locations and made
operational.
Department: Corrections
Location: Bellefonte, Centre County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1713206 Computer equipment—6 each modules, add on, 9.1 GB, Streamlogic No.
LM9100. 1 each Microdisk LT base system, 9.1 GB, Streamlink direct network
attachment, Streamlogic No. MDLT9100. 1 each storage module, Streamlogic No.
NET100. All items are no substitute.
Department: State Police
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
8503710 Construction and building materials—64 ln. ft. pipe, reinforced cement
concrete, 84 dia. 8 section tongue and groove with 2 1/2 in. dia. lifting hole in each
section.
Department: Transportation
Location: Sullivan County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
7313790 Containers, packaging and packing supplies—225,000 each carton, gift,
inside, dimensions 3-5/8 x 3-5/8 x 12-7/16.
Department: Liquor Control Board
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1751236 Food preparation and serving equipment—1 each walk-in freezer, furnish and
set up operational.
Department: Game Commission
Location: Franklin, Venango County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1634226 Generators—1 system; complete Standy generator system to include—277/480
volts AC, 3 phase, 4 wire, 60 HZ, 120 Amperes output.
Department: Fish and Boat Commission
Location: Bellefonte, Centre County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1712356 Laboratory equipment—various quantities; instruments and equipment
needed to convert existing EPA oil and grease method to EPA method 1664.
Department: Environmental Protection, Labs
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1740356 Laboratory instruments and equipment—10 each of the following: 07-430
aluminum filters (set of 11); 07-601 fluoroscopic resolution tool (16-60 mesh); 07-604
x-ray beam diameter gauge; 07-606 x-ray beam size ruler; 07-661 x-ray collimator test
tool; 07-662 x-ray alignment test tool; 07-706 patient phantom/penttrometer.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1815046 Laboratory instruments and equipment—1 each Leco FP-428 nitrogen
determinator or approved equal.
Department: Agriculture
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1721206 Laboratory instruments and equipment—1 each sterilizer, general purpose,
electric.
Department: State Police
Location: Greensburg, Westmoreland County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1724356 Laboratory instruments and equipment—10 each ionization chamber survey
meters.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1810356 Laboratory instruments and equipment—2 each; automated carbonyl sampler
Model 925 Xontech (or equal) and second expansion tube module for use with the
automated carbonyl sampler, Model 925.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1809356 Laboratory instruments and equipment—30 each API Model 200A nitrogen
oxides analyzer.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1758136 Materials handling equipment—1 each LPG 4 wheel lift truck (3,000 lb.
capacity).
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: Hollidaysburg Veterans Home, Hollidaysburg, Blair County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1845136 Mattresses, air—2 each First Step Plus 200-600 fluidized air mattress—
mattress overlay system—as manufactured by Kinetic Concepts or an approved equal.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: Hollidaysburg Veterans Home, Hollidaysburg, Blair County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1838076 Medical (personal) care products—1800 gross; latex condoms, FDA approved,
reservoir end, lubricated without nonoxynol-9; 200 gross; latex condoms, FDA ap-
proved, reservoir end, non-lubricated.
Department: Health
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1764356 Medical, dental and veterinary equipment and supplies—5 each radiation
monitors; 5 each test buttons; 5 each auto barometric pressure compensation; 5 each
ion chamber assembly.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1759356 Motor vehicles, trailers and cycles—1 each latest model 50 ton self-lifting
detachable gooseneck trailer.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1797226 Motor vehicles, trailers and cycles—4 each 1997 model Jeep Cherokee.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1800116 Motor vehicles, trailers and cycles—6 each 1997 model cabover truck with 24
van body, certified for Class 8 license.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
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1861236 Paper and printing—95200 M/pages; Pennsylvania Hunting and Trapping
Digest.
Department: Game Commission
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1696156 Photographic equipment—1 each Polaroid Pro Pallette 8000 digital film
printer (recorder).
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1653156 Photographic equipment—1 each wide angle zoom lens with 2X extender.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1695156 Photographic equipment—2 each Associated Press NC2000E (Kodak/Nikon
N90S Body) assorted cables, power supply and manuals; 2 each Powershop accelerator
board for Macintosh with NC2000E software for NC2000 camera.
Department: General Services
Location: Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1871116 Plumbing, heating and sanitation equipment—100 each vitreous china, plain
rim, floor-mounted flush valve closet bowl w/blow out action, integral seat, wall outlet
10-1/4 center, 1-1/2 back spud.
Department: Corrections
Location: Graterford, Montgomery County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1871116 Plumbing, heating and sanitation equipment—50 each prison lavatory;
vitreous china, wall hung with integral combination spout and drinking bubbler,
integral soap dish, integral front overflow and integral slow draining outlet; complete
w/faucet.
Department: Corrections
Location: Graterford, Montgomery County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1001117 Service and trade equipment—1 each furnish and set up, dryer, steam
tumbler to be minimum 450 lbs. dry weight capacity unit of not less than 175 cubic
foot volume.
Department: Correctional Industries
Location: Cresson, Cambria County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
1793116 Steam plant and drying equipment—1 each convention oven/combination
steamer combo, electric 208 V 3-phase full size capacity (20) 18 x 26 x 1 (40) 13 x
18 x 1 (40) 12 x 20 x 2-1/2 all stainless steel construction. Include five (5) wire
racks, spray down hose and water purification system. One year limited warranty on
parts and labor with second year extended warranty on water purification system.
Department: Corrections
Location: Somerset, Somerset County, PA
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Vendor Services: Fax request to (717) 783-6241 or call (717) 787-2199
or (717) 787-4705
SERVICES
Computer Related Services—08
Project No. 96-14 ‘‘Application Systems Maintenance Services.’’ The objective of this
project is to satisfy a need for contract programming and systems analysis to provide
Application Systems Maintenance for PennDOT. Detailed requirements and an RFP
are available upon request. Fax requests to Tina Chubb at (717) 783-7971.
Department: Transportation
Location: Bureau of Office Services, 8th Floor, 555 Walnut Street, Forum
Place, Harrisburg, PA
Duration: Up to five (5) years
Contact: Tina Chubb, (717) 787-7001
SP-299390 The contractor shall perform specialized Microcontamination services in
the Willow Oak Building Computer Room, First Floor, located in Department of Public
Welfare Complex No. 2, Harrisburg, PA. Complete details and specifications may be
obtained by contacting the Procurement Office.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Room 32A Willow Oak Building, Harrisburg State Hospital, Harris-
burg, PA 17105
Duration: 4/1/97—6/30/97
Contact: Kathy A. King-McCarthy, (717) 772-7119
OB/CO-96-5030-101 SupportMagic SQL Ver. 3.11 for 12 concurrent users. SIR-
Statistical Information-Retrieval for 12 concurrent users. ServiceWare Knowledge-Paks
with SupportMagic Interface—all titles for 12 concurrent users. Crystal Reports
Professional Report Writer Ver. 4.5 for 3 concurrent users. Interface to Microsoft
Systems Management Server (SMS). Software to include 3 months support.
Department: Office of the Budget
Location: Comptroller Operations, 702 Health and Welfare Building, Harris-
burg, PA 17120
Duration: 3 months
Contact: Carolyn Ney, (717) 787-2231
X92078 Provide Action Request System Software and License by Remedy Corporation.
Department: Environmental Protection
Location: Harrisburg, PA
Duration: Through 6/30/98
Contact: Ally Castaneira, (717) 787-2471
ESRS The Commonwealth of PA (CMIC and PHMC) is seeking solutions for an
enterprise storage and retrieval system for report information. Recommended solutions
must include alternatives to paper and microfiche media and provide users with more
efficient data access methods. Solutions must provide portability, scalability and
interoperability, and support an incremental implementation approach. The initial
phase must include CD-ROM recordable equipment and at least a limited Optical disk
capability to provide on-line access to report information.
Department: OA CMIC
Location: Harrisburg, PA
Duration: 6-1-97 to 6-30-98
Contact: Charles Cameron, (717) 772-8008
SPC-Software The Department of Transportation is in need of the following software
packages: 21 copies (estimated) MicroStation 95 for NT 4.0 by Bentley Systems
(without CSP or documentation) Bentley Item No. MSA00001A-1/0550. 6 copies
(estimated) Power Scope for NT 4.0 by Bentley Systems (with documentation) Bentley
Item No. PWA0000A-1/0550. No substitution of software will be permitted. All requests
for bid packages must be Faxed to Debra Gray at (717) 783-7971.
Department: Transportation
Location: PennDOT Bureau of Office Services, Harrisburg, PA
Duration: N/A
Contact: Debra Gray, (717) 783-9671
Construction and Construction Maintenance—09
0397 Fabricate and install a stainless steel grate on two (2) dietary lines in building
Number 4 at YDC New Castle, Lawrence County, PA. Site visit is required. Call for
specifications, (412) 656-7310.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Youth Development Center, Frew Mill Road, R. R. 6, Box 21A, New
Castle, Lawrence County, PA 16101
Duration: No later than 6-30-97
Contact: T. E. Mateja, Purchasing Agent, (412) 656-7310
Project No. 9742 Install approximately 25 squares of vinyl siding for a 2 1/2 story
dwelling to include: rigid insulation; soffits; gutters and downspouts; fascias; all
required trim and 2 vinyl replacement windows.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: Quarters 36, Ft. Indiantown Gap, Lebanon County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 December 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
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Project No. 9744 Front concrete step demolition.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, Smythe Park, Mansfield, Tioga County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9748 Automatic transfer switch was ruined during the flood.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 236 Standing Stone Avenue, Huntingdon,
Huntingdon County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9749 Concrete placement, replacement steps, sidewalk and handrail.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 441 North Findley Street, Punxsutawney, Jef-
ferson County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9801 Supply poles and lighting for new MVSC Compound, is approxi-
mately 160 x 200.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 119 North Walnut Street, Blairsville, Indiana
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 98
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9802 Backflow preventer.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 22 South 23rd Street, Philadelphia, Philadelphia
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 98
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
080948 Berks County, Group 5-97-POC1C; Carbon and Monroe Counties, GR 5-97-
GR2; Berks County, Group 5-97-GR1.
Department: Transportation
Location: District 5-0
Duration: FY 1996-97
Contact: V. C. Shah, (717) 787-5914
00693 000 93 AS-1 Picnic Pavilion. All work to include constructing a picnic pavilion
at Fort Loudoun, Franklin County, PA. For directions, please contact the site at (717)
369-4742. All interested bidders should submit a request for the purchase of the bid
package in writing, along with a $25.00 check (non-refundable) made payable to
PHMC and mailed to: PA Historical and Museum Commission, P. O. Box 1026, Room
526, Harrisburg, PA 17108-1026, Attention: Judi Yingling. Bids are due on Monday,
March 31, 1997 at 1:30 p.m. Bid opening will be held in Room 526 of The State
Museum of PA, Corner of 3rd and North Streets, Harrisburg, PA.
Department: Historical and Museum Commission
Location: Bureau of Historic Sites and Museums, Fort Loudoun, Fort Loudoun
Historical Society, Box 181, Fort Loudoun, PA 17224
Duration: April 1, 1997 to August 30, 1997
Contact: Judi Yingling or Gina M. Douty, (717) 772-2401
DGS 573-21 Project title: Installation Bag House/Boiler Renovations. Brief description:
work includes adding a bag house to 3 coal fired boilers, electrical service, boiler
renovations, bag house controls, induced draft fans and ash handling systems. General,
HVAC and electrical construction. Plans deposit: $207.00 per set. Payable to: The
Kuljian Corporation. Refundable upon return of plans and specifications in reusable
condition as construction documents within 15 days after the bid opening date. The
bidder is responsible for the cost of delivery of the plans and specifications. Contact the
office listed below to arrange for delivery of documents. A separate check must be
submitted to cover the cost of delivery. Mail request to: The Kuljian Corporation, 3700
Science Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104. (215) 243-1900. Bid date: Wednesday, April 9,
1997 at 2:00 p.m. Site visitation/controlled walk-through scheduled for Tuesday, April
1, 1997 at 10:00 a.m. Contact: William Goodlander, (717) 737-4531, ext. 5259. All
contractors who have secured contract documents are invited and urged to attend.
Department: General Services
Location: Camp Hill State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill, Cumberland
County, PA
Duration: Proposed date of bag filter completion: December 15, 1997. Proposed
date of project completion: 253 calendar days from date of initial job
conference
Contact: Contract Bidding Unit, (717) 787-6556
DGS 800-208 Project title: construction of Classroom Building. Brief description: new
brick and block masonry, precast concrete and steel framing two story classroom
building with basement. Prime contracts: general, HVAC, plumbing and electrical
construction complete with sitework and utility extensions. General, HVAC, plumbing
and electrical construction. Plans deposit: $172.00 per set. Payable to: Agoos/Lovera
Architects. Refundable upon return of plans and specifications in reusable condition as
construction documents within 15 days after the bid opening date. The bidder is
responsible for the cost of delivery of the plans and specifications. Contact the office
listed below to arrange for delivery of documents. A separate check must be submitted
to cover the cost of delivery. Mail request to: Agoos/Lovera Architects, 731 South Broad
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19147-1804, telephone (215) 735-0100. Bid date Wednesday,
April 9, 1997 at 11:00 a.m.
Department: General Services
Location: Pennsylvania State University, Media, Delaware County, PA
Duration: 340 calendar days from date of initial job conference
Contact: Contract Bidding Unit, (717) 787-6556
DGS A 947-14 Project title: Electrical Repairs. Brief description: install new under-
ground services to great house and Harmonie Building. Electrical construction. Plans
deposit: $25.00 per set. Payable to: The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Refundable
upon return of plans and specifications in reusable condition as construction docu-
ments within 15 days after the bid opening date. The bidder is responsible for the cost
of delivery of the plans and specifications. Contact the office listed below to arrange for
delivery of documents. A separate check must be submitted to cover the cost of
delivery. Mail request to: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Room 107, Headquarters
Building, 18th and Herr Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17125. Telephone: (717)
787-3923. Bid date: Wednesday, April 2, 1997 at 11:00 a.m.
Department: General Services
Location: Old Economy Village, Ambridge, Beaver County, PA
Duration: 120 calendar days from date of initial job conference
Contact: Contract Bidding Unit, (717) 787-6556
DGS A 985-4 Revised Rebid Project title: Composting Toilets System and Water
Distribution—Phase II. Brief description: repair two existing pit toilet vaults and
install new composting system in each and construct a new building on each existing
slab. Install new water distribution system and drinking fountains. General construc-
tion. Plans deposit: $25.00 per set. Payable to: The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Refundable upon return of plans and specifications in reusable condition as construc-
tion documents within 15 days after the bid opening date. The bidder is responsible for
the cost of delivery of the plans and specifications. Contact the office listed below to
arrange for delivery of documents. A separate check must be submitted to cover the
cost of delivery. Mail request to: The Department of General Services, Room 107,
Headquarters Building, 18th and Herr Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17125.
Telephone: (717) 787-3923. Bid date: Wednesday, April 9, 1997 at 11:00 a.m. Pre-bid
conference has been scheduled for Wednesday, March 19, 1997 at 2:00 p.m. at the
Visitors’ Center, Bushy Run Battlefield, Harrison City, PA. Contact: John Giblin,
telephone (412) 527-5584. All contractors who have secured contract documents are
invited and urged to attend this pre-bid conference.
Department: General Services
Location: Bushy Run Battlefield, Harrison City, Westmoreland County, PA
Duration: 90 calendar days from date of initial job conference
Contact: Contract Bidding Unit, (717) 787-6556
Contract No. FDC-016-269 Work includes debris removal from channels, ditches and
pipes; reconstructing washed out trail areas; providing and installing drainage pipes,
precast concrete U-channel with removable top and rip rap. Work site is located on the
Pine Creek Rail to Trail, section extends from Ansonia to south of Blackwell.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Brown Township, Lycoming County and Morris, Elk, Delmar and
Shippen Townships in Tioga County
Duration: 120 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-017-266 Provide and construct a new 50 x 100 x 20 high pole
building at the Hopewell Fire Tower in French Creek State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Union Township, Berks County, PA
Duration: 60 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-124-239 Grading and excavation; providing and placing approxi-
mately 1050 tons of rock protection; and seeding and mulching at Sizerville State
Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Portage Township, Cameron County, PA
Duration: 60 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-104-158R Construction of new 36 x 104 maintenance facility
(masonry and frame structure with log sided exterior). Includes reinforced concrete
slab with inslab radiant tube heating system, sanitary piping and finish work.
Building is at Chapman State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Pleasant Township, Warren County, PA
Duration: 180 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-312-232 Construction of a 30 x 52 pavilion on a new reinforced
concrete pad and concrete walkways; and provide and install electrical receptacles and
lighting at Samuel Lewis State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Lower Windsor Township, York County, PA
Duration: 90 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-422-267 Removal and disposal of existing shingles, plank roofing
and insulation; removal of rafters over part of building; provide and construct new
roof, insulation and attic floor; replace three windows; replace existing TV antenna;
provide and install new gutter and downspouts; and repoint brick at two chimneys. All
work is for the Park Manager’s Residence at Nockamixon State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: East Rockhill Township, Bucks County, PA
Duration: 60 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-438-217 Demolition of a portion of the existing residence;
construction of new one and two story additions including masonry, plumbing,
mechanical and electrical work; and alterations to portions of the existing building at
Swatara State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Union Township, Lebanon County, PA
Duration: 120 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
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MI-696 Project title: Open-Ended Concrete Maintenance. Scope of work: repair,
maintain and install new concrete for walks, ramps, curbs, etc. on an as-needed basis.
Plans cost: $50.00.
Department: State System of Higher Education
Location: Various Locations Campus Wide, Millersville University, Millersville,
Lancaster County, PA 17551-0302
Duration: 8/1/97—7/31/98 (one year, with 2-year renewal in 1 year increments)
Contact: Bernadette J. Wendler, (717) 872-3829
MI-697 Project title: Open-Ended Asphalt Paving Maintenance. Scope of work: repair,
maintain and install asphalt pavement on an as-needed basis, e.g., parking lots,
walkways, etc. Plans cost: $50.00.
Department: State System of Higher Education
Location: Various Locations Campus Wide, Millersville University, Millersville,
Lancaster County, PA 17551-0302
Duration: 8/1/97—7/31/98 (one year, with 2-year renewal in 1 year increments)
Contact: Bernadette J. Wendler, (717) 872-3829
Elevator Maintenance—13
Project No. 001 Provide on-call elevator services.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armories, 111 Armory Drive, Spring City, PA; 2700
Southampton Road, Philadelphia, PA; 23rd and Ranstead Streets,
Philadelphia, Philadelphia County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Engineering Services and Consultation—14
RFP 97-06 Kutztown University of the State System of Higher Education will select a
firm for the purpose of providing professional design services for renovations to the
Graduate Center, an 18,700 square foot structure built in 1913. Experience on historic
preservation projects is required. Interested professionals should obtain Request for
Proposal (RFP) information from Ms. Barbara Reitz, Director of Purchasing, 224
Stratton Administration Building, (610) 683-4132, FAX (610) 683-4674, e-mail:
reitz@kutztown.edu. There is a pre-proposal meeting on Wednesday, April 2, 1997, at
10 a.m. RFP’s are due on April 17, 1997 at 2:00 p.m. in the Purchasing Office, Room
224, Stratton Administration Building. The System encourages responses from small
firms, minority firms, women owned firms, and firms which have not previously
worked for the System, and will consider joint ventures which will enable these firms
to participate in System professional services contracts. Non-Discrimination and Equal
Opportunity are the policies of the Commonwealth and the State System of Higher
Education.
Department: State System of Higher Education
Location: Kutztown University, Graduate Center, Kutztown, PA 19530
Duration: Through design and construction phases
Contact: Barbara Reitz, (610) 683-4132
Environmental Maintenance Services—15
SP 323341 Provide and install a complete domestic water system which shall include
well, pump, wiring, water line, pressure tank, contact tank, chlorine feed pump and
tank, and miscellaneous items required to provide a complete and functional system.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: State Parks Region No. 3, Whipple Dam State Park, c/o Greenwood
Furnace State Park, R. R. 2, Box 118, Huntingdon, PA 16652-9006
Duration: Completion time—30 days after notice to proceed.
Contact: Gene Strick, (814) 733-9123
Food—19
9544 Oleo—margarine, one pound block size and ready pattys. All items will be bid
quarterly. All amounts are approximate for entire eight (8) month period). Plus
additional related items as required. 1 lb. block—18,000 lbs.; ready pattys—13,000 lbs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9545 Eggs, shelled, frozen liquid and frozen whites (plus related items as required). To
be bid monthly.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9546 Cheese products—items listed below are to be bid quarterly—all amounts are
approximate for the entire twelve (12) month period. (Plus additional related items as
required). Swiss cheese—12,000 lbs.; American cheese—14,000 lbs.; cheddar cheese—
12,000 lbs.; provolone cheese—12,000 lbs.; mozzarella cheese—12,000 lbs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9547 Dairy products—all items listed below will be bid semi-annually—all amounts
are approximate for entire twelve (12) month period. (Plus additional related items as
required). Milk, 2%—10,000 gal.; milk, skim—5,000 1/2 pint cont.; milk, 2%—72,000
1/2 pint cont.; cottage cheese—10,000 lbs.; sour cream—5,000 lbs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9548 Fresh fruits and vegetables—all items listed below will be bid monthly— all
amounts are approximate for entire twelve (12) month period. (Plus additional related
items as required). Apples—650 cs.; bananas—800 cs.; cabbage—42,000 lbs.; carrots—
30,000 lbs.; celery—650 cs.; grapefruit—800 cs.; lettuce—800 cs.; onions—46,000 lbs.;
oranges—800 cs.; tomatoes—500 cs.; potatoes—100,000 lbs.; cantaloupe—350 cs.;
watermelon—400 cs.; honeydew—110 cs.; pears—110 cs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9549 Bread products—all items listed below will be bid monthly—all amounts are
approximate for twelve (12) month period. (Plus additional related items as required).
White bread—60,000 loaves; rye bread—4,500 loaves; whole wheat bread—11,000
loaves; snowflake rolls—1,000 doz.; hot dog rolls—10,000 doz.; hamburg rolls—10,000
doz.; sub rolls—7,500 doz.; Italian bread—10,000 loaves.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
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9550 Frozen vegetables—items listed below are to be bid quarterly—all amounts are
approximate for the entire twelve (12) month period. (Plus additional related items as
required). Cauliflower—15,500 lbs.; broccoli—17,500 lbs.; brussel sprouts—15,500 lbs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9551 Ice cream novelties—Dixie cups; popsicles; sandwiches; plus additional related
items as required. All items will be bid quarterly. Estimated requirements for entire
eight (8) month period—3,000 boxes.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
9552 Meat products—all items listed below will be bid monthly—all amounts are
approximate for entire twelve (12) month period (plus additional related items as
required). Chicken quarters—23,000 lbs.; turkey bologna—5,700 lbs.; ground turkey—
11,250 lbs.; turkey roll—2,300 lbs.; turkey salami—3,600 lbs.; chicken, whole—23,000
lbs.; turkey roasts—11,250 lbs.; beef frankfurters—7,900 lbs.; veal patties—3,400 lbs.;
liver—8,900 lbs.; breaded fish—10,000 lbs.; cheese pizza—8,900 lbs.; fish fillet—12,000
lbs.; Italian sausage—5,500 lbs.; clams—2,300 lbs.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution, Route 405, Box 180, Muncy, PA 17756
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/98
Contact: W. Voeckler, Purchasing Agent, (717) 546-3171
B-2120 Food service catering. Contractor to provide food service catering for auction
sales at the Commonwealth Garage, 2221 Forster Street. The contractor agrees to pay
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a flat catering privilege fee. Approximately 12
auctions for the year.
Department: General Services
Location: Bureau of Vehicle Management, 2221 Forster Street, Commonwealth
Garage, Harrisburg, PA 17125
Duration: 05-01-97 through 04-30-98
Contact: Bureau of Vehicle Management, (717) 787-3162
Fuel Related Services—20
Contract No. FDC-005-88 Removal and disposal of existing fuel systems (one—2,000
gallon gas, one—1,000 gallon gas and one—1,000 gallon diesel); provide and install
above ground tanks (two—2,000 gallon, one gas and one diesel and two—1,000 gallon,
one gas and one diesel); soil tests; and contaminated soil disposal (approximately 50
c. y.). Work is located at Whipple Dam and Stony Point Forest Maintenance Headquar-
ters.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Jackson and Logan Townships, Huntingdon County, PA
Duration: 90 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-400-149 Removal of 43 underground fuel storage tanks/
appurtenances and installation of 21 aboveground systems at 13 locations throughout
Eastern Pennsylvania. Work includes backfill, contaminated soil disposal, pre disposal
analysis, bituminous paving and confirmatory sampling/analysis.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Bucks, Carbon, Lackawanna, Lebanon, Luzerne, Monroe, Montgom-
ery, Pike, Schuylkill and Sullivan Counties
Duration: 180 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Hazardous Material Services—21
814170 Furnish necessary labor, supervision, tools, and equipment to remove asbestos
pipe insulation in the boiler room of Building Number 28 at the Harrisburg
International Airport, Middletown, Dauphin County, PA 17057.
Department: Transportation
Location: Aviation, Harrisburg International Airport, Middletown, Dauphin
County, PA 17057
Duration: Anticipated May 1, 1997—June 30, 1997
Contact: Curt Summers, (717) 705-1239
WC 647 West Chester University is seeking sealed bids for providing Phase II Site
Surveys and the Removal and Disposal of Contaminated Soils. The University may
award one contract for both the surveys and soil removal, or it may award two
separate contracts (one for surveys and a separate contract for the removal and
disposal of contaminated soils). The work will be supplied under an Open-Ended
Agreement with a $100,000 maximum per year and $25,000 maximum per order. The
Agreement will be issued for one year with two 1 year options for renewal. There is not
guarantee of a certain amount of work being authorized. The awarded contractor(s)
must be able to provide a minimum of $1,000,000 of pollution prevention or
environmental impact insurance and the required PA certifications. In the best interest
of the University, only firms within a 50 mile radius will be considered.
Department: State System of Higher Education
Location: West Chester University, West Chester, PA 19383
Duration: One year with two one year options for renewal
Contact: Jacki Marthinsen, Contracts Manager, (610) 436-2705
Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning—22
Project No. 002 Provide on-call roof repairs.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armories, 229 Walnut Street, Columbia, PA; 438 North
Queen Street, Lancaster, Lancaster County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 003 Provide on-call roof repairs.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armories, 2048 Eden Road, York, PA; 369 North George
Street, York, York County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 355 Provide emergency and routine repair work for air conditioning
system. The contractor must respond to the call within four (4) hours of receiving a
call either directly or via a recording device. Replacement parts must be as originally
installed or of equal quality and function. The contractor must agree to redeem
manufacturer’s warranty on parts where applicable, and further agree to guarantee
workmanship and replacement parts, provided by his firm for a 90 day period. Bid
proposal forms used to submit bids are available from the State Armory Board.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, Harrisburg Military Post, 14th and Calder
Streets, Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 356 Provide emergency and routine repair work for air conditioning
system. The contractor must respond to the call within four (4) hours of receiving a
call either directly or via a recording device. Replacement parts must be as originally
installed or of equal quality and function. The contractor must agree to redeem
manufacturer’s warranty on parts where applicable, and further agree to guarantee
workmanship and replacement parts, provided by his firm for a 90 day period. Bid
proposal forms used to submit bids are available from the State Armory Board.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 2700 Southampton Road, Philadelphia, Philadel-
phia County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 357 Provide emergency and routine repair work for air conditioning
system. The contractor must respond to the call within four (4) hours of receiving a
call either directly or via a recording device. Replacement parts must be as originally
installed or of equal quality and function. The contractor must agree to redeem
manufacturer’s warranty on parts where applicable, and further agree to guarantee
workmanship and replacement parts, provided by his firm for a 90 day period. Bid
proposal forms used to submit bids are available from the State Armory Board.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 2601 River Road, Reading, Berks County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
010 314 Plumbing services for interstate safety rest areas. Work consists of servicing,
maintaining, replacing, repairing, and upgrading of sewage and water systems,
replacement and repair of water lines, and other work typical to safety rest area
facilities. The following equipment may be required: backhoe, 8 ditch digger, 50 crane
or bucket truck.
Department: Transportation
Location: I-90 in Erie County; I-79 in Crawford and Mercer Counties and I-80
in Mercer and Venango Counties
Duration: 12 months
Contact: Cindy Smith, (814) 437-4213
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010 315 Provide electrical services at 9 interstate safety rest areas in northwestern
PA. Work consists of servicing, maintaining, repairing, and replacing switches, electric
lines, various fixtures, area luminaries, motors, hand dryers, heaters and other
electrical work typical to safety rest areas. The following equipment may be required:
backhoe, 8 ditch digger, 50 crane or bucket truck.
Department: Transportation
Location: Engineering District 1-0: I-90 in Erie County; I-79 in Crawford and
Mercer Counties and I-80 in Mercer and Venango Counties
Duration: 12 months
Contact: Cindy Smith, (814) 437-4213
9701 Calibration of B.I.F. Control Board for sewage plant. Proof of site visit required to
accompany bid.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Clarks Summit State Hospital, 1451 Hillside Drive, Clarks Summit,
Lackawanna County, PA 18411-9505
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 2000
Contact: Stanley Rygelski, Purchasing Agent, (717) 587-7291
9702 Calibration of Hagen Control Board for power plant. Proof of site visit required to
accompany bid.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Clarks Summit State Hospital, 1451 Hillside Drive, Clarks Summit,
Lackawanna County, PA 18411-9505
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 2000
Contact: Stanley Rygelski, Purchasing Agent, (717) 587-7291
9703 Refrigeration and air conditioning service. Proof of site visit required to
accompany bid.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Clarks Summit State Hospital, 1451 Hillside Drive, Clarks Summit,
Lackawanna County, PA 18411-9505
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 1998
Contact: Stanley Rygelski, Purchasing Agent, (717) 587-7291
Project No. 9750 Electrical upgrade.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 1501 Allen Street, Allentown, Lehigh County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
403367 Maintenance of gas fired heating system.
Department: Transportation
Location: 101 Bennett Avenue, Milford, PA 18337
Duration: 08/29/97—08/28/00
Contact: Chuck Johnson, (717) 296-7193
320-297957 Provide HVAC maintenance service for this facility. This service will begin
6/1/97 and end on 6/30/2000. Additional information is available by contacting this
agency.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PA Soldiers and Sailors Home, 560 East 3rd Street, P. O. Box 6239,
Erie, PA 16512-6239
Duration: July 1, 1997 through June 30, 2000
Contact: Jeanette Gualtieri, (814) 878-4930
Contract No. FDC-213-191 All electrical work associated with a new park office at
Raccoon Creek State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Hanover Township, Beaver County, PA
Duration: 180 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
Contract No. FDC-213-192 All HVAC and plumbing work associated with a new park
office at Raccoon Creek State Park.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Hanover Township, Beaver County, PA
Duration: 180 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
JC-05-97 Provide plumbing services, as needed, at the Easton Job Center. Services to
be available on a 24 hour basis. Any materials furnished to be of first quality.
Materials and parts to be at contractor’s cost plus no more than ten percent. This is a
two year contract.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Job Center Field Operations, Easton Job Center, 220 Ferry Street,
Easton, Northampton County, PA 18042
Duration: 10/1/97 to 9/30/99
Contact: Mary A. Hallahan, Manager, (610) 250-1708
JC-06-97 Provide heating and air conditioning repairs and services to the Easton Job
Center. Services are to be available on a twenty-four hour basis. Any materials
furnished to be of first quality. Materials and parts to be at contractor’s cost plus no
more than ten percent. This is a two year contract.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Job Center Field Operations, Easton Job Center, 220 Ferry Street,
Easton, Northampton County, PA 18042
Duration: 10/1/97 to 9/30/99
Contact: Mary A. Hallahan, Manager, (610) 250-1708
JC-07-97 Provide electrical services to the Easton Job Center. Services to be available
on a 24 hour basis. Any materials furnished to be of first quality. Premises to be
inspected on a quarterly basis to determine if fluorescent light bulbs need to be
replaced. Materials and parts to be at contractor’s cost plus no more than ten percent.
This is a two year contract.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Job Center Field Operations, Easton Job Center, 220 Ferry Street,
Easton, Northampton County, PA 18042
Duration: 10/1/97 to 9/30/99
Contact: Mary A. Hallahan, Manager, (610) 250-1708
SP-336309 Furnish all labor, supervision, materials, equipment and services required
to remove six (6) existing circuit breaker panels in the Northwest Office Building and
install new buss bars, circuit breakers, and new panel covers.
Department: Liquor Control Board
Location: Harrisburg, PA
Duration: Upon final approval—60 days
Contact: Debra L. Brinser, (717) 772-2043
Janitorial Services—23
400000-7200 To provide janitorial services, twice weekly, at the Department of
Transportation’s DuBois Driver Exam Site to include emptying waste baskets,
sweeping and mopping all tile floors or vacuuming carpets, washing walls, dusting
furniture, washing windows inside and outside, plus semi-annual house cleaning.
Requests for bid packages should be faxed to (717) 787-0462.
Department: Transportation
Location: DuBois Driver Exam Site, Brockway, PA 15824
Duration: 4-21-97 to 4-20-98
Contact: Dennis Kissinger, (717) 783-8782
FM-28 Furnish all labor, materials equipment and materials to perform janitorial
services including empty waste baskets, clean lavatories, sweep floors, machine buff
tile floors, vacuum carpets, dust furniture, general housecleaning twice a year and
shampoo carpets at the DuBois Station, 101 Preston Way, Falls Creek, PA 15840.
Detailed work schedule and bid must be obtained from the Facility Management
Division, (717) 783-5484.
Department: State Police
Location: Facility Management Division, DuBois Station, 101 Preston Way,
Falls Creek, PA 15840
Duration: 07/01/97 to 06/30/00
Contact: Deshawn Lewis or Joan Berkoski, (717) 783-5484
Lodging/Meeting Facilities—27
CMTW98 Meeting room for approximately 190 classrooms with 7 breakout rooms for
25 each from 7:00 a.m. January 28 through 1:00 p.m. January 30, 1998. 160 single
lodging rooms required January 27, 28, and 29, 1998. 3 breakfasts and 2 lunches with
associated breaks required. Facility must be identified with the State College Boro
area. Bid forms may be obtained from David Mays (717) 783-3647 and submitted to:
Transportation University, 555 Walnut Street, 9th Floor, Harrisburg, PA 17101 by
11:00 a.m. March 31, 1997 for consideration. Videoconferencing equipment will be
required.
Department: Transportation
Location: Construction, State College Meeting/Lodging Facility
Duration: January 27—30, 1998
Contact: David Mays, Trans University, (717) 783-3647
OVR-1-97 Facility needed for 1-day meeting on October 3, 1997, to hold 44th Annual
Governor’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities conference. Services
needed include meeting space for 300 people, soda/coffee breaks, reception room,
luncheon, and audio/visual equipment. Overnight accommodations will be needed for
the night of October 2, 1997, for approximately 60 people. Bid specifications will be
sent to interested parties. Facility must be accessible to persons with disabilities in
accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Within 30 miles of GCEPD Headquarters (Labor and Industry
Building), Harrisburg, PA
Duration: October 2, 1997—October 3, 1997
Contact: Sandy Pace, (717) 787-8504
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Medical Services—29
136 Autopsy services. Contractual arrangement for anatomical pathology service.
Estimate: 20 deaths/year.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Polk Center, Polk, Venango County, PA 16342
Duration: 5/1/97—4/30/00
Contact: Patty Frank, (814) 432-0397
Inquiry No. 7448 Physical therapy service.
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Danville State Hospital, Danville, PA 17821-0700
Duration: 7/1/97—6/30/98
Contact: Pamela Bauman, Purchasing Agent, (717) 275-7412
BOWC 01-97 Consultant to prepare medical access studies for the years 1996-1999 as
required under Workers’ Compensation Act.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 1171 South Cameron Street,
Harrisburg, PA
Duration: 07-01-97—06/30/00
Contact: David Weyl, (717) 783-5421
Photography Services—32
SP 323059 Provide aircraft and pilots to obtain aerial photography over various areas
of Pennsylvania. Five contracts will result from this bid based on the point of
departure.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Bureau of Forestry, various locations in Pennsylvania
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/99 w/one year renewable option
Contact: Cory Gaiski, (717) 783-0760
Property Maintenance—33
Project No. 9743 Roof repairs.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 747 West Main Street, Plymouth, Luzerne County,
PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9745 Fence repair/replacement.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 280 Market St., Luzerne County, Wilkes-Barre, PA
County, PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 9746 Exterior painting.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 515 E. Samuels Ave., Luzerne County, Hazleton,
PA
Duration: 1 March 97—30 September 97
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
814174 Replace glass monitor walls (skylights) in the Hangar Number 28 at the
Harrisburg International Airport, Middletown, Dauphin County, PA 17057.
Department: Transportation
Location: Aviation, Hangar Number 28, Harrisburg International Airport,
Middletown, Dauphin County, PA 17057
Duration: Anticipated May 1, 1997—June 30, 1997
Contact: Curt Summers, (717) 705-1239
090-000215 Roadside mowing: Cambria County (T. R. 219 and ten (10) interchanges,
two (2) guaranteed mowing cycles and one (1) optional cycle per year, 169.0 acres per
cycle.
Department: Transportation
Location: Maintenance District 9-3, Cambria County, T. R. 219 and ten (10)
Interchanges
Duration: 7/1/97—6/30/98
Contact: Joe Demko, 9-0 Roadside Specialist, (814) 940-5151
090-000216 Herbicide Spraying: provide professional herbicide application complement
for the period July 1997 through June 1999 (2 years). Estimated total hours: 1500
(yearly estimate: Blair County 350, Cambria County 400). Must provide applicator and
licensing record form, pesticide application business license, and vehicle registration of
spray truck with bid.
Department: Transportation
Location: District 9-0 Throughout Blair and Cambria Counties as directed
Duration: July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1999 (2 years)
Contact: Joe Demko, 9-0 Roadside Specialist, (814) 940-5151
090-000217 Herbicide Spraying: provide professional herbicide application complement
for use throughout Bedford and Somerset Counties for the period August 1997 through
July 1999 (2 years). Estimated total hours: 1500 (yearly estimate: Bedford County 350,
Somerset County 400). Must provide applicator and licensing record form, pesticide
application business license, and vehicle registration of spray truck with bid.
Department: Transportation
Location: District 9-0 Throughout Bedford and Somerset Counties as directed
Duration: August 1, 1997 to July 31, 1999 (2 years)
Contact: Joe Demko, 9-0 Roadside Specialist, (814) 940-5151
Contract No. FDC-213-211 Carpentry, painting and staining, insulating, drywalling,
installing a countertop, concrete and masonry work. Basically finishing a new Park
Office at Raccoon Creek State Park. Most materials will be supplied by the
Department.
Department: Conservation and Natural Resources
Location: Hanover Township, Beaver County, PA
Duration: 180 days
Contact: Construction Management Section, (717) 787-5055
FM-27 Furnish all labor, material, and equipment required to cut, trim, fertilize, weed
and maintain grass areas, including vegetation control. Vendor will supply all
necessary equipment to perform services and remove from premises all clippings,
trimmings and debris from the Kiski Valley Station, 471, Route 66, Apollo, PA 15613.
Detailed work schedule and bid must be obtained from Facility Management Division,
(717) 783-5484.
Department: State Police
Location: Facility Management Division, Kiski Valley Station, 471, Route 66,
Apollo, PA 15613
Duration: 07/01/97 to 06/30/00
Contact: Deshawn Lewis or Joan Berkoski, (717) 783-5484
Inquiry No. FM 08789602 Replace storm drain line—Sleighter Hall. (Approximately
500 feet).
Department: Public Welfare
Location: Laurelton Center, Laurelton, Union County, PA 17835-0300
Duration: April 15, 1997 to June 30, 1997
Contact: Arletta K. Ney, Purchasing Agent, (717) 372-5070
JC-03-97 Landscaping services to be provided ten times a year at the Easton Job
Center. In April, provide spring cleaning of grounds. Services to be provided on a
bimonthly basis in June, July, August, September, and October. This is a two year
contract.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: J.C.F.O., Easton Job Center, 220 Ferry Street, Easton, Northampton
County, PA 18042
Duration: 04/01/98 through 10/31/99
Contact: Mary A. Hallahan, Manager, (610) 250-1708
JC-04-97 Snow/ice removal service for the Easton Job Center on an as-needed basis.
Snow/ice removal to be provided for the parking lot and sidewalks. Service to include
spreading of anti-skid materials, which is to be included in the price quote. Weekend
work may be necessary in the event of heavy snowfalls on weekends and holidays. This
is a two year contract.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: Job Center Field Operations, Easton Job Center, 220 Ferry Street,
Easton, Northampton County, PA 18042
Duration: 10/01/97 through 04/30/99
Contact: Mary A. Hallahan, Manager, (610) 250-1708
KU97-17 Kutztown University is seeking contractors interested in bidding on the
Painting of Johnson Hall. This project consists of the preparation of all surfaces to be
painted, the application of a professional paint covering, and the clean up of all work
areas. The contractor shall furnish all labor, supervision, equipment, materials and
insurance to complete the project. Bid packages will be available March 17, 1997 for a
non-refundable fee of $10.00. Checks shall be made out to: Kutztown University; and
mailed to: Kutztown University, Attn: G. Frankhouser, Purchasing Department, P. O.
Box 730, Kutztown, PA 19530. There will be a pre-bid meeting on March 26, 1997 at
10:00 a.m. Though not required, attendance is highly suggested. Bids are due on April
4, 1997 no later than 2:00 p.m. Late submissions will be returned unopened. Bids will
be opened on April 7, 1997 at 2:00 p.m.
Department: State System of Higher Education
Location: Kutztown University, Kutztown, PA 19530
Duration: Total of 50 working days
Contact: G. Frankhouser, Purchasing Agent, (610) 683-4663
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Railroad/Airline Related Services—34
10-97-02 Repair and overhaul of instruments and accessories, and exchange of
instruments/accessories used in the helicopters owned and operated by the Pennsylva-
nia State Police. Vendor must be an authorized instrument repair station under F.A.A.
regulations, holding Class 1, 2, 3, 4 and a Class 3 accessory rating. Vendor must have
overhaul facilities. Detailed bid specifications must be obtained from the Procurement
and Supply Division at (717) 783-5485.
Department: State Police
Location: 575 Airport Drive, New Cumberland, PA 17070
Duration: 7-1-97 through 6-30-99
Contact: Margaret Chapman, P&S Division, (717) 783-5485
Real Estate Services—35
968A Sale of State owned property Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Department
of General Services will accept sealed bids for the purchase of a 14.9 acre parcel of the
New Castle Youth Development Center located in New Castle, PA. Interested bidders
should contact Lloyd Colegrove at (717) 772-0538 or FAX (717) 783-7127. Solicitation
968. Requests for information and bidding packages are due by April 8, 1997.
Department: General Services
Location: Real Estate, 505 North Office Building, Harrisburg, PA 17125
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Lloyd D. Colegrove, (717) 772-0538
973A LEASE OFFICE SPACE TO THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Proposals are invited to provide the Department of Public Welfare with 8,688 useable
square feet of new or existing office space, with minimum parking for sixteen (16)
vehicles, within the Borough of Gettysburg, Adams County, PA. In areas where street
or public parking is not available, an additional thirty (30) parking spaces are
required. Proposals due: May 5, 1997. Solicitation No.: 99969.
Department: General Services
Location: Real Estate, 505 North Office Building, Harrisburg, PA 17125
Duration: Indeterminate 1996-97
Contact: Doris Deckman or Cynthia T. Lentz, (717) 787-4394
Sanitation—36
Project No. 400 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—6 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 327 Frankstown Road, Altoona, Blair County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 401 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a semi-weekly basis. Trash
will be in 3—6 cubic yard containers.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 14th and Calder Streets, Harrisburg, Dauphin
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 402 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 4—32 gallon containers.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 515 East Samuels Avenue, Hazleton, Luzerne
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 403 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a semi-weekly basis. Trash
will be in 1—4 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 621 Wayne Avenue, Indiana, Indiana County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 404 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—6 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 447 Airport Road, Johnstown, Cambria County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 405 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—6 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 565 Walters Avenue, Johnstown, Cambria County,
PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 406 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—6 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 438 North Queen Street, Lancaster, Lancaster
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 407 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—8 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 1000 East Cumberland Street, Lebanon, Lebanon
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 408 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—4 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, 580 US Route 15 South, Lewisburg, Union County,
PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
Project No. 409 Remove trash and refuse from armory on a weekly basis. Trash will
be in 1—3 cubic yard container.
Department: Military and Veterans Affairs
Location: PAARNG Armory, P. O. Box 510, R. D. 1, Lock Haven, Clinton
County, PA
Duration: 1 July 97—30 June 2000
Contact: Emma Schroff, (717) 861-8518
03070225010 Trash and garbage removal as follows: placement of seven (7) 1 1/2—2
yard stationary plastic covered, freshly painted containers located in designated areas
of the Park. Scheduled pick ups: each Tuesday and Friday: July, August, September,
May, June. Each Friday: October, November, December, January, February, March and
April for the years 97/98, 98/99, 99/2000.
Department: Historical and Museum Commission
Location: Brandywine Battlefield Park, U. S. Route 1, Chadds Ford, PA 19317
Duration: 7/1/97—6/30/2000
Contact: Toni E. Collins, (610) 459-3342
0440-009289 Provide 6 cubic yard dumpster and empty weekly.
Department: Transportation
Location: 101 Bennett Avenue, Milford, PA 18337
Duration: 07/01/97—06/30/00
Contact: Chuck Johnson, (717) 296-7193
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Security Services—37
SP 299870 Security coverage, 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., seven days a week at three
Commission facilities; Walnut Creek Marina, Fairview Township, Erie County; North-
east Marina, Northeast Township, Erie County; Frankford Arsenal Access Area,
Philadelphia City, on Talcony Street.
Department: Fish and Boat Commission
Location: See Above
Duration: 4/1/97 to 12/31/97
Contact: Mike Roush, (814) 725-8244
Vehicle, Heavy Equipment and Powered
Machinery Services—38
0800-TSBM-01-97-00 The PA Department of Transportation intends to rent the
following described equipment: 4 (four) Turbo Blast Machines. Referenced models are
4000 and 5000 manufactured by Dickson Industries. An equal model size or greater by
this manufacturer or other manufacturer and being a functional equivalent will be
accepted. The Lessor will be required to supply sufficient and competent operator(s) for
the machine(s).
Department: Transportation
Location: The following District 8-0 Counties: Adams, Cumberland, Franklin,
York, Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon and Perry
Duration: May 15, 1997 to May 14, 2000
Contact: R. A. Wiest, (717) 783-0443
Miscellaneous—39
814172 Provide labor, equipment, and materials necessary to remove existing sewage
pumps and related parts and replace existing pumps with two (2) flush kleen pumps at
Building Number 272, at the Harrisburg International Airport, Dauphin County,
Middletown, PA 17057.
Department: Transportation
Location: Aviation, Building 272, Harrisburg International Airport, Middle-
town, Dauphin County, PA 17057
Duration: Anticipated May 1, 1997—July 31, 1997
Contact: Curt Summers, (717) 705-1236
814173 Furnish all materials, parts, tools, equipment, and labor to remove and dispose
of the existing shredder and related components and install new shredder and related
components, at the sewage treatment facility, at the Harrisburg International Airport,
Middletown, Dauphin County, PA 17057.
Department: Transportation
Location: Aviation, Sewage Treatment Facility, Harrisburg International Air-
port, Middletown, Dauphin County, PA 17057
Duration: Anticipated May 1, 1997—June 30, 1997
Contact: Curt Summers, (717) 705-1236
8000-C Provide Chaplaincy services for inmates of the Protestant faith at the State
Correctional Institution at Waynesburg. Approximately twenty (20) hours per week.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution at Waynesburg, R. D. 1, Box 67,
Waynesburg, PA 15370
Duration: 7/1/97 through 6/30/99
Contact: Judith Cook, Purchasing Agent, (412) 852-5609
L&I-4-97 Maintenance: onsite maintenance on one (1) Xerox 1090 copier with the
following features: finisher, offset stacker and reduction/enlarger. Estimated 60,000
copies per month.
Department: Labor and Industry
Location: PA Labor Relations Board and Labor and Industry Office of Chief
Counsel, Room 1605 Labor and Industry Building, 7th and Forster
Streets, Harrisburg, Dauphin County, PA 17120
Duration: 7/1/97—6/30/99 (two year contract)
Contact: Donna A. Sodrosky, Procurement Manager, (717) 787-2560
RFP-970211 Provide consolidation and transportation services of PLCB regular
merchandise from vendors/locations in New York/New Jersey to PLCB Distribution
Centers in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Taylor, Pennsylvania.
Department: Liquor Control Board
Location: New York/New Jersey to Distribution Centers in Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh and Taylor, PA
Duration: One year with four one year options
Contact: Nelson A. McCormick II, (717) 787-9851
T35578 The State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh requests proposals for a
Chaplain to provide 24 hours per week Chaplaincy services for the inmates of the
Protestant Faith. Selection of vendor will be based on the following factors: 1.
Correctional experience; 2. Response to a corrections scenario; 3. Contract amount; 4.
Training and Theology. Interested vendors can call Father Salberg at (412) 761-1955,
ext. 352 for additional information.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, 3001 Beaver Avenue,
P. O. Box 99901, Pittsburgh, PA 15233
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 2000
Contact: Ronald J. Dudek, Purchasing Agent, (412) 761-1955, ext. 212
T35579 The State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh requests proposals for
Coordinator of Native American Religious Cultural Programs, approximately 4 hours
per week. Selection of vendor will be based on the following factors: 1. Correctional
experience; 2. Response to a corrections scenario; 3. Contract amount; 4. Training and
Theology. Interested vendors can call Father Salberg at (412) 761-1955, ext. 352 for
additional information.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, 3001 Beaver Avenue,
P. O. Box 99901, Pittsburgh, PA 15233
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 2000
Contact: Ronald J. Dudek, Purchasing Agent, (412) 761-1955, ext. 212
T35580 The State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh requests proposals for
Chaplaincy Service to provide 3 hours per week for inmates of Islamic Jumma faith.
Selection of vendor will be based on the following factors: 1. Correctional experience; 2.
Response to a corrections scenario; 3. Contract amount; 4. Training and Theology.
Interested vendors can call Father Salberg at (412) 761-1955, ext. 352 for additional
information.
Department: Corrections
Location: State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, 3001 Beaver Avenue,
P. O. Box 99901, Pittsburgh, PA 15233
Duration: July 01, 1997 to June 30, 2000
Contact: Ronald J. Dudek, Purchasing Agent, (412) 761-1955, ext. 212
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DESCRIPTION OF LEGEND
1 Advertising, Public Relations, Promotional
Materials
2 Agricultural Services, Livestock, Equipment,
Supplies & Repairs: Farming Equipment
Rental & Repair, Crop Harvesting & Dusting,
Animal Feed, etc.
3 Auctioneer Services
4 Audio/Video, Telecommunications Services,
Equipment Rental & Repair
5 Barber/Cosmetology Services & Equipment
6 Cartography Services
7 Child Care
8 Computer Related Services & Equipment
Repair: Equipment Rental/Lease,
Programming, Data Entry, Payroll Services,
Consulting
9 Construction & Construction Maintenance:
Buildings, Highways, Roads, Asphalt Paving,
Bridges, Culverts, Welding, Resurfacing, etc.
10 Court Reporting & Stenography Services
11 Demolition—Structural Only
12 Drafting & Design Services
13 Elevator Maintenance
14 Engineering Services & Consultation:
Geologic, Civil, Mechanical, Electrical, Solar
& Surveying
15 Environmental Maintenance Services: Well
Drilling, Mine Reclamation, Core &
Exploratory Drilling, Stream Rehabilitation
Projects and Installation Services
16 Extermination Services
17 Financial & Insurance Consulting & Services
18 Firefighting Services
19 Food
20 Fuel Related Services, Equipment &
Maintenance to Include Weighing Station
Equipment, Underground & Above Storage
Tanks
21 Hazardous Material Services: Abatement,
Disposal, Removal, Transportation &
Consultation
22 Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning,
Electrical, Plumbing, Refrigeration Services,
Equipment Rental & Repair
23 Janitorial Services & Supply Rental: Interior
24 Laboratory Services, Maintenance &
Consulting
25 Laundry/Dry Cleaning & Linen/Uniform
Rental
26 Legal Services & Consultation
27 Lodging/Meeting Facilities
28 Mailing Services
29 Medical Services, Equipment Rental and
Repairs & Consultation
30 Moving Services
31 Personnel, Temporary
32 Photography Services (includes aerial)
33 Property Maintenance &
Renovation—Interior & Exterior: Painting,
Restoration, Carpentry Services, Snow
Removal, General Landscaping (Mowing, Tree
Pruning & Planting, etc.)
34 Railroad/Airline Related Services, Equipment
& Repair
35 Real Estate Services—Appraisals & Rentals
36 Sanitation—Non-Hazardous Removal,
Disposal & Transportation (Includes
Chemical Toilets)
37 Security Services & Equipment—Armed
Guards, Investigative Services & Security
Systems
38 Vehicle, Heavy Equipment & Powered
Machinery Services, Maintenance, Rental,
Repair & Renovation (Includes ADA
Improvements)
39 Miscellaneous: This category is intended for
listing all bids, announcements not applicable
to the above categories
GARY E. CROWELL,
Secretary
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Contract Awards
The following awards have been made by the Depart-
ment of General Services, Bureau of Purchases:
Requisition
or
Contract #
Awarded
On To
In the
Amount Of
0045-07 03/15/97 Standard Reg-
ister Co.
25,000.00
0045-07 03/15/97 Moore Bus.
Forms and
Systems,
Inc.
40,000.00
0045-07 03/15/97 Digital-L-Ink 35,000.00
0045-07 03/15/97 American
Business
Printing,
Inc.
50,000.00
0045-07 03/15/97 Eagle Progres-
sive
150,000.00
0045-07 03/15/97 Phoenix Data,
Inc.
75,000.00
1354116-01 02/27/97 Diottavio &
Son, Inc.
67,500.00
1378156-01 02/27/97 Hesco 14,489.64
1473236-01 02/26/97 Starr Uniform 52,013.30
1513226-01 02/27/97 Regester
Chevrolet,
Inc.
83,992.00
1513226-02 02/27/97 Winner Group,
Inc.
15,649.00
1514206-01 02/27/97 PA Police Sup-
ply
13,095.00
1517206-01 02/27/97 Turnbow Trail-
ers, Inc.
45,660.00
1534116-01 02/27/97 Quanta
Secursystems,
Inc.
16,962.00
1539356-01 02/27/97 Xontech, Inc. 21,840.00
1548216-01 03/03/97 Griffin Motor
Co.
19,214.00
1561116-01 02/27/97 Agway, Inc.
Crop Ser-
vices
34,254.60
Requisition
or
Contract #
Awarded
On To
In the
Amount Of
1573116-01 02/27/97 Nichols Alumi-
num Daven-
port
57,465.60
1577206-01 02/27/97 NEI, Inc. 1,279.00
1608206-01 02/27/97 Cardels 3,260.80
1609206-01 02/27/97 Keener Mfg.
Co.
1,527.00
1611236-01 02/27/97 Five Thousand
Forms
44,000.00
1620216-01 02/27/97 Medical Surgi-
cal Center
14,466.50
1701156-01 02/27/97 Cleveland
Brothers
15,712.00
1719216-01 02/27/97 American Coal
and Miner-
als Co.
25,915.83
1726116-01 02/27/97 Old Country
Millworks,
Inc.
77,272.78
1771156-01 03/03/97 Nurenberb
Photomechanix,
Inc.
19,065.00
1772156-01 03/03/97 Loersch Corp. 12,201.94
8135-01 03/15/97 Interstate
Container
Corp.
402,532.00
8193020-01 02/27/97 Carl
Drolsbaugh
4,936.50
8206020-01 03/03/97 Umbergers of
Fontanna,
Inc.
10,745.00
8217140-01 02/27/97 Hesco 16,066.62
GARY E. CROWELL,
Secretary
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